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Abstract
This thesis does three things. It describes and analyses the progress of environmental 
politics in the Antarctic. In doing so, it contributes to a wider research agenda on the 
environment as an issue in international relations. Finally, it explores questions in 
international relations theory about the nature of cooperation and change in the 
international system.
The case study of environmental politics in the Antarctic Treaty system focusses 
attention on the systemic issues of the adequacy of interstate practices on the 
management of the environment, the need for new thinking on international cooperation 
and the role of non-state actors (particularly environmental organisations and the 
scientific community).
Traditional realist theory, with its state-centric assumptions, is poorly placed to generate 
propositions which enable these major themes to be investigated. This thesis therefore 
employs an analytical framework grounded in the liberal institutionalist tradition of 
international relations theory.
This thesis argues that two dimensions of a regime are important in judging the 
adequacy of state practice on environmental issues: the prevailing hierarchy of values 
on security and the environment and the relative weight given to sovereignty or 
interdependence norms.
The Antarctic regime, based on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, was constructed as a 
security regime to avoid conflict over competing territorial claims and to avoid tension 
between the superpowers in the Antarctic. Yet it was increasingly required to function 
as an environmental protection regime - a purpose for which it was not designed.
The hierarchy of values in this regime privileged political (and security) concerns over 
environmental ones. Sovereignty norms dominated. Thus the process of decision­
making on environmental issues was, in the final analysis, flawed. The network of 
environmental rules and procedures adopted was ad hoc, disaggregated and increasingly 
unwieldy. Implementation of those rules was poorly monitored.
The increasing asymmetry between the normative political values of the Treaty system 
and the demands for comprehensive environmental protection were most in evidence in 
the debates surrounding minerals activity in the Antarctic. The particular focus of the 
case study, in its examination of environmental politics in the Antarctic, is the
ii
negotiation and subsequent overturning of the Minerals Convention and the negotiation 
of a qualitatively different agreement in the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.
This process of radical change can be analysed in the context of a reordering of the 
hierarchy of values and a move away from sovereignty norms towards interdependence 
norms. Non-governmental environmental organisations are a key dimension in 
mobilising this change. Because they focus critical attention on inter-state 
environmental practice and, in doing so, bring new values and ideas to the debate, their 
role needs to find an appropriate place both in the empirical analysis of the Antarctic 
regime, and in the wider theories of regime-making and change in international 
relations.
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1Introduction
THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE CONTEXT
AND THE ISSUES
This thesis does three things. It tells a story about environmental politics in the 
Antarctic. In doing so, it contributes to a wider research agenda on the environment as 
an issue in international relations. Finally, it explores questions in international 
relations theory about the nature of cooperation and change in the international system.
To set the Antarctic issue in its appropriate context, I go first in this introduction to a 
discussion of the place of environmental issues on the international agenda.
The environment in international politics
The debate on environmental issues has become in the 1980s an integral part of the 
agenda of international politics and is therefore an important subject for students of 
international relations. Environmental degradation, and the need for environmental 
protection and management, is no longer a soft issue on the fringes of international 
politics or the province only of the environmentalist lobbies. The environment is also 
no longer simply a national issue. It now has transboundary implications and, in an 
increasing number of cases, global impact. Issues such as air and water pollution, 
ozone depletion, acid rain, climate change, disposal of nuclear waste and loss of 
biodiversity now have an impact upon international economic and possibly even 
security relationships.1 The environment also raises questions about how best to 
manage human activity in an ecologically sustainable way to minimise further 
disruption to the physical fabric of the planet, and to deal with the degradation that has 
already taken place.2
As environmental issues have moved up the hierarchy of the international agenda, a 
central question has arisen as to whether these issues can be managed in the ways that 
other international issues, for example international trade, are managed, or whether the
1. Problems of environmental degradation and unsustainable use of resources (such as forest 
resources) particularly in developing countries, are related to the development debate, the 
relationship between rich and poor countries, and the difficulty of international debt The 
conduct of practices argued to be environmentally unsound has led to calls for restrictions on 
international trade in certain commodities such as rain-forest timber. The potential for conflict 
over scarce resources such as water or arable land, which may be the result of environmentally 
unsound practices, which may in turn be related to problems of poverty, cannot be ignored. The 
number of environmental refugees, now thought to number in the millions, is another aspect of 
the international environmental debate which relates directly to questions of welfare, 
international aid and development.
2. The concept of ecological sustainability is, of course, a contested one.
2nature of these environmental issues is such as to require new approaches to global 
cooperation and decision-making.
It is clear already that there are some features of the debate on environmental issues that 
serve to distinguish it from the way decisions are made on other core issues like security 
and international economics. We can turn here to consider the role of states, the role of 
non-govemmental organisations and the role of the scientific community.
With respect to the role of states, there is now a groundswell of argument among 
environmentalists, academics and, increasingly, those involved in international policy­
making on these issues, that the state-centric practices of international politics may no 
longer be adequate to meet the task of managing transboundary environmental issues 
and may even act as critical impediments to dealing constructively with these issues.
Competing national interests and the practice of sovereignty are seen as standing in the 
way of a recognition of common global interests. They are thus argued to form the 
main barriers to the emergence of effective centralised decision-making institutions on 
the environment. Rather than the lowest common denominator level of cooperation 
which usually characterises international decision-making among states, new 
international norms and values are required to encourage a cooperative internationalism. 
These norms and values would emphasise shared and common interests among states 
and peoples, the intrinsic value of the natural world, and the ethic of intergenerational 
equity. The first task of this thesis is to examine the role of states in managing 
environmental issues.
While environmental issues have raised these questions about state practices, they also 
require a rethinking of the role of non-state actors in international relations. 
International environmental politics has been characterised by the increasingly high 
profile of non-govemmental environmental and conservation organisations. As 
environmental protection has taken on an international dimension, so too has the 
environmental movement established transnational coalitions and international 
organisations. NGOs have sought to reform the practice of states on environmental 
protection by working to improve the accountability and transparency of state practice. 
They have identified threats to the environment and drawn attention to breaches of 
existing rules. They have monitored intergovernmental negotiations, lobbied decision­
makers, and sought to inform the public of inter-state practice and process on 
environmental issues. NGOs have established themselves as a vanguard in advancing 
new ideas and propositions about protecting the environment and in reassessing the 
interaction between the human and natural worlds. They have also moved from the 
margins of the policy debate to occupy a central position within it. A further task of this
3thesis is to examine the impact of these political groups on state dominated decision­
making on environmental issues.
Along with the arguments about state practice and the role of non-governmental actors, 
a third distinguishing feature of the environment in international politics is the role of 
scientific knowledge and the scientific community. The scientific community and the 
knowledge it produces are ambivalent quantities in the debates about the environment. 
Scientific knowledge is crucial to understanding the nature of environmental problems 
and to the search for solutions. However, scientific knowledge can also be a site of 
conflict. Political debates over meaning and about scientific uncertainty are often used 
as a justification for little or no action. The scientific community is, in effect, a shadow 
actor in this: it presents the data and draw the conclusions for policy while generally 
asserting that its role is non-political and disinterested. In fact, the scientific community 
has its own interests to prosecute and thus functions as an interested actor in the policy 
debates. Another task of this thesis is to examine the role of the scientific community 
and scientific knowledge in environmental debates.
This thesis also raises questions of theoretical significance in the study of international 
relations. Does the literature of international relations theory provide a good guide to 
our understanding of cooperative endeavours on the environment among states? What 
views do international relations scholars hold on the potential for change in state 
practice and in the international system on environmental issues. Does the literature 
account adequately for the role of non-state actors (both environmental NGOs and the 
scientific community) in international environmental politics? To what extent does the 
literature examine and account for the impact of new ideas, values and knowledge on 
the agenda of inter-state diplomacy (and the practice of states) with respect to 
environmental issues?
The study of environmental decision-making on the Antarctic, which is the core of this 
thesis, is actually a case study of these larger questions of states and non-governmental 
actors in the international system. This case study focuses on these systemic issues of 
the adequacy of interstate practices on the environment, the need for new thinking on 
international cooperation, the role of non-state actors, particularly environmental 
organisations and the scientific community, and the impact of scientific knowledge.
The Antarctic
The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in 1959 to prevent interstate conflict over 
competing territorial claims in the Antarctic, and to avoid superpower tensions.3
3. The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated by the twelve countries which had participated in Antarctic 
research during the International Geophysical Year (1957-58), many of whom had long
4Environmental protection is barely mentioned in the Treaty except for a reference to the 
conservation of living resources. The Treaty contains no statement of objectives or 
principles on environmental protection. This is not altogether surprising given the 
Treaty’s purpose and the time of its negotiation. In spite of this lack of attention, 
environmental issues have become the dominant focus of decision-making under the 
Treaty. Thus a regime negotiated to offset security conflict has been required to 
function as an environmental regime when it was not designed for that purpose. As we 
will see later in this thesis, this conflict of purpose lies at the heart of the Antarctic issue 
in international politics.
Well over half the recommendations adopted at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
(the primary mechanism for decision-making) have related either explicitly or implicitly 
to environmental protection and management. The environment agenda has expanded 
to encompass the development of a protected area system, conduct of scientific 
expeditions, marine pollution, the adverse effects of tourism and other non­
governmental activities, waste disposal, environmental impact assessment and the 
effects of mineral exploitation.
Yet, in spite of the growing complexity of, and linkages among these issues they have 
been addressed in an ad hoc, incremental fashion. This incremental approach evolved 
in part because of the way environmental issues came onto the Antarctic agenda - as 
separate and discrete concerns with little attention paid (in the 1960s and 1970s at least) 
to the connections between them. Political concerns were also an important factor. 
Once the Treaty was in force, the need to avoid disputes over competing interpretations 
of sovereign rights in the Antarctic ensured that protecting the political compromise 
between those states which claimed Antarctic territory and those which did not shaped 
the pattem of interstate cooperation in the Antarctic and became the determining factor 
in Antarctic decision-making. The mechanism for enforcing this compromise was the 
use of consensus decision-making and the mutual veto. In the hierarchy of values thus 
engendered, protection of the environment, while not ignored, was subordinated to these 
political interests.
This has resulted in an unwieldy and disparate collection of environmental measures. 
The Treaty parties did not seek to remedy the deficiencies in the Treaty by elaborating 
coherent principles and objectives on environmental protection. As with states in the 
international system generally, the Antarctic Treaty parties also exhibited a distinct
Antarctic histories. The twelve were Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, 
Norway, the United Kingdom (the seven states with territorial claims in the Antarctic), Belgium, 
Japan, South Africa, the United States and the Soviet Union. The claims of Argentina, Chile and 
the United Kingdom overlap significantly. See chapter two for detail on this.
5reluctance to adopt environmental compliance mechanisms, or to abridge their potential 
economic advantage in the interests of environmental protection.
There was little criticism of this process and its outcomes in the 1960s and 1970s. In 
the 1980s, however, the existing hierarchy of values, the incremental, ad hoc approach 
to environmental protection in the Antarctic and the record of implementation, was 
challenged by non-governmental environmental organisations. They argued that the 
environmental measures and practices adopted were inadequate, especially in the light 
of changing ideas about the importance of environmental protection and new 
knowledge about the Antarctic environment. Adequate environmental protection, 
NGOs argued, demanded better environmental management mechanisms for the 
Antarctic, improved compliance and the elaboration of comprehensive environmental 
principles. This required environmental values to be given priority over political ones.
In this way, states, non-governmental organisations and the scientific community 
became involved in a qualitatively different argument and power struggle over the 
environment in the Antarctic arena. It was the negotiations for a minerals regime which 
brought this power struggle onto the global public agenda.
The Antarctic Treaty states struggled for almost two decades to produce a regime to 
regulate Antarctic mineral exploitation which would reconcile competing assertions of 
national interest (territorial, economic and environmental). This was the internal 
accommodation. Non-governmental environmental organisations, nationally and 
internationally, were vocal in their opposition to the minerals negotiations. They called 
instead for a prohibition on minerals exploitation, for the Antarctic to be declared a 
World Park and for the parties to negotiate a comprehensive Treaty-based 
environmental protection regime for the continent. At the same time, NGOs also sought 
to ensure that if the minerals convention did eventuate, its rules were as 
environmentally sound as possible.4
The internal accommodation among the Treaty parties appeared to have been resolved 
by the adoption of the Antarctic Minerals Convention5 in June 1988. There was little 
external accommodation with the broad demands of the environmental groups and even 
less with the non-Treaty states. The internal compromise did not hold. The minerals 
regime was overturned. In an international political reversal the environmental values 
espoused by non-governmental organisations, and the practices they advocated as
4. Non-Treaty states also opposed the minerals negotiations, not on environmental grounds, but on 
the grounds that the Treaty "club" had no right to make decisions about a part of the world that 
was (as the non-Treaty states argued) a global commons.
In full, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) 
also sometimes called the Wellington Convention.
5.
6essential to protect the Antarctic environment, were incorporated to a significant degree 
in a new agreement within the Antarctic Treaty system6 - the Madrid Protocol of 1991.
How and why did this happen?
In May 1989 the then Prime Minister of Australia, Bob Hawke, announced that his 
government had decided not to sign the Antarctic Minerals Convention despite having 
participated in its negotiation and having agreed to its adoption. The Australian 
government, Hawke argued, recognised that the Convention did contain environmental 
protection measures. However, the view held in the 1970s that "mining in Antarctica 
could be consistent with the preservation of the continent’s fragile environment", he 
said, was now clearly incorrect and on these grounds the Minerals Convention was 
"basically flawed" (Hawke 1990a: 18). The effect of this decision, unless Australia 
could be persuaded to change its mind, was to scuttle the Convention.7
In an unlikely coalition with the French government,8 Australia urged its Antarctic 
Treaty partners to prohibit minerals activity and to negotiate a comprehensive 
environmental protection regime for the Antarctic which would establish the continent 
as a "Nature Reserve - Land of Science".
These unexpected, unilateral decisions, and the policy initiatives that derived from 
them, threw the Antarctic Treaty system into a turmoil. Cleaving to a consensus (in this 
case the Minerals Convention) was a fundamental norm of the Treaty system, and 
Australia and France had broken the rules by defection from this central norm. In doing 
so, their Treaty partners argued, they had threatened the stability of the Treaty system 
which had served the individual and collective interests of the Treaty signatories, in 
avoiding conflict over territorial claims, since 1961.
The initial response to the Australian/French initiative from other Treaty states was that 
a comprehensive agreement, and a ban on minerals activity, were not open to
6. The term is used to describe the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, and the various measures and other 
agreements that have been adopted under the auspices of that Treaty, including the 199 
Consultative Meeting recommendations, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 
the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the recently 
agreed Madrid Protocol which has not yet entered into force.
7. Without the ratifications of all seven states which claim territory in the Antarctic, of which 
Australia is one, as well as those of the United States and Soviet Union, the Minerals 
Convention could not enter into force.
8. Australia was strongly opposed to French nuclear testing in the Pacific and its political role in 
New Caledonia. France was also not noted for its environmental commitment in the Antarctic or 
in the region generally. The French Prime Minister, M Rocard, had announced in April that his 
government wanted to work for a renegotiation of the Minerals Convention, and expressed 
concern about its environmental provisions, especially in the light of the Exxon Valdez disaster 
in Prince William Sound.
7negotiation. Even those Treaty states which favoured improved environmental 
protection rules in Antarctica, and even a possible ban on mining, believed that the 
proposal was politically unachievable. Yet what was non-negotiable in May 1989 had, 
by October 1991, become a diplomatic reality in the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol).
These events within the Antarctic Treaty system in the late 1980s can be best explained 
by an inquiry into environmental decision-making and practice under the Antarctic 
Treaty since its entry into force in 1961. This task is the core of this thesis.
This case study of inter-state decision-making on environmental issues in the Antarctic 
Treaty system is an interesting story in its own right apart from its wider implications 
outlined above. It analyses an important piece of international diplomacy in both 
historical and contemporary terms, exposing the practices of states and the struggle to 
open decisions on Antarctic environmental issues to the wider values and influences of 
non-governmental groups.
The Antarctic has been "long neglected by the mainstream of international law and 
politics" (Joyner and Chopra 1988:1). There are few book length studies on the 
international politics of the Antarctic.9 Of these only one (in the English language at 
least) employs a theoretical framework drawn explicitly from the discipline of 
international relations.10 Beck (1987/88:159) has drawn attention to an "existing void 
in interpretations of Antarctica from the perspective of international relations ... theory". 
This thesis seeks to fill part of that void.
The story of the minerals regime and the Madrid Protocol has not yet been subject to 
critical analysis in the Antarctic literature. Neither has there been a detailed analysis of 
the history and politics of environmental issues within the Treaty system. This thesis is, 
therefore, a timely study which fills a gap in the literature on the politics of the 
Antarctic and on the Antarctic in the environmental politics literature.* 11
The thesis proceeds in the following way. Chapter one establishes the analytical 
framework for the study. It discusses those parts of the literature of international 
relations theory which have addressed questions relevant to the analytical concerns of
9. See, for example, Auburn (1982), Quigg (1983), Shapley (1985), Triggs (1986b), Beck (1986b) 
and Peterson (1988). The literature on the Antarctic is not extensively reviewed here. The 
argument o f the thesis responds to that literature where appropriate.
10. Peterson (1988).
11. The following chapter surveys the international relations literature relevant to this thesis. It does 
not survey the empirical literature on the Antarctic which, for the most part, lacks major political 
analytical works. The argument engages with that literature at relevant points in the thesis.
8this thesis. It considers first the debates about the potential for cooperation in the 
international system, and particularly the difficulties the broad realist tradition 
encounters in providing an adequate model of cooperation when environmental issues 
are the focus of study. I suggest that realist paradigms, in their propositions about 
interstate cooperation, provide little insight into questions of values, ideas and 
knowledge, or into the role of non-state actors. The theoretical framework of this thesis 
is therefore grounded in an exploration of those models, broadly termed liberal, which 
seek to incorporate these neglected factors into their explanations. These models seek 
to extend the state-centric approach of the realist school.
Chapter one argues that the literature on regimes and institutions particularly that work 
which addresses questions of how states ‘learn’, leadership, the function of knowledge 
and ideas, and the role of transnational epistemic communities, adds a new dimension to 
the study of international cooperation and change which is of particular relevance to the 
study of environmental issues. It also suggests that this literature still needs to pay 
greater attention to incorporating non-governmental organisations into the models of 
learning and change.
Chapter two introduces the Antarctic case study. Using the analytical framework 
developed in chapter one, it describes first the history of states’ attempts in the 1940s 
and 1950s to come to an agreement on the Antarctic. It then examines the political and 
legal aspects of the Antarctic Treaty identifying the individual and collective state 
interests involved. It explores how these influenced the Treaty’s normative framework, 
the rules and decision-making procedures developed, and the process of construction of 
the Antarctic regime.
In chapter three, I move to a consideration of how environmental issues have been 
addressed in the Antarctic regime described in chapter two. This chapter draws 
extensively on primary source material, much of which has become publicly available 
only recently. Chapter three analyses decision-making on a set of discrete 
environmental issues: the conservation of fauna and flora, protected areas, tourism and 
non-governmental expeditions, scientific research, waste disposal, and environmental 
impact assessment.
This chapter also identifies the actors influencing Antarctic decision-making, both at the 
formal level (the bureaucrats and scientists) and the informal level (non-governmental 
organisations and non-Treaty states). In this, the tensions between the internal 
accommodation and the external accommodation, which characterise the politics of the 
Treaty system, emerge.
9In chapter three I argue further that there was a process of incremental change in the 
scope and impact of recommendations adopted on the Antarctic environment before the 
disputes surrounding the minerals convention in the late 1980s. I argue that this 
incremental process of change became more pronounced in the 1980s and that it was in 
large part a response to external factors, particularly the activities, arguments and 
pressures of non-governmental organisations and to the raising of environmental issues 
in international institutions. Here also the question of changing values, the ‘learning’ 
process and the role of NGOs become important in the changing nature of 
environmental politics in the Antarctic.
Chapter four completes the story of the process of making environmental 
recommendations and agreements on the Antarctic before the major issue of minerals 
becomes the focus of Antarctic attention. This chapter examines the conventions on 
seals and marine living resources as both political and conservation agreements within 
the Antarctic regime.
Chapter five focuses on the specific question of minerals exploitation in the Antarctic. 
It is this issue, I argue, where the tensions between competing values on environmental 
protection within the Treaty system have been most pronounced. Those competing 
values are first the resource use/environmental protection dualism. There is also an 
increasing asymmetry between the normative political values of the Treaty system and 
the demands for comprehensive environmental protection which require a compromise 
of those political values. In this way, the Antarctic regime was increasingly unable to 
respond to changing knowledge and external demands.
In order to sustain this argument, chapter five traces the diplomatic negotiations on the 
minerals question from the early 1970s when the minerals issue was first inscribed on 
the Treaty agenda, through the formal minerals negotiations commencing in 1982, to 
the adoption of the Minerals Convention in June 1988. In this chapter I show how the 
debates in the 1970s about the minerals "problem" took place within the formal 
mechanisms of Antarctic Treaty system under the control of the Treaty parties, that is 
"within the club", and how they centred on the need to maintain the political status quo. 
This chapter also describes the negotiations of the special consultative meeting in the 
1980s which resulted in the adoption of the Antarctic Minerals Convention.
In the 1980s the debate broadened (in different ways) with the influence of both non- 
Treaty states and non-governmental organisations on the "in club" debate. It thus 
became a much wider debate about environmental protection versus resource 
exploitation set within the context of changing ideas on international environmental 
issues. These issues are addressed in chapter six.
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Chapter six analyses the politics of the Minerals Convention. It argues that, while the 
Minerals Convention incorporates a number of valuable environmental principles and 
procedures for protecting the environment, the scope of those principles and procedures 
was constrained by the need for political compromise.
In chapter seven, I consider events within the Treaty system since the Minerals 
Convention was adopted in 1988. I address the rejection of the Minerals Convention by 
Australia and France in the first half of 1989 and their proposals for a prohibition on 
minerals activity and the establishment of a "wilderness reserve". This defection from 
the norms of the Treaty system is analysed using the framework established in chapter 
one. Chapter seven then traces the struggle for a comprehensive environmental 
protection regime and analyses the recently agreed Madrid Protocol. The chapter also 
reflects on the nature of change in the Antarctic Treaty system, and the reasons for the 
convulsions over the minerals regime, relating this directly to the analytical propositions 
set out in chapter one.
The conclusion to the thesis, chapter eight, revisits the broad and specific questions 
raised in this introduction and in the following chapter on theory.
A note on documentation, primary sources and method
This thesis draws upon a wide range of primary source material, detailed in the 
bibliography.12 Because the Antarctic Treaty has no central secretariat, access to 
Consultative Meeting documents depends on the archival capacities of national 
governments, and their willingness to facilitate access to that material. Although the 
Consultative Parties agreed in 1985 to establish national contact points with a view to 
improving the availability of Antarctic Treaty documentation and information this 
system, to date, has not worked well.13 However, the archives at the Scott Polar 
Research Institute library in Cambridge, England, hold a comprehensive collection of 
Treaty material and I was fortunate to be able to work there in 1989 on some of the
12. See the explanatory notes at the beginning of the bibliography for a guide to referencing of 
primary material in the text
13. Under recommendation XIII-1 national contact points were charged with making available, "to 
the greatest extent practicable and feasible" (paragraph 3) the final reports of Consultative 
Meetings, the Antarctic Treaty Handbook, and annual exchanges of information under the 
Treaty, as well as maintaining information on "the location of depositories of data, samples and 
collections resulting from scientific research in Antarctica, and the nature and location of 
bibliographies or other information sources concerning reports and published works related to 
Antarctic matters" (paragraph 5). Some governments were more responsive to my requests for 
information than others. NGOs, on the whole, were forthcoming with published and 
unpublished material.
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documents from earlier meetings. When I began my research for this thesis in 1988, 
only material from the first seven consultative meetings (1961 to 1972) had been 
publicly made available by the Consultative Parties. At the 15th Consultative Meeting 
(at the end of 1989) this was extended to include material up to, and including, the 14th 
Consultative Meeting.14 In spite of this, it was only shortly before this thesis was 
completed that documents from the more recent meetings were available through the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra.15
Other documentation, particularly negotiating texts from the minerals negotiations and 
the recent Madrid Protocol meetings, has been put on the public record by non­
governmental organisations to counter what they see as unwarranted secrecy on the part 
of the Consultative Parties. Incidentally, this practice has ceased to cause much 
consternation among the Treaty parties themselves.
I was fortunate to be able to supplement my Australia-based work on primary and 
secondary sources during fieldwork in 1989. In that year I visited New York (to work 
at the UN library), and Washington (where I conducted several interviews with 
government agencies and non-governmental organisations, as well as undertaking 
research at the Library of Congress and the National Science Foundation).16 In England 
I spent time at the Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge (where the Scientific 
Committee on Antarctic Research is also headquartered) and in the Royal Institute for 
International Affairs library in London. Again I conducted interviews with government 
and non-government representatives. I also visited the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature in Gland, Switzerland, and Greenpeace International in 
Amsterdam, Holland. During a private visit to New Zealand at the end of 1989, I 
conducted further interviews, and carried out research at the New Zealand secretariat 
offices of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition.
The method used for research and analysis of this subject is of a broadly traditional 
kind. That is, the questions the thesis addresses are closely related to the contemporary 
theoretical literature on international cooperation and change. The empirical research 
proceeds by the methods primarily of diplomatic history, based strongly on primary 
source research, paying attention in this process to the secondary empirical literature. 
The methodological focus is political analysis at the domestic, regime and international
14. The 15th Consultative Meeting also decided to make publicly available the minutes of the 
meetings held in Brussels in 1964 leading to the adoption of the Agreed Measures, and the Final 
Report of the Special Preparatory Meeting in Paris in 1976.
15. A list of Antarctic Treaty documents that have been used as primary source material for this 
thesis is included in the bibliography. Documents from the minerals negotiations were not 
publicly available.
16. A list of interviews is annexed to this thesis .
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levels informed by values of the contemporary liberal institutionalist school in 
international relations.
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Chapter one
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION; THEORIES OF CHANGE
Introduction
This chapter establishes the analytical framework of this thesis. Its purpose is to set out 
those concepts and basic assumptions, drawn from the relevant literature of 
international relations theory,1 that will guide the analysis in the following chapters. In 
this, as with Keohane (1989:158), the object is to "formulate conditional, context- 
specific generalisations" related to the concerns of this study, rather than an attempt to 
develop a theoretical model of international cooperation and change.
To be useful such generalisations have to relate directly to the major questions of this 
study in both its general and particular Antarctic focus. These are, to summarise the 
discussion in the introduction: how do environmental issues get on the international 
agenda and how are they managed there? How and why are environmental regimes 
formed and how do these change? How is the nature of international cooperation 
influenced by non-governmental actors, new knowledge and leadership?
The task here is to identify those concepts and generalisations in the literature which 
separately and together may help to frame answers to these questions. This approach to 
developing an analytical framework for the study does not require a broad-ranging 
traverse of current debates in international relations theory (although it sits within that 
wider context of debate) but rather a more modest and focussed selection of particular 
theoretical issues.
This chapter examines, therefore, those parts of the literature of international relations 
theory which have addressed issues relevant to the central concerns of this thesis. It 
considers first the debate about the potential for cooperation in the international system, 
and particularly the difficulties encountered by the broad realist tradition in 
international relations theory in providing an adequate model of cooperation when 
environmental issues are the focus of study.
The chapter then considers those areas of the literature which have explored the nature 
of change in the international system, with a particular interest in the impact on states of
1 . The literature on international relations and environmental politics theory, which is examined in 
this chapter, is set out in the bibliography separate from the Antarctic literature in the secondary 
sources. This is to facilitate ease of reference in a large bibliography.
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new ideas and values which, I have argued in the introduction to this thesis, are 
important characteristics of the debate on international environmental issues. These 
investigations into the literature on cooperation and change examine propositions about 
regimes, the importance of knowledge, the role of non-state actors, and the nexus 
between domestic and international political processes.
In this chapter I argue that the key concepts that underpin realist discourse, deriving as 
they do primarily from the experience of analysing interstate power and security issues 
in international relations, do not lend themselves easily to a consideration of the central 
features of international environmental politics. Those approaches to the study of 
international relations which are broadly identified as "liberal" provide, I suggest, a 
firmer foundation for the analytical framework of this thesis.
Theorising about cooperation
Cooperation among states generally implies a degree of conscious collaborative or 
concerted action, or joint decision-making for the purposes of managing an issue-area. 
In this thesis, I am concerned with the potential for, and characteristics of, such 
conscious action over time rather than a short-term coincidence of policy or behaviour. 
This concern arises not only because it is relevant to the Antarctic case study, but also 
because long-term multilateral cooperation is appropriate, and indeed essential, for the 
successful management of international environmental issues. Propositions in 
international relations theory about the potential for cooperation among states derive 
from contending views of the nature of the international system. I examine below two 
of those contending views, realist and liberal, and the propositions on cooperation they 
generate.
Realism
The realist school of thought2 characterises the international system as anarchic and 
decentralised. By this it is meant that no enduring central authority exists, and that 
states are independent ("sovereign") actors in the system. In this view, states are the 
most important actors in international politics which, argues Morgenthau (1985:31) is 
"like all politics ... a struggle for power". By this definition, states seek to maximise
2. Without engaging the complexities of the large and long-standing debate about realism, I would 
identify the core texts of the realist school of thought as including E H Carr’s The Twenty Year’s 
Crisis (the first edition of which appeared in 1939), Martin Wight’s Power Politics (published in 
its original version in 1946), Hans J Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (which dates to 1948) 
and more recently, Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society (1977). Zacher (1990:143) 
distinguishes Bull and Wight as the "international society" school within the realist tradition. 
The traditions of realist theory are carried through in the so-called neorealist writings of authors 
such as Robert Gilpin (see, for example, War and Change in World Politics, 1981) and, 
especially, Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics (1979). For a focussed 
discussion of neo-realist thought, see Neorealism and its critics, edited by Robert Keohane 
(1986b).
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their power relative to that of other states in order to achieve security in a system which 
is inherently competitive and therefore insecure. In doing so, states must ultimately rely 
on their own resources. Thus the principle of self-help underpins that of sovereignty.
Independence, self-help and the maximising of relative power as defining 
characteristics of state action give form to the expression of state or national interest. 
The realist paradigm argues that there is a well defined hierarchy of issues in the 
articulation of national interests and in relationships among states in the international 
system. The primary interests of states is (and must be) to preserve territorial integrity 
and military security against other states. International politics is therefore defined, in 
the realist tradition, as the politics of power and security.
In a system characterised as inherently conflictive, the potential for cooperation is 
argued to be limited. There is, nevertheless, a spectrum of views within the broad 
realist school on this issue. At one end, Frankel sees cooperation as only workable 
outside power politics. Cooperative interaction he argues "does not, properly speaking, 
come into the ambit of politics ... [it is] successfully [sic] only when it does not affect 
power relations" (Frankel 1988:108-9).3
A more sophisticated version of the realist school of thought observes that even within a 
condition of international anarchy, there are broadly accepted cooperative norms which 
generally govern the behaviour of states. Even within power politics, balances of 
power, alliance systems and spheres of influence involve explicit or tacit cooperative 
behaviour among states. Bull (1977) in particular has argued that the existence of an 
international society based on a restricted set of norms or shared values constrains 
conflict and establishes a potential for some degree of cooperative behaviour.4
It would, of course, be misleading to suggest that realist writers have focussed only on 
the security issues which they argue to be the central concerns of states and of 
international politics. The key concepts of the realist paradigm have been brought to 
the study of a variety of cooperative endeavours outside the traditional security domain, 
particularly in the area of international political economy.5 In this view, the rational 
pursuit of national economic security and the struggle for relative economic gains are
3. See also Waltz (1979:105-6) on the limits to cooperation under structural realism.
4. Even Morgenthau, whom Holsti (1972:181) characterises as "the foremost advocate of the 
concept of power as the theoretical core erf international politics" discusses the "moral 
limitations upon the struggle for power" (Morgenthau 1985:349).
5. See, for example, Stephen D Krasner, Structural Conflict: the Third World against Global 
Liberalism (1985), Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (1987) or 
Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade 
(1990).
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key factors in international economic relations among states and similarly constrain the 
opportunities for, and the nature of, international economic cooperation.
Thus for realist writers the potential for cooperation in both security and economic 
arenas is structurally limited.
Writers in the realist tradition have generally paid little attention to ecological issues as 
a focus of study. In the hierarchy of issues which realism assumes, environmental 
issues have not been considered an important focus for the study, or indeed the practice, 
of interstate relations. They have, therefore, been consigned by realist scholars to the 
lowest of low politics because of a perception that they are neither "security” issues nor 
issues in which power relationships are central.
Nevertheless, realist perceptions of the limited potential for cooperation in an inherently 
conflictive world would hold little hope for the type of international cooperation 
required to address international environmental issues.6 Nor, as we shall see later in 
this chapter, does realist theory accept the possibility of normative change in relations 
among states in response to global interests or new values. In this respect, realism is 
inherently pessimistic about cooperation and change.
Liberalism
The major point of departure from the assertions of the realist tradition about the 
behaviour of states, which permits (and indeed encourages) an exploration of 
cooperation, lies in a contending characterisation of the international system. The 
liberal school of thought7 argues that there are numerous examples of long-standing
6. Gilpin (1981:224) argues that "to the extent that the limits-to-growth thesis is correct, its 
influence on the behaviour of nation-states may not be as benign and conducive to cooperation 
as many of its proponents would like to believe". Ophuls (1988:370) warns that "[t]he clear 
danger is that, instead of promoting world cooperation, ecological scarcity will simply intensify 
the Hobbesian war of all against all and cause armed peace to be replaced by overt international 
strife".
7. The term "liberal" is used here to encompass those scholars who argue the case for cooperative 
potential in the international system and who have focussed on more than power politics in their 
explanations of inter-state behaviour. Although realism and liberalism both consider states to be 
purposive self-interested actors liberal writers focus on the importance of international 
institutions. Although they offer contending propositions about cooperation, liberalism and 
realism are points on a continuum in the development of international relations theory, rather 
than diametrically opposed models. Seminal works in the liberal school (broadly defined) 
include Keohane and Nye (1977), Keohane (1984) and Ernst Haas (1990b). Works by Keohane, 
Nye, Haas and Young have contributed greatly to the development of liberal conceptualisations 
of international relations theory. To draw attention to the problem of labelling within the liberal 
school, we might note that while Keohane identifies himself as a neoliberal institutionalist 
(1989), Krasner (1983b:2) suggests that Keohane is a modified structural realist. Keohane 
argues that neoliberal institutionalism subsumes realism (1989:15) and points out the similarities 
as well as the differences between the two, but Grieco (1990:10) argues that liberalism is not
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cooperation among states. In this view, contemporary international politics is 
characterised by multiple channels of communication between societies (which 
challenges the realist conceptualisation of states as unitary and predominant actors), a 
recognition of the lack of utility of force as an instrument of policy (which casts doubt 
on the centrality of the "power” factor in international politics) and disagreement on the 
hierarchy of issues (which suggests that security issues do not necessarily dominate 
international politics). Together these aspects of international politics constitute the 
condition of complex interdependence (see Keohane and Nye 1977; Ernst Haas 
1980:357-8). One of the characteristics of this complex world is an increased level of 
policy coordination and cooperation.8 In the liberal perspective, international 
cooperation is seen "not only as the outcome of relations among states, but of the 
interaction between domestic and international games and coalitions that span national 
boundaries" (Haggard and Simmons 1987:513).
Keohane and Nye (1977:3) acknowledge that interdependence is a "vague phrase" but 
one which nevertheless "expresses a poorly understood but widespread feeling that the 
very nature of world politics is changing". While not all issue areas satisfy the criteria 
of interdependence,9 international environmental issues can be so categorised. They are 
characterised by multiple channels of communication (especially through the activities 
of non-governmental organisations) and the use of force is infeasible as a solution to the 
global threat of ecological insecurity. Further, there is little agreement among states (or 
among states and other actors) on where environmental issues are to be located in the 
hierarchy of international concerns. For these reasons, the liberal theories of 
international relations are worth investigating further.
Writers in the liberal tradition also depart from the realist school in their assessment of 
the potential for, and the nature of, cooperation among states. States, so the argument 
goes, are predisposed towards cooperative behaviour in order to manage the conditions 
of interdependence in an anarchic world.10 Liberal scholars are also interested in the
grounded in realism. To confuse matters even further, Ashley (1986) suggests that Keohane is a 
neorealist, a tag Keohane denies.
8. This complexity has been fostered by technological developments, revolutions in 
communications and transportation, and the expansion of world trade and finance.
9. The concept of complex interdependence was developed to provide a model for understanding 
international economic relations. Keohane and Nye (1977) acknowledge that there are issue 
areas in which realist conceptualisations may be more appropriate, even in a world characterised 
by interdependence. Interdependence modifies an understanding of an anarchic world, rather 
than replacing it as an ordering principle. Indeed, Keohane (1986a: 1) suggests that whatever 
facilitates cooperation must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help.
10. Although the interdependence theorists developed the work of the earlier integration theorists, 
the concept does not necessarily invoke a normative dimension. It does not suggest that 
cooperation will be necessarily benign in its intent or impact Neither do interdependence 
theorists dismiss the idea that there are power differentials between states, or that states still seek 
to maximise their interests.
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conditions under which cooperation can improve the international system and make for 
a better world. However, the liberal assertion that states will cooperate under conditions 
of interdependence is as inherently deterministic as the realist assertion that they will 
not under conditions of anarchy. It is not enough to assert that cooperation occurs: what 
is then required is an investigation of why and how cooperation occurs in order to 
further delineate the departure from the realist tradition and to develop propositions to 
guide the analysis in this thesis.
Regimes and institutions
At the least, states engage in cooperative behaviour and collaborative decision-making 
in order to reduce uncertainty and minimise risk in their interactions with each other. 
They are likely to seek to cooperate when they perceive that the joint management of an 
issue is more beneficial to them (individually) than unilateral action,11 or that a problem 
cannot be solved without multilateral action.12 Cooperation is likely to be sought when 
there is a perception among relevant states that it is in their individual and collective 
interests that a particular outcome be avoided, even if there is no agreement on what 
should happen in its place.13 Cooperation under these conditions can take a variety of 
forms, from short-term bilateral accords to multilateral agreements that may require 
little further policy action, to comprehensive decision-making institutions. Beyond 
these minimum conditions for international cooperation lie the advantages of 
cooperation over time and the fact that states also cooperate for a mix of self-interest 
and altruism (for example, in the field of foreign aid).
Liberal scholars have used the concept of regime to examine recurring patterns of 
cooperative interaction between states.14 The most commonly cited definition of 
regimes is that they are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations" (Krasner 1983b:2).15
11. For example, the development of satellite technology has required agreement on geostationary 
orbits in order to avoid potential chaos. The same is true of the radiomagnetic spectrum.
12. For example, as with international terrorism or drug trafficking.
13. For example, when states seek to avoid conflict over resources, or border disputes, even if they 
are not agreed on how those resources should be managed, or where those borders should be.
14. The word ‘regime’ has been borrowed by international relations scholars from the study of 
international law but the concept has been redefined. While the concept of regimes has been 
identified with liberal international relations theory it could, as Nye (1987:374) observes, also 
easily be made to fit with realist theory. Indeed, the realist school of thought has responded 
vigorously to the liberal challenge especially to question the utility of the concept of regimes in 
explaining cooperation. Consideration of regimes and their role in facilitating cooperation has 
been applied to the realist concerns of security and the condition of anarchy. See, for example, 
Oye (1986), Nye (1987) and Jervis (1983). Young (1989b) has sought, with respect to 
international environmental cooperation, to examine why regimes arise to cope with some 
transboundary problems but fail to do so for others.
15. Since the concept entered the lexicon of international relations literature, a number of 
approaches to the study of regimes, and international cooperation, have been developed which
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The study of regimes has been more recently embedded in the study of international 
institutions which Keohane (1990:732) defines as "persistent and connected sets of 
rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape 
expectations". Regimes, therefore, are but one form of international institution, and are 
usually based on a formal agreement and given effect through some form of 
organisation.16 Because formal agreements and/or international organisations are more 
amenable to empirical study, they have become the main focus of the study of 
institutions.17 It should be noted, of course, that not all examples of interaction between 
states can be characterised in regime terms.
The basic characteristics of a regime derive from its principles and norms. Principles 
are the prevailing "beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude" (Krasner 1983b:2) that 
inform states’ attitudes to an issue area. They may or may not be articulated in any 
formal agreement.18 Norms (which may also be implicit or explicit) specify standards 
of behaviour in terms of the rights and obligations of regime participants, and provide 
guidance on legitimate and illegitimate behaviour. Norms and principles reflect the 
values held by states. In this respect, as Puchala and Hopkins observe (1983:66), all 
regimes are biased in that they "establish hierarchies of values, emphasising some and 
discounting others".
Finlayson and Zacher (198T.564) suggest that norms may be defined as sovereignty 
norms (thus reflecting realist "politics as usual") or interdependence norms, which 
"incline states to maximise welfare through collaboration". While the margin between 
them can be difficult to locate, this distinction is a useful one in examining international 
environmental politics and especially the Antarctic issue. When sovereignty norms
reflect different methodological as well as theoretical approaches. Young (1989b:350-2) 
identifies utilitarian models, based on game theory, and power focussed models (which have 
been most in evidence in hegemonic stability theory). Krasner (1983b) distinguishes between 
the Grotian/liberal tradition, and the modified structural realist approach. For a recent summary 
of theories of international regimes see Haggard and Simmons (1987). They identify four 
theoretical approaches to regimes - structural, game-theoretic, functional and cognitive, which 
they suggest are not mutually exclusive. Young (1990a:340-2) has developed his earlier 
typology to include five (not necessarily contradictory) streams of analysis - structural 
arguments, power-based arguments, interest-based arguments, cognitive arguments and 
contextual arguments.
16. The definitions of regimes and institutions, as they relate to each other, has changed as liberal 
scholars have sought to refine the concepts.
17. There is now a considerable body of literature on regimes and institutions, and the nature of 
cooperative relationships between states in the international system, much of it produced since 
the mid-1970s. Krasner’s edited volume (1983a) remains the most wide-ranging study of the 
subject Just as Keohane suggests that it is possible to "trace the evolution of cooperation in an 
issue-area over time" (1990:741) so it is possible to trace thinking on institutionalism and 
cooperation in his recent collection of essays (Keohane 1989).
18. One of the most often used examples is the principle (that is, the belief) that free trade enhances 
the welfare of all countries.
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prevail (in spite of an agreement to cooperate), monitoring and compliance rules are 
likely to be limited, and governments are likely to seek to maintain some control over 
important decision-making processes, especially where international environmental 
rules impact upon domestic policy, rather than cede responsibility to an international 
bureaucracy.19
Rules and procedures establish the functional component of a regime. They are likely 
to be codified in an agreement (such as a convention or treaty) and to establish 
processes for decision-making.20 Rules may set out injunctions and specific guidelines 
on the management of the issue area (as we will see is the case in the Antarctic Treaty 
system). Together with norms, rules contribute to the behavioural injunctions of a 
regime. The nature of rules and procedures (the decision-making framework) is 
determined by the norms and principles of the regime. The better the fit between the 
two, the greater the internal coherence of a regime, and the more likely it is to persist 
over time.
The existence and the extent of regimes (and thus the theoretical analysis that surrounds 
them) has been hotly debated by international relations scholars. The concept is fraught 
with terminological difficulties, and subject to challenges to its explanatory rigour and 
usefulness.21 The idea of a convergence among actors’ expectations is a crucial 
component of the liberal definition of a regime and carries with it an implication of a 
redefining of state’s interests and policy objectives. It is on this point that liberal and 
realist interpretations of regimes differ most strongly.
The realist approach argues that "regimes" cannot be differentiated from the power 
relationships pertaining among states participating in the regime, and that compliance 
with norms and rules is conditioned only by a state’s short-term interests.22 In other 
words, regimes are epiphenomenal.
Liberal scholars (including "modified" liberals such as Keohane) argue that regimes 
have the potential to become intervening variables in the causal relationship between
19. Finlay son and Zacher, in elaborating this distinction, suggest (1981:564-5) that for a regime to 
exist there must be some degree of commitment to interdependence norms.
20. Keohane (1984:58) suggests that rules may be difficult to distinguish from norms. At the 
margin they merge with one another. See also Young (1980:334-6) for an elaboration of 
different types of rules.
21. Stein notes (1983:115) that "scholars have fallen into using the term ‘regime’ so disparately and 
with such little precision that it ranges from an umbrella for all international relations to little 
more than a synonym for international organisations". Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986:764) assert 
that the "practice of regime analysis is wracked by epistemological anomalies ... [which] 
debilitate any endeavour to achieve clarity and precision of the concept of regimes and to 
enhance its productive capacity as an analytical tool".
22. See, for example, Strange (1983).
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power and interest, and behaviour and outcomes. Regimes serve to coordinate decision- 
making, facilitate cooperation and establish accepted patterns of behaviour. Liberal 
conceptualisations of regime-structured behaviour contend that norms and rules 
constrain and modify state behaviour over time, and represent more than just a 
coincidence of short-term interests.23 They argue that in the context of international 
institutions, states will subordinate short-term interests in the expectation of long-term 
(and possibly unspecified) gains.
However, as Keohane himself observes (1990:738) "causal inference is difficult where 
experimental or statistical research designs are infeasible". Zacher (1987:174) suggests 
that a "stable pattern of collective behaviour, coupled with statements by at least the 
most powerful actors in a system that they support certain rights and obligations 
[nevertheless] provide[s] strong evidence for the existence of regime injunctions", that 
is, norms and rules. In other words, the perceptions of state actors provide some 
measure of regime existence.24
An exploration of the concepts of regimes and institutions is useful to this thesis 
because they represent attempts by scholars to understand how cooperation works in the 
international system. There is a normative aspect to this exercise. If we are to meet the 
international environmental challenge, then understanding "which patterns lead to more 
rather than less cooperative behaviour" (Keohane 1989:11) is imperative. Indeed, 
Young (1989a:viii) is convinced that the tools of regime analysis offer an appropriate 
vehicle for tackling problems of an environmental kind and for devising institutional 
arrangements to cope with transboundary environmental problems.
We need to augment earlier propositions about why states cooperate to include an 
analysis of the processes involved in reaching substantive agreement and, further, how 
cooperation based on such an agreement is sustained over time. An agreement is not of 
itself a regime, even though it may form the basis for one. Our understanding of regime 
(and therefore of cooperation) of necessity incorporates a temporal dimension.
Regimes, the literature suggests, may be imposed by a hegemonic state or negotiated.25 
In this thesis I am interested in investigating negotiated regimes, and the process of
23. Nevertheless there is a widespread recognition that regimes may function at different levels of 
complexity. They may be comprehensive or incomplete. They may serve simply to provide for 
an exchange of information, or to coordinate policy, or to provide extensive regulatory 
mechanisms.
24. This is so even if an explicit agreement exists with respect to an issue area because, as noted 
later in this chapter, an agreement is not of itself a regime.
25. The concept of an imposed regime has been used especially in hegemonic stability theory. The 
structural realist approach to regime theory suggests that the presence of a hegemonic power is 
required for a regime to be established and maintained. In other words, collective action
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bargaining that underpins them for two reasons. First, the case study of this thesis, the 
Antarctic Treaty system, is a negotiated rather than a hegemonic regime (a question 
addressed below in chapter two). Second, the management of international 
environmental issues is, in the long run, unlikely to work well under a system of 
imposition or coercion. Even under conditions of ‘benign’ hegemony no one state (or 
even a group of states) is, in the long run, able to provide or impose a public or common 
environmental good.26 Further, imposed or hegemonic regimes are more susceptible to 
free-rider problems (in which actors benefit from access to the public good that a 
regime provides without contributing to the provision of that public good) than are 
negotiated regimes.27 In addressing global environmental issues such as global 
warming, some degree of willing participation in an agreement (among over 160 states) 
is required if free-rider problems are to be avoided.
Thus liberal theory, which argues that cooperation is possible without a hegemon, 
focuses on institutional bargaining and leadership in its explanation of the process of 
non-hegemonic regime formation and maintenance.
Institutional bargaining and leadership
A shared perception among states that they need to cooperate on an issue area (in other 
words the "demand" for a regime) does not necessarily mean that states will have shared 
preferences with respect to the form and content of any agreement upon which their 
cooperation might be based. Cooperation does not imply, and in fact rarely involves, a 
harmony of interests among states. States will have non-identical preferences and 
interests that they wish to maximise in a given issue area. The norms, rules and
problems can only be overcome if a state with the appropriate resources acts to define a regime, 
not only in its own interests (a ‘coercive’ hegemon) but also for the purposes of contributing to 
order and thus providing a ‘common good’ (a ‘benign’ hegemon). While the model has been 
generalised, hegemonic stability theory arose out of a concern to explain the role of the United 
States in the post-war international economic order. Hegemonic stability theory has also been 
used in explanations of the decline of post-war international economic institutions such as the 
GATT and Bretton Woods. Haggard and Simmons (1987:500-504) canvass the empirical and 
theoretical challenges to hegemonic stability theory.
26. This is because the idea of the environment as a global commons, or a common good, means that 
access to the environment is indivisible and non-exclusive. No state can ‘opt out’. The idea of 
common security, that no state should diminish the security of another by maximising its own, is 
directly applicable to environmental protection and offers a solution to the security dilemma 
identified by realist theorists (that is, the unintended consequence of maximising one’s own 
security is to encourage feelings of insecurity in others). This analysis only works, however, 
when an understanding of security is widened to include both economic and environmental 
security. The idea that all gain when all cooperate in security endeavours is a concept central to 
that of international cooperation on environmental issues. The difference is that when common 
military security is threatened, the resort is to collective or alliance security, in other words, the 
relative gains doctrine. In environmental issues, without a common environmental security 
framework, there are no relative gains - the stakes are simply too high.
27. The costs of providing a common or public good are therefore disproportionately distributed, 
while the benefits are not (except that with respect to ecological security, if some states do not 
participate, the ‘good’ is underprovided). Those who bear the costs are therefore disadvantaged.
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procedures embodied in an agreement represent what individual participating states are 
willing to accept as not being contrary to their national interests, as well as contributing 
to their collective interests. They represent what the least flexible state will agree to on 
any particular aspect of the agreement.28 As we will see, these outcomes have been 
typical of the Antarctic regime.
The process of negotiation has been investigated by Young (1989b; 1990b) in his model 
of institutional bargaining.29 That process, he suggests (1989b:360-61) "operates on the 
basis of a unanimity rule in contrast to a majority rule" and is less likely to be 
characterised by distributive bargaining or the search for relative gains.30 However, 
institutional bargaining, in its requirement for unanimity, does not preclude the use of 
payoffs, incentives or moral suasion. Neither does it suggest that all states are equal in 
the negotiations, or that power relationships31 are irrelevant. It assumes neither equity 
in the outcome,32 nor even efficiency.33 Young’s model of negotiation fits well with 
processes in the Antarctic regime.
Successful negotiation (in the absence of a hegemon) depends upon the exercise of 
leadership. Leadership, in Young’s model (1990b) may be structural (of which 
hegemonic leadership is an extreme type), entrepreneurial or intellectual. In its various 
forms it involves, he argues, the use of bargaining power, imagination in inventing 
institutional options, skill in brokering the interests of numerous actors to line up 
support for such options and the power of ideas (or a combination of these). Under 
Young’s typology, leaders in institutional bargaining need not be states, nor even act as 
the agents of states. Indeed, his most recent formulation (Young 1991) attends 
particularly to the role of individuals.
28. The bargaining process typically involves persuading states to accept other than their "bottom 
line". If congruence between collective interests and individual interests cannot be reached on 
those issues considered to be fundamental, there will be no agreement. If consensus cannot be 
found on an issue that is not fundamental to the negotiation, then it is likely to be excluded from 
the agreement, in order not to prejudice the negotiation process.
29. Hampson (1989-90:55) calls Young’s model a "useful antidote" to realist and hegemony-based 
accounts of the requirements for international cooperation. Young’s model of institutional 
bargaining was developed to deal with inadequacies he perceived in earlier models of regime 
formation, particularly those concerned with hegemonic imposition or game theoretic prisoners’ 
dilemma models.
30. Young (1989b:361) uses the term "integrative bargaining" to characterise the bargaining process 
when negotiators "do not start with a common understanding ... [of] the contract curve". That is, 
they are not sure where the intersection of their common interests might be.
31. In the sense that some states have more issue-relevant resources to bring to bear on influencing 
other states.
32. States which are to some degree affected by the rules of an agreement may have little or no say 
in its content For example, a regime which sets out the general rules with respect to the retiring 
of debt to lesser developed countries may not include such countries among its signatories, or 
may continue to reflect the interests of the lender countries and institutions, but with which the 
recipients have little choice but to concur.
33. The rules and procedures of a regime may not adequately address the task at hand.
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This might appear commonsensical to anyone familiar with negotiation theory in 
domestic politics or even to those familiar with the practice of diplomacy. However 
little attention has been paid to leadership or institutional bargaining in theories of 
international relations, which have been reluctant to shed a commitment to more 
conventional forms of ‘power’ or to expand into the ‘sociology’ of international 
politics. Incorporating leadership and bargaining into an analysis of cooperation 
facilitates a study of the role of non-hegemonic states as influential actors in 
international politics. It points also to the importance of building coalitions to support 
initiatives in the processes of regime construction and maintenance, as well as in the 
process of change.34 These generalisations about institutional bargaining, unanimity 
rules and leadership will be important to the analysis in this thesis of the process of 
decision-making, and change on environmental issues within the Antarctic Treaty 
system.
Compliance
As already noted, reaching an agreement is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the existence of a regime. An agreement does not constitute cooperation if its norms 
and rules are never adhered to. Therefore the temporal dimension of a regime must also 
be supported by a dynamic dimension which involves implementation and compliance.
The strength and stability of a regime is defined by the degree of adherence to its norms 
and rules by the parties to that regime.35 The relevant question then is how is a regime 
maintained over a period of time especially if, as Young (1980:339) suggests, a highly 
decentralised system such as the international system is likely to rely on less formal 
compliance mechanisms. Understanding the reasons for compliance with norms and 
rules contributes to the analysis in this thesis of the persistence of the Antarctic Treaty 
system.
A regime can provide states with some measure of certainty about decision-making 
processes on an issue area, and provide actors with information which might otherwise 
be unavailable to them, thereby reducing transaction costs. A cooperative arrangement 
will persist if the parties continue to believe that the benefits of participation outweigh
34. Young (1990b:3) suggests that institutional bargaining "limits the relevance of theories 
focussing on coalition formation for those endeavouring to understand the formation of 
international institutions". I would suggest, however, that coalition building may well be an 
important factor in the bargaining process. Indeed, more recently Young (1991:291) has argued 
that "the conversion of structural power into bargaining leverage is also in part a matter of 
forming effective coalitions". See also Hampson (1989-90:58).
35. The strength of a regime is also dependent upon the legitimacy accorded to it by non- 
participants. Adherence to the norms and rules by participants is a necessary, although not 
sufficient, condition in reinforcing the legitimacy of a regime.
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the costs. Compliance with regime injunctions may be motivated by calculations of 
self-interest and, in the short-term at least, by those same interests which motivated 
states to negotiate the agreement in the first place.36 Adherence to regime injunctions 
may not guarantee that a state’s optimal national objectives will be met, but if those 
goals cannot be achieved unilaterally, then cooperation with other states may ensure a 
‘second-best’ outcome which will constrain other states in maximising their relative 
gains.37
The experience of the regime reinforces expectations of reciprocity.38 In other words, 
‘abiding by the rules’ and acting in accordance with regime injunctions rests on an 
understanding that other states will do the same in the long-term. Compliance and 
reciprocity thus contribute to confidence-building within the regime. The shared 
expectation of reciprocity is stronger when it is reinforced by a perception that non- 
compliance may also be reciprocated, and when non-compliance by any one state 
adversely affects other regime parties.39 In the case of the Antarctic regime, 
maintenance of the system has rested on reciprocal restraint rather than the working 
through of specific reciprocity across issues.
Adherence to a regime may become a matter of habit or custom through the 
socialisation or internalisation of norms and rules as a result of the practice of the 
regime. Imperatives for compliance might also include a sense of obligation, fear of 
repercussions in the case of defection from the norms or not abiding by the rules, or a 
belief that defection from the injunctions of one regime may raise doubts as to the 
trustworthiness of the state in any other regime, either of a similar nature, or with 
similar actors.
Reciprocity, in other words the expectation that states will meet their obligations over 
time, bears directly on the problem of international cooperation on environmental issues 
under negotiated (or non-hegemonic) regimes. The issue of compliance is a particularly 
important practical aspect of the debate about international environmental politics. 
Meeting the environmental challenge requires more than agreement to the content of 
rules and measures: it requires that the content be complied with.
36. The utilitarian model of regimes, which draws on game theory, suggests that states, in 
cooperating, are acting as rational utility maximisers.
37. For example, an agreement over disputed territory, as the basis for a regime, may not give 
territorial control to any one state, but it may prevent any other (possibly more powerful) state 
from gaining that control as in the case of the Antarctic.
38. As Keohane (1986a:3) observes this is an ambiguous terms which can refer to a policy pursued 
by a single actor, or a systematic pattem of action. For a detailed discussion of specific and 
diffuse reciprocity, see Keohane (1986a).
39. In game theoretic terms, the incentives to cheat are reduced in iterated games, when ‘players’ 
can expect to meet again.
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How compliance can be encouraged or enforced in a system where states are reluctant 
to allow an international bureaucracy to oversee their performance is a crucial question. 
In other words, sovereignty norms are generally dominant in the hierarchy of values. It 
is non-governmental organisations rather than states that have argued strongly that 
existing environmental rules have not been adequately complied with.40 They have 
increased pressure on governments to comply with specific rules and measures on 
environmental protection, and sought to increase the accountability and transparency of 
state actions on environmental issues.
National interests and the domestic!international nexus
A recurring theme in this analysis of international cooperation and its focus on regime- 
patterned behaviour, is that of a state’s interest. The term ‘national interest’ is an 
imprecise one which gains much of its apparent strength from its use as a rhetorical 
political device. Broadly speaking, however, it can be argued that the national interest 
is seen to lie in policies which advantage (or at least do not disadvantage) the state and 
its citizens, assuming that those interests are indeed consonant.
At first blush, this may appear to differ little from realist conceptualisations. 
Nevertheless, what advantages or disadvantages the state is often highly contested 
within the state. With respect to any particular issue area, decision-makers will 
articulate policy objectives that are argued to meet the ‘advantage’ criterion. Specific 
measures and actions will be sought, or adopted, in pursuit of those policy objectives. 
In other words, when I talk here about ‘national interests’ I am talking about a state’s 
policy goals (the ends) and the processes by which they are to be attained (the means) 
with respect to a particular issue area.
The question of how states define their interests and how their interests change, that is 
how states "learn", is, Nye suggests (1988:238), one of the most thought provoking 
questions in international relations. It is also particularly relevant to this thesis. Realist 
theories pay little attention to foreign policy making and the redefinition of national 
interests within a study of international relations41 and therefore offer little guidance
40. With respect to global environmental issues, the question of monitoring and compliance is a 
touchy subject Who does the monitoring?
41. Waltz (1979:121) cautions against mistaking theories of foreign policy for theories of 
international relations. See Mastanduno et.al (1989) for an attempt to lay the foundation of a 
realist theory of the state which bridges domestic and international politics. Their analysis 
nevertheless posits the "state" as the pivot, looking inwards as well as outwards. It does not 
consider the effect of domestic factors on the state. Putnam (1988) offers a two-level game 
model as one attempt to solve the "puzzling tangle" of the relationship between domestic politics 
and international relations. His focus is on state negotiators who must try to satisfy domestic 
and international coalitions simultaneously. In other words, successful playing of a two level 
game requires coincident "win-sets".
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here. What needs to be considered in addition to "power and egoistic self-interest" (the 
staples of realist discourse) as explanations of state action is, as Smith urges (1987:255), 
"knowledge and the process by which states leam". These concepts are central to the 
liberal tradition. "Cognitive" insights into international relations suggest that 
"cooperation cannot be completely explained without reference to ideology [or ideas], 
the values of actors, the beliefs they hold about the interdependence of issues, and the 
knowledge available to them" (Haggard and Simmons 1987:509-10).
This also involves an investigation into the interaction between the domestic and 
international arenas of politics.42 One must, however, be mindful of Dryzek, Clark and 
McKenzie’s (1989:479-80) caution against losing sight of the international system in 
considering domestic factors. Otherwise, they correctly imply, one has a theory of 
comparative foreign policy rather than of international relations.
Propositions about international cooperation which seek to depart from realist power- 
based explanations need to explore the role not only of individual actors or 
organisations within the state in the process of defining national interests,43 but more 
particularly of those actors where they form transnational communities.44 Such 
communities have been increasingly active and influential both within the Antarctic 
Treaty system and on international environmental issues generally.
Learning and knowledge
Learning, as noted above, is in this case the process of defining (or redefining) national 
interest, in response to new knowledge.45 Thus learning is also relevant to the process 
of change. Although liberal theory emphasises the role of scientific and technical 
knowledge in enhancing interdependence and cooperation, (and therefore welfare), 
neither knowledge nor learning need be inherently progressive or benign.
42. The so-called ‘second image’ and the ‘second image reversed’.
43. A point that is often overlooked is that while a multilateral agreement (that is, an agreement to 
cooperate) is made between states, it often establishes rules that impact upon private entities, for 
example, mining or fishing companies, telecommunications companies, or industrial enterprises. 
Giving effect to a regime (compliance) may involve domestic legislative or regulatory initiatives 
and therefore require the support of domestic coalitions. This level of analysis supports the 
proposition that the willingness of a government to adopt and comply with cooperative policies 
(in other words, defining its national interests in terms of cooperation, or learning to cooperate) 
is linked to domestic factors.
44. Transnational defines interactions across national boundaries where the actors are not agents of 
the state. Non-govemmental actors may, however, interact with national governments in an 
international setting. I have continued to use the term ‘international’ for non-govemmental 
organisations which are established at the ‘non-national’ level (for example, Greenpeace 
International or WWF-Intemational).
45. That new knowledge may be consensual or contested, and it may be nationally or internationally 
generated, or both.
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Learning occurs at the level of the state or at the level of the regime (institutional 
learning). It is the process which gives rise to the demand for cooperation on an issue- 
area. Ernst Haas suggests (1980:390) that "we know that learning has taken place when 
actors adopt new rules and behaviour that make use of new information and knowledge, 
or adopt ways to search for such knowledge".
Knowledge, according to Ernst Haas (1980:367-8) is
the sum of technical information and of theories about that information 
which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested 
actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some 
social goal.
More recently he has defined it as
no more than the temporary consensus of a group of practitioners that a 
"problem" should be defined in a certain manner, the causes and effects 
arranged in a certain pattem ... (Emst Haas 1990a:219)
These are general definitions. The important component is that information does not of 
itself constitute knowledge: there must be agreement on the meaning attached to that 
information (the interpretation or ‘theory’ that surrounds it) amongst a group of people 
to whom that information is professionally relevant. Without agreement, knowledge 
can have little impact on regime development, as Krasner (1983b:20) observes, nor on 
learning in a world of sovereign states. This is important with respect to environmental 
politics where scientific uncertainty, that is a lack of agreement about the meaning of 
scientific information, is often used by states as a justification for inaction.
Knowledge is relevant to the process of learning, and cooperation only when it is 
accepted by decision-makers.46 Knowledge in this case is power only when it informs 
policy. Learning by states in response to new knowledge is, therefore, a political 
process whereby those who ‘have’ knowledge seek to influence decision-makers, 
sometimes in contest with competing ‘knowledge’.
The definition of knowledge must be flexible enough to include new values. This is 
relevant to international environmental politics in which non-governmental 
organisations, as well as contributing to the flow of information, bring to the debate 
competing interpretations of scientific information, and new values and beliefs on what 
is environmentally acceptable and how we should view our relationship with the natural 
world.
46. Haggard and Simmons (1987:510) draw attention to the fact that "cognitive approaches cannot 
predict at what point consensual values and knowledge will produce cooperation".
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The norms and rules, and the information provided by a regime, once established, also 
constitute ‘knowledge’. Liberal approaches to cooperation suggest that national 
interests and policy objectives come to be defined in a way that is congruent with the 
norms and rules of a regime. Learning therefore goes to the heart of compliance and is 
at the crux of the liberal argument that states ‘learn’ to cooperate under a regime (in 
other words, that regimes do matter).
Transgovernmental and transnational actors: inside and outside the state 
As Puchala and Hopkins observe (1983:63) "each regime has a set of elites who are the 
practical actors within it".47 Bureaucratic elites contribute to the definition of a state’s 
national interest, that is its policy objectives, although this is often in response to 
particular interests within the state. These elites are also crucial to the implementation 
and maintenance of the regime. Their ‘knowledge’ is likely to predominate over that of 
other actors (domestic and international) once the regime is in place although the degree 
to which this is so is conditioned by the salience and politicisation of the issue area.
International environmental issues have come to be highly politicised topics on national 
and international agenda. At both a domestic and international level we might expect, 
therefore, to see bureaucratic actors competing with other "knowledge based" 
communities for influence over these issues. Bureaucratic elites have an advantage in 
this contest in that their location within the formal decision-making apparatus offers 
some advantages in setting the terms of the debate.
Zacher (1990:153) suggests that ”[t]he integration of domestic political systems into a 
study of the evolution of general patterns of international collaboration should examine 
how ... linkages among ... elites impinge upon the occurrence and form of regimes" (my 
emphasis). National elites establish a network of communication with other national 
elites through the decision-making procedures and rules of the regime.48 Keohane 
(1984:101) talks about "informal coalitions of like-minded officials" which develop to 
achieve common purposes and establish networks of acquaintance and friendship. 
Officials form transgovemmental bureaucratic coalitions with some degree of 
commitment to a regime and to maintaining their own positions of influence within it. 
This has been a persistent and influential feature of the Antarctic regime.
47. These elites are most likely to be from within foreign ministries and possibly other government 
departments with expertise in the issue area. Foreign ministries, charged with the carriage of 
diplomacy, are often reluctant to relinquish policy control to actors within other departments.
48. Keohane and Nye (1977:34) note that contacts between governmental bureaucracies charged 
with similar tasks may not only alter their perspectives but lead to transgovemmental coalitions 
on particular policy questions.
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Participation in a regime (that is, experience of cooperation) may alter the way key 
participants in the state understand that state’s interests, although as Nye suggests 
(1987:381) individual learning is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the more 
complex process of organisational learning.
Bureaucrats and policy-makers in participant states in a regime become attuned to the 
pattern of that regime as it structures decision-making on the relevant issue-area. Their 
socialisation into its norms and rules is reinforced by interaction with their counterparts 
in other regime countries. This process may be described as a form of cognitive 
congruence (Ernst Haas 1980:368). We might expect, therefore, that such elites will 
continue to be supportive of the regime in contest with other interests within the state as 
well as outside the state. Nevertheless, bureaucratic elites continue to be agents of the 
state in a way that, for example, bureaucrats in intergovernmental organisations are not. 
Therefore while they may seek to maintain the regime, they will also be seeking to 
advance the interests of the state they represent.
Clearly the role of national bureaucratic elites is central not only to the formation of 
states’ policies but also to the way regimes are managed and how they "acquire" 
knowledge. But bureaucratic elites do not learn and act in a vacuum - they have to 
interact with, and possibly compete with non-state actors.
In line with the key features of international environmental politics outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis, the analytical framework developed here needs also to 
consider the role of those non-state actors.
Realist theory does not adequately account for the influence of non-state actors.49 Thus 
it sheds no light on how actors within societies can use partners in transnational 
coalitions or transnational institutions to advance (or retard) the learning of new 
interests by their own governments (Nye 1987:373). However, in line with Young 
(1989b:364) it would be a "serious mistake to overlook the role of transnational 
alliances among influential interest groups in developing and maintaining regimes" at 
an international level, or their role in influencing the definition (and redefinition) of 
national interests.
49. Holsti (1985:137) suggests that while "[n]onstate actors may well influence the course of 
international politics ... ultimate decisions on war, peace, security and order depend solely upon 
the public authorities of states". New models, he argues, are therefore not necessary. There is 
an internal contradiction in this assertion. If non-state actors may well influence the course of 
international politics, then they must be accounted for in the models. Holsti makes the mistake 
of assuming that challenges to the state-centric model of international relations and the need to 
extend it to include non-state actors is equivalent to an argument that states are no longer the 
most important actors in international politics or that non-state actors have surpassed states as 
the new decision-makers in international politics. Waltz (1979:95) makes a similar mistake.
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Non-governmental organisations
Liberal approaches to international relations argue that transnational non-state actors are 
important actors in the practice of international politics. However in broadening their 
study to include non-state actors, liberal scholars have focussed mainly on 
intergovernmental organisations or on multinational corporations, especially within the 
study of international political economy.50 On the whole, liberal theorists have only 
recently begun to examine the role of environmental organisations.
Any serious investigation of environmental issues in international politics needs to 
inquire into the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). They are, as Sands 
(1989:401) observes "repositories and developers of ideas. And they are actual 
international actors". Caldwell suggests (1988:16) that the "emergence of an organised 
international environmental movement and a collateral growth of knowledge regarding 
the ... consequences of environmental problems have generated an evolutionary 
progression in international institutional development".
On international environmental issues NGOs seek to improve the policies and actions of 
governments with respect to environmental protection. They lobby national and 
international decision-makers in their attempts to influence both domestic and 
international agenda. NGOs also seek to apply indirect pressure on decision-makers 
through the mobilisation of public opinion on the nature of the environmental challenge 
and through the instrument of electoral politics.
As domestic actors, NGOs now play an important role in the process of defining, or 
redefining, national interest on environmental issues. In other words, they contribute to 
the learning process. However they compete for influence with other actors involved in 
this process. Domestic NGOs do not act in isolation on international issues. They form 
transnational coalitions to coordinate their policies and activities on international issues 
and to facilitate the exchange of information in support of domestic and international 
campaigns.51 Rowlands (1991:113) suggests that NGOs also "create channels of 
communication that can later be used by states’ representatives in order to conduct 
intergovernmental negotiations". On international environmental issues NGOs bring to 
the debate new values and ideas about what is environmentally acceptable. NGOs also
50. The qualitative difference that may be identified between non-state actors such as MNCs and 
non-governmental actors such as environmental organisations is that the former continue to have 
a narrowly-defined definition of ‘self-interest’ (profits, freedom of access to resources or from 
government regulation) whereas for the latter, their actions are not primarily geared to self- 
interest but to the public interest or to a more broadly defined interest of humankind.
51. In the absence of the latter dimension, a study of non-governmental organisations here would 
rest on the nature of domestic interest group politics.
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contribute to the flow of scientific and technical information and may provide an 
alternative source of information to state and other non-state actors. They focus 
explicitly on improving the practice of international politics on environmental issues (in 
the rules adopted and in compliance with those rules). They are established, therefore, 
in order to bring about change.
Ness and Breckin (1988:271) argue that NGOs "typically face two tasks in reaching 
their general goals: they must develop some consensus in the world community for the 
goal, and they must deliver technical assistance" (in other words, knowledge) for that 
goal. Their success in those tasks will depend on the level of access to decision-makers 
(nationally and internationally) and in their ability to mobilise public support At the 
national level (where NGOs seek to redefine national interests) access is more likely in 
an open than a closed society. Their voices are more likely to be listened to when there 
is a lack of unity among decision-makers on what is the best policy. At the 
international level, where NGOs seek to inform and encourage institutional learning 
(that is, the adoption of new values and knowledge directly at the level of the regime) 
access depends on the nature of the regime as it operates internationally. The 
legitimacy which NGOs acquire in the eyes of state actors is also important and is 
strengthened by the development of expertise and knowledge over time.
Incorporating the activities of non-governmental organisations into an analysis of 
international environmental politics requires addressing the distinction between activity 
and influence. It is a relatively straightforward task to describe the activities of NGOs. 
Establishing influence is another matter. In part it rests on a counter-intuitive 
proposition - can we argue that the same outcomes would have occurred without the 
presence of NGOs - as well as an investigation into the statements and responses of 
decision-makers. The Antarctic case study shows clearly NGO activity and influence at 
work on several environmental issues including the overturning of the minerals 
convention.
Environmental organisations are not the only non-state actors with an interest in the 
debate on environmental issues. Commercial interests have also been active in the 
debate, particularly at a domestic level. Nevertheless commercial interests have, at least 
until now, been less likely to form transnational alliances to support their views on 
environmental issues. Indeed commercial competition with may well override any 
sense of common interests among industry groups in different states. The impact of 
multinational corporations on the debate should not be overlooked on particular issues 
and may become increasingly important on certain environmental issues.52 The impact
52. A case in point is that of ICI and DuPont whose work on chlorofluorocarbon substitutes made it 
possible for an agreement on the phasing out of these ozone-depleting substances to be adopted
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of the scientific community, which has become influential in the debates on 
environmental protection, has often been overlooked in discussions of international 
politics because of a misplaced perception (sometimes fostered by scientists 
themselves) that they are not political actors and are therefore peripheral to the study of 
international politics.
A recent addition to the literature on international cooperation, which provides a means 
of investigating the role of the scientific community, and one which has been adopted 
by international relations scholars in the context of environmental issues, is that of 
epistemic communities.53
Epistemic communities
Broadly, these are defined as "transnational^ organised networks of knowledge-based 
communities” (Peter Haas 1990:347) but a definition which helps us to identify an 
epistemic community easily is hard to pin down.54 The emphasis is on scientific and 
technical knowledge rather than, for example, ‘diplomatic’ experience. Peter Haas 
(1989; 1990) has sought to identify an ecological epistemic community whose 
members, while sharing a belief in ecological principles, may nevertheless come from a 
variety of ‘scientific’ disciplines and backgrounds.55
What seems to be important in the definition is that the "network" seeks, in a coherent 
manner, to influence decision-makers to adopt policies which give effect to their 
knowledge and beliefs. Their influence is more pronounced when expertise is regarded 
as important to the making of sound policy, when technical information is at a premium 
and political leaders and decision-makers defer to experts, and when the knowledge is 
not contested. Where that is not the case, epistemic communities will be influential 
only when they are able to repel challenges to their knowledge by other interested 
actors.
and, more importantly, to be implemented even if not as fast as many environmental 
organisations would like. Without the support of the large multinational chemical companies, 
the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting substances would be 
empty agreements.
53. As Peter Haas (1989:384) points out the term has been adapted from the literature on the 
sociology of knowledge, although it has been used in a somewhat more specific manner in 
international relations literature.
54. Peter Haas (1990:349) refers to an epistemic community as "transnational networks of 
knowledge based communities that are both politically empowered through their claims to 
exercise authoritative knowledge and motivated by shared causal and principled beliefs". Ernst 
Haas (1990b:41) defines an epistemic community as "composed of professionals ... who share a 
commitment to a common causal model and a common set of political values". These 
professionals are, he suggests, "united by a belief in the truth of their model and by a 
commitment to translate this truth into public policy, in the conviction that human welfare will 
be enhanced as a result".
55. Ernst Haas (1990b:70-71; 221fn23) makes it clear that NGOs might also constitute an epistemic 
community, although they do not always do so.
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The role of epistemic communities has been explored in the processes of compliance 
with regimes and in enhancing the process of cooperation. Peter Haas argues 
(1989:377) that the "transformative processes that regimes may initiate or foster" can 
empower a group of experts (that is, the epistemic community) which then contributes 
to the development of congruent state policies. In other words, they are potential 
contributors to the definition of a state’s national interests and thus to the process of 
learning. Epistemic communities may also be important, with respect to environmental 
issues, in mobilising states to seek agreements and in influencing the content of those 
agreements, as well as in encouraging compliance and maintaining regimes. While the 
Antarctic example demonstrates some of these features of an epistemic community the 
experience of influencing policy has been less straightforward than the model Peter 
Haas describes.
Peter Haas (1989:399) suggests that the concept of epistemic communities contradicts 
three common explanations for the development of congruent state policies: foreign 
pressure (coercion), public opinion, and the rational anticipation of future benefits by a 
unitary government. This holds only if epistemic communities are seen to be successful 
and it is probably simplistic to suggest that these explanations are necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Very little work has been done on epistemic communities, or the conditions 
under which they are effective.56 Further investigation is needed into the conditions in 
which other explanatory factors might, or might not, be relevant.
Cooperation revisited
This section of the chapter, theorising about cooperation, has revealed the extremely 
disparate, complex and contested nature of generalisations about cooperation, extending 
from broad-based systemic level concepts through complex arguments about the 
operations of regimes, to the nature of knowledge-based communities and state and 
non-state actors. Before turning to the next section, which is about theorising change, it 
is helpful here simply to summarise those generalisations about cooperation which are 
useful to understanding the issues at the heart of this thesis - how international 
environmental politics are managed.
These generalisations seek to depart from those generated by the realist school which 
would have it that interstate cooperation is, in the end, a victim of the competitive
56. The major empirical study on epistemic communities in international environmental politics has 
been on the role of ecologists and scientists in the Mediterranean Action Plan. Peter Haas 
suggests only that it may be generalisable to other environmental issues. Young (1990a:341) 
observes that while the argument about epistemic communities "requires further elaboration and 
may not stand up in its strongest form, there are indications that groups of this kind have played 
significant roles in the formation of some environmental regimes".
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nature of the international system and the assertion of states’ interests. Instead those 
propositions which are argued to be useful in examining both the Antarctic case study 
of this thesis and, more broadly, questions about how international environmental issues 
are managed, derive from an initial proposition that collective action problems (which 
might arise because of competing national interests) can be overcome and that states do 
cooperate where their long-term interests (individual and collective) are seen to lie in 
seeking joint gains.
The way states mostly cooperate under those circumstances is through regimes and 
institutions which establish frameworks for, and impart a degree of certainty to, their 
interactions over time. Regimes operate through norms and rules, bargaining and 
leadership, and reciprocity and socialisation. Transgovemmental and transnational 
coalitions play an important role in the creation and maintenance of regimes, and the 
definition of national interests, through the development and sharing of knowledge and 
the process of learning.
These concepts and generalisations form the analytical framework for discussing 
cooperation in this thesis. It is these concepts, generalisations and propositions that 
need to be examined in the course of the investigation of the Antarctic case study and of 
environmental politics in international relations as a whole.
Theorising about change
The concept of change, as Rosenau observes (1989:15), is "a difficult and elusive 
concept, pervaded with ambiguity and marked by a deceptive simplicity". This 
investigation of the literature on change in international relations theory examines 
debates about the processes of, as well as the potential for, change.57 The propositions 
elucidated here will be useful when we examine, later in this thesis, change in 
environmental politics and practice in the Antarctic Treaty system. Further, the debate 
about how best to cooperate on international environmental issues includes an explicitly 
normative and prescriptive demand for change in the way states define national interests 
and conduct international relations. As outlined in the introduction, this thesis explores 
how states have responded to those demands, and to new knowledge on the 
environment, and the extent to which there has been a change in the nature of 
cooperation on environmental issues.
57. A word of caution is warranted here. It should not be assumed that changes in a regime, or new 
policy preferences on the part of any actor within a regime, are inherently progressive or 
benevolent. They may or may not lead to a strengthening of the regime or to an improvement in 
cooperation, or in the management of the issue area.
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Demands for change
It is instructive to examine briefly the demand for normative change, before proceeding 
to an investigation of the dynamics, and complexity, of the process of change in 
international relations. At a functional level, states are challenged (principally by 
NGOs) to improve their policies and practice with respect to environmental issues. It is 
argued, however, that in the long term, success in meeting the environmental challenge 
will be limited while cooperation among states is largely determined by sovereignty 
values and norms deriving from the state system. As well as an impetus for change in 
rules and procedures there is, therefore, a demand for new norms and principles, and 
even for a shift from a state-based international system to some form of "cooperative 
internationalism".
Thus it is argued that the successful management of environmental problems requires 
not only cooperative adjustment in the short-term (which can go a long way to 
mitigating some of the effects of environmental mismanagement), but ultimately a 
transformation of the international system so that interdependence norms eventually 
replace sovereignty norms. This critical argument is advanced by scholars who might 
be described, in the paradigm debate, as "post-realists"58 (Falk 1983:14) and by non­
governmental environmental organisations whose challenge derives from the practical 
experience of the difficulties encountered in moving states on environmental issues.
In this connection, the question arises as to exactly why managing environmental issues 
should require a transformation of the international state system. Essentially, the 
argument for a transformation of the state-system rests on the need to come to terms 
with the cumulative impact of environmentally irresponsible behaviour and the 
irreversibility of environmental change.
In this view, the playing out of competing national interests in the international system 
is seen to limit the extent of cooperative adjustment and thus the extent to which it can 
address these core environmental issues. This is because, in identifying national 
interests and thus the degree of adjustment that will be accepted, the values of states 
focus (on the whole) on short-term interests. Environmental security, on the other hand, 
requires a focus on long-term interests and a recalculation of the value of 
intergenerational equity and the relative values of the ethic of the natural world and the 
ethics of human interests. In this transformation, therefore, the existing hierarchy of
58. The models which fit into the "post-realist" or what might be called a post-statist approach vary 
widely, from the ideas in Gurtov (1988) through the world order models of Falk and Mendlovitz 
(see, for example, Richard A Falk etal (eds) (1982) Toward a just world order, Westview, 
Boulder) to regionalists like Kothari.
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values which privileges a state’s political and economic concerns over environmental 
ones must be restructured.
Gurtov (1988:19) argues that the more transnational politics becomes and the more 
global some of the issues, the less relevant and effective are policies and interpretations 
based on a narrow concept of national interests.59 Astrophysicist Carl Sagan, in 
testimony to a 1985 US Senate Committee hearing on legislative responses to the threat 
of excessive global warming, warned that
nations ... have to make a change from their traditional concerns about 
themselves and not about the planet and the species, a change from the 
traditional short-term objectives to longer-term objectives ... [W]hat is 
essential is a global consciousness (cited in Seyom Brown 1988:184).
Further, defection from norms and rules of an environmental agreement (when a state’s 
short term interests are perceived to be disadvantaged) can have irreversible 
consequences for the state of the environment.60
What we are presented with in this particular debate, therefore, are competing value 
systems. For realist analysts and states operating in what they perceive to be an 
anarchic world system, the dominant values are sovereignty, autonomy, self-help and 
interest perceived as states self-interest. For the post-statists demanding change, the 
dominant values should be interdependence, system transformation, interest defined as 
human (or even planetary) interests, political accountability, peace, justice and 
ecological balance.61
The potential for change
Realist approaches to international relations assert that the potential for change is 
limited by the nature of the international system and by a state’s position within that 
system. Generally, realist models pay little attention to how changes in the intentions 
and actions of particular state actors come about, except in response to changing power 
relationships in the international system. Hegemonic stability theory suggests that
59. In a similar vein Caldwell argues (1988:14) that the "complex transnational character of many 
environmental problems presents special difficulties in a world governed upon premises of 
exclusive national sovereignty".
60. One might argue here that trade problems require high levels of interstate cooperation and a 
degree of harmonisation of domestic economic policies as the basic condition for their 
resolution. Defection from such norms by some states in the case of trade can be damaging but 
not necessarily irreversible or fatal to a changing trade regime and the international economic 
order.
61. Gurtov (1988) argues for "global humanism" and Seyom Brown (1988) suggests that the new 
ordering principle should be polyarchy, rather than anarchy or hierarchy. Gerald and Patricia 
Mische (cited in Falk 1983:45) envision a new order of relationships based on universal social 
justice for all persons.
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change in a regime, or in the international system generally, is dependent upon the 
values and structural capabilities of the hegemon. Game theoretic approaches tend to 
concentrate on the sets of preferences at any one time and therefore, as Jervis argues 
(1988:326-7), set the question of change to one side. Questions of learning through 
experience or knowledge, or changes in values and ideas, are generally outside the 
ambit of realist interpretations of change.
The theories of the broad realist tradition therefore shed little light on the process of 
non-hegemonic peaceful change generally, or with respect to environmental issues 
particularly. Further, given its fundamental assumptions, the realist tradition is 
unsympathetic to the idea that international politics can incorporate global human 
interests into the interests of states. Gilpin (1981:225) argues that there is "no guarantee 
of common interest or of a willingness to subordinate selfish concerns to the larger 
good". A "unified humanity" he asserts, does not really exist. Carr is similarly 
sceptical on the existence of a "harmony of interests" which he describes (1981:42;45) 
as the idea that the interests of the community and the interests of individuals coincide 
and that "nations in serving themselves serve humanity". We must reject, he argues 
(1981:60) as "inadequate and misleading the attempt to base international morality on 
an alleged harmony of interests".
The "post-realists" counter that
realist decision-makers may be driven toward globally meaningful 
change by self-interest... [A]s state leaders come to appreciate the non- 
military threats to national security they may invest ... more in dealing 
with them and eventually more in cooperative responses to problems that 
are transboundary in scope" (Gurtov 1988:170-71).
Seyom Brown (1988:306) also argues that there is "no requirement for altruism on the 
part of the relevant actors, only that they act consistently with their enlightened self- 
interest". However the critical voices have not yet developed, as Falk observes 
(1983:15), a "convincing base for a conception of transition from the world that is to the 
world that might be, and needs to be, if current challenges are to be met".
The liberal critique of the realist tradition, with its emphasis on cooperation and 
international institutions, on transnational actors, knowledge and the processes of 
learning, is well-placed to provide some insight into the nature and processes of change 
in regimes where power-based explanations are less appropriate, and into change in 
perceptions of national interests. It may also provide some insight into the process by 
which normative change might come about.
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In the liberal tradition, under conditions of complex interdependence, change in the 
international system can be explained as a product of individual or institutional 
learning. Nye (1988:239) observes that the "more sophisticated variants of Liberal 
theory provide a useful supplement to Realism by directing attention to the ways in 
which domestic and international factors interact to change states’ definitions of their 
interests".
In the light of the analysis of cooperation in the first section of this chapter, there are 
two questions that can be asked about the nature of change in international relations 
which are relevant to this thesis. The first is how do regimes change? The second is 
how do states redefine their national interests? These are different but not unconnected 
questions. The first focuses primarily on the international dimension: the second
primarily on domestic processes. The difficulty is to link the two. The discussion here 
turns first to the level of the regime, and then to the level of the state.
Changes in regimes
Regimes may be inherently resistant to change even when, as Young notes (1983:96) 
they produce "outcomes that are widely understood to be undesirable or suboptimal". 
Sunk costs, that is the investment of past efforts, mean that institutions, as Stein 
suggests (1983:138), are not "lightly to be changed or destroyed". Regimes provide a 
known and understood framework for cooperation on an issue area. Policy objectives 
may well be defined so as to support a state’s participation in an existing regime. 
Further, the costs of establishing a new, and unknown, agreement are likely to be 
considered correspondingly high.62
In response to new technology, information or ideas about the management of an issue 
area, states may agree to modify existing rules and procedures,63 or adopt and 
implement new rules and procedures to address new agenda items within the issue 
area.64 Individually, these adjustments may not be identified as a change, although
62. Established transgovemmental bureaucratic elites within a regime are likely to be resistant to 
change of anything more than an incremental kind and then often to small changes in rules and 
procedures rather than in any reordering of the normative framework. Caution is normally the 
keyword.
63. For example, new information on the breeding habits o f a particular species of fish might require 
a rethinking of total allowable catch levels within a fisheries management regime.
64. This is somewhat akin to Puchala and Hopkins’ (1983) evolutionary change, or to Ernst Haas’ 
(1990b) adaptation through incremental growth which, he suggests, is not the same as learning. 
In their typology Puchala and Hopkins identify evolutionary change as "cognitive learning and 
the recasting of goals among dominant elites" which occurs when learning and technology foster 
new or changed goals. It is, they suggest, less common than revolutionary change where new 
principles and norms are generated in accordance with shifts in power (1983:66). Haas’ most 
recent and extensive work on change is specifically concerned with change in international 
organisations. It does not specifically address the question of why and how states’ interests 
change at the individual level, nor is he concerned with regimes and institutions in the broader
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cumulatively they may prove to be so. This process can be defined as consensual, 
incremental change. Proposals for change are normally generated through the regime’s 
decision-making processes by representatives of one or more participating state.
The appearance of new actors within the regime, whose beliefs about cause and 
rectitude (their principles) differ from those of the original members, may also as Ernst 
Haas (1983:217) observes, generate new demands and different expectations of 
behaviour. Changes to the rules and procedures of a regime may also occur as a 
strategic response to external pressures. The extent to which actors outside the formal 
boundaries of the regime, who may be state or non-state actors, are influential will 
depend on the salience of the issue-area and the extent to which there is international 
disagreement over the legitimacy of the regime.
In addition to changes in the rules and procedures that structure cooperation on an issue 
area, the norms and principles shared by states within a regime may alter. When new 
norms and principles are adopted to replace existing ones no longer acceptable to the 
regime states, this effectively means that a new regime is created with respect to the 
issue-area. The hierarchy of norms and principles inherent in a regime may also be 
reordered even if their substance does not change. Regime participants may accept the 
need to moderate sovereignty norms and accept a greater influence of interdependence 
norms to achieve an outcome that is collectively thought to be desirable. The rules and 
procedures are then likely to be adjusted to give expression to the altered normative 
hierarchy. Participating states nevertheless continue to perceive that they will not be 
disadvantaged by the change.
Most explanations of regime change, especially of change to norms and principles, have 
focussed on power-related factors within the regime. In other words, change is argued 
to result from a change in the "distribution of capabilities (overall or within issue areas) 
among major actors of world politics" (Keohane and Nye 1977:54).65 These 
explanations have the advantage of parsimony and may well be appropriate in some 
circumstances.
sense. He says, with respect to his work, that "such abstracted representations of multilateral 
state behaviour as "regime" and "system" are not appropriate here" (Ernst Haas 1990b:53).
65. Thus in imposed or hegemonic regimes, regime change results when the hegemon perceives its 
interests differently and acts accordingly or when the power of the hegemon declines and it is no 
longer able to maintain the regime. In negotiated regimes where, as noted above, the 
distribution of power need not be equal, changes in that distribution may affect the regime. See 
also Puchala and Hopkins (1983:66) and Young (1983:108). In their typology of four models of 
change, Keohane and Nye also consider an economic process model which discounts political 
factors altogether (1977:38-42).
However these explanations do not given an account of the dimensions of international 
environmental politics of interest here - the relationship between domestic and 
international factors, the role of transgovemmental and transnational coalitions, and the 
importance of knowledge and ideas. In their international organisation model of 
change, Keohane and Nye (1977:54-8) argue that such factors can work to constrain the 
ability of powerful actors to effect change in accordance with their interests. "Power 
over outcomes" they suggest (1977:55) "will be conferred by organisationally 
dependent capabilities such as voting power, ability to form coalitions, and control of 
elite networks" (their emphasis).
However this still sheds little light on a possible role for non-state actors or bureaucratic 
elites in the process of learning, or redefining national interests, or in mobilising states 
to change. The knowledge to which regime participants respond, as discussed above in 
the section on theorising cooperation, may be generated by the scientific community, or 
by non-governmental organisations, who function through transnational coalitions to 
impact upon the regime, as well as upon individual states. The incremental process of 
change described here results from the interplay between transgovemmental and 
transnational coalitions.
Redefining national interests
Regime change cannot be separated from changes in national interests. Institutional 
learning and individual learning are linked. As I have outlined earlier in this chapter, 
national interests in any issue area are given expression in policy objectives (the ends) 
and the particular measures and actions (the means) that are believed to meet those 
broad policy objectives. However, those objectives do not exist independently of the 
sets of values and principles held by the players in the national and regime games. It is 
appropriate to consider not only how the definition of ends or means might change but 
also how new values and priorities are incorporated in these.
Peter Haas (1989:397) distinguishes between single-loop learning (the "pursuit of new 
instrumental policies while the ends remain constant or unquestioned") and double-loop 
learning ("the recognition of new ends and the adoption of new means to accomplish 
them"). Nye (1987:378) offers three ways in which perceptions of national interests 
may change: because of domestic shifts in power, through cognitive change and
learning in response to new knowledge or through normative change.66 A state’s policy 
objectives may change with a change of government or when one group of decision­
makers gives way to another. Policy preferences on international environmental issues 
are increasingly the outcome of domestic political contests in response to international
66. For example, changing beliefs that apartheid can no longer be tolerated. Change of this sort is 
based on new values which are not dependent on scientific or technical knowledge.
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debates. Traditional foreign ministry elites may be challenged in their policy 
recommendations by bureaucrats from other ministries, especially the newer 
environmental ministries.67 Environmental organisations, the scientific community and 
commercial interests are also participants in this domestic process.
The process of cognitive learning, and the role of knowledge, have been examined in 
the first part of this chapter and the analysis there is relevant to this discussion. 
Cognitive learning may also take the form of paradigmatic learning which Mann 
(1991:304) identifies as a "radical transformation of a community’s norms, values, 
beliefs, practices [and] perceptions". Thus cognitive change (in response to new 
knowledge) becomes normative change. Changing values are important not only in 
reshaping an existing regime, but also in mobilising states to seek to cooperate on 
environmental issues where no regime exists. The catalyst for a change in values, with 
respect to environmental politics, is most often to be found outside the formal state 
apparatus, within the scientific community or the non-governmental environmental 
community. The Antarctic is a case that demonstrates this.
Redefined national interests and policy objectives, whether they come about as a result 
of domestic power shifts, or normative or cognitive learning (or a combination of 
processes) do not of themselves lead to a change in how states cooperate on an issue 
area. It is useful, therefore, in returning to the international dimension, to explore in a 
little more depth the linkages between change in a state’s policy objectives and change 
in the cooperative management of an issue, through the mechanism of a regime, to meet 
those changed goals.
Where a state has new policy initiatives it will seek to have the rules and procedures of 
a regime reflect, in some way, those changes. In doing so, it will make assessments 
about which of its preferences are negotiable and which are not. For such preferences 
to be adopted through the decision-making processes of the regime (that is, incremental 
change) there must be similar support for the new objectives in other regime states. As 
with the bargaining process which leads to regime creation, the pace of incremental 
change will be set by what the least flexible of the influential states (and its decision­
makers) will accept as not being contrary to its national interests. In this process, non­
state transnational actors may well be influential in mobilising support for new policies, 
or in hindering their acceptance.
67. In most countries, environmental ministries have been established only in the years since the 
1972 UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
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Defection
The examples of Australia and France within the Antarctic Treaty system raise 
questions about why states defect from the norms and rules of a regime, and how that 
affects cooperation. The potential for defection is also important in international 
environmental politics because it bears on the need for compliance and the constraint of 
free-riders.
As Young has argued (1983:94) "deviance or non-conforming behaviour is a common 
occurrence in connection with most institutions.68 Commitment to the norms and rules 
of a regime can vary over time, both within a state and between states who are 
participants in a regime. However, defection implies some sudden, unexpected 
departure from regime injunctions. It may involve refusing to comply with agreed rules 
or measures, or the breaking of unwritten conventions on what is appropriate practice 
within a regime. Defection is a manifestation of a change, initially at the level of the 
state, but also at the level of the regime as it impacts upon cooperation.
In Putnam’s terms, defection can be voluntary or involuntary (1988:438). The former 
refers to "reneging by a rational egoist in the absence of enforceable contracts". Thus, 
defection appears more profitable (or less costly) than compliance. Involuntary 
defection "reflects the behaviour of an agent who is unable to deliver because of failed 
ratification", in other words because of a lack of domestic support.
The test of the importance of a violation to other states rests on the extent to which they 
feel that their own interests are threatened by the violation, or the comparative value 
they attach to the norm or rule that has been violated. Defection will be judged more 
seriously if the defecting state (or states) possesses issue-specific power within the 
regime and its defection might contribute to regime instability. Thus issue-specific 
power based explanations can have some utility in connection with an examination of 
processes inside and outside the state.
Several outcomes of defection are possible. Rather than inspiring a "spiral of conflict" 
(Jervis 1988:330) it may be confined to one round of action and reaction (in game 
theoretic terms). Non-compliance or defection does not necessarily lead to a change in 
the regime, nor to its demise, nor imply that the regime is even inherently unstable.69 
However, continual non-compliance by the actors most affected by the norms and rules
68. Puchala and Hopkins (1983:89) also note that in most regimes "a certain degree of unorthodox 
behaviour is tolerated and not taken as a challenge to the regime".
69. Although it might indeed do so as any state cannot be certain of the unintended consequences of 
defection from regime injunctions.
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of a regime is likely to lead to its demise.70 A defecting state may subsequently 
withdraw from a regime because of the belief that both its short and long-term interests, 
that is policy objectives, can no longer be met by continuing to cooperate with other 
states on the management of an issue area.
Non-compliance or defection is not necessarily dysfunctional. Jervis (1988:330) 
suggests that "defection in one instance can produce mutual cooperation over the longer 
run", a proposition supported by Kratochwil (1984:708) who observes that "from non- 
compliance can come orderly change ... or the establishment of a new and 
discontinuous order" (my emphasis).
Defection may signal an increasing dissatisfaction on the part of one or more states with 
the pace of incremental change. Violation may be useful to overcome institutional 
inertia. The defecting state may then seek to persuade its regime partners to adopt rules 
and procedures congruent with its redefined objectives or in support of new policy 
initiatives, and may thus effect regime change. In mobilising support for its initiatives, 
the processes of leadership and bargaining described earlier in this chapter are relevant. 
Again, the Antarctic case provides a clear example of leadership and bargaining at work 
following defection.
The extent to which the defecting state is able to build coalitions and mobilise that 
support within the boundaries of the regime will depend upon several factors. These 
will include the extent to which those new policy objectives are shared by other 
participants in the regime. It will depend upon the impact other states believe the new 
policy objectives, if adopted, will have on their interests and preferences within the
70. The International Whaling Convention is a case in point. If those countries engaged in whaling 
cease to abide by its rules, then the regime is no longer effective, even if non-whaling states 
have not withdrawn from the agreement Further, regimes do not cease to exist only because of 
non-compliance with the rules or norms. They may cease to exist because the regime is no 
longer required. Regimes may also cease to function, but the agreement may not be dissolved. 
The ANZUS arrangement is a case in point and provides a good case study of change in a 
security regime. After the New Zealand government’s decision not to permit US nuclear- 
capable vessels into New Zealand harbours (even though there was technically nothing in the 
ANZUS pact about nuclear vessels) the arrangements under the agreement ceased to operate 
between the three parties (Australia is the third), although the Australian and US governments 
continued to refer to the pact in describing their security relationship. Nevertheless the ANZUS 
treaty has not been declared null and void and it is still possible, if the New Zealand government 
"changes its mind" that the practices under the treaty will be resurrected. In passing, this is also 
a particularly interesting example of the processes of change resulting from the impact of new 
ideas and values on domestic policy processes feeding into the international arena, and of the 
role of non-governmental organisations in mobilising those ideas. It is also an example of the 
changing importance given to particular values within a regime (in other words, the security 
umbrella against Japan which ANZUS was intended to provide in the 1950s ceased to be 
important and it was possible for other values to be considered).
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regime. Transnational non-state actors such as NGOs or the scientific community may 
be crucial in assisting or hindering a defecting state to mobilise that support.
Conventional international relations wisdom would argue that change in a state’s 
national interests or in the way states cooperate is unlikely to be based on normative 
change, or a paradigm shift. However, defecting states may not be necessarily ‘free­
riders’ nor is defection necessarily the natural outcome of the incentive to ‘cheat’, in 
game theoretic terms.
Defection is the outcome of a redefinition of national interests, or the way in which it is 
believed by relevant actors that the interests of the state can best be met So called 
altruistic values (such as support for human rights, or for the protection of nature) have 
generally been posited as subordinate to political and economic values in determining 
the way any one state conducts its foreign policy or defines its national interests. 
National interests are most often argued to rest on short-term and instrumental interests. 
Yet the discussion on cooperation in the first section of this chapter raised the 
possibility that learning could occur in response to new values as well as to new 
knowledge on environmental issues.
The idea of an ‘enlightened’ self-interest (which, by definition, can be linked to 
learning) involves a balancing of short- and long-term interests, and the recognition of 
long-term national interests as being connected to (and ultimately met by) a greater 
global good. Short-term interests are restrained in the interests of long-term gains 
(which are often loosely defined) 71 which with they might be in competition. The 
point at which cognitive learning, that is a reassessment of policy goals in response to 
new knowledge, becomes a normative change based on a new set of values and 
principles, is unpredictable and the process is not easily amenable to analytical 
explication.
Change revisited
This section on theorising change has revealed that the debates with respect to 
cooperation on environmental issues relate to the potential for change, the need for 
change, and the processes of change. Separately, we can make generalisations about 
each of these. However, even when these generalisations are taken together, we are still 
unable to see clearly how cognitive change on environmental issues (in the Antarctic 
Treaty system or in the international system generally) will lead to normative change, or
71. For example, environmental security or ecological sustainability for future generations is a fairly 
general goal with little specificity, but which may require constraints upon economic growth and 
resource use in the short-term.
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to a possible transformation in the nature of the international system. This is because 
the theoretical literature still lacks a causal explanation for these processes.
The context-specific generalisations on change that are set out here derive from that 
literature which argues, first, that the potential for change is not limited by the nature of 
the international system and, second, that change is not solely related to shifts in power 
relationships. These generalisations can be summarised as follows. Change in the 
practice of international relations, and in the values that guide that practice, is essential 
if the environmental challenge is to be met. Change in cooperation on environmental 
issues comes about through transformation of existing regimes, or the creation of new 
regimes where none existed before. This process of change occurs through the 
redefinition of national interests (individual learning) and collective decision-making 
(institutional learning). Non-state actors, especially the environmental movement and 
the scientific community, are important sources of new knowledge and ideas which 
serve to encourage learning and mobilise change. As with the generalisations on 
theories of cooperation, these generalisations concerning change need to be examined 
critically in the course of this thesis.
Conclusion
The task of this chapter has been to draw out, from the literature of international 
relations theory, context-specific generalisations to guide the analysis in this thesis of 
environmental politics in the Antarctic Treaty system and its wider context of 
international environmental issues.
This chapter has argued that the broad realist tradition in international relations is 
limited in its usefulness here because its state-centrism restricts what it has to say on 
factors relevant to international environmental politics: the impact of new knowledge, 
ideas and values, the role of non-state actors and the interaction between domestic and 
international politics. This chapter has therefore proceeded from the position that 
understanding the processes of cooperation and change, as they apply to the Antarctic 
Treaty system case study and to the management of international environmental issues 
generally, can be best served by an analytical framework that seeks to look inside the 
state and beyond the state, and which addresses the admittedly complex linkages 
between them. In doing so, this chapter has derived the analytical framework for this 
thesis from the liberal tradition of international relations.
In examining this Antarctic case study and questions about the management of 
environmental issues on the international agenda, the analytical framework developed 
here points to an examination of:
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the nature of principles, norms, rules and procedures which define the regime 
and the processes and outcomes that result;
the process of institutional bargaining and the exercise of leadership; 
the role of transgovemmental elites;
whether or not an epistemic community can be identified and, if it can, how it 
has functioned;
the activity and influence of non-governmental organisations; 
the nexus between domestic and international politics; 
the nature and processes of change.
The relevant concepts and generalisations set out here are often contested, as is made 
clear in the discussion above. This analytical framework does not formulate these 
generalisations as propositions at this point, but rather leaves their argument open to 
examination in the working through of the case study. In the conclusion to this thesis 
the worth of the concepts and generalisations will be set against the empirical 
experience.
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Chapter two
CONSTRUCTING A REGIME: THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 
Introduction
Interstate cooperation on the Antarctic is structured by a regime built on the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959. This chapter explores the construction and maintenance of that regime 
to set the context for the analysis of environmental politics in the chapters which follow.
We should not assume, in line with Oxman’s caution (1978:288), that the Treaty was 
drafted "in splendid isolation by a group of profound wise men whose overriding 
characteristic was foresight", an assumption which consigns pre-Treaty events to "a son 
of pre-history". The deeply entrenched interests and demands which were brought to 
the Antarctic negotiating table in 1958 and 1959 were the product of that past, and 
states were not about to abandon them. Those national interests have continued to 
dominate the politics of the Antarctic.
Antarctic history and politics prior to the negotiation of the Treaty has been well 
documented and analysed by Antarctic scholars.1 The first part of this chapter does not 
seek to repeat that exercise in any extensive way but to examine, briefly, the historical 
context of the Antarctic regime.
My concern in the second part of this chapter is to consider the Antarctic Treaty as an 
inchoate regime. In other words, I examine it as a basis for cooperation, exposing its 
principles, norms, rules and procedures. This framework has not been widely used in 
the Antarctic literature, with the exception of Peterson (1988) whose emphasis differs 
from mine. Peterson is concerned with examining the processes of regime development 
and implementation generally, whereas I am concerned in this thesis with locating 
environmental decision-making within the Antarctic regime framework.2 As 
subsequent chapters in this thesis depend on the context-specific arguments developed 
here, it is worth examining the basis of the regime in some depth, particularly as its 
major premisses are not widely known.
1. See, for example, Anderson (1981), Shapley (1985:1-18), Beck (1986b:2145), Quigg (1983:5- 
38) and Headland (1989). See Fifield (1987) on the scientific component of early Antarctic 
expeditions.
2. Peterson’s work was published before the Minerals Convention was adopted and, obviously, 
before the negotiation of the Madrid Protocol. The analysis of those agreements forms a major 
part of the case study of this thesis.
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The third section examines the implementation of the Antarctic regime after 1961 and 
analyses its main normative and procedural features.
I: the history of Antarctic politics
Antarctic history prior to the mid-1950s can be conveniently divided into two slightly 
overlapping periods - the so-called Heroic Age of exploration (1770 to 1915 or 
thereabouts) during which time the Antarctic was sought, discovered and explored, and 
the Imperialist Era (1908 to the mid-1950s) when territorial claims, and the attendant 
potential for conflict in the region, were established. Throughout, those who have gone 
to the Antarctic and surrounding oceans have been driven by a combination of motives - 
adventure, empire, commerce and science.
Even with the benefit of modem technology the Antarctic is a dangerous and 
inhospitable place. It is a continent characterised by extremes. It is the coldest, driest, 
windiest place on earth. Average temperatures in the Antarctic rarely rise above 
freezing, even in the summer months. Annual precipitation is minimal, less even than 
the Sahara.3 Katabatic winds (caused by local gravitation of cold air currents down 
steep slopes) can reach 300 km per hour. All but 2 percent of the continent’s 13.5 
million square kilometres4 is covered by a slowly moving ice sheet, with an average 
thickness of 2000 metres.5 The continental ice-cap also extends offshore in permanent 
ice-shelves.6 The continent is almost inaccessible during the long months of winter 
darkness when pack-ice almost doubles the size of the continent. Large tabular (flat- 
topped) icebergs which break free of the ice shelves and glaciers compound the dangers 
to shipping at all times of the year.
Thus the Heroic Age, which began and ended with British explorers, was aptly named.7 
It was Captain James Cook who first circumnavigated the continent in 1772-75
3. At the United States Amundsen-Scott station at the South Pole the annual mean temperature is - 
49‘C and annual precipitation averages about 7cm although towards the coast precipitation can 
be as much as 30cm per year.
4. This is approximately one-tenth of the earth’s land surface and larger than the United States and 
Mexico combined.
5. At its deepest (or highest, for the Antarctic has the highest average elevation of all the 
continents) it extends to 4500 metres. This ice sheet contains approximately 70 percent of the 
world’s fresh water and 90 percent of its ice. If the ice-cap were to melt completely the world’s 
oceans would rise by about 60 metres (about 200 feet). However, the release of the great weight 
of the ice, which depresses about one-third of the Antarctic land mass to below sea-level would 
mean that much of Antarctica itself would still be above water. There are some ice-areas away 
from the coast - the McMurdo Dry Valleys, the Burger Hills, the Larsemann Hills and the 
Vestfold Hills.
6. These ice-shelves constitute about 10 percent of the Antarctic. The largest are the Ross, 
Filchner, Ronne and Amery (all named for Antarctic explorers). As an example, the Ross ice- 
shelf is about the size of France.
7. The existence of a ‘great southern land’ had long been a subject for speculation. The Greek 
explorers speculated on the existence of a geographically-balancing southern continent after
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although, as far as we know, he never saw it.8 He saw fit to pronounce "...I can be bold 
enough to say that no man will ever venture farther than I have done; and that the lands 
which may lie to the South will never be explored" (Quigg 1983:8).
Cook was, unwittingly, the harbinger of resource exploitation in the Antarctic region. 
His reports of abundant wildlife in sub-Antarctic latitudes attracted sealers (mainly from 
Norway, Britain and the United States) to the southern oceans where they proceeded to 
decimate seal populations to such an extent that by 1830 the industry was at an end.9
The first sighting of the continent itself sometime in 1820 or 1821, and thus the right to 
claim discovery, is disputed.10 The British, Russians (later the Soviets) and the 
Americans have all fielded candidates.* 11
In the late 1830s scientific expeditions were mounted by the United States (under 
Lieutenant Charles W ilkes),12 the French (Jules Sebastian Cesar Dumont D ’Urville) and
Pytheas journeyed to the Arctic. Post-Columbian maps included "terra australis incognita" (the 
unknown southern land). The journeys of explorers whose names are well known to history, 
Diaz, Magellan, Halley, dispelled many of the myths about this unknown land, even though they 
never saw it or came close to it. Early eighteenth century explorers sailed southward searching 
for great riches and command of strategic trade routes. Their voyages were made more 
dangerous by the natural obstacles confronting them in their quest for the southern land - the 
winds and storms of the Roaring Forties, the Furious Fifties and the Screaming Sixties and, as 
they moved southward, the ever present and unpredictable ice.
8. According to Quigg (1983:8) Cook never claimed to have seen the Antarctic, although he 
admitted that it was probable that he had seen part of i t  He did land on South Georgia and also 
showed that the Antarctic was not connected to New Zealand which he had ‘discovered’ in 1769.
9. The most sought after seals were the fur seal and the elephant seal. The numbers killed may 
well be in the scores of millions.
10. According to Polynesian legend a Polynesian chief sighted the continent in 650 AD.
11. The British assert that Edward Bransfield saw the Antarctic Peninsula late in January 1820. The 
Americans argue that what Bransfield called Trinity Land was, in fact, an island. The British 
claim is somewhat undermined by the fact that Bransfield’s report to the Admiralty was 
subsequently lost. However it seems likely, from his charts and crew reports, that he sighted the 
continent sometime in February (Quigg 1983:10). The Russian contender (later claimed by the 
Soviets) was Thaddeus von Bellingshausen who, in the employ of Czar Alexander I, crossed the 
Antarctic Circle in January 1820. He never claimed to have seen the mainland, although again 
his ships log and diary indicate that he may well have done so (Quigg 1983:11). Alexander I 
Land, which Bellingshausen named in January 1829 assuming it to be part of the continent was 
shown, 120 years later, to be an island. The Americans have fielded two candidates: sealer 
Nathaniel Palmer (only 21 at the time) who sailed close to the Peninsula in November 1820 and 
Captain John Davis, who went ashore on the Antarctic Peninsula on 7 February 1821 - the first 
recorded landing. According to US historians, Palmer must have seen the Antarctic mainland 
(see Quigg 1983:11). Bellingshausen and Palmer met off Deception island (Quigg 1983:12; 
Shapley 1985:8). Shapley suggests (1985:27) that Captain McFarlane in the British ship, 
Dragon, may have landed earlier than Davis. The first undisputed landing on the main part of 
the continent did not occur until 1895.
12. David Jaffe believes Wilkes’ journey may have provided the model for the story of Moby Dick 
(see Shapley 1985:28-29). Wilkes’ expedition was the first to have the official backing of the 
US government, by virtue of an act of Congress of 18 May 1836 (Hunter Miller 1927:508). 
Wilkes was courtmartialled, but acquitted, upon his return to the US.
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the British (Captain James Clark Ross). All three made new discoveries which had 
implications for later debates over territorial rights.13
Interest in Antarctic exploration waned after 1830, but was revived again in the 1890s 
by scientific, and territorial, interests. In the next twenty years, several scientific and 
exploring expeditions were undertaken.14
In the early years of the twentieth century, Antarctic expeditions, previously confined to 
coastal regions, sought to explore further inland culminating in the race for the South 
Pole.15 Roald Amundsen planted the Norwegian flag at the South Pole on 14 December 
1911, a month ahead of his rival, Englishman Robert Falcon Scott whose party perished 
on the return journey.16
From the turn of the century, whaling became the dominant resource industry in the 
region. Norway and Britain were the main whaling nations, although ships from Japan, 
the Netherlands, Russia and Argentina were also active. The over-exploitation which 
had characterised sealing was repeated by the whaling industry.
Antarctic imperialism
By the early 1900s thirteen countries had, through the activities o f their nationals, 
established some degree of interest in the Antarctic, based variously on discovery, 
exploration, commercial activity and scientific investigation.17 The Antarctic was 
considered by them to be terra nullius, land owned by no-one, and therefore properly 
open to territorial claims. During the years from the turn of the century until the 1930s 
(at least) Antarctica became "the scene of a final, frantic phase of Western imperialism"
13. Wilkes’ expedition followed and mapped the coast of East Antarctica for 2400 kms, and 
therefore has some political significance for the inchoate US claim. Dumont D ’Urville 
discovered, but did not set foot on, the coast he named Terre Ad61ie, later claimed by France. 
Ross discovered Victoria Land, the Ross Sea and the Ross Ice Shelf, which he called the Great 
Ice Barrier.
14. A Belgian expedition led by Baron de Gerlache sailed in 1897 (with a young Roald Amundsen 
as first mate). Gerlache was the first expedition to winter over in Antarctic waters (because his 
ship, the Belgica, stuck fast in pack ice). Borchgrevink, a Norwegian-born resident of Australia 
(financed by private British funds) headed south in 1898. Borchgrevink was the first to winter 
deliberately on the mainland and, using sledge dogs for the first time in the Antarctic, reached 
78*S, further south than anyone had ever been before. Three major expeditions sailed in 1901, 
from Germany (von Drygalski), Sweden (Nordenskjöld) and Britain (Scott). Other expeditions 
in this period included Charcot (1908-10), Shackleton (in 1980 and 1914-15), Filchner (1911- 
13), the first Australasian Antarctic expedition under Mawson (1911-1914), and a Japanese 
expedition in 1911-12.
15. In 1907, Shackleton came within 97 miles of the South Pole. The British flag was raised at the 
South Magnetic Pole on 16 January 1909 by (Australian) Professor Edgeworth David’s three 
man party.
16. Scott’s party reached the South Pole on 17 January 1912.
17. Britain, Norway, the United States, Russia, France, Japan, Belgium, Australia, Sweden, 
Germany, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Argentina.
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(Henrikson 1986:3) with the race to acquire new territory on the last place on earth 
available for expansion. Contemporary observers drew attention to the "familiar 
Imperialist expansion movement" and "the final manifestation of that impulse to 
explore ... and exploit new lands" (Anon 1930:221).18
This territorial expansion placed the Antarctic firmly and permanently on the 
international political agenda. By the mid-1940s there were seven formal claims to 
parts of the Antarctic, established by Argentina, Britain and Chile (the three claims 
overlapped), Australia, France, New Zealand and Norway (see attached map). An 
unclaimed sector, Marie Byrd Land, was tacitly ‘reserved’ for a possible American 
claim. The claims were contentious. Only five of the seven (Britain, Australian, New 
Zealand, France and Norway) were mutually recognised. The claimants asserted the 
right to exercise jurisdiction in their territory over the nationals of any other state, a 
right not acknowledged by the non-claimant states. Other states with varying degrees of 
interest in the region argued that the exercise of sovereign rights could only be based 
upon the perfection of an inchoate title by effective occupation. The inhospitable 
Antarctic, they argued, had not been effectively occupied by the claimants and the 
claims were thus invalid.19
The British were the first to lay formal claim to Antarctic territory, based on prior 
discovery, exploration, commercial and administrative activities.20 In 1908, by Letters 
Patent, the Governor of the Falkland Islands was charged with the administration of 
undefined lands lying to the south. No official protests from other states were received. 
The claim was further delimited in 1917, to describe a sector with its apex at the South 
Pole, thereby establishing a precedent for other claims which were to follow.21
The applicability of the sector principle to the Antarctic claims is hotly debated by 
international lawyers. Developed initially to support Canadian claims in the Arctic, it 
relies there on continuity and contiguity. Hayton (1960b:398) has described the
18. There were 169 expeditions to the Antarctic prior to World War II. 75 were sponsored by the 
British, with the United States in second place with 24.
19. For analysis of the interests of the various Antarctic states and the claims see Shapley (1985:65- 
82), Hayton (1960b); Quigg (1983:110-141). On the international law debates about the claims 
and the exercise of sovereignty see, inter alia, Greig (1978), Conforti (1986), Johnson (1976), 
Bernhardt (1975) and Honnold (1978).
20. Britain (through the Governor of the Falkland Islands) levied fees on whaling vessels which had 
to process their catches on land. The invention of the factory ship in 1926 meant that whalers 
became less reliant on port facilities.
21. The original 1908 claim mistakenly included parts of the Chilean and Argentine mainland 
(Shapley 1985:69). The British claim is to all lands lying south of 50*S between 20* and 50*W 
longitude, and south of 58*S between 50* and 80*W. This includes the South Shetland and 
South Orkney Islands, which lie just north of 60*S, the line used now to define the outer limits of 
the Antarctic Treaty area, and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands which are just 
south of 60*S.
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application of this principle to large areas of undiscovered land (and much of the land 
claimed in the Antarctic had not been discovered when the claims were made) as a 
"flagrant flaunting of international law standards [which] should be exposed as such".
The British government was keen to claim the whole of the Antarctic for the British 
empire, a policy endorsed at the Imperial Conference of 1926 (Hunter Miller 1927:508). 
In pursuit of this aim, and on the grounds of British discovery and exploration, the Ross 
Dependency was claimed by Order-in-Council in 1923, to be administered by the 
Governor-General of New Zealand.22 In 1933, again by Order-in-Council, the British 
government placed 42 percent of the continent, much of it unexplored, under Australian 
control.23 The Australian government was a much keener claimant than its New 
Zealand neighbour.
The declaration of the Australian Antarctic Territory had been delayed by the French 
announcement in 1924 of its formal claim to Terre Adelie, which lay in the area 
designated by the British for Australia.24 The French claim was based on discovery and 
exploration, although no French person had ever set foot on the coastline sighted by 
Dumont d’Urville in 1840.25 It was further defined in 1938, but it was not until 1949 
that France attempted (without initial success because of heavy pack ice) to revisit its 
claim.
United States policy in this period was, in contrast with the British, characterised by 
ambivalence and vacillation on the claims issue.26 In 1924, Secretary of State Hughes 
first expounded a policy of non-recognition of the territorial claims on the grounds that 
discovery had to be followed by settlement to perfect claims to sovereignty over newly 
found territory (Anon 1947:97; Hunter Miller 1927:509-10). This underpinned 
American reluctance to declare an Antarctic claim of its own. Nevertheless the 
government supported extensive efforts by private expeditions to map and claim parts
22. The New Zealand government was uncertain over what to do with territory in the Antarctic. 
New Zealand’s first independent Antarctic activity was not carried out until the 1956-7 season 
(Bertram 1958:13). The first New Zealander in the Antarctic may have been a New Zealand 
Maori who participated in Wilkes’ expedition in the 1830s (Shapley 1985:29).
23. The 1929-31 British, Australian, New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition (BANZARE), led 
by Australian Douglas Mawson, was designed primarily to prepare the way for an Australian 
claim to that sector of the Antarctic to the south of Australia.
24. The Australian National Research Council urged the government to protest the French action 
and to protect Australia’s strategic and economic interests by establishing a claim immediately.
25. According to McNickle (1949:788) France had advised Britain of her territorial intentions 12 
years earlier. Although the French claim was based on discovery, France did not lay claim to 
other areas of coastline discovered by French explorers. Indeed, French expeditions of 1903-05 
and 1908-10 had been to the more accessible Palmer peninsula area (Hayton 1960b:375). The 
French claim was attached, initially, to the administrative dependencies of the Government 
General of Madagascar (Hayton 1960b:376). See also Hunter Miller (1927:508).
26. On the development of US policy in this era see, inter alia, Shapley (1985), Quigg (1983:126- 
141), Hayton (1960b:382-386).
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of the Antarctic for the United States. Secret instructions were issued, encouraging 
expeditions to do whatever they might to assist a possible US claim.27 The revival of 
US interests in this period began with the Byrd expedition in 1928.28 His first 
expedition was followed by others in which Americans saw and mapped (and secretly 
claimed for the US) more of the Antarctic than nationals of any other state. This 
activity established the basis for later US assertions of interest in the whole continent.
In 1939 Norway, concerned over an imminent German claim,29 formally asserted its 
sovereignty, based on exploration as well as commercial activity, over Dronning Maud 
Land.30 The Soviet Union, in its first expression of Antarctic interest, formally refused 
to recognise the Norwegian claim and reserved judgement on the ownership of land 
discovered by Russian explorers (Wolk 1958:44).
Argentina and Chile responded to northern hemisphere interest with claims of their 
own, even though neither had been particularly active in the Antarctic to date.31 Their 
claims were made not on the basis of discovery and exploration but on geographical 
contiguity and propinquity, and on rights of legal inheritance derived from Spain. 
Under the Papal Bull of 1493 (later confirmed by the Spanish-Portuguese Treaty of 
Tordesillas in 1494) the world was divided between Spain and Portugal - Spain was
27. Records of claims were classified. None of the claims was formalised, but contributed to the 
development by the US government of its doctrine of "constructive occupation" - discovery 
followed by subsequent exploration by air or land, coupled with a formal claim to possession as 
well as other acts, such as administrative acts, short of actual and permanent settlement (Shapley 
1985:46-7;67).
28. On 29 November 1928, Byrd and his crew were the first to fly over the South Pole, although 
Byrd was not flying the plane (Shapley 1985:34). The first flight in the Antarctic was on 16 
November 1928, by the Australian Sir Hubert Wilkins.
29. In 1938-39 Hermann Goerring sent Captain Alfred Richster on the catapult-sip Schwabenland to 
the Antarctic to carry out an aerial mapping expedition. German planes mapped 350,000 square 
miles of the continent and dropped swastika claim markers (Mitchell 1981:69). German rights 
to the Antarctic had been renounced in Article 118 of the Versailles Treaty after World War I 
(Hunter Miller 1927:508). No such requirement was made after WW1I, although earlier German 
activity was not followed up by either of the two post-war Germanies in the immediate post-war 
period..
30. Norway had already claimed Bouvet Island in 1928 and Peter I Island, west of the Peninsula, in 
1931. The basis of these claims had been Norway’s extensive whaling activities in the area. 
Norway’s claim to the mainland is to the coast and hinterland only; its southern and northern 
boundaries are undefined. One reason for this is that the ‘sector principle’ is not advantageous 
to Norway in the Arctic, and so Norway has wished to avoid giving it credibility by using it in 
the Antarctic (Quigg 1983:112) even though that principle is generally thought inappropriate for 
the Antarctic. Neverthless Norway does recognise the British, Australian, New Zealand and 
French Antarctic claims which do utilise the sector principle (although they do not, technically, 
adopt the contiguous and continuous basis that applies in the Arctic).
31. The Chilean press referred to the 1946 Byrd expedition as "an armed invasion of Chilean 
territory" (Anon 1947:97).
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given the New World, including undiscovered lands, which included the then unknown 
Antarctic.32
The Chilean claim, which substantially overlapped British territory, was promulgated 
by Presidential Decree in 1940. The President argued that his decree did not establish a 
new claim, but served only to define Chile’s historical rights in the Antarctic. Japan 
responded with a diplomatic note reserving all Japanese rights in the Antarctic.33 Chile 
did not send an expedition to the Antarctic until 1947.34
Argentina’s assertion of sovereignty over the area also claimed by Chile and Britain, is 
usually dated to 1943 although, as Hayton notes (1960b:379) "as a matter of principle 
Argentina has not issued any formal claims document. Title ... is viewed as original and 
continuous from the beginning of the Republic".35
Thus by WWII there were seven claims to 85 percent of the Antarctic. The overlapping 
of some of the claims, and the refusal by some some states to acknowledge the validity 
of any of the claims, was a source of potential tension.
In the years after the Second World War political interests dominated the Antarctic 
debate. As claimant states sought to assert their sovereign rights, and as the new 
bipolarity of the post-war international order, dominated by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, extended even to the Southern polar region the potential for conflict 
grew. Hayton (1956:590) refers to the "concerted - though not yet bellicose - rivalry" of 
this period, which was characterised by "an increase in the vigor and size of exploration 
programs, in the number of bases manned, and in the frequency of nationalistic 
declarations".36
32. See Hayton (1956) for a good and (then) contemporary discussion of the Argentinian and 
Chilean claims. For a discussion on the involvement and attitudes of other South American 
states, see Clark (1988) and Child (1988a).
33. At Australia’s insistence, Japan was required to renounce all claims and rights to the Antarctic in 
the San Fransisco Peace Treaty of 1951 (Article 2e of Chapter II).
34. This expedition established a base in the South Shetlands named ‘Soberania’ - sovereignty 
(McNickle 1949:787). The Chilean claim followed a commissioned study of Chile’s titles by 
Professor Escudero Guzman of the University of Chile.
35. The boundaries of the claim are set, apparently, by a Presidential decree of September 1946 
which prohibits publication of Argentinian maps without all of the claimed territories as set forth 
in that decree (see Hayton 1960b:379). Hayton (1956:587) notes that the first official 
Argentinian assertion of sovereignty may have come with a note to the Universal Postal Union 
in 1927. In 1942 Argentina sent its first formal expedition to Antarctica although there had been 
annual relief voyages to an Argentinian meteorological station in the South Orkneys since 1904. 
That station was established by a Scotsman, William A Bruce, but was handed over to Argentina 
when he failed to gain support from the British government
36. The claimant states habitually sent diplomatic notes to any non-claimant state sending an 
expedition to their territory, offering facilities or granting permission to visit, or reminding them 
of the territorial status if overflight was planned (see Maquieira 1986:50).
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Conflict was most likely between the three overlapping claimants, Argentina, Britain 
and Chile. Although Argentina and Chile had been unable to reach a boundary 
agreement on their claims they nevertheless agreed that there was a South American 
Antarctic and that they were the only countries with exclusive rights of sovereignty over 
it.37 A British suggestion in 1947 that the competing claims be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice for arbitration and settlement was therefore rejected.38
The British naval operation Tabarin of 1944-45 was intended to reinforce British 
presence as a counter to that of Argentina and Chile.39 Argentina revived its Antarctic 
Commission in the 1940s, and in the 1946-47 and 1947-48 seasons both Argentina and 
Chile sent expeditions into the area also claimed by Britain. The British government 
formally protested at these alleged acts of trespass.40 The potential for conflict was 
tempered somewhat when the three governments agreed, in the 1949 Tripartite Naval 
Agreement, not to send warships south of 60* South latitude.41
Both superpowers were active in the Antarctic after WWII. In 1946 the Soviet whaling 
flotilla, Slava, accompanied by Soviet scientists, appeared in the Southern Ocean.42 In 
1946-47 the United States despatched 13 ships and over 4000 service personnel to the 
Antarctic on Operation Highjump to train personnel and test equipment under polar 
conditions (with an eye to possible conflict in the Arctic). Secretary of State Acheson 
urged the expedition to take steps which might assist the US in supporting a claim of 
sovereignty 43 The Navy conducted coastline mapping operations and photographed an
37. This agreement followed discussions in March 1941 between the heads of their Antarctic 
Commissions (see Hayton 1956:586) confirmed by later discussions in 1948. Agreement was 
difficult because any settlement of boundaries would have implications for the dispute between 
them over the Beagle Channel. The US had also proposed a Pan-American sphere of influence 
in the Antarctic but interest in this waned as US interest in maintaining an influence over the 
whole continent grew. Hayton (1960b:385) has characterised this as an extension of the Monroe 
Doctrine to that part of Antarctica in the Western Hemisphere, motivated by the challenge of the 
Axis powers and the war in Europe.
38. Britain reiterated this suggestion in 1951, 1953 and 1954 and in 1955 made a unilateral 
application for arbitration which was subsequently dropped.
39. Tabarin, which established bases on the Antarctic Peninsula, was subsequently transformed into 
the Falklands Islands Dependency Survey, which was the forerunner of the present day British 
Antarctic Survey, responsible for Britain’s scientific activity in the Antarctic (see Headland 
1989:310).
40. The then recently retired Director of the Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge, England, 
referred to Argentina and Chile as the "two open usurpers" (Bertram 1958:7). Another British 
author had described "barefaced Argentinian and Chilean claim-jumping" (Illingworth 
1953:551).
41. This agreement was renewed annually until the late 1950s. See Auburn (1982:84) and Beck 
(1986b:34).
42. This followed Soviet ratification of the International Whaling Convention.
43. 68 claim markers were dropped but no public announcement about these actions was made.
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estimated 60 percent of the Antarctic coastline (one-quarter of which had not been 
previously seen).
Scientific research, which had been the corollary of exploration in the Heroic Age, 
continued to be inextricably linked with politics. The claimants viewed scientific 
activity as further evidence of their permanent presence in the Antarctic and thus 
supportive of the validity of their territorial claims.44 Between 1945 and 1950, at least 
ten nations sent scientific expeditions into sub-Antarctic and Antarctic waters.45 These 
expeditions were now almost always sponsored by governments, rather than privately 
sponsored as had been the norm before WWII.
Political interests in acquiring and maintaining Antarctic territory were joined by 
strategic interests. Concerns about Soviet interest and activity in the Antarctic, 
reinforced by memories of hostile German activities during the war,46 and compounded 
by the potential for territorial conflict among the claimants (especially Argentina, Chile 
and Britain all o f whom were US allies47) prompted the US government to initiate 
informal and exploratory discussions with the claimants on a possible legal settlement 
for the continent.48
Various proposals were canvassed with little success. The claimants were opposed to 
any internationalisation of the Antarctic (that is, anything that removed decision-making 
from their exclusive hands). A proposal that the Antarctic be established as a United 
Nations Trust Territory was not well received. In response, however, the Chilean 
government (with what we might now characterise as considerable foresight) proposed
44. The occupation of winter scientific stations on a continuous basis dates to 1944 (Headland 
1989:308).
45. Britain, New Zealand, France, Argentina, the Netherlands, the US, Chile, Norway, South Africa 
and Sweden (Headland 1989:310-336).
46. German activity in the Southern Ocean during the second world war pointed to the potential for 
southern sea lanes to be controlled by hostile powers, a scenario which also concerned Argentina 
and Chile. Part of the Norwegian whaling fleet had been captured by German Commerce 
Raiders in 1941 in the southern ocean, and German submarines had been active in sub-Antarctic 
waters. The US and Britain were also worried about hostile control in the event of either the 
Suez or Panama canals being denied them as trading routes.
47. Argentina and Chile argued that British activity in the area constituted a threat by an outside 
state under the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - the Rio Pact - which 
defines a security zone reaching to the south pole, and tried to pressure the US Government, also 
a signatory to the Pact, to support them against the British. Had the US accepted this 
interpretation it would have been tantamount to a tacit acceptance of claims (Peterson 1988:62) 
For a recent account of the impact of the Rio Treaty on the geopolitics of Antarctica and the 
Southern Cone see de Castro (1988).
48. As Young observes (1989a:55) "there was no need for a regime covering Antarctica before 
states began to assert jurisdictional claims to the continent and to establish research stations in 
the region".
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a five-year freeze of all claims and rights, during which time further scientific 
cooperation would be encouraged.49
In August 1948 the US government publicly sought responses from the seven claimants 
to the concept of a multiple condominium, stressing the importance of scientific 
investigation and research in the Antarctic, and the need to find a solution to the 
problem of the conflicting sovereignty claims.50 The United States envisaged an 
"extended exchange of views, consideration of suggestions, and probably reconciliation 
of varying viewpoints" although no formal conference was contemplated "at present" 
(Anon 1948b:301). Replies from all seven claimants were received by March 1949, but 
there was clearly no common ground among them.51
The Soviet Union made it clear that it would not countenance any domination of the 
Antarctic by the United States and its allies. In 1949 the semi-official Geographical 
Society of the USSR passed a resolution asserting that the Soviet Union had an 
"indisputable right ... to participate in the solution of questions concerning the 
Antarctic" (Wolk 1958:45) and that they had every reason not to accept or recognise 
any solution made without their participation.52 In June 1950 (just before the outbreak 
of the Korean War) the Soviet government addressed a note to the United States and six 
of the seven claimants53 declaring that any discussion on the future of the Antarctic 
should not take place without Soviet involvement, citing von Bellingshausen’s voyage 
and recent Soviet whaling interests.54
49. This proposal was drafted by Professor Escudero who had conducted the inquiry into Chile’s 
sovereignty claim.
50. Throughout this period the US had not rejected the possibility of making a claim of its own. 
President Eisenhower had approved a 1954 National Security Proposal that the US make a 
formal claim although in 1956 he revised US Antarctic policy to delete references to permanent 
stations and ongoing mapping programs (Shapley 1985:60-61; Beck 1986b:41). In the 1956/57 
season, United States nationals deposited 31 claims in various parts of the Antarctic.
51. Argentina rejected it out of hand on the grounds of "uncontestable sovereignty". Chile again 
offered the Escudero Declaration as a counter-proposal. New Zealand and the UK thought it a 
useful basis for discussion. France and Australia saw no need to discuss the sovereignty issue at 
all, although they supported the principle of scientific investigation. Norway was somewhat 
equivocal.
52. See Wolk (1958:43). The President of the Society, L S Berg, asserted that Soviet interest in the 
Antarctic had always been there but that the economic and general domestic difficulties which 
had beset the USSR during the first years of its evidence had prevented the government from 
taking the necessary practical steps.
53. There were no diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Chile at the time.
54. The Soviet note also referred to the great economic value of the territory of the Antarctic and 
adjacent waters, as well as its scientific significance (Hayton 1960b: 381-2). Many 
commentaries have referred to the time lag of almost 130 years between Bellingshausen’s 
exploration and the revival of Soviet interest However it is worthwhile noting that prior to the 
late 1920s the US had been absent (at least officially) from the Antarctic for almost 90 years, 
and the French claim had been based on a sighting 80 years previous, with no intervening French 
activity in that part of the Antarctic.
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In the absence of any common ground discussions stalled in the early 1950s.55 This 
faltering of interest has generally been described (with hindsight) as a failure to 
establish a regime (Peterson 1988:50-66). However discussions in the late 1940s were 
little more than an exchange of views as opposed to detailed negotiations. The scope 
and nature of an Antarctic problem was not clearly defined among the claimants and the 
US. The claimants did not perceive any urgent need for an agreement among them, 
either in terms of benefits to be gained or losses to be minimised. Their interests were 
defined primarily in terms of the exercise of their sovereign rights. US presence in the 
Antarctic was generally accepted and, in the absence of active interest from other states, 
any territorial or legal challenge to the claimants’ interests did not seem imminent. 
While rivalry between the overlapping claimants was potentially a matter for concern, it 
had been contained to some extent by the Tripartite Naval Agreement.56
The only point on which there was agreement was the exclusion of the Soviet Union.57 
However, in spite of Soviet pronouncements, and some concern about superpower 
rivalry extending to the Antarctic, the Soviet Union was not active in the Antarctic 
(except for whaling) and showed no signs of becoming so in the near future.
Science and politics: towards a regime
The nature of Antarctic politics changed in the mid-1950s as a result of international 
attention generated not by explorers nor even predominantly by diplomats and 
international lawyers, but by the scientific community. Concerted scientific research 
during the International Geophysical Year (1957-58) reaffirmed not only the intrinsic 
value of Antarctic science,58 but also the link between politics and science which has 
characterised the Antarctic since.
The International Geophysical Year (IGY), an ambitious programme of scientific 
investigation, began on 1 July 1957 and lasted, in fact, until the end of 1958.59 It was
55. US attention was diverted by the Korean War, and internal disagreements on US policy 
undermined any attempts to seek a solution with the claimants. Chilean interest in advocating 
the Escudero proposal was waning in part because of its forthcoming (1952) election.
56. To recall, under this agreement Argentina, Britain and Chile had agreed not to send warships 
south of 60*S.
57. The intention to exclude the USSR as an unfriendly power was set particularly against the 
background of the blockade of Berlin and the Berlin Airlift of June 1948, in which both the US 
and the UK were involved.
58. Antarctic IGY research included investigation into the aurora and airglow, gravity, cosmic rays, 
ionospheric physics, geomagnetism, meteorology, oceanography, seismology and glaciology 
(Department of State 1964:4) and contributed immeasurably to knowledge about the region and, 
indeed, the planet.
59. On the IGY generally, see Bertram (1958), Beck (1986b:46-58), Quigg (1983: 46-55). Plans for 
a third International Polar Year had evolved to become an international scientific programme 
encompassing the whole earth. Worldwide, 67 countries took part (Shapley 1985:59). Planning 
for the IGY generally attempted to separate politics from science. Resolutions were passed at 
planning meetings to the effect that IGY activities would not "modify the existing status of the
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co-ordinated by the Comitd Speciale de 1’Armee Gdophysique Internationale (CSAGI) 
of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). In the Antarctic a total of 12 
countries (the seven claimants, the US, Belgium, Japan, South Africa and the Soviet 
Union) conducted scientific programs in over 60 research stations.60 In September 
1957 the ICSU established the Special (later Scientific) Committee on Scientific 
Research to coordinate science in the Antarctic after the IGY. This non-governmental 
body provided an institutional focus for the development of an epistemic community 
and was to become a integral part of the Antarctic regime.
In the interests of advancing knowledge about the Antarctic, scientists intended that 
cooperation would be encouraged and politics put to one side during the IGY. Military 
activity was banned as contrary to this spirit, although logistical support by the military 
was permitted. Mapping activities were also considered inappropriate in the Antarctic 
because of the political implications for claims. In accordance with the principle of 
scientific cooperation, meteorological and rescue services were pooled and the 
exchange of science personnel was encouraged.61
Scientists lobbied successfully, through their national IGY committees, to secure an 
agreement on free access to all parts of the Antarctic for the purposes of scientific 
investigation. Under this agreement, which was formulated in a resolution of CSAGI, 
the exercise of sovereignty by the claimants was to be held temporarily in abeyance in 
the interests of science. Scientists from any country would free to go anywhere in the 
Antarctic without being subject to diplomatic protest notes and confrontations over the 
location of bases. In effect this embodied the principles of the Escudero Declaration 
proposed some years earlier by Chile as a possible solution to the claims issue. What is 
important is that the tacit support of the claimant governments was obtained to put it 
into effect. In this way, cooperation between states (although not strictly 
intergovernmental) began in the Antarctic with some limited concession to 
interdependence norms.
Antarctic regarding the relations of the participating countries" - thus hoping to avoid diplomatic 
exchanges (Peterson 1988:39). Note also Shapley’s (1985:59) references to the fact that the US 
planning committee seems to have been unaware that the State Department was continuing to 
make plans for a US claim and hoped to use the scientific expeditions during the IGY as part of 
its development of the "constructive occupation" doctrine.
60. For a summary of the interests of the IGY states, albeit from a British perspective, see Bertram 
(1958). Not all of the Antarctic stations were new ones - in 1955 there had been 20 stations on 
the Antarctic continent, operated by Argentina, Chile, the UK and Australia. 19 of these were 
peninsula stations; the other was Australia’s Mawson station.
61. In both the 1956/57 and 57/58 seasons, Soviet meteorologists wintered at Little America V 
station, and US meteorologists wintered at the Soviet station Mirny (Department of State 
1964:5).
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Nevertheless, this scientific cooperation did not mean an absence of politics. Given the 
potential for tension among the claimants and between the superpowers, it was perhaps 
naive to hope (as the scientists did) that politics and science could be kept completely 
separate. For example, the decentralised "mother-daughter" system for communication 
of essential weather data was constructed so that no "daughter" station was reliant on a 
politically unsympathetic "mother" (Shapley 1985:87-88). The US, which had already 
established a base at McMurdo in 1955, established the Amundsen-Scott base at the 
South Pole,62 effectively giving it a geographic foothold in all sectors.63
More importantly, scientific activity itself had direct political implications. Bertram 
argued (1958:10) that, with the exception of Belgium, the IGY Antarctic nations had 
aspirations and interests that extended beyond the scientific. He argued (1958:2) "it is 
the naive alone who are convinced that pure science is the sole stimulant" for the 
increase in activity. Hayton argued (1960b:370) in a similar vein: "in the absence of 
the political purpose it is doubtful whether so much energy and money would have been 
budgeted for permanent meteorological observatories and geographic and 
oceanographic investigations".
The so-called ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ on freedom of access to all parts of the 
continent, and the temporary ‘freezing’ of the claims that accompanied it, was 
scheduled to last only for the duration of the IGY.64 The potential for a resurrection of 
prior conflict over territory,65 as well as the spectre of future tensions between the 
superpowers, encouraged the Antarctic states to think once more about a treaty for the 
continent.
62. No-one had stood at the South Pole since Scott in 1912. Shapley (1985:85-86) gives a nice 
account of how decisions were made about the siting of some of the bases in order to avoid 
confrontation. According to Shapley (1988:313) the US had not planned a South Pole station. 
However at a 1955 IGY planning meeting, the Soviet delegate announced that the USSR 
intended to put a base there. The French chairperson (Shapely suggests with a quick wink to the 
US delegate) countered this by saying that the US already had plans for siting a station there, 
even though they had not til that moment. The Soviets were therefore "diverted" to the Pole of 
Inaccessibility. Quigg (1983:48) tells the story differently, suggesting that the US had expressed 
a prior interest in the South Pole site.
63. The siting of the seven US scientific stations was influenced by the Department of Defence and 
a 1954 National Security Council memorandum and was intended to insure that the US was 
second to none in the Antarctic (Quigg 1983:49).
64. Many of the scientific stations had been constructed to close when the IGY finished. In many 
countries IGY funding had been a ‘one-ofF arrangement which was unlikely to continue.
65. In the early 1950s Britain, Chile and Argentina had resumed their heated diplomatic 
correspondence over their conflicting claims (see Hanessian 1960:447). In 1952, British and 
Argentine expeditions exchanged gunfire (although without casualties) at Hope Bay. See Beck 
(1986b:35) for details. See Beck (1986b:32-36) also for a description of the various actions 
taken by the three competing claimants to assert their sovereignty over the area. In 1953 tension 
arose after the British tore down an Argentine hut on Deception Island and arrested two 
Argentine personnel who were expelled as illegal immigrants.
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The Soviet announcement that it would remain in the Antarctic after the IGY caused 
"genuine apprehension that the most dangerous inter-nation rivalry of all time, the Cold 
War, might be extended to the South Pole" (Hayton 1960b:371). Bertram (1958:18) 
argued that "political stability in Antarctica in the next few years is certainly 
improbable".66 These Cold War fears were exacerbated by the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary in 1956 and by the dawning of the missile age.67 Hayton (1960b:382) noted 
that "some countries were visibly nervous [at Soviet activity] and lamented privately 
that a final settlement of the political status of the area had not been reached prior to the 
widening of the field of participation to include the unscrupulous and unpredictable 
chief of the Communist bloc". The Australians especially were worried about Soviet 
activity in its territory where the USSR had built its IGY bases.68
Discussions on a settlement resumed during the IGY, this time with a greater sense of 
urgency.69 The IGY provided governments with an opportunity to break the impasse of 
the late 1940s and early 1950s on the sovereignty question. Territorial concessions 
were made and political arrangements tested without states having to make formal or 
long-term commitments. However, the political landscape had changed since 1948. 
The claimants and the United States were no longer in a position to negotiate an 
exclusive settlement. Other interests had joined the debate. The Soviet Union could no 
longer be excluded from any discussions or agreement and the other Antarctic IGY 
states (Belgium, Japan and South Africa) were unlikely to accept any agreement made 
without their involvement.
Thus the demand for a regime, that is for cooperation, arose in response to pressures 
from states outside the key ‘in-group’ (the claimants and the US). Those external states 
could not be excluded from any subsequent agreement on the Antarctic.
In May 1958, well before the IGY finished, US President Eisenhower formally invited 
the eleven other Antarctic IGY states to participate in a conference for the purposes of
66. Quigg (1983:144) notes that Admiral Dufek, who had been a leading figure in the US IGY 
effort, had drawn up contingency plans in the event of hostilities in the region.
67. The launching of Sputnik on 4 October 1957 fueled concerns about Soviet technological ability 
and the spectre of "[Soviet] intercontinental missiles poking their snouts out of southern ice 
fields" (Anon 1958:94).
68. When Secretary of State Dulles had visited Australia in March 1957, the Australian government 
asked him to do something about the situation.
69. In 1956, New Zealand Prime Minister Nash had revived the UN trusteeship proposal but again it 
was not well received. Various proposals were also made for some form of expanding 
condominium based initially on the US, New Zealand and Australia (Quigg 1983:140). In 1956, 
and again in 1957 and 1958, India, concerned at the possibility of conflict in Antarctica, 
proposed that the question of the Antarctic be placed on the UN General Assembly agenda, but 
did not press the matter in the face of Argentinian and Chilean opposition and lack of support 
from Britain. However this served to indicate that there was a potential for interest from non- 
Antarctic states.
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concluding an agreement for the management of Antarctica. Although the US took the 
initiative here, it did not function as a hegemon in the construction of the Antarctic 
regime, a point which is discussed in greater detail below.
The US invitation suggested that "the need for coordinated scientific research in 
Antarctica ... will continue for many more years" and that it was "desirable ... to reach 
agreement ... on a program to assure the continuation of the fruitful scientific 
cooperation" of the IGY. "Such an arrangement", it suggested, "could have the 
additional advantage of preventing unnecessary and undesirable political rivalries in 
that continent, the uneconomic expenditure of funds to defend individual national 
interests and the recurrent possibility of international misunderstanding" (cited in 
Hayton 1960b:371). In fact, this "additional advantage" went to the heart of the matter: 
avoiding conflict was the fundamental reason for negotiating a treaty. As Heap puts it 
(1983:105) "few, if any, of the governments invited were attracted by the positive 
aspects of the Treaty. The crucial stimulus was ... fear. Each government had its own 
scenario of the chaos it foresaw if the Treaty was not successfully concluded".
The invitation expressed the belief that a treaty could be concluded "without requiring 
any participating nation to renounce whatever basic historic rights it may have asserted" 
(in Hayton 1960b:371). It might just as well have observed that such a treaty could not 
be concluded otherwise. This provision was the quid pro quo for claimant participation 
in the negotiations and was crucial to the negotiations and the Antarctic Treaty. It was 
to be the fundamental principle of the Antarctic regime.
As well as a common interest in preventing conflict there were other interests which 
could best be met by a treaty. In spite of their ideological rivalry, the USA and the 
Soviet Union had similar interests in the Antarctic. Neither had made a formal claim 
but each had reserved its right to do so in the future.70 They were equally suspicious of 
each other’s motives. Each wanted to prevent the other gaining a dominant foothold. 
In May 1957, Senator Wiley, in introducing a congressional resolution on Antarctica, 
stressed "the prevention of a seizure of strategic areas by Russia [sic]" as a vital factor
70. The United States also took the opportunity to assert its "substantial rights and interests in 
Antarctica" including the right to make a territorial claim (or claims). The Soviet Union made a 
similar assertion in its otherwise positive response to the US invitation. A claim by the US at 
this time would have angered its allies, and effectively denied it the free access to the whole 
continent that it sought, as well as possibly motivating the Soviets to make a claim; similarly a 
unilateral Soviet claim would also have caused tensions, especially if it overlapped any of the 
other claims. The only unclaimed sector, that area called Marie Byrd Land (discovered and 
explored by American Byrd) was considered to be available for the US to claim. A joint 
resolution was introduced into the US House of Representatives in January 1957 for the purpose 
of declaring American right of sovereignty over the unclaimed sector and providing for the 
President to take such steps as were necessary to establish US sovereignty rights over other areas 
of the continent.
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in US Antarctic policy (cited in Purver 1984:890). Similarly the Soviet Union warned 
of American imperialist designs to "seize the whole of the Antarctic" (cited in Purver 
1984:890). Nevertheless, both were aware of, and wished to avoid the logistic and 
financial costs of conflict between them in the Antarctic.
All seven claimants were faced with the potential erosion of their influence in the 
Antarctic as a result of activities by other states. Bertram suggested (1958:3) at the time 
that "the five nations regarding themselves as possessed of mainland sectors are capable 
of loss" (he ignores Chile and Argentina). The passage of time, he said (1958:20) was 
"n o t... in favour of the five mutually-recognising sovereign powers".71 The Economist 
noted that "the British have a particular interest in a quick settlement, since the longer it 
is delayed the further they will be outclassed by the lavishness of American and Russian 
expenditure" (Anon 1957a: 112). The potential costs of conflict and the difficulties of 
militarily protecting territorial interests were high, with little chance of success. The 
chances of legal settlement of title in favour of any of the claimants were likely to be 
low.72 The claimants also sought, to varying degrees, to contain the influence of the 
superpowers and of the three non-claimant IGY states.
Treaty negotiations: 1958-59
On 4 June 1958 the State Department announced that all 11 states had accepted the US 
invitation. Negotiations for the treaty were conducted in two stages. Over 60 informal 
(and secret) meetings were held between 13 June 1958 and 13 October 1959, to 
facilitate frank discussion and compromise and possibly also not to alert other countries 
to the discussions.73
Points of difference during these meetings derived mainly from contending views about 
the exercise of sovereignty in the Antarctic.74 The claimants, especially Chile and
71. His distress is obvious in respect of the level of activity of the commonwealth countries vis-a-vis 
others. He said "our grandfathers must turn in their graves at this astonishing change in maritime 
power and forethought and at the depths to which the British commonwealth has sunk, so that 
great exploratory ventures into British Antarctic territory must set out in chartered foreign 
vessels flying foreign flags, because the whole commonwealth has no adequate shipping 
available" (Bertram 1958:21).
72. Hayton (1956:608) had also argued that "in all likelihood, Britain will experience extreme 
difficulty in seeing this Antarctic question through to a legal showdown".
73. Documents from the meetings are still classified, as are those of the formal treaty negotiations 
which followed. However, researchers have recently been able to work from the personal papers 
of Admiral Dufek, who was the US Antarctic Projects Officer at the time, and who was kept 
informed of progress of the meetings through a series of detailed memoranda. Shapley’s 
analysis (1985:91-100) is based on those unpublished notes from what she terms the 
"shirtsleeves meetings".
74. The Soviet Union was reluctant to discuss anything of substance at the informal meetings in 
1958 and 1959, maintaining that only questions of an agenda and representation for the formal 
conference should be considered. However the Soviet Union altered its position as progress was 
made by the other representatives on draft provisions. This may have been in part due to its
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Argentina, would not agree to any provision which derogated from their rights as 
territorial sovereigns. Thus questions of administrative arrangements, compulsory 
dispute settlement and jurisdiction were contentious.
Other issues on which there were significant differences of opinion included 
demilitarisation, the related question of inspection, the membership scope of the Treaty 
and the exploitation of resources. Nevertheless, considerable progress was made on 
draft provisions at these secret meetings.75
The Antarctic Treaty was formally negotiated at the Washington Conference which 
began on 15 October 1959.76 As with the preparatory meetings, the more than 50 
formal and informal meetings of the Washington Conference were also held behind 
closed doors, except for the opening and closing sessions.77 Thus a precedent was set 
for what Davis (1987a:27) has called the "closed circle mentality" which has continued 
to characterise the Antarctic regime. The Antarctic Treaty was concluded and signed on 
1 December 1959, less than seven weeks after the formal conference began.
II: The Antarctic Treaty78
The Treaty is an agreement to deal with a dilemma of common aversion in that the 
parties had a common interest in avoiding a particular outcome.79 It proscribes
desire to expand participation in the treaty negotiation. The Soviet Union was especially keen 
that Poland be asked to join with the other 12. Poland had been active, in conjunction with the 
Soviets, during the last part of the IGY. Plans to establish a permanent base in 1959/60 fell 
through for budgetary reasons (Hayton 1960b:389).
75. In November 1958, the US representative submitted draft articles around which further 
discussions would centre. By mid-March (1959) participants agreed that the first three articles 
should provide for Antarctica to be used for peaceful purposes only, for freedom of scientific 
research in the area, and for international cooperation in the conduct of this research. By mid- 
May there was some measure of agreement on draft provisions on the territorial claims, 
inspection, jurisdiction, the relationships between signatory and non-signatory countries, 
accession, the zone of application, periodic meetings of signatories, settlement of disputes, and 
the revision and ratification of the Treaty (Department of State 1964:9).
76. The Washington Conference took place after Khrushchev’s visit to the US in September 1959. 
The main areas of contention were the area of application, jurisdiction and dispute settlement, 
and membership scope (Hanessian 1960:467). On 23 October delegates announced that they 
had reached agreement on the principle of international cooperation in scientific research and 
exchange of information and on the principle of non-militarisation. This is not surprising, given 
that these issues had been effectively settled during the pre-negotiation discussions and were 
based on IGY precedent By mid-November 1959, the USSR and the USA had agreed on an 
inspection system. Argentina, with the support of the other southern Hemisphere nations, 
introduced the question of a complete ban on all nuclear explosions and the disposal of 
radioactive waste (see Shapley 1988:315).
77. The Conference was organised into two Committees - the First to address scientific issues 
(which were, on the whole, not contentious), the Second, legal and political ones. A credentials 
committee, a drafting committee and a committee on style were also established.
78. For analyses of the Treaty see, inter alia, Hanessian (1960), Hayton (1960a), Beeby (1972), 
Triggs (1985), Bush (1982:38-111). For an analysis which focuses particularly on regime 
components, see Peterson (1988:41-49). A copy of the Treaty is to be found at appendix 2.
79. See Stein (1983:120-130) on dilemmas of common aversion and common interest
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potentially conflictive activities and thus establishes a regime of mutual security. The 
Treaty is a product of the internal accommodation among the parties on their differing 
and entrenched views on territorial sovereignty and the exercise of jurisdiction. It 
reconciles the seemingly irreconcilable. In line with the process of bargaining which 
underpins a negotiated regime, the Treaty represents what the least flexible of the 
parties could be persuaded to accept in the pursuit of its own interests. It is 
characterised by a contrived ambiguity which leaves much open to interpretation.
The Treaty is a combination of an open membership agreement in theory, and a limited 
membership agreement in practice. Under the rules of article XIII, accession to the 
Antarctic Treaty is open to any member of the United Nations. Non-UN members may 
accede only on the invitation of the decision-making parties to the Treaty.80
Article IX establishes a two-tier system of treaty membership which entrenches the 
authority of the original signatories and those acceding states which gain decision­
making status by conducting substantial scientific research in Antarctica (collectively 
known as the consultative parties) .81 Thus science provides the basis for political 
privilege in the Antarctic regime and for membership of the Antarctic ‘club’.82 There is 
no role for those acceding states which do not conduct research (the non-consultative 
parties). Substantial research activity is not defined although examples are given.
These provisions of article IX and XIII represent a compromise between parties (such 
as the Soviet Union) which advocated open membership and those (such as the United 
States) which wanted a limited membership. In other words, any state may accede, but 
only a few may make decisions, and only after making the considerable financial outlay 
that Antarctic research involves.83
80. Several states expressed their concern at this limitation on open accession (see Bush 1982:42- 
43). Apparently one state held out on this issue, and thus consensus could not be reached on 
anything more. Both North and South Korea acceded to the Treaty under the invitation 
provision.
81. Under this article the original signatories will always be able to participate in decision-making, 
even if they do not continue to undertake scientific research. For example, Belgium, Japan and 
Norway closed their IGY stations but were not required to relinquish consultative status. Japan 
returned to the Antarctic in 1965 and Norway in the 1968-69 season. Until 1983, those who 
could not ‘participate* in decision-making were not able even to attend consultative meetings as 
observers.
82. While the Treaty establishes rules for accession, it contains nothing on the procedures by which 
a state shall become a consultative party. Van der Essen (cited in Quigg 1983:148) a long- 
serving Belgian Antarctic diplomat who was at the Washington Conference suggests that the 
conditions and procedures for consultative membership were discussed extensively during the 
negotiations.
83. Peterson (1988:41) suggests that this incorporates an implicit principle to the effect that there is 
an Antarctic community that should share the continent and its governance. However given that 
the Treaty is, theoretically at least, an open one, the nature of this Antarctic community is 
unclear. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to argue that there was an assumption on the part 
of the twelve that they had a demonstrated right to negotiate the Treaty.
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In examining the Antarctic Treaty as the basis for a regime, I consider here its 
principles, norms, rules and procedures. There are three fundamental principles (which, 
we recall from chapter one, are statements of belief, causation or rectitude) in the 
Antarctic Treaty (all of which draw on the experience of the IGY), which give rise to 
aspects of the normative and procedural framework of the regime. The first relates to 
the compromise on sovereignty, the second to the need to maintain the Antarctic as a 
zone of peace and the third to the importance of scientific research and cooperation.
The compromise on sovereignty
The unstated objective of the Treaty was to find, and maintain, a successful compromise 
on the exercise of sovereign rights in order to protect the interests of all parties, 
claimant and non-claimant. Thus the principle of compromise on sovereignty was 
entrenched in the Treaty.
Article IV is the focal point of this internal accommodation between the original 
signatories. It is best to reproduce it in full:
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or 
claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its 
activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or 
non-recognition of any other State’s rights of or claims to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No 
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
Article IV thus confirms the existence of the territorial claims, but makes no statement 
as to their legal validity. It is non-discriminatory in that it applies equally to the 
claimants, those with a basis of claim (the United States and the Soviet Union) and the 
non-claimant parties. Under the protection of article IV, nothing that the claimants do, 
or do not do, can be argued by others to diminish their rights to sovereignty or, by them, 
to enhance those rights.84 While the claimants recognised in the late 1950s that their 
interests could be best protected by a treaty, they would not agree to anything that 
prejudiced their individual positions on the exercise of territorial sovereignty.
84. Note, however, that article IV does not prevent acts or activities which might be considered the 
prerogative of a sovereign state - it simply says that they cannot be used in support of the 
assertion of claims.
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Article IV does not solve the sovereignty question: it puts it to one side.85 It is for this 
reason that it has been the subject of considerable criticism from international lawyers. 
It has been called an illusory safeguard (Auburn 1982:110) and a "constructive evasion" 
(Wyndham 1980:195). Marcoux (1971:379) argues that it casts the concept of 
Antarctic sovereignty into a "purgatory of ambiguity". Hayton (1960a:359) expressed 
his concern about the "questionable ... practice of writing sweeping exclusion articles" 
although he suggested also that the "drafters ... need to be congratulated on the 
formulation of this element of the treaty, for it was, without the slightest doubt, 
absolutely essential to a successful conclusion of the agreement".86
This article establishes what Peterson (1988:42) calls the suggestive norm that conflict 
on the sovereignty question should be avoided. It refines the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ 
of the IGY, which was in turn based on the Chilean Escudero proposal of the late 1940s. 
It fulfils the promise contained in the US invitation of 1958 that states would not have 
to renounce any historic rights in the Antarctic.
Article IV gave rise to the norm that no state would push its position on the claims to a 
logical conclusion. Thus the compromise is maintained, and conflict deterred, not by 
the threat of mutual force, nor by a hegemon, but by a reciprocal acceptance of mutual 
restraint.
The exercise of jurisdiction in the Antarctic was another issue inextricably linked to the 
sovereignty dispute. Under the rules of article VIII, observers, scientific exchange 
personnel, and their staffs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of 
which they are nationals. This article says nothing about jurisdiction in respect of other 
personnel (military, scientific and support) in the Antarctic, whether part of a national 
program or not.87 Efforts at Washington to reach agreement something more 
substantial were unsuccessful. The British delegation had hoped for a "more complete 
system of jurisdiction" (see Bush 1982:40-41) but article VIII represents the minimum 
that could be agreed in the face of opposition from Argentina, Chile and France. They 
strongly opposed any suggestion that national jurisdiction should apply on the grounds 
that it would undermine their claims to sovereignty (in spite of the provisions of article
85. The question which has exercised the minds of international lawyers is the extent to which 
international law can be frozen. A strict interpretation of IV(2) would be that, should the treaty 
collapse, the situation as at 1961 in respect of claims would pertain. This would also mean that 
the practice of free access could not be argued to support the application of a law of common 
spaces to the Antarctica. Bush (1982:60-61) lists a "string of questions" raised by article IV(2).
86. Statements made at the final session of the Plenary Committee (see Bush 1982:38-39) indicate 
that each participating state interpreted article IV as supporting its position on sovereignty which 
was the intention of the drafters.
87. Peterson (1988:43) suggests that this silence confirms that states retain jurisdiction over their 
ships, aircraft, stations, national and scientific expeditions.
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IV). The non-claimants would not accept territorial jurisdiction on the grounds that it 
would imply the rights of claimants to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non­
claimant states. In the absence of any middle ground the issue was simply omitted. 
Disputes between parties over the exercise of jurisdiction are to be addressed by 
consultation among them with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
In a further concession to the differences over jurisdiction, Article IX(5) provides that 
rights under the Treaty, such as the right of inspection, to conduct scientific programs 
and to exchange personnel are conferred directly from the date of signature, rather than 
waiting until entry into force which might imply that the exercise of these rights was 
subject to approval from other parties.
The peaceful purposes principle
The preamble to the Treaty establishes the principle that "it is in the interests of all 
mankind that Antarctica shall continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord".88
Linking the Treaty with the wider good (the "interests of all mankind") was intended to 
counter arguments that the Treaty was an exclusive agreement among twelve states for 
the protection and furtherance of their own interests. It suggests, rather, that the Treaty 
also provides a public good (peace and stability) from which all can benefit.89
This principle expresses the belief that conflict in the Antarctic would be inimical to the 
interests of the signatories and would undermine the compromise on sovereignty. 
"Discord" refers not only to actual conflict on the ice, but also to diplomatic 
disagreement over the status of the claims. It might also be taken as a gentle hint to the 
international community that they should not engage in disputes about the status of 
Antarctica. Peaceful purposes are not defined although scientific investigation clearly 
meets the test Thus the consultative parties can determine what constitutes a peaceful 
purpose at any time while the Treaty is in force.
In support of the peaceful purposes principle, article I of the Treaty confirms the 
practice of the IGY and prohibits "inter alia, measures of a military nature".90 It can 
therefore be inferred that anything not of a military nature is a peaceful purpose.91
88. Several references are made to the principles and objectives of the Treaty in its articles, but these 
are not specifically elaborated, thus leaving the Treaty parties to define them.
89. See Conference on Antarctica (1959) for statements to this effect.
90. This provision was strongly backed by the British, Soviet and French delegations (Hanessian 
1960:468). Beeby (1972:12) indicates that the final wording owed much to the Soviet drafting 
effort.
91. More recently this has raised questions about whether scientific research which has military 
applications, for example Very Low Frequency research, contravenes the Treaty. See,
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"Inter alia” signifies that the Treaty parties may prohibit any other activity determined 
by them not to be a peaceful purpose.
Measures of a military nature are not defined exclusively, but do include "the 
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military 
manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapon".92 In a continuation of IGY 
practice, article I permits the use of military personnel or equipment in support of 
scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose. However, in the absence of 
sanctions, as Almond (1985:246-7) observes, the demilitarisation rules are hortatory. 
Nevertheless, under the Treaty an entire continent and its surrounding oceans are 
effectively demilitarised, something unique in international relations.
Nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Antarctic are prohibited 
under the rules of article V.93 This article effectively applies to peaceful nuclear 
explosions.94
In further support of the peaceful purposes principle, Article XI establishes limited 
procedures for resolving disputes among parties over the interpretation or application of 
the Treaty. Parties may choose a method of resolution after consultation among them. 
A dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice but only if all parties to 
the dispute agree. The majority of Contracting Parties had been willing to accept 
compulsory arbitration by the ICJ but Argentina, Chile and the Soviet Union opposed 
this (Hayton 1960a:363). Hayton (1960b:407) lamented that the disputes settlement 
provisions were "weak, permissive and [add] little or nothing to the present 
opportunities and obligations of the nations involved". In fact, these procedures have 
never been invoked.
particularly, Hemmings (1990). Non-governmental organisations have raised the possibility that 
the US McMurdo station was being used to assist the MX missile program with targetting 
information (CAN, # 27,1985).
92. Although Peterson notes (1980:392) that official Argentine maps label some bases as scientific 
stations, but others as army bases or naval outposts. See also Financial Times, 21 January 1983.
93. Neither of the superpowers were keen on this rule being incorporated into the Treaty (Hanessian 
1960:467). The prohibition is subject to the provision that if all consultative parties are 
signatories to any other international agreement which addresses those issues, the rules of that 
agreement shall apply. In any event, this has not occurred.
94. Non-peaceful nuclear explosions and the testing of nuclear weapons would be prohibited under 
the provisions of article 1. Article V, it should be pointed out, does not prohibit the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy. However the experience of the US nuclear reactor (known as Nukey Poo) 
between 1962 and 1972 as a source of energy in the Antarctic has not been repeated. The 
reactor was never fully operational, was subject to radioactive leaks, and in the end was 
decommissioned at considerable cost, given that vast amounts of contaminated rock and soil had 
to be returned to the US for disposal, because of the prohibition on disposal of radioactive 
wastes in the Antarctic. Van der Essen (cited in Quigg 1983:148) suggests that the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy in the Antarctic was one of the most time-consuming issues at the Washington 
Conference.
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Scientific research and cooperation
The preamble to the Treaty also sets out the principle that "the establishment of a firm 
foundation for the continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of 
freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctic as applied during the International 
Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress of all 
mankind". Again, the parties imply that they are providing something (scientific 
knowledge) for the benefit of all. Scientific investigation is established as a peaceful 
purpose and as the raison d’etre of activity in the Antarctic.
Articles II and HI set out norms and rules on scientific investigation. Freedom of 
scientific investigation, and cooperation towards that end (which, as the preamble notes, 
is in the interests of all mankind) is to continue as it applied during the IGY. Article III 
sets out rules for the exchange of information on scientific programs in Antarctica and 
for the exchange of scientific personnel.95 Under article VII, the parties agree to 
provide (to each other) information on expeditions, stations and military personnel and 
equipment in the Antarctic.
Paragraph 2 of article III exhorts signatories, in implementing the principle of 
international cooperation in scientific investigation, to give "every encouragement... to 
the establishment of cooperative working relationships with those Specialised Agencies 
of the United Nations and other international organisations having a scientific or 
technical interest in Antarctica". While, taken together, articles II and HI may be 
argued to reinforce a degree of openness with respect to scientific investigation, those 
cooperative relationships have not been widely encouraged by the parties. The main 
exception is the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, a relationship which is 
explored later in this chapter.
The remaining articles of the Treaty deal with the practical aspects of activity in the 
Antarctic and the procedural components common to any international agreement. 
They are, nevertheless, shaped by the compromise on sovereignty as much for what is 
omitted as for what is included.
Decision-making: the consensus rule
Article EX sets out rules and procedures for decision-making by the consultative parties 
and is the closest the treaty comes to establishing any form of administrative machinery.
95. Scientific observations and results are to be exchanged and made freely available, although to 
whom is not specified.
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It also articulates the consensus, or unanimity, rule which has become a fundamental 
norm of the Treaty system (discussed in section in below).
Under paragraph 1 the original Contracting Parties, are to meet in Canberra within two 
months of entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places
for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of 
common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and 
recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and 
objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding:-
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII 
of the Treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
The Treaty parties have argued that this is not an exclusive list. They suggest that any 
issue which relates to the principles and objectives of the Treaty (which is open to 
interpretation given that the principles and objectives of the Treaty are not defined) and 
which meet the test of a peaceful purpose, is a valid matter for the consultative agenda.
No voting rules are established in the Treaty itself. Article LX does provide that "the 
measures referred to ... shall become effective when approved by all the Contracting 
Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to 
consider those measures". Article IX thus provides an effective veto for consultative 
governments and ensures that neither the claimants, nor the non-claimants, can be 
outvoted. The requirement for consensus is implicit. The rule that consultative 
recommendations be adopted by consensus was made explicit in the Rules of Procedure 
drawn up prior to the first consultative meeting. Bush (1982:82) argues that the "weak 
administrative arrangement is consistent with the limited objects which states, 
especially those claimant states which particularly feared erosion of their claimed 
sovereign rights, envisaged for the treaty".
Area of application
The area of application of the Treaty proved to be a contentious issue in the 
negotiations. Article VI establishes the rule that
the provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60* South 
Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice 
or in any way affect the rights, or exercise of the rights, of any state under 
international law with regard to the high seas within that area".96
96. The lines of delimitation of four of the claims stretch to 60*S at their northernmost and thus 
technically encompass areas of high seas. The Chilean and Norwegian claims have no northern
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This does not provide a definition of Antarctica which is not defined in the Treaty (even 
though it is used 40 times) except that where the term is interpreted by the Treaty 
parties to mean the continent, it includes all ice-shelves.97 Ice-shelves, therefore, are 
not high seas, even though they are not grounded on land. This was particularly 
important for New Zealand, much of whose claimed territory encompasses the Ross Ice 
Shelf.98
Article VI was drafted "so as to leave indefmite the question of what was the high seas" 
(Phleger cited in Bush 1982:144). It provides no assistance as to whether the 
continental shelf or territorial waters are high seas or not. In this respect it is linked 
with the ambiguities of article IV. For the claimants, the continental shelf and territorial 
waters are pan of sovereign territory (and therefore under national jurisdiction): for the 
non-claimants they were not. Oxman (1986:225) observes that a "difficult question is 
whether the prohibition on new claims or enlargement of existing claims [in article IV] 
applies to coastal state jurisdiction".
Article VI is also ambiguous on whether any high seas rights are to be restricted under 
the Treaty. It could be argued that military activity and the disposal of radioactive 
waste are high seas freedoms and that the Treaty rules which prohibit those practices do 
not apply when they are conducted on the high seas within the Treaty Area. In practice 
those high seas freedoms which are not explicitly the subject of any other article of the 
Treaty may be exercised freely (on the high seas) as long as they meet the test of a 
peaceful purpose.99
Compliance rules
Compliance is an important feature in the development of a regime (an aspect discussed 
below in section ID of this chapter). There are no explicit rules in the Treaty to enforce 
compliance.
The Treaty does include inspection rules "to promote the objectives and ensure the 
observance of the provisions of the present Treaty". Article VII sets out rules about 
what may be inspected, by whom and under what conditions but provides no guidance 
on what procedures are to be followed if an inspection reveals violations of the
boundary, and the British claim is set at 50*S and 58*S, although the area of the British claim 
between that and 60*S was separated after the Treaty was signed to become the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies (Beck 1986b:68). The limits of the Tripartite Naval Agreement were set at 60*S.
97. Shapley (1985:95) notes that the British were charged with the task of drafting this article, and 
came up with 15 definitions of ice.
98. Although New Zealand was a reluctant claimant, and even offered at the Washington 
Conference to relinquish its claim, if all other claimants did likewise.
99. See Bush (1982:66-70) on the high seas provisions of article VI.
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Treaty.100 All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment 
within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging and embarking 
cargoes or personnel, are to be open at all times to inspection. 101 Inspection is therefore 
intended to be continent-based, rather than covering activities on the high seas. 102 
However inspection may be conducted only on a unilateral basis: no agreement could 
be reached on multilateral inspection or the establishment of an independent 
inspectorate. 103 Thus the rules are limited. Only consultative parties may conduct 
inspections. This article is nevertheless significant in that it represents the first 
agreement by the Soviet Union and the United States on mutual inspection, although not 
on their territory.104
The parties are also required, under article X, to "exert appropriate efforts, consistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in 
Antarctica contrary to the principles and purposes of the present Treaty". However this 
is a general exhortation which adds little to the already weak compliance rules. 105
Amendment of the Treaty
Under the amendment procedures elaborated in Article XII amendments or 
modifications to the Treaty may be made at any time after entry into force by 
unanimous agreement, and ratification, by the consultative parties. The consensus 
requirement is thus reinforced. 106
100. Peterson (1988:44) suggests that the rules for prior notice of scientific programs and the 
exchange of scientists (article III) also contribute to ensuring compliance with Treaty rules.
101. Article VII also provides for aerial observation. For those states which denied the validity of the 
claims this reinforces the argument that there is no territorial airspace in the Antarctic. The 
claimants, however, can permit overflight of their territory by accepting it as a specific provision 
of the Treaty and as a concession to the principles of scientific cooperation. US President 
Eisenhower was apparently particularly pleased with this provision which he saw as an echo of 
his ‘Open Skies’ proposal (Shapley 1988:315).
102. However, given that Antarctica is not defined, and that the provisions of the Treaty apply south 
of 60*South, the question might be raised whether inspection of installations and equipment that 
are not ships, for example, drilling rigs, are covered by this provision, or whether this would be 
an infringement of high seas freedoms.
103. Soviet fears of setting a precedent for inspection in arms reduction agreements precluded 
collective inspection or the establishment of an independent inspectorate.
104. The inspection provision had initially been linked to the demilitarisation provision, but the 
provisions were delinked in the face of opposition by the superpowers.
105. This articles raises a general question of treaty law: to what extent are non-signatories bound by 
either the provisions or sentiments of an agreement to which they are not party. For example, 
are non-Treaty parties bound to refrain from making the Antarctic the scene or object of 
international discord. Shapley (1985:98-99) notes that a draft article on the rights of non-parties 
was drafted, but later dropped. See also Bush (1982:99-103).
106. Non-consultative parties then have a period of two years from the date of entry into force to also 
accept any amendments, which become effective for that NCP at the time of the notification of 
ratification. If no such ratification is deposited within two years, then that NCP is deemed to 
have withdrawn from the Treaty.
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A conference "to review the operation of the Treaty" may be requested by a consultative 
party after the Treaty has been in force for 30 years. This has led some observers to 
conclude, erroneously, that the Treaty expires after 30 years. It is, in fact, of unlimited 
duration. Amendments or modifications adopted at a review conference require the 
support of a majority of Treaty signatories, including a majority of the consultative 
parties.107 However, because review conference amendments can only enter into force 
when all consultative parties have ratified them, consensus is still likely to be sought in 
spite of the majority rule. Further, while non-consultative parties (NCPs) may 
participate in a review conference, their subsequent ratification of amendments does not 
contribute to effecting entry into force.
Paragraph 2(b) establishes withdrawal procedures but only in connection with the 
review conference procedure. If a review conference amendment has not become 
effective within two years, any party (consultative or non-consultative) may withdraw 
from the Treaty, such withdrawal to take effect a further two years from notification of 
such intention.
Omissions
There were a number of fundamental omissions from the Treaty, related almost 
exclusively to differences on the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction and the 
reluctance of some of the claimants to accept anything that could be seen to impinge of 
their autonomy. The absence of enforcement and compliance rules has already been 
mentioned. The Treaty does not establish a secretariat or organisation with legal 
personality, a point on which most of the parties would not concede. Thus decision­
making remains firmly under the control of national governments.
The question of resource exploitation (especially mineral resources) was also omitted 
from the Treaty, because of its implications for the contentious sovereignty question. 
Shapley (1985:97) suggests that a provision was drafted but its content is not known. 
As resource exploitation was not considered to be an imminent activity, and not 
fundamental to the treaty, it was left to one side.
From the perspective of this thesis, the Treaty also contains almost no reference to 
environmental protection with the exception of the conservation and preservation of 
living resources in article IX. It was added as an afterthought at the insistence of Chile 
more as a result of concern over the economic impact of unregulated exploitation than 
for the intrinsic protection of wildlife. It is the only topic listed in article EX(f) which is 
not referred to in more detail elsewhere in the Treaty. Peterson (1988:45) suggests that
107. This majority rule applies only to review conference amendments and does not replace the 
consensus rule implicit in article IX.
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the prohibition on nuclear explosions and the dumping of radioactive waste reflects an 
implicit concern with the Antarctic environment. However the southern hemisphere 
governments who introduced this topic were more concerned (at this stage) about the 
effects of radioactive fallout on their own environments than they were about protecting 
the Antarctic environment. This omission relates not to the sovereignty issue but to the 
timing of the Treaty (environmental issues were not of high salience in the late 1950s) 
and to the focus of the Treaty as a security agreement.
These omissions were to become main points of contention in the development of the 
the Antarctic regime and focal points for change.
The Treaty as a political bargain
The Antarctic Treaty was greeted warmly as a precedent for agreement between the 
superpowers and as a model for international cooperation. In the context of the Cold 
War, the Treaty was genuinely perceived as a potentially significant step in the 
"construction of a durable peace" (Hanessian 1960:461).
President Eisenhower, in his State of the Union message to Congress early in January 
1960, called it "a significant contribution toward peace, international cooperation and 
the advancement of science" (Department of State 1964:10). Hayton (1960b:408) 
argued that its "exhortations and declarations help keep alive that glimmer of hope for 
the peaceful solution of the military-ideological confrontation of our age; the struggle 
for survival by the western liberal tradition in the face of a "no holds barred" challenge 
from Communism". The Department of State (1964:10) thought it a "pioneering 
document".
Not all, it should be said, were so enthusiastic. During United States ratification 
hearings, for example, several dissenting opinions expressing concern about Soviet 
involvement were heard.108 One witness called the Treaty an "instrument of the peace 
offensive of the Soviet empire" (Shapley 1985:101). As already noted, the Treaty came 
under particularly heavy fire from those international lawyers who found it less than 
satisfactory as a legal document. Their concern was not so much with its political 
implications as its legal weaknesses which derived in particular from article IV (and its 
failure to solve the sovereignty question) and the absence of sanctions or any formal 
organisational structure.
However, the Treaty needs to be interpreted as a political document as much, if not 
more than as a piece of international law. It is a compromise which "secures nearly
108. Indeed, the Treaty only just attained the two-thirds majority required for ratification. The Senate 
vote was 66 to 21.
everything that was possible of agreement, given the diverse dispositions of the 
participating states" (Hayton 1960b:409). Indeed, compromise (through the search for 
consensus) has become a hallmark of the successful operation of the Treaty. Shapley 
(1985:91) characterises it as "an unfinished political deal". There was, at that time, no 
possibility of finishing that deal.
Sir Esler Denning, leader of the UK delegation at the Washington Conference, chose to 
characterise the Treaty as "almost entirely a self-denying ordinance on the part of the 
signatories, who will derive from it virtually no privileges but only obligations" 
(Conference on Antarctica, 1959:37). However to portray the treaty as one in which the 
future expression of national interests was to be put to one side in favour of a greater 
good is to misrepresent both the Treaty and the processes that led to it. As noted earlier, 
the parties were motivated by self-interest in seeking to negotiate a Treaty. In the late- 
1940s the claimant governments and the United States had not been convinced that any 
agreement could protect their interests. Indeed the claimants were concerned that their 
interests might be compromised by a treaty. However by the late 1950s, as Oxman 
(1978:296) observes, "the Antarctic Treaty was possible because states, including the 
territorial claimants, had reason to believe that without it their national interests might 
be prejudiced" (my emphasis). As noted earlier, this perception was changed by the 
involvement of new states whose interests were likely to conflict with those of the 
claimants and the US.
However the Treaty does not substitute for national interests, it complements them and 
could not have done otherwise. The Treaty satisfies policy goals which were based on 
the desire for a guaranteed presence in the Antarctic, influence over decision-making on 
Antarctic issues, and for recognition of the differing positions on territorial claims. 
Influence, supported by the effective veto and the consensus norm, is guaranteed. The 
decision-making processes are non-discriminatory as between the twelve original 
signatories. Guaranteed freedom of access to all parts of the Antarctic satisfied those 
who did not accept the exercise of sovereign rights by the claimants. The claimants, on 
the other hand, were able to accede to freedom of access, to inspection, to territorial 
overflight, and to the fact that the Treaty did not formally recognise their claims, as a 
concession to scientific cooperation and the pursuit of peace, protected by article IV 
which meant that those concessions could not later be used as legal argument against 
their effective occupation.
Peterson (1988:87) suggests that the Washington Conference (and, by implication, the 
Treaty) demonstrates the link between overall and issue-specific power. This is not, 
however, a clearly sustainable proposition. Five of the claimants (Australia, New 
Zealand, Norway, Argentina and Chile), while important Antarctic powers with
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considerable influence over the Antarctic negotiations, had little overall power in the 
international system.109 What is probably more relevant is that, even given superpower 
involvement, the original signatories were able to establish a strong founding coalition 
vis-a-vis other states because of their issue-specific power (rather than overall power) 
which was enhanced because there was little interest in Antarctic issues from other 
states in the late 1950s.
While it is true that the United States took a leading role in mobilising the Treaty 
negotiations this not the action of a hegemon.110 Peterson (1988:85) suggests that most 
of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty fully reflected the shared preferences of the 
superpowers. The point is, however, misleading in that she also observes, correctly, 
that on further investigation most of those interests were also shared by the other 
parties. Krasner (1985:252) also suggests that the "basic American objective was to 
stabilise strategically the Antarctic area" but neglects to mention that this goal was 
shared by the other states, especially the claimants. Indeed, as section two of this 
chapter has demonstrated neither the US nor the USSR were able to impose their 
preferences on the negotiations.* 111
Power-based explanations for the establishment of a cooperative regime in the Antarctic 
are therefore clearly unsatisfactory. As the formal basis for a regime, the Treaty is a 
negotiated, rather than an imposed agreement. It can reasonably be characterised as the 
product of institutional bargaining. This process rests on integrative bargaining which 
is encouraged by the "absence of a fully specified zone of agreement" (Young 
1989b:366) rather than the pursuit of relative gains and distributive bargaining.112
Young (1990b:32) argues that we can expect to encounter leadership in action whenever 
we observe success in the formation of international institutions. Yet it is not clear what 
leadership role was exercised, and by which state or states, in the Treaty negotiations. 
There is not a strong case for arguing that the United States, or any other state, acted as 
a structural leader by employing "bargaining power to bring pressure to bear on others 
to accede to the terms of the proposed constitutional contract" (Young 1990b: 10).113
109. Similarly, neither Belgium nor South Africa could be considered major powers.
110. Peterson (1988:85) supports this contention when she argues that "there was no hegemon at 
work".
111. The US proposal of the compromise on sovereignty was based on proposals put forward by 
Chile in the 1940s.
112. Institutional (and therefore integrative) bargaining, Young suggests (1989b:366), can only 
succeed when the issues at stake lend themselves to contractarian interactions.
113. Entrepreneurial leaders (Young 1990b: 17) are most often individuals who "employ negotiating 
skills to put together deals that would otherwise elude participants". It may be that Paul Daniels, 
chief US negotiator at the informal meetings in Washington at which considerable agreement 
was reached on draft treaty provisions, acted in this way (see Shapley 1985:111; Beck 1986b: 
63, 73,116, 170; Quigg 1983:146).
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Indeed, Young (1980:354) has typified the Antarctic Treaty negotiation process as a 
"small group of actors with strong or generally compatible interests banding together to 
work out an acceptable set of arrangements". Along these lines Kremenyuk (1991:30- 
31) suggests that the Antarctic Treaty is the result of a joint-problem solving approach, 
by which the negotiators seek to find an acceptable solution to a problem the nature of 
which is agreed upon, a process he too distinguishes from a relative gains model of 
negotiation.114
HI: the Antarctic Treaty system
Under the rules of article XIII(5) requiring ratifications from all twelve original 
signatories, the Treaty came into effect on 23 June 1961, upon receipt of the final 
notices of ratification from Argentina, Chile and Australia.115 Yet, as I have argued in 
chapter one, an agreement is at best an inchoate regime.
Young suggests (1980:336) that the substantive core of any international regime is to be 
found in a collection of rights and obligations.116 As this chapter has shown, the Treaty 
clearly imposes obligations upon the signatories.117 It also confers privileges, or rights 
upon the consultative parties.118 Indeed, it would be more correct to say that the 
original signatories conferred rights upon themselves through the formal agency of the 
Treaty.
However regimes, as Young argues (1980:336), must also include a "procedural 
component [which] encompasses recognised arrangements for resolving situations 
requiring social or collective choices". To this might be added an informal component 
which extends the norms and rules of a treaty to define implicit standards o f behaviour
114. He suggests that in relative gains bargaining, the main interest of any party is to maximise its 
gain by building up bargaining power (Kremenyuk 1991:30). It may be that building up 
bargaining power is what the USSR tried, unsuccessfully, to do in the informal negotiations 
prior to the Washington Conference by refusing to discuss anything of substance.
115. In accordance with the final act of the Washington Conference, the participating governments 
met in Washington on 27 January 1960 and continued to meet to consult and make 
recommendations to their governments on interim arrangements regarding matters dealt with in 
the Treaty (Department of State 1964:11). In all, 37 meetings were held before entry into force, 
at which delegates produced Rules of Procedure and a draft agenda for the first consultative 
meeting.
116. This approximates Krasner’s (1983b:2) definition of norms which he describes as "standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations".
117. For example, to preserve peace, not to carry out nuclear explosions or dump radioactive wastes, 
not to assert new claims, not to undertake military activity, to guarantee free access to the 
continent, to encourage scientific cooperation and to exchange scientific information, to take 
account of the interests of humankind and to acknowledge responsibility in accordance with 
consultative recommendations.
118. Such as the right of free access, the right to conduct inspections and observations (including the 
right of overflight), the right to conduct scientific programs and, most importantly, the right of 
exclusive decision-making on Antarctic issues.
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upon which compliance and the strength of a regime ultimately rests. Both this 
procedural framework and the informal normative component of the Antarctic regime 
are elucidated here.
The procedural framework
It was not clear in 1961 just what would eventuate from the operation of the treaty.119 
When the twelve consultative parties met in Canberra, Australia, less than two weeks 
after the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty, for the first of the meetings convened 
under the provisions of article IX, the task before them was to implement the Treaty’s 
principles and objectives and to ensure compliance with its norms and rules.120 There 
was, as this chapter has shown, little guidance in the Treaty as to how they should 
attempt this task. This was because the Treaty was a political agreement among the 
parties to solve problems of the past, rather than a blueprint for future action.
Nevertheless it did provide a framework for future interstate cooperation on the 
Antarctic and, if compliance could be assured, a degree of certainty and predictability to 
those interactions. The rules and procedures on decision-making set down in article IX 
were sufficiently general as to be susceptible of interpretation. Article IX was itself a 
compromise between those who, with an eye to the future, wanted some form of 
administrative machinery, and those who wanted none. Peterson (1980:381) calls it 
more of a coordination technique although Sollie (1985:42) considers that it is "close to 
being a legislative process for extending and supplementing the Antarctic Treaty". 
Hayton (1960a:367) argued that it would not "be a proving ground for a rather advanced 
form of international administration".
Those who negotiated the Treaty provided for decision-making on Antarctic matters to 
remain firmly in the hands of the consultative governments. Under the control of the 
consultative parties, the article IX procedures121 have given rise to a complex network
119. The Argentine delegation at the Washington Conference argued forcefully that the conference 
had "not been convened to institute regimes or create structures ... It is not its mission to change 
or alter anything" (Conference on Antarctica 1959:31).
120. From the first consultative meeting the parties adopted the procedure of meeting in private. The 
Final Reports of those early meetings give no indication of the substance of debates. Documents 
were confidential and no formal minutes were kept Reports recorded only administrative 
details (such as the names of participants, the agenda adopted), opening speeches at the public 
plenary, and recommendations adopted. Reports may be adopted by a majority of delegations, 
although often the report notes if it has been adopted by consensus. A proposed change to the 
rules of procedure to the effect that reports should be adopted by consensus was unsuccessful.
121. Under the "suitable intervals" provision of article IX consultative meetings have come, by 
convention, to be held every two years. A preparatory meeting for each consultative meeting 
sets the agenda. The practice has increasingly been for those meetings, in agreeing to the agenda 
by consensus, to debate issues of substance as well. At the most recent consultative meeting, the 
16th, the parties decided to meet annually but without preparatory meetings. The consultative 
parties also continued the process of meeting behind closed doors, and making little detail about 
their deliberations available to the public.
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of recommendations, separately negotiated conventions122 and supplementary 
procedures such as meetings of experts and special consultative meetings.123 
Collectively this has come to be known as the Antarctic Treaty system, defined by its 
participants as the "whole complex of arrangements made for the purposes of regulating 
relations among states" in the Antarctic (Handbook 1989:xii).124
The view that prevailed at the first consultative meeting, and over the following years, 
about the procedural implementation of the Treaty is best represented by the eloquent 
counsel of the head of the Chilean delegation, His Excellency Sehor Mora (who had 
also been present at the Washington Conference):
It is the opinion of the Chilean government that in this First Consultative Meeting 
the best service we can render for the safeguarding of the Treaty ... is to proceed 
cautiously in our eagerness to make it operative and fruitful, and to recommend 
only such measures as, after lengthy study of the various projects, convince us of 
their obvious usefulness and immediacy. If we are to avoid unproductive 
misunderstanding and harmful friction, we must proceed with caution ...
In Antarctica, it may be more advisable to wait for problems to arise and then seek 
the most reasonable means of solving them, than to hasten to propose theoretical 
solutions for presumptive events or situations ... in no case must we overstep the 
provisions of the Treaty ...
Consequently at this First Consultative Meeting, we should begin by avoiding all 
matters on which we are divided for it is essential to the objectives of the Treaty 
that close cooperation be established among us and that an atmosphere of the 
utmost harmony should prevail ... we should renounce any attempt to achieve 
perfection if the measure proposed does not muster unanimous consent. It is better 
to be content with a modest achievement than to back spectacular solutions which 
might later be rejected by our governments.
The Antarctic Treaty is an event of too recent birth to be stamped with the hallmark 
of perfection. Its application may have far-reaching and beneficial repercussions so 
long as we proceed with prudence, in order to do it safely.
For example, we must avoid the formation of bodies which could create the 
impression that we are establishing a supra-national administration for Antarctica. 
This would not be in keeping with the letter or with the spirit of the Treaty (Final 
Report 1961:25).
122. The separate conventions - the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) - are 
discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis.
123. A list of consultative meetings, of recommendations, and of special consultative meetings are 
appended to the thesis (see appendixes 4 ,5  and 6).
124. There are two useful collections of the measures adopted by consultative parties. Bush’s (1982) 
comprehensive volumes of inter-state and national Antarctic documents is organised on both a 
chronological and country by country basis, enhanced by extensive cross-indexing and 
supported by analysis, particularly from the perspective of questions of international law. The 
Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty system collates these measures on an issue by issue basis, but 
with little critical analysis.
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This emphasis on caution, on avoiding conflict and seeking consensus, which has 
become the hallmark of the Antarctic regime, has engendered a functional, ad hoc, and 
piecemeal approach to decision-making. The Treaty system is both "decentralised and 
functionally oriented" (Triggs 1986a: 17). As Shapley observes (1988:316) Antarctic 
administration is pragmatic - "rules [are] adopted only for immediate problems; 
sweeping principles [have been] eschewed in favour of limited measures". This 
characterisation of the Treaty system is shared by the participants:
various measures and actions have been taken as and when a present or 
future need for them has been perceived. The practice has been 
essentially pragmatic; there has been no systematic attempt to provide 
for an all-embracing code for the governance of Antarctic activities 
(Handbook 1989:xii).125
Measures adopted at consultative meetings, under the provisions of article IX and the 
rules of procedure, are hortatory rather than mandatory: they urge, suggest, and 
recommend rather than require or enforce action. There is a strong tendency to avoid 
enforcement mechanisms and sanctions.
The Treaty parties have expanded their decision-making process in a limited way by 
adopting "new institutions and techniques" have been created "only as and when 
necessary ... in response to [a] well-defined need and well-defined problems" which 
require collective action (Scully 1986b:405; my emphasis). A special consultative 
meeting was first convened in 1977 as a procedure for dealing with applications for 
consultative party status.126 Special consultative meetings have also come to be 
increasingly used to deal with issues which require faster decision-making than the 
regular consultative process is capable of. In particular they have been used to 
negotiate the separate conventions which have extended the functional scope of the 
Treaty.
In spite of the expansion of procedural mechanisms, the Treaty parties have also sought 
to maintain their authority over Antarctic decision-making. Meetings of experts have 
been convened from time to time to discuss practical problems relating to Antarctic
125. The Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty system is edited by Dr John Heap of the British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, a long-time Antarctic diplomat (and scientist before that) of high 
standing.
126. In 1977 Poland indicated that it believed it had fulfilled the criterion required for consultative 
party status. In the absence of any rules in the Treaty on how to address this situation, the 
original signatories decided that it should not be automatic, but rather ‘awarded’ by the existing 
consultative parties. Their decision on this matter was, however, intended to take effect 
immediately rather than requiring the subsequent agreement of all governments in accordance 
with article IX of the Treaty. As Bush observes (1982:337) this is representative of a more 
flexible decision-making approach.
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activities.127 However, only experts from consultative parties may attend, unless 
unanimous agreement is reached to invite other experts who have no voting rights.128 
Few steps were taken to establish cooperative working relationships with UN agencies 
or other international organisations.129 Where such relationships have proved 
necessary, the consultative parties have made it clear that they will not accede to the 
authority of any other organisation on Antarctic issues.
Matters which were inherently conflictive, or upon which consensus could not be 
reached because of their implications for the political and legal compromise of the 
Treaty, were quickly removed from the consultative agenda.130
There was continued resistance to any formal institutionalisation of the regime. The 
British observed at ATCM-I that they "had little doubt that when we come to consider 
our agenda we shall find it advisable to recommend to our governments that they 
establish some form of permanent administrative machinery however modest in scope, 
to facilitate inter-governmental cooperation in the intervals between Meetings of this 
group". This was not to be the case.131 Administrative responsibility was devolved 
onto the host government of each consultative meeting. Communication between 
meetings was to be conducted through bilateral diplomatic channels (recommendation I- 
XIV).132 The matter was discussed at the second consultative meeting and inscribed 
on, but subsequently dropped from the agenda of the third consultative meeting.133 It 
was not formally raised again until the 1980s and has still not been settled.
127. For example, on telecommunications.
128. The reports of such meetings are submitted to consultative meetings for final consideration. At 
the third consultative meeting, the New Zealand delegation (Doc/P13, 1964) argued that 
technical meetings convened by the consultative parties did not have the same status as 
consultative meetings.
129. The World Meteorological Organisation has been an exception to this (see Bush 1982:55-56;
122).
130. The Treaty has not totally depoliticised the Antarctic. In 1973 the President of Argentina took 
his entire cabinet to the Vicecommodoro Marambio station, declaring it to be the temporary 
capital of Argentina (Mitchell 1981:70). A baby was bom to an Argentine woman in Antarctica 
in January 1978, and marriage ceremonies have been conducted there. In January 1977 
President Pinochet of Chile went to the Antarctic, taking with him a large chest of soil collected 
from various parts of Chile, as a symbol of Chilean unity. The Argentine press expressed 
surprise at his provocative behaviour in Argentinian territory: in Pinochet’s opinion he had 
never left Chile (Neilson 1977).
131. Their suggestion that the Australian government be entrusted, at least for the time being, with 
essential administrative services was not adopted. Australia had apparently been keen to have a 
secretariat established in Canberra and this was a bone of some contention at early consultative 
meetings.
132. The consultative parties have adopted a numbering system for recommendations which 
identifies the meeting at which it was adopted (the first part) and sequential numbering of 
recommendations for that particular meeting. For example, I-XIV is the fourteenth 
recommendation adopted at the first consultative meeting.
133. A seemingly less contentious New Zealand suggestion (P.13, 1962) that intersessional meetings 
be held at least quarterly at the Washington mission of the host government of the forthcoming 
consultative meeting, (later revised to refer only to the diplomatic mission of the host
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The question of jurisdiction was one such issue even though it was specifically set down 
in the Treaty as one of the issues on which parties could consult. The British raised it at 
the second consultative meeting.134 Although the item was listed in the draft agenda 
(Doc.1, 1962)135 it was not on the agenda included in the Final Report and there is no 
reference in the final report to it having been discussed.
The informal component: norms and standards of behaviour
Cooperation under the Antarctic Treaty has succeeded because the Treaty parties have 
continued to put their differences on the sovereignty question to one side. It points to 
the importance of article IV (which allowed all Treaty states to maintain their position 
on the exercise of sovereignty in the Antarctic) in the development of the Treaty 
regime. As Young observes (1989a: 182) it serves to "clear away an otherwise 
intractable complex of conflicting ... claims so that opportunities for cooperative 
ventures can be addressed in a spirit of integrative bargaining and joint problem- 
solving".
Kimball (1988c: 15) notes that "every time [the consultative parties] seek agreement on 
a new measure, they must once again find a balance that preserves the positions of ... 
countries claiming territory in Antarctica and those that do not recognise any claims". 
Thus decision-making is often slow. However this imperative for compromise has been 
a major factor in the Antarctic Treaty system, sometimes to the detriment of effective 
management.136
Negotiation and compromise are strengthened by the consensus process which is valued 
by the Treaty parties as essential to maintaining the regime. Thus consensus, once
government in the capital of any one of the Contracting powers) was unacceptable. So was a 
South African proposal (P.17, 1962) for the establishment of a working group, to carry out a 
variety of roles, in a capital where all Treaty parties were represented. Oddly, this document 
concludes that "the above measures are designed to eliminate the possibility of even the embryo 
of a permanent secretariat..." whereas it seems that it would do precisely that.
134. In an explanatory memorandum (Memo.Expl.6, 1962) the UK observed that while this was a 
very complex subject, for which reason the UK had refrained from raising the substance of the 
issue at Canberra, that is, at the first consultative meeting, it was an issue that ought to be 
addressed, before the problem arose in an acute form. They suggested that a Committee of 
Experts be convened to examine the position relating to jurisdiction in Antarctica and to 
formulate appropriate recommendations for further consideration (P .10,1962).
135. Documents from Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings are listed in a separate section of the 
bibliography.
136. Wyndham (1980:187) gives the example of the 1968 Conference on Antarctic 
Telecommunications convened by the Treaty parties which was unsuccessful in agreeing on a 
workable scheme for the transmission of Antarctic meteorological data to the World Weather 
Watch because some claimants were unwilling to allow another state - a rival claimant or a non­
claimant - to be the only designated source of data for their territory. Five sources were listed 
when two would have sufficed.
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reached, is not to be broken. This rule, as Peterson observes (1988:94) has "remained 
undisturbed because it is essential to the continued existence of the regime". It was for 
this reason that the Antarctic and French defection from consensus in 1988, the subject 
of chapter seven, was so contentious.
There is also a shared understanding among the Treaty parties that differences between 
them on Antarctic matters should be managed within the confines of the consultative 
process and that tensions on non-Antarctic matters will not affect Antarctic 
cooperation.137 In maintaining their authority over Antarctic decision-making 
consultative parties have sought also to keep Antarctic matters off the agenda of other 
international institutions.
Thus in the hierarchy of values (which Puchala and Hopkins suggest (1983:66) 
exemplifies all regimes) conflict avoidance, consensus, maintenance of the political 
compromise and the authority of the consultative parties, take precedence other values 
such as over scientific cooperation and environmental protection. As chapter three will 
show, this has had substantial implications for environmental decision-making.
Compliance
As Beeby observes (1972:16) the Treaty "is not framed in such a way as to guarantee 
the implementation of its terms". Its weaknesses - the absence of compliance rules and 
sanctions and the ambiguous nature of its articles and provisions - "leave [it] open to the 
criticism that its successful implementation depends entirely on the maintenance of the 
same cooperative spirit ... [that] brought [the parties] to draw it up" (Beeby 1972:15- 
16). Nevertheless, the Treaty system is a remarkably successful example of 
international cooperation, and the founding coalition, together with states which have 
acceded to the Treaty, have maintained a high degree of internal cohesion.
This cohesion and the successful maintenance of the regime is indicative of the 
importance placed upon the Treaty by its signatories as the best vehicle available for the 
protection of their individual and collective interests. Once agreed to and in force the 
Treaty became the guarantor of the parties’ interests in the Antarctic.138 As long as the 
Treaty remained in place, the spectre of conflict could be subdued, and other national 
interests could be met (or at least not undermined). Its members, as Quigg notes
137. Numerous instances are given of the latter, for example, continued US and Soviet involvement 
in the Treaty system, without apparent acrimony, during such tensions as the Bay of Pigs, the 
invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. The most frequently cited example is that of the 
British and Argentinians continuing to attend consultative meetings together during the 
Falklands/Malvinas War.
138. For a useful and concise recent study of the interests of individual states in the Antarctic Treaty 
system, see Rowland (1988:15-25).
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(1983:212), are held together by powerful interests in common. The Treaty provides a 
mechanism whereby seemingly irreconcilable differences can be accommodated.
Thus the "habit of cooperation [that] has been maintained and developed" (Beeby 
1972:4) is generated by self-interest. As Shapley bluntly puts it: "the Treaty has 
worked because it suits the individual national interests of those countries with stakes in 
Antarctica - not because it asks them, in effect, to join hands and sing" (1984:30). 
Quigg similarly observes (1983:163) that "the Treaty is seen to serve their individual 
interests more efficiently than any conceivable alternative and therefore they feel it 
must be preserved at the cost of difficult compromises".139
This process rests on more than a calculation of short-term interests. Rather it reflects 
the realisation of long-term individual and joint gains. Further, sunk costs (that is, the 
investment of past effort) make any alternative to the Treaty system especially one 
which might erode the influence of existing consultative parties (especially the 
claimants) inherently unpalatable. Agreement to cooperate under the Treaty, rather than 
pursue a unilateral path, rested on individual state learning. Once those policy 
adjustments (and a shift of norms) were achieved, the process of institutional learning 
ensured that states identified both their individual and collective interests with the 
maintenance of the Treaty regime.
The Treaty parties were assisted in the development of the regime by the fact that, as 
Francioni (1986:163) observes, "the international community treated the Antarctic 
continent with benign neglect" after the Washington conference. The issue dropped 
from the international agenda for almost two decades.
There has also been a remarkable continuity, and cohesion, of Antarctic decision­
makers which has continued even with the growth of the Treaty system. Through the 
regular consultative meetings, a network of individuals (mainly diplomats and 
international lawyers, with some scientists) with extensive experience of the Treaty 
system has been established. The low political salience of Antarctic issues, nationally 
and internationally, meant that there were few domestic constituencies on Antarctic 
issues (except for scientists, who are discussed below). The same people who were 
involved in the multilateral process of cooperation were also pivotal actors in 
establishing national Antarctic policies and defining national interests. Thus the 
transgovemmental elite, socialised into the norms of the Treaty, was important in 
maintaining and defending the Antarctic regime.
139. This point was stressed in many of the interviews I conducted during research for this thesis. 
Participants talked about the need to moderate national interests and demands in the interests of 
protecting the Treaty system, and a common interest, in order to avoid conflict.
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Science and politics
The discussion so far has concentrated on political and diplomatic cooperation in the 
Antarctic. Scientific cooperation, which was specifically encouraged in the Treaty 
exists, for the most part, at a different level through practice ‘on the ice’ and through the 
coordination of scientific research. Nevertheless, recommendations adopted at 
consultative meetings have established rules for the conduct of scientific research and 
the encouragement of scientific cooperation.
Science was confirmed in the Treaty as an important part of the agenda of Antarctic 
politics although the Treaty was not, as Zumberge (1987:4) and Gould (1971:54) 
erroneously suggest, negotiated to protect a scientific programme.140 Science was, as 
Richard Laws141 suggests "used as a means to an end by providing an excuse to remove 
a potentially controversial region from international conflicts" (1987:250).
The relationship between science (and the scientific community) and the consultative 
process is a somewhat ambivalent one. The focus for scientific cooperation has been 
the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), which was established by 
ICSU during the IGY. SCAR is a coordinating body whose members are national 
Antarctic committees, not individual scientists. It is charged with the initiation, 
promotion and coordination of scientific activity in the Antarctic, with a view to 
framing and reviewing scientific programs of circumpolar scope and significance. It 
does not conduct scientific research itself.
While SCAR is not mentioned in the Treaty, even though it predates it, the consultative 
parties have come to rely on it heavily for advice on all manner of issues, including 
protection of the environment It is thus a source of knowledge upon which institutional 
learning might be based. It has effectively become the Treaty system’s scientific 
secretariat through the work undertaken by its various Working Groups. Yet there is no 
direct relationship between SCAR and the consultative process. Advice is sought from 
SCAR through national Antarctic committees and is, in turn, officially transmitted to 
consultative meetings through national delegations. Until recently SCAR 
representatives were not even invited to attend consultative meetings at which their 
recommendations were being discussed.142 The consultative parties have sought to
140. Young (1989b:373) suggests that CSAGI and SCAR had a leadership role in forming the regime 
for Antarctica in 1959. While it is the case that cooperation under the IGY provided an example 
for the diplomats and international lawyers to adopt as the basis for the Antarctic Treaty, the 
scientific community was not directly instrumental in its negotiation.
141. A former director of the British Antarctic Survey.
142. This question of the relationship with SCAR was dealt with at the first consultative meeting and 
indeed in the preparatory meetings prior to that. Governments were recommended, individually, 
to encourage SCAR to continue its advisory work on scientific cooperation. The short
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ensure that SCAR’s participation is advisory only and do not commit themselves to take 
its advice.
Generally the scientific community, and SCAR, has sought to distance itself from the 
politics of the Treaty system. SCAR has neither sought nor undertaken an advocacy 
role. Indeed, Robert Hofman143 goes so far as to suggest that "science has been 
completely independent of the politics surrounding Antarctica" (cited in Wolfe 
1983:425). The scientific community has perceived its Antarctic role in two ways - the 
first, the conduct of scientific research in the pursuit of knowledge and the second, 
responding to requests for information and advice from the ATCPs.
The scientific community is an interested actor in the regime. Political influence and 
prestige within the Treaty system is linked directly to the conduct of scientific research. 
Therefore, as Walton observes (1987b:61) "it must be expected that political 
considerations will inevitably intrude, in some countries, in the selection of which 
scientific activities to support".144 Senior scientists have been included in consultative 
delegations. Nevertheless, Laws argues (1987:251) that lawyers and diplomats 
predominate at consultative meetings, and that the "few scientists present have second- 
class status, although almost invariably they represent the only practical experience 
there".
Further, scientists have clearly benefited from the successful maintenance of the Treaty 
system and therefore have some vested interest in its successful implementation.145 As 
Laws notes (1987:250) "Antarctic scientific research has profited from its role in 
perpetuating this political truce by continuing to receive financial support from 
governments".
However, it is not clear that the scientific community can be identified as an epistemic 
community within the Antarctic regime, especially when we recall that the definition 
assumes a degree of conscious policy advocacy.
recommendation then recognises that the work of SCAR constitutes "a most valuable 
contribution to international scientific cooperation in Antarctica" and that SCAR should be 
encouraged to continue in this advisory work, (see also Bush 19825-27, 110-11; Myhre 
1986:77-85).
143. Scientific Program Director of the United States Marine Mammal Commission.
144. The quality of scientific programs has become an important debate in Antarctic politics which 
will be addressed in subsequent chapters.
145. There is some anecdotal evidence that national scientific communities have been influential in 
pressing their governments to become signatories to the Treaty.
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Expansion of the regime: limited incremental change
The Antarctic regime was consolidated in the 1960s and 1970s. Once the early 
consultative meetings had laid the procedural groundwork, there was little effective 
pressure for substantive change until the 1980s. The limited expansion of the Treaty 
system in the 1960s and 1970s took the form of incremental decision-making through 
the adoption of new rules and procedures in response to policy proposals, always guided 
by the need for unanimity and consensus. The development of the environmental 
agenda, in this way, is examined in chapters three and four.
In the 1980s the Treaty regime was subject to internal and external demands for change. 
Nevertheless even in the 1980s, the extent of the response by the consultative parties 
was constrained by the boundaries set by the normative framework of the Treaty 
system.
The internal dimension
Between 1961 and 1980 there were only nine new signatories to the Treaty.146 The 
decision-making club did not expand until 1977 when Poland became a consultative 
party. In the 1980s, however, the number of treaty signatories and the number of 
consultative parties expanded dramatically. This expansion was not unconnected with 
the debate about mineral resource exploitation.
Since 1980 twenty more states have acceded to the Treaty, and the number of 
consultative parties has increased by fourteen.147 The new consultative parties include 
countries such as India, China, Brazil, Uruguay and the Republic of Korea. This 
increase in the number of consultative parties was not unconnected with the process of 
strengthening the Treaty system to resist outside challenges. The existing consultative 
parties sought to co-opt developing states to counter criticisms of the Treaty system as a 
club for western, industrialised states.148
The involvement of non-traditional Antarctic states such as India and China has altered 
the balance of interests within the system, although their involvement has not subdued 
the perceived need to maintain the political compromise on sovereignty. Indeed the 
newer states have become rapidly socialised into the traditional norms of the Treaty 
system and have become staunch supporters of the Treaty system. Nevertheless, as 
Beeby observes (1991:14) "it is [now] much less easy to generate a dynamic that will
146. See appendix 3 for a list of contracting parties to the Treaty.
147. This would make the total number of signatories 41 including 27 consultative parties - except 
that the reunification of Germany changes the numbers to 40 and 26 respectively, as both the 
FRG and GDR had been consultative parties.
148. The rules on substantial scientific activity were relaxed to accommodate some of the newer 
Antarctic Treaty parties as part of the process of ensuring their participation in the system.
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lead to a consensus acceptable to all". If the numbers continue to increase, he suggests, 
"there might need to be a search for new methods of arriving at a consensus".
That states have acceded to the Treaty and sought to attain consultative party status 
provides one measure of the legitimacy (and the strength) of the Treaty system. States 
have acceded for a combination of motives including the chance to participate in 
scientific investigation (and the prestige that accompanies that), to participate in 
decision-making and discussions on the future of the Treaty system, and the potential 
for access to resources.149 They benefit from access to decision-making on an equal 
basis and from the scientific expertise of the more experienced Antarctic countries.150
The external dimension
The 1980s heralded a growing international interest in the Antarctic which was fostered 
especially by the debate over mineral resources. Third-world countries led the 
challenge in the UN General Assembly, where they accused the consultative parties of 
constituting an exclusive, secretive club managing the Antarctic for their own ends. 
Environmental non-governmental organisations became increasingly and publicly 
critical of consultative parties’ record in protecting the Antarctic environment, a 
criticism which was located in a growing public awareness of the importance of 
environmental protection. These external demands are explored in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters.
Response to demands for change
In the context of internal and external pressures for change in the 1980s, it was not 
surprising that, with reluctance on the part of some, a cautious reassessment of the 
procedural framework of the Treaty system began to take place. The normative 
framework, however, was little affected.
The issue of the operation of the Treaty system, including the ‘openness’ of the system 
came back onto, and this time stayed on, the agenda.151 The vexed question of 
administrative arrangements and the establishment of a secretariat should once again be 
raised. However this question has still not been settled in the face of opposition from
149. See, for example, Mansukoski (1987:15) on Finland, Joyner (1990b:53) on India, Lee 
(1990b:581) on China.
150. The national Antarctic programs of consultative parties have often provided assistance to the 
newer Treaty parties in the conduct of their scientific work.
151. As a general issue the wider circulation of information about the treaty system, such as Final 
Reports, had been first considered in 1977 although little was done until 1983. By the 1980s 
reports were more fulsome and often used to contain decisions and set out further programs for 
action which were not the subject of recommendations.
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Argentina with the support of some of the newer consultative parties such as India and 
East Germany.152
As the numbers of acceding states increased, non-consultative parties (NCPs) became 
increasingly dissatisfied at being excluded from the decision-making process. From 
1983 they were invited to attend consultative meeting (as observers only), a decision 
which Kimball (1983a:5) called a "major departure from prior practice".153
The new openness extended to making publicly (although not easily) available 
documents tabled at consultative meetings.154 During the 1980s the Final Reports of 
the consultative meetings became increasingly detailed and often contained the 
substance of agreements and programs of further action which were not incorporated 
into recommendations.
From ATCM XIV (1987) the consultative parties invited experts from appropriate 
international organisations to assist with deliberations at regular consultative
152. It was raised briefly at the 11th Meeting in 1981, possibly motivated by the recent conclusion of 
CCAMLR under which a small secretariat was to be established, and discussed more fully at the 
12th Meeting (1983) where it was agreed that "the establishment of a more permanent 
infrastructure ... would be premature at the present time" (Final Report 1985:14). Discussion 
was again widened at the 14th Meeting (1987) to include the possibility of cost-sharing in 
respect of consultative meetings The financial burden of each individual consultative meeting 
fell on the host government. Some delegations expressed the view that there may be no 
alternative to the creation of a permanent secretariat which should, nevertheless, be 
"proportional to real needs, which in the immediate future called only for something modest in 
scope and cost" (Final Report 1987:12). Predictably this was again deferred for further 
consideration. The Final Report of the 15th Meeting sets out in some detail the arguments on 
this matter, with the observation that "in view of the differing arguments that had been 
expressed, the Meeting was unable to reach a consensus on this issue".
153. The question of observers at consultative meetings had been raised at the 11th Meeting in 1981 
where the view was expressed that this issue required careful thought before any conclusion 
could be reached. In 1983 NCPs were invited for the fust time (on a one-off basis). An 
invitation was extended to NCPs to attend the 13th meeting (including the preparatory meeting) 
in 1985 where the consultative parties decided that the invitation to NCPs should be on a 
permanent basis, subject to new rules of procedure. NCP delegations may attend all formal 
waking group and committee meetings and speak, unless a consultative party delegation 
requests otherwise but may not participate in the decision. Draft rules of procedure were 
adopted to incorporate this change. In a further development of the decision-making process, 
the report of the 12th Meeting notes that the draft rules would be circulated to governments for 
their consideration and any government which had not indicated its views by 1 April 1984 would 
be taken to have accepted the text.
154. At the 13th meeting (1985) documents from the fust three consultative meetings (1961, 1962 
and 1964) were made publicly available, unless any party objected. Things moved quickly after 
that. The 14th Meeting ‘released’ documents from the 4th to the 7th Meetings, and the 15th 
Meeting did so f a  all subsequent meetings, including any documents from that 15th meeting not 
otherwise designated. At the 12th Meeting in 1983 the circulation of the Final Reports was 
widened to include the UN Secretary General, no doubt a response to the inscription of the 
Question of Antarctica on the General Assembly agenda that year.
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meetings.155 Organisations invited to that meeting included the WMO, IUCN and 
SCAR.156 At the 15th Meeting, the organisations from which experts were invited to 
attend was widened considerably.157.
Thus the Antarctic Treaty system at the end of the 1980s was, to some extent, 
procedurally different from the system of the 1960s. There was, however, no change in 
the hierarchy of values or in the dominance of sovereignty norms. That change was to 
come with the overturning of the Minerals Convention and the negotiation of the 
Madrid Protocol (discussed in chapter seven).
Conclusion
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is a negotiated rather than a hegemonic agreement, with 
limited objectives. Its primary focus was the avoidance of conflict between claimant 
states (especially Argentina, Britain and Chile whose claims overlapped), between 
claimants and non-claimants (over the validity of the claims) and between the 
superpowers (both of whom maintained a presence in the Antarctic). Thus the 
hierarchy of values implicit in the Treaty and the regime ultimately places political and 
security concerns before economic or environmental ones where those interests are seen 
to be in conflict. The fundamental principle of the Antarctic regime is the protection of 
the compromise on sovereignty. Only if this political bargain is maintained can other 
interests be met. In this regard, the consensus rule, and the exercise of mutual restraint 
on the sovereignty question, have become foundational norms of the Treaty system.
155. The issue was first raised at the 12 consultative meeting. At the 13th Meeting some delegations 
expressed concern that disadvantages (unspecified) might flow from premature invitations if 
these were made without a careful study (Final Report 1985:26). A decision on inviting experts 
was not made until the 14th consultative meeting. It was decided that such decisions should be 
made as part of the preparatory process for each meeting. The Rules of Procedure were 
amended accordingly. At the preparatory meeting for the 14th ATCM there was an attempt to 
include UNEP as one of the bodies to be invited as an observer but this was blocked by nations 
opposed to the inclusion of UN bodies. The Chair of the working group considering the agenda 
item for which the expert has been invited may "with the agreement of all the Consultative 
Parties" invite an expert to speak. Experts do not participate in decision-making and may 
participate only in those discussions for which they have been specifically invited.
156. It is extraordinary that after 24 or more years of providing scientific advice to the consultative 
process and essentially being responsible for the substance of a number of environmentally 
related aspects of the system it was only now that SCAR was to be invited to send an observer to 
the consultative process. What is more extraordinary is that the item SCAR was asked to assist 
with was that on air safety in Antarctica, at a meeting where its report on the Protected Area 
system was also under consideration. Note also that this process differs from that by which a 
SCAR observer (as opposed to expert) presents a general report to the Meeting on SCAR 
activities.
157. This did not extend to representatives from non-governmental environmental organisations 
generally although three consultative party delegations (Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States) had begun to include such representatives. The role of non-govemmental organisations 
is addressed in later chapters of this thesis.
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Although Finlayson and Zacher suggest (1981:564) that some degree of commitment to 
interdependence norms is required for the development of a regime, in that parties 
forego a degree of independent decision-making, the Antarctic Treaty system is 
nevertheless characterised by a continuing substantive commitment to sovereignty 
norms.
The key actors in the development and maintenance of the regime were the diplomats 
and (to a lesser degree) the scientists who made national Antarctic policies and were 
also the international decision-makers on Antarctic issues. The principles and norms 
inherent in the Antarctic Treaty dictated the nature of the decision-making process and 
informed standards of behaviour which became both valued and expected by the key 
actors as the Treaty system developed. Similarly, as that decision-making process was 
seen to work over time in protecting interests and preventing conflict, its value was 
reinforced. Thus a learning process underpinned the development and strengthening of 
the regime. Reciprocity, that is a shared expectation that all parties would adhere to the 
norms of the Treaty, served to build and reinforce confidence in the Treaty system as a 
guarantor of states’ interests.
The procedural framework which was based on those values resisted institutionalisation 
and reinforced the consensus rule and the authority of the consultative parties (and the 
bureaucratic elite) over Antarctic decision-making. In the 1980s there was a limited 
opening up of the Treaty system in response both to internal and external demands for 
change. However this change was incremental and limited. It was within this 
framework that the Treaty parties addressed environmental issues - a process explored 
in the next chapter.
Chapter three
THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: POLITICS AND OUTCOMES
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Introduction
The Antarctic Treaty is not an environmental treaty. Protection of the environment is 
barely mentioned. Only the preservation and conservation of living resources is 
referred to and that was as much to do with economic sustainability as it was to do with 
the intrinsic protection of Antarctic species. However, inter-state cooperation on the 
Antarctic has been marked by the development, through the adoption of consultative 
recommendations and other instruments, of an environmental regime nested within the 
Antarctic Treaty system.
This chapter traces the development of that nested regime showing how its form was 
conditioned by the procedural and normative dimensions of the Treaty system which 
were examined in chapter two. The first part of this chapter describes the Antarctic 
environment that the rules and procedures were intended to protect. The chapter then 
discusses the actors involved in the environmental debate - the bureaucratic actors 
within the Treaty system, the scientists and non-governmental organisations.
Finally the chapter exposes the general environmental principles and norms, as well as 
the specific rules and procedures adopted on a range of environmental issues. The 
specific issues explored here are the conservation of fauna and flora, the development of 
the protected area system in the Antarctic, the conduct of scientific expeditions, waste 
disposal, environmental impact assessment and the question of tourism and non­
governmental expeditions.
There are three themes in this analysis. First, the decision-making process and the 
norms that guided it were, in the final analysis, flawed with respect to environmental 
issues. Second, as a result, the set of rules and procedures adopted was limited. Third, 
the implementation of those rules was erratic.
The discussion in this chapter provides the context for the analysis in subsequent 
chapters of the events surrounding the minerals conventions, the Australian/French 
proposal for a comprehensive environmental protection convention and subsequent 
changes in the environmental regime. The analysis here is necessarily selective. 
Numerous documents on a wide variety of environmental issues have been tabled at 
consultative meetings over a period of thirty years - this chapter cannot incorporate 
discussion of them all.
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The Antarctic environment
The Antarctic terrestrial ecosystem is marked by limited biological diversity "due to 
geographic isolation, low temperatures, lack of water, persistent strong winds and 
primitive soils" (Lucas and Dingwall 1987:222; Rudolph 1970:52-53).1 By contrast 
with the sparse terrestrial ecosystem, the marine ecosystem of the Southern Ocean is 
teeming with life. There are four species of Antarctic seal2 and two more species which 
breed in the sub-Antarctic islands and range across the whole Southern Ocean3 (Laws 
1983:609; Roberts 1977:99). The southern oceans are also host to six species of baleen 
(filter-feeding) whale4 and two species of toothed whale5 (Tierney 1978:8). Forty 
species of breeding birds, of which penguins are by far the most numerous, inhabit the 
Antarctic region although only sixteen of them actually breed on the continent itself 
(Tierney 1978:8).6 In spite of this abundance of life, the marine food-chain is a 
remarkably short and simple one, depending primarily on a small shrimp-like 
crustacean, the Antarctic krill, which is the main food of whales, seals, penguins and 
sea-birds (see Lucas and Dingwall 1987:226). Antarctic fish provide a further link in 
the short food chain.7
Both terrestrial and marine ecosystems are vulnerable to, and slow to recover from, 
disturbance. The simple terrestrial ecosystem lacks the regenerative powers of more 
elaborate ecosystems (Rudolph 1970:53; Holdgate and Tinker 1979:19).8 A recent 
SCAR report notes that the unique terrestrial ecosystems and species which have 
adapted to the harsh Antarctic environment may be extremely vulnerable to changes in 
their local environment (Benninghoff and Bonner 1985:13). Similarly, the short food- 
chain makes the marine ecosystem vulnerable to perturbations to any constituent part.
Disturbance to the Antarctic ecosystem as a result of human activity can take a variety 
of forms.9 Economic activity, activity associated with the conduct of science and
1. There are only two species of flowering plant, found mainly on the Antarctic peninsula, although 
there is a "surprisingly complex association" (Lucas and Dingwall 1987:222) of lichens, mosses 
and microfungi. The largest land-based fauna are two small insects. The remainder of the 
terrestrial fauna consists of "mites, springtails, microscopic rotifers, tardigrades, protozoa, and 
nematode and rare enclytraeid worms" (Rudolph 1970:52).
2. The crabeater, Weddell, leopard and Ross.
3. The Southern für seal and the Southern elephant seal.
4. The blue, fin, sei, humpback, minke and southern right whale.
5. The sperm whale and the killer whale.
6. Penguins and other birds are considered to be part of the marine ecosystem because they depend 
on the sea for food and, apart from breeding, spend much of their lives at sea.
7. Most of the 200 species of Antarctic fish belong to the group Notothenioidei and have developed 
physiological properties which allow them to survive in the cold southern waters NERC/BAS 
[n.d.]:l).
8. A footprint in an Antarctic moss bed may last for decades, for example.
9. In their report for SCAR, Benninghoff and Bonner list possible impacts on Antarctic terrestrial, 
marine and atmospheric environments (1985:43) and categories of activities that might be 
reasonably expected to have a significant impact on the Antarctic environment (1985:46).
%tourism all have the potential for adverse environmental impact.10 Economic activity in 
the past has resulted not only in the near decimation of particular species (first seals and 
then whales) but also in severe disturbances to the balance of the ecosystem. The 
impact of the exploitation of krill and fish stocks remains a central debate of the 
Antarctic Treaty system. (Both this and the potential environmental impact of minerals 
activity are canvassed in chapters four and five.)
Human presence in connection with scientific activity can have, and has had, localised 
impact on the Antarctic environment, particularly on terrestrial and fresh-water 
ecosystems on the continent and in-shore marine habitats. The most suitable location 
for scientific stations are the predominantly ice-free coastal regions required by bird and 
seal populations for breeding grounds.* 11 Human impact of this sort includes disruption 
to breeding colonies, the potential introduction of alien diseases and viruses, localised 
marine and terrestrial pollution as a result of sewage and waste disposal (where there is 
little natural biodegradation) and the burning of fuel for heat and energy, and the 
impacts of the construction of stations and support facilities.
The increase in the number of countries conducting scientific research in the Antarctic 
in the 1980s raised concerns about the cumulative impact of bases built in close 
proximity to each other.12 The increase in the number of consultative parties brought 
with it an increase in the number of people in the Antarctic, both scientists and support 
personnel and a consequent increase in the potential for adverse environmental 
impact.13 As most countries rely on ships to transport personnel to the continent, this 
increase in activity also brought with it an increase in the potential for accidents and 
marine pollution. Similar impact problems to those noted above arise from tourist 
activity, especially in those areas where repeated visits can have a cumulative impact 
(see Hart 1988).
10. See Brewster (1982:48-66) for a summary of the potential negative impacts of human activity.
11. Some Adelie penguin rookeries, for example, cover several square kilometres and the breeding 
season population may number several hundred thousand birds (Lucas and Dingwall 1987:222).
12. King George Island has become the most ‘inhabited’ and overcrowded part of the Antarctic, 
because of its relatively easy access, which makes it attractive to acceding states wishing to 
establish a scientific station in order to attain consultative party status. The potential for 
cumulative impact of this sort was recognised by at least some commentators early one. Robert 
Cushman Murphy (himself an Antarctic scientist) noted (1962:2) that "parties from a dozen or 
more nations, working year after year in the Antarctic, could do very much more harm than the 
single, occasional expeditions that entered the field between the 1840s and the beginning of the 
present century".
13. In spite of requirements that data on personnel in the Antarctic be exchanged between treaty 
parties information on the total numbers in any one season is difficult to come by. A US 
Congressional Research Service report in 1987 was unable to find complete data. Their totals 
for the summer population was almost 2700 but figures from several countries were not 
available (Browne 1987). Most observers suggest the summer population could be anything 
between 4000 and 6000 people.
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The Antarctic environment, in its undisturbed state, is a valuable scientific laboratory 
for its contribution to knowledge about the Antarctic and the earth generally.14 There is 
still a great deal to be learned about Antarctic ecosystems and scientific knowledge is a 
necessary component of sound environmental and conservation decision-making. The 
"continuing nature of Antarctic scientific activity requires that ... the Antarctic 
environment [be kept] in the best possible condition" (Benninghoff and Bonner 
1985:18).
As well as increasing knowledge about the Antarctic, research there can reveal a great 
deal about past climatic changes and about the impact of past global pollution. The 
Antarctic also provides an important baseline for measuring the effects of contemporary 
industrial pollution, in particular the impact of ozone-depleting and greenhouse gases.15 
Disturbances to the Antarctic environment as a result of human activity are likely to 
erode this scientific value.
The Antarctic, distant as it is, plays an important role in global weather patterns and acts 
as a heat sink for the planet by reflecting incoming solar radiation (IUCN 1984b:5; 
Drewry 1988:7-8). Severe perturbations to the Antarctic environment could affect the 
albedo (reflective) factor although the extent to which that is likely to occur as a result 
of locally generated activity is unclear.16 Nevertheless changes of this sort in the 
Antarctic "are likely to have global impacts" (Laws 1990:10).
The debate about environmental protection in the 1980s focussed not only on the 
continent’s scientific value but also on the its intrinsic wilderness and aesthetic values. 
To this extent, environmental protection has a value in its own right, not just as a 
contributing factor to resource sustainability and scientific investigation. An untouched 
Antarctica, as Mitchell notes (1980:14) "has a significant symbolic and aesthetic role 
which extends beyond the strictly scientific sphere". This debate addressed the 
importance of preventing localised impacts as well as maintaining the integrity of the 
environment as a whole.
14. Antarctic science includes geophysics, geology, atmospheric physics and chemistry, physical, 
biological and chemical oceanography, glaciology, biology, physiology (including human 
physiology), meteorology and environmental monitoring. Benninghoff (1987:13-14) notes that 
Antarctica "yields key information about global systems such as heat budget, magnetism, 
atmospheric electricity, plate tectonics, ocean currents and ocean chemistry".
15. Ice-cores and samples of recent snowfalls reveal traces of pollutants and heavy metals whose 
origins lie outside the Antarctic, but which are dispersed there through atmospheric circulation 
(Drewry 1988:10). Traces of radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests have been found in the 
Antarctic, and DDT has been located in penguin.
16. Benninghoff and Bonner (1985:45) raise the problem of dust and litter impacting upon localised 
Antarctic environments in this way. The problem was more seriously debated in the context of 
extensive industrial development in the event of minerals activity.
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Benninghoff and Bonner (1985:21) identify two major components of environmental 
protection in the Antarctic: first, the maintenance of the high productivity and 
ecological relationships in the southern ocean and, second, the maintenance of the 
unspoiled environment and fragile ecosystems of the land, inlands waters and ice- 
covered areas of the continent. The consultative parties have addressed both aspects in 
the development of the environmental regime.
The actors: bureaucrats, scientists and NGOs
The environmental sub-regime was developed and consolidated through the 
consultative process conducted, for the most part, behind closed doors. Decision­
making on environmental issues, as on Antarctic issues generally, was dominated by the 
Antarctic bureaucrats.17 As observed in chapter two, decision-makers became well 
socialised into the norms of the Treaty system and, given the smallness of their number, 
established close networks among them. Within this group there were a select few, 
perhaps a dozen, who were acknowledged by all participants to be experienced hands 
and to have some political ‘clout’ in the system.18
Delegations to consultative meetings were usually made up of foreign ministry officers 
supported by representatives from national Antarctic operators (that is, the organisations 
responsible for the conduct of Antarctic programs) and Antarctic scientific institutions. 
Some countries, especially Chile and Argentina, included delegates from their defence 
ministries.
Few delegations, if any, included delegates from environment ministries or 
representatives with particular environmental expertise, a point which Barnes 
(1990d:33) suggests hampered substantive discussion.19 By contrast, representatives 
from energy and industry ministries (and private enterprise) were included once 
minerals issues came onto the agenda. The same is true of the fisheries issue. United 
Nations or other intergovernmental organisations outside the Treaty system, with 
expertise or interests relevant to protection of the Antarctic ecosystem, were rarely 
called upon for advice (although this changed in the late 1980s).
17. In the 1960s and 1970s they represented only the twelve original signatories with Poland joining 
their number in 1977.
18. A senior Antarctic diplomat, a member of this inner group, explained that they knew each other 
well. Proposals and ideas for consultative meetings were often discussed by them between 
meetings in an informal collaboration to ensure that politically sensible proposals were put to the 
meetings.
19. The US and Norway seem to have been the first to include representatives of environment 
bureaucracies in their delegations, from ATCM-VIII in 1975.
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Scientists
The scientific community, particularly through the agency of the Scientific Committee 
on Antarctic Research, had a major role in providing the knowledge upon which the 
rules and procedures of the environmental sub-regime were based. Nevertheless, in line 
with SCAR’s determination to separate science from politics (an approach also 
favoured by the consultative parties), this role was essentially advisory. SCAR did not 
seek an advocacy role. Nevertheless, a formal role for SCAR was written into some of 
the environmental measures adopted by the Treaty parties.
Environmental issues were most often dealt with by the conservation sub-committee of 
the SCAR Working Group on Biology and later by the Group of Specialists on 
Antarctic Environmental Affairs and Conservation.20 SCAR’s advice was often 
moderated by the political dictates of the system. As John Heap has observed, the 
consultative parties fed SCAR’s advice "as one of many factors into the political 
context of the decision to be made" (1988:22-3).
Scientists were well placed as a source of knowledge, and the have their interests 
protected, in that in the 1960s and 1970s they were the only Antarctic constituency 
besides the diplomats. They were also in the situation of being both the users of the 
Antarctic and the enforcers of its environmental rules. While operationally convenient, 
there was a potential clash between these roles.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
The third identifiable group of actors involved in debates about the environmental 
regime are non-governmental conservation and environmental organisations who were 
increasingly active, and influential, in the 1980s. NGOs have brought to the Antarctic 
debate new ideas and values on environmental protection. The expansion of the Treaty 
system’s environmental agenda in the 1980s was in part a response to the pressures 
exerted by NGOs.
Kimball (1988d) has undertaken a detailed survey of Antarctic NGOs and the 
development of their interest in Antarctic issues. That extensive exercise is not repeated 
here. Rather, the key features of this involvement are identified. NGO interest in the 
Antarctic dates to the late 1970s and was spurred by concern about the potential 
exploitation of the marine ecosystem during the negotiation of CCAMLR. This interest
20. In 1986 the SCAR Executive acted upon a proposal to establish the multidisciplinary Group of 
Specialists on Antarctic Environmental Affairs and Conservation, to replace the arrangement 
whereby environmental matters were considered by a sub-committee of the Working Group on 
Biology. It was also suggested that SCAR should draft its own principles on the protection for 
the Antarctic environment and that application for SCAR membership should include a 
commitment to comply with those rules (Kimball 1987d:25).
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was heightened by the minerals negotiations (which began in 1980s) and, more 
generally, by what NGOs perceived to be "real and potential" threats to the Antarctic 
environment (Greenpeace nd(i):8) and a less than satisfactory environmental protection 
record on the part of the consultative parties. In this respect, they act as a ginger group 
outside the formal mechanism of the system. In the closed atmosphere of the Treaty 
system, NGOs have sought to impose transparency and accountability on the Treaty 
parties by reporting details of the meetings and releasing confidential documents.21
Early NGO activity was organised on a national basis, primarily in the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand and the UK. In 1977, the transnational Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean Coalition (ASOC) was formed to provide greater coordination between national 
NGOs with an interest in the Antarctic in the belief that their developing expertise and 
knowledge could best be used collectively.22 ASOC is primarily a clearing-house for 
information: it does not direct members activities.23 Greenpeace International, the 
largest member organisation of ASOC, on the other hand specifically provides policy 
direction as well as coordinating action on a transnational basis among its national 
offices.24 Information often travels more quickly through this transnational network 
than it does between foreign ministries on a bilateral basis.
While ASOC can now point to a large organisational membership the number of 
experienced Antarctic lobbyists is still relatively small. In this respect NGOs mirror the 
formal Treaty system, where a small group of people with considerable ‘institutional 
memory’ have dominated the decision-making process.
NGOs have sought to influence governments’ international behaviour (in Treaty 
meetings and in their practice in the Antarctic) by creating domestic pressures and 
influencing public opinion. In some consultative states, particularly the US, UK, 
Australia and New Zealand, NGO representatives are involved in the policy process
21. The changing attitude towards confidentiality of documents by the ATCPs in the 1980s may 
well have been in part a response to the NGO habit of making material public. In other words, 
they sought to pre-empt the NGOs.
22. ASOC now points to a membership of over 200 organisations in 35 countries. It operates 
through secretariats in Australian, New Zealand and the United States where NGOs had also 
been taking a keen interest in the CCAMLR negotiations.
23. Members of ASOC include national organisations with a specific Antarctic concern, as well as 
environmental and conservation organisations with a wider policy interest. Some of the better 
known members are nature conservancy groups of long-standing (such as the Sierra Club of the 
Audubon Society in the US) whereas others are representative of the ‘second wave’ of 
environmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth (founded in 1969), Greenpeace (1971) 
and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).
24. Greenpeace International formally established its Antarctic campaign in mid-1983. Greenpeace 
International does not deal directly with the public, although it represents over 3 million 
members worldwide. It coordinates campaign activity among national Greenpeace offices (in 
over 20 countries), prepares position papers and fact sheets, and works directly to meetings of 
the Treaty system.
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although sometimes with a degree of reluctance on the part of bureaucrats. By the early 
1980s three countries (the US, Australia and New Zealand) regularly included NGO 
representatives on their delegations but this was not adopted by other consultative 
parties until recently and is still a limited practice.25 However, the ‘inside’ NGOs 
provided an important link with the ‘outside’ lobbyists at Treaty meetings. NGOs have 
had a lower profile in other consultative states, especially in Latin America and the 
newer consultative parties.26
Until recently, NGOs had little success in gaining independent access to the formal 
mechanisms of the Treaty system. ASOC and Greenpeace International first applied for 
observer status to meetings of the Commission and Scientific Committee of CCAMLR 
in 1983.27 ASOC was successful in 1988.28 ASOC was granted observer status to the 
special consultative meeting on comprehensive measures in 1990 and was invited as an 
expert organisation to the 16th consultative meeting in 1991.
NGOs have adopted a variety of tactics in seeking to influence the policy process at a 
national and international level. Since the late 1970s, they have maintained a lobbying 
presence at ATS meetings.29 Their analyses of Treaty initiatives and decisions are 
circulated to delegates as ‘non-papers’ and are often the only alternative source of 
information for delegates, especially those new to the consultative process or, from 
1983, for non-consultative parties.30 Further, these policy alternatives are not 
constrained by the political concerns of the Treaty system. Thus NGOs stand as another 
source of knowledge, often in contest with the scientific community.
25. They were joined by Denmark, an NCP, from the 1983 meeting when NCPs were able to attend 
for the first time.
26. For example, Greenpeace has an office in Argentina but not in Chile. The first workshop of 
Latin American Antarctic NGOs was held in 1990 with the aim of setting up a Latin American 
NGO transnational network which would join in the efforts of the international NGOs (see 
Yafiez and Zaflartu (1990).
27. Greenpeace has observer status at a number of international organisations and conventions. 
ASOC was granted observer status at the IWC in the early 1980s.
28. See Kimball (1988d) for further details. In 1984 the Commission decided that, as Greenpeace 
was a member of ASOC, it would consider the ASOC application only. A decision was 
postponed in subsequent years as the Commission sought further information from ASOC and 
then tried to obtain a consensus among its members for granting such status.
29. Lobbying activities included publication at each Treaty meeting of the newspaper ECO which 
is circulated to delegates and to the media). NGOs hold press conferences and host dinners and 
other social functions. Coordinators of the NGO lobbying presence normally advise the meeting 
secretariat in advance of the lobbying team. ‘Accredited’ NGO representatives are usually given 
official badges to guarantee entry into the consultative meeting venue (although not, of course, 
into the meeting itself). They are usually granted access to delegates at coffee breaks and are 
often invited to attend functions held by the embassies of Treaty parties. The ASOC report on 
ATCM XV, for example, notes that NGO representatives were invited to attend every function.
30. NGO representatives were more experienced in the ways of the consultative process than the 
NCPs.
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NGOs have increasingly drawn on ‘in-house’ scientific expertise in order to put 
coherently argued policy alternatives to the Treaty parties.31 This was useful also in 
establishing credibility with the scientific community, many of whom were equally 
concerned about environmental protection but were less than complimentary about the 
environmentalists. A former director of the British Antarctic Survey observed that 
while "scientists tend to avoid publicity and are constrained to be truthful about their 
work [i]t is self-evident ... that environmentalist... propaganda tends to be blatant and 
less scrupulous" (Laws 1985:55). British scientist Nigel Bonner (1987a: 149) went so 
far as to suggest that the Antarctic "is today facing its severest threat - not from the 
exploiters but from those who claim to be wholly dedicated to the cause of 
environmental conservation".32
Antarctic bureaucrats have also displayed a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards 
NGO representatives. Quigg (1983:179) notes that
[w]hile showing proper respect for conservationists in public, officials 
involved in Antarctic affairs in the United States and Britain particularly 
are in a state of more or less perpetual irritation with the 
environmentalists for what is often seen as their demand for absolutes, 
their unwillingness or inability to comprehend the reality of international 
politics, and the processes of negotiation among sovereign states.
Non-governmental organisations also turned their attention to the compliance record of 
ATCPs with the measures and recommendations they had adopted under the Treaty by 
making violations public (often with the additional support of photographic evidence). 
They argued that the traditional approaches to decision-making under the Treaty were 
inadequate in meeting environmental responsibilities.
NGO criticism, Auburn suggests (1987:6), has been "increasingly sophisticated". 
Shapley describes (1988:329) environmental groups as "important sources of lateral and 
vertical communication within the regime". In reporting the meetings and educating the 
public NGOs "create and inform a wider constituency for Antarctic matters" (Kimball 
1990d:32). The extent to which NGO tactics have had an impact on the rules and 
procedures adopted by the consultative parties is difficult to assess. The parties have 
accepted that they must be seen to respond positively to the increased public attention 
generated by NGOs. The New Zealand head of delegation at ATCM-X (1979) noted 
that "the international community at large, international organisations and private 
groups interested in the environment are looking to the consultative parties to live up to
31. Kimball (1988d:50n) gives examples of technical studies prepared by NGOs and workshops 
sponsored by them.
32. His concern here was over the implications of NGO demands in the early 1980s that the 
Antarctic should be managed under a United Nations regime.
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the high ideals" which the Parties professed to hold environmental protection (Final 
Report 1979:78). NGO influence was marked in the overturning of the minerals 
convention, discussed in chapter seven below.
The Greenpeace Antarctic campaign
NGO effectiveness in calling the Treaty parties to account increased with experience 
and was assisted by the high profile of the Greenpeace International Antarctic 
campaign. The first Greenpeace Antarctic vessel, the MV Greenpeace, left New 
Zealand at the end of 1985 to establish a scientific station at Cape Evans.33 This 
attempt was unsuccessful because of severe pack ice. The base was built by the second 
expedition in January and February 1987.34 Four expeditioners wintered over that year 
and personnel were exchanged on the resupply voyage in the austral summer of 
1987/88.35 During that voyage, Greenpeace ‘inspected’ a number of bases in the 
vicinity of Cape Evans as well as the Antarctic Peninsula and adjacent islands to draw 
attention to violations of environmental protection measures.36 On its next voyage in 
the 1988/89 austral summer, the Greenpeace expedition visited 25 scientific bases and 
again drew attention to violations of the codes of conduct.37 By 1990 Greenpeace had 
conducted environmental inspections at 39 Antarctic stations (de Poorter and Schmidt 
1990:39).38 Greenpeace announced recently that the base would be closed so that its 
campaign could concentrate on monitoring environmental practice in the Antarctic.
The Greenpeace Antarctic expeditions and the World Park Base were intended to serve 
a political and a scientific purpose.39 Greenpeace sought to demonstrate to the 
consultative parties that expeditions and scientific research could be conducted in an 
environmentally sound manner in accordance with the various environmental protection 
measures in place.40 They also sought to raise public awareness of Antarctic issues and
33. An environmental impact assessment was carried out prior to establishment of the base, and was 
circulated to all Treaty consultative parties. World Park Base was established in territory 
claimed by New Zealand.
34. The site chosen was close to where the Mear-Swan ‘Footsteps of Scott* expedition had 
established a support base in early 1985. The Greenpeace expeditioners dismantled this base 
and removed it from the Antarctic.
35. A new hut was erected during the resupply and a wind generator and solar panels were installed 
to cut dependency on diesel-generated power. Stored wastes were returned to New Zealand-
36. Greenpeace also drew attention to stations where the measures were complied with. The report 
of those inspections was distributed to all Treaty nations.
37. During these inspections expeditioners often took steps to rectify situations which were having 
adverse environmental impacts, such as transferring fuel from leaking barrels to new ones.
38. It is unlikely that any of the consultative parties would have conducted this many inspections 
throughout the life of the Treaty system.
39. In 1986 Greenpeace established ‘Antarctic embassies’ in twelve countries, and appointed 
naturalist David Bellamy as the British ‘ambassador’ to Greenpeace’s Antarctic World Park 
(see The Times 1 February 1986).
40. Their scientific program included studies into the effects of low light levels on human 
physiology, studies of coastal fish and meltwater lakes, as well as tests on soil and water samples 
taken from the bases of consultative party bases.
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to acquire expertise to support their application for observer status to the Treaty.41 
They were, they argued "looking over the shoulders of bases, literally ... [and] morally" 
(Wilkinson 1988).
This put increasing pressure on the consultative parties to respond, especially in a world 
where environmental issues were moving up the agenda. The consultative parties were 
keen to assure the world of their responsible stewardship of the Antarctic at a time when 
they were under some pressure in the United Nations for being secretive and exclusive 
and where electoral pressure in at least some of the consultative parties could be 
mobilised. That response is examined later in this chapter.
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 
which was established in 1948, is another environmental organisation with a well- 
developed interest in Antarctic issues.42 Like ASOC, it is an umbrella organisation. 
However, unlike ASOC which is a coalition of NGOs, IUCN membership comprises 
both government and non-government organisations.43 The IUCN is not a lobbying or 
pressure group in the style of ASOC or Greenpeace. Rather it sees its role as a one of 
providing advice and expertise where appropriate to promote conservation objectives. 
Nevertheless IUCN does share with the more advocacy-oriented NGOs a concern about 
the adequacy of environmental rules and regulations.
IUCN has been somewhat more successful than other organisations in establishing a 
working relationship with the scientific community although, as Kimball notes 
(1988d:40) this was a tentative and somewhat wary collaboration in its early stages. 
While the IUCN saw SCAR as the best channel through which to approach the ATS to 
promote conservation objectives "SCAR’s relatively closed network of old Antarctic 
hands was somewhat sceptical of IUCN’s lack of Antarctic credentials" (Kimball 
1988d:40). However, in late 1985 a joint IUCN/SCAR working group on long-term 
conservation in the Antarctic was established, although some form of collaboration had 
been suggested as early as 1982.44
Antarctic decision-makers also viewed IUCN somewhat differently, given its standing 
as an organisation with government as well as non-govemment membership. It was
41. By establishing a permanent base and conducting scientific research, Greenpeace International 
had effectively met the criteria applied to the granting of consultative status to states.
42. Kimball (1988d:37) suggests that it was Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) and IIED 
which encouraged IUCN to become more involved in Antarctic issues.
43. Barnes (1984:172) styles IUCN as a hybrid NGO. Greenpeace International is a member of 
IUCN as are many of the Treaty parties.
44. This collaboration resulted in the establishment of a joint task force to develop a long-term plan 
for Antarctic conservation and environmental management which would give effect to an 
"integrated and comprehensive approach" (Kimball 1986:2).
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invited to attend, as an observer, the diplomatic conference at which CCAMLR was 
signed in 1980 and to participate (again as an observer) at institutional meetings under 
CCAMLR.45 Since 1987, IUCN has been invited to send an expert to consultative 
meetings to assist in discussion on the agenda item on human impact on the Antarctic 
environment.
The Antarctic environmental regime
The consultative parties adopted a "prevention rather than cure" approach in seeking to 
regulate activities which might have an environmental impact that "a reasonable person 
would look upon as being at least regrettable" in the understated language of the 
Handbook (1989:1101). However, in adopting measures on environmental protection 
the consultative parties have sought to balance the recognised need to minimise 
environmental impact with the needs of scientific research, tourism and resource 
exploitation.
Environmental needs were not only set against other uses of the Antarctic, but were also 
subordinated to the political concerns of the regime. Those concerns, as outlined in 
chapter two, were dominated by the need for accommodation on the exercise of 
sovereignty. The imperative for consensus and compromise meant that the results of 
decision-making and negotiation were of a lowest common denominator kind.
This hierarchy of values did not favour environmental protection. Auburn (1982:274) 
suggests that "sovereignty, politics, logistic convenience and the facilitation of scientific 
research prevail over environmental considerations". Broady (1983:26) notes that 
"political and economic control is the major consideration: limiting damage to the 
environment is secondary". The need for consensus, and for the political compromise 
on sovereignty to remain undisturbed, were paramount.
Decision-making on environmental issues in this context was issue-specific and thus 
piecemeal. It was also frequently slow. The process of negotiation and compromise 
meant that sometimes years passed before substantive rules and procedures could be 
agreed upon. Draft recommendations were often watered down so that agreement could 
be reached. Contentious issues were often deferred. Monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms were avoided. The decentralised nature of the Treaty system worked 
against consistency of implementation practice across the Treaty parties. The 
environmental measures thus established by the Treaty system were, as Kriwoken and
45. The institutions of CCAMLR first met in 1982. IUCN was not the only organisation with 
observer status. Others included the FAO, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, 
the IWC and SCAR. In 1986, the IUCN observer at the Commission meetings noted that for the 
first time he was able to be present at a working group meeting without being challenged 
(Kimball 1988d:46).
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Keage observe (1989b:41), disparate and fragmented. The regime was incomplete and 
ad hoc.
This process has given rise to two debates which are not unique to the Antarctic. Both 
relate to questions of regime efficiency. The first questions whether a process 
dominated by sovereignty norms and characterised by lowest common denominator 
decision-making is capable of producing ‘good’ environmental rules. The second asks 
whether the emphasis on voluntary compliance which characterises sovereignty norms 
undermines the effective implementation of environmental protection rules. Ultimately, 
these debates are about competing values and ideas.
The argument has been advanced by non-governmental organisations, environmental 
experts and scientists, that the slow decision-making process, with its emphasis on 
political compromise, means that the rules adopted are increasingly inadequate as 
environmental protection and management measures. NGOs in particular have also 
argued that those rules which have been adopted have not been adequately observed. 
As Kimball (cited in Barnes 1986:436) has noted
a primary weakness of the system, which stems from the need to avoid 
prejudicing either claimant or non-claimant position, is its lack of 
specificity with respect to enforcement rights and procedures to consider 
allegations that the rules are not being complied with.46
Inspection under article VII of the Antarctic Treaty is the only formal means of 
detecting violations of environmental measures. However, a reluctance to rock the boat 
meant that even when violations were noted, parties were unwilling to bring them to the 
attention of the consultative process in any formal way. Violation of environmental 
protection rules was not considered fundamentally destabilising to the regime, whereas 
arguments over those violations might have been.
In the 1960s and 1970s the smallness and cohesiveness of the Antarctic club and the 
general lack of international attention to the Antarctic, combined with a low level of 
international consciousness about environmental protection issues generally meant that 
potential difficulties over the inadequacies of environmental rules and implementation 
could be masked. However by the late 1970s it was clear that "the legal and political
46. The question of whether consultative recommendations are legally binding on states has not 
been settled. Recommendation III-VIII, in suggesting that new consultative parties be urged to 
accept existing recommendations and to inform other Parties of their intention to apply and be 
bound by them implies that the recommendations can be argued to be binding. However their 
force in international law is unclear (see Bush 1982:96-98). In spite of recommendation III-VIII 
the consultative parties seem to have taken a position that the recommendations are morally 
binding but not binding in law.
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arrangements for governing ... the Antarctic lag disturbingly behind the human ability to 
affect [this] region" (Schatz 1978:477).
The Antarctic environmental agenda expanded in the 1980s in response to a number of 
factors. The number of people in the Antarctic each year increased as the number of 
consultative parties grew. Scientific research contributed to the growing (although still 
limited) knowledge about the Antarctic environment and about the impact of human 
activity upon it. Protection of the environment became an international agenda item. 
Concerns were raised by scientists about the impacts of environmental degradation.47 
Increasing national concerns about the state of the environment reinforced international 
concerns as transboundary impact, such as air and water pollution, became more 
pronounced and directly affected people’s quality of life.
In this context, interest from non-govemmental organisations ensured that public 
attention was focussed both on the decisions the consultative parties made and the way 
those rules were implemented.48 The consultative parties were increasingly required to 
respond to these pressures.
Principles and norms
In a series of general recommendations the consultative parties declared their 
commitment to protection of the Antarctic environment and set out principles and 
norms in support of this which have become an integral component of the Antarctic 
regime.
The first clear articulation of those environmental principles came in a recommendation 
(VI-4) adopted at ATCM-VI in 1970.49 The consultative parties recognised that
(1) in the Antarctic Treaty Area the ecosystem is particularly vulnerable to 
human interference;
(2) the Antarctic derives much of its scientific importance from its 
uncontaminated and undisturbed condition;
(3) there is an increasingly urgent need to protect the environment from 
human interference;
47. For example, the depletion of the ozone layer and potential for climate change as a result of the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide.
48. The common heritage debates in the United Nations did not make substantial references to 
environmental protection (until the late 1980s) concerned as they were more with access to 
resources.
49. The Chilean delegation submitted that there was an obligation to investigate with the utmost 
urgency the negative effects of man’s impact on nature and possible measures of control. The 
body of this draft suggests that"... man’s activities [should] be eliminated insofar as possible 
with the exception of activities related to scientific investigations proper" (ANT/24, 1970). A 
symposium on this matter, they suggested, should be held at the earliest possible date.
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In support of this principle, recommendation VI-4 also established the general norm that 
"the Consultative Parties should assume responsibility for the protection of the 
environment and the wise use of the Treaty Area". Thus the principles of scientific 
research and environmental protection are linked, and environmental protection is 
placed in the context of the "wise use" of the Antarctic. In other words, environmental 
and utilitarian values are linked.
This norm adds to the Parties’ obligations under the Treaty but there is nothing to say 
how that obligation should be met. The principles and norms elaborated in this 
recommendation have been recalled and reinforced in subsequent recommendations 
which establish specific rules and procedures for environmental protection and 
management. The consultative parties argued that, by virtue of their experience and 
knowledge, they were in the best position to undertake this task.50 As discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter, this stewardship of the Antarctic environment was subject to 
critical review in the 1980s.
In recommendation VIII-13 ( adopted in 1975) the consultative parties are exhorted to 
"act in accordance with their responsibility for ensuring that such measures are 
consistent with the interests of all mankind ... in considering measures for the wise use 
and protection of the Antarctic environment". Further,
no act or activity having an inherent tendency to modify the Antarctic 
environment over wide areas within the Antarctic Treaty Area shall be 
undertaken unless appropriate steps have been taken to foresee the 
probable modifications and to exercise appropriate controls with respect 
to the harmful environmental effects such uses ... may have.
These principles and norms were again stated in a declaration on environmental 
protection adopted at ATCM IX in 1977 (recommendation IX-5). This elaboration of 
general principles on environmental protection, however, was not translated into a 
comprehensive set of environmental standards against which human activity would be 
measured, in spite of the increasing number of environmental recommendations and the 
complexity of the issues.
Rules and procedures51
Consideration of environmental issues initially focussed on the conservation and 
preservation of living resources which was specifically set out in the Treaty as an issue 
for the consultative process. The effects of tourism was inscribed on the agenda in 1966
50. This also reinforces the general norm of the Treaty system that Antarctic issues should be kept 
firmly within the purview of the Treaty system.
The description and analysis here draws on documents from consultative meetings which are 
now publicly available, primary material from non-governmental organisations, the final reports 
of consultative meetings, and secondary sources.
51.
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and the preservation of historic monuments in 1968. Since 1970 "Man’s [sic] impact on 
the Antarctic environment" has been a standing agenda item,52 and environmental 
topics now include marine pollution, conduct of scientific expeditions, waste disposal, 
the development of a protected area system, the siting of scientific stations, 
environmental impact assessment and the effects of the exploitation of mineral 
resources.
As well as the increasingly complex network of rules and procedures adopted in 
consultative recommendations, which are discussed in this chapter, the Treaty parties 
have negotiated three separate conventions. Those conventions, which attempt to 
balance environmental and utilitarian values are the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources and the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities and are examined in the following chapters.
i. The conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora
The first environmental issue addressed by the consultative parties was that specifically 
mandated by article IX(f) of the Treaty, the conservation and preservation of "living 
resources".53 Debate on this issue at the first two consultative meetings culminated in 
the adoption, at the third consultative meeting in 1964, of the Agreed Measures on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora.
While the Treaty parties were genuinely concerned to establish conservation measures, 
the substance of those measures was dictated by sensitivities over the exercise of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. Bush (1990:126) notes that this engendered an 
"unwillingness ... to have any but the most rudimentary institutional structure to oversee 
implementation of the Agreed Measures".
The Agreed Measures had their genesis in guidelines for the protection of living 
resources developed by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) at its 
1960 meeting.54 Several delegations submitted draft recommendations which proposed 
adopting SCAR’s guidelines.55 There was, however, disagreement over the extent of
52. Its inscription on the agenda appears to have been proposed by the US which had provided 
preliminary views on this matter at preparatory meetings.
53. Roberts (1966:2) (then senior Antarctic diplomat with the British Foreign office) suggests that it 
was included in the Treaty because of pressure from biologists on the need for conservation 
measures and because it was a relatively uncontroversial subject
54. Those guidelines were tabled at the first consultative meeting in 1961 (SEC Paper/8,1961).
55. Australia (Doc7P.12, 1961), the United States (DocVP.13, 1961), Chile (Doc./P.15, 1961) and 
the United Kingdom (DocVP.18,1961; EXPL.MEMO/4,1961).
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protection.56 Chile (Doc./P15 CORR 1, 1961) suggested that rules should be vigorously 
observed by Antarctic personnel and that strict compliance should be ensured.57 Chile 
also favoured the establishment of wildlife sanctuaries where no interference of any 
kind would be permitted, "not even such exceptions to the conservation measures 
recommended by SCAR as are allowed in the rest of Antarctica". The US on the other 
hand (Doc./PI3, 1961) suggested that protection rules could be relaxed for the 
"exploitation of fauna for commercial gain, on terms which accord with sound 
conservation principles".
The United Kingdom delegation, anticipating a lack of consensus, submitted a draft 
recommendation (Doc/P18, 1961) suggesting further consideration of this issue, but 
annexing measures which might be voluntarily observed in the meantime. This was a 
favoured tactic of the British delegation as a way of achieving a measure of agreement 
to advance consideration of an issue.
Recommendation I-VIII acknowledged the urgent need for measures to conserve the 
living resources of the Treaty area and protect them from uncontrolled destruction or 
interference by humans. In spite of this acknowledged urgency, governments were 
urged only to consult on the form in which it would be most suitable to establish "in due 
course" internationally agreed measures for this purpose. In the interim, general rules 
of conduct extracted from SCAR’s guidelines were to be issued "to the extent possible 
under national legislation".58 This enabled the rules to be given some status, without 
requiring any formal commitment on the part of the Treaty parties but fits with the 
voluntary nature of recommendations that was to become a hallmark of the 
environmental regime.
Little further progress was made at ATCM-H The United Kingdom and Chile tabled 
proposals similar to their 1961 suggestions.59 Recommendation II-II expressed the
56. A senior Antarctic diplomat suggested in an interview that the debate on the Agreed Measures 
was a resource one - whether wildlife could be ‘utilised’.
57. Drafts by the US and Australia omitted references to compliance.
58. These suggested guidelines were not as extensive as those proposed by the UK.
59. The UK (Doc P.3, 1962) tabled a "Draft Convention on the Conservation of Wildlife in the 
Antarctic" which differed little from the annex to Doc P/18 circulated at ATCM 1. A new draft 
article suggests that areas may be designated "nature reserves" for the express purpose of 
safeguarding and perpetuating natural communities of animals, with human interference kept to 
a minimum. This is in addition to "absolute sanctuaries" which adopts the Chilean suggestion of 
no interference whatsoever. In an explanatory memorandum (Memo.Expl.l, 1962) the UK 
government expressed its belief that an international convention was the best method of dealing 
with this issue. Chile also tabled a draft recommendation (Doc P .4 ,1962) entitled "Measures for 
the Protection and Conservation of Living Resources and exchange of information on the 
subject" As a result of working group debate held on 24 and 25 July in connection with the 
British and Chilean proposals, the secretariat tabled a recommendation (Doc P.18, 1972) which 
was subsequently adopted as recommendation II-II.
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conviction that the rules attached to recommendation I-VIII should be scrupulously 
observed. A further exchange of information was recommended as well as consultation 
"with a view to the establishment... of effective and internationally agreed measures on 
this subject".
Differences over the "form in which it would be most suitable to promulgate whatever 
measures might finally be agreed upon"60 and the area to be covered by such measures 
contributed to the difficulties in reaching a consensus.61 Governments were asked to 
formulate a draft text as part of the preparation for ATCM-III.
Delegates to the preparatory meetings for ATCM-III convened a working group to do 
this.62 As a result the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and 
Flora were drawn up and adopted as an annex to recommendation HI-VIII. 
Governments were called upon to approve them as soon as possible and implement 
them without delay.63 Under recommendation EII-IX the Agreed Measures were to be 
treated as interim guidelines "as far as feasible" .64
Under the Agreed Measures the Antarctic Treaty Area was designated a Special 
Conservation Area,65 although this concept is not defined. The "killing, wounding, 
capturing or molesting of any native mammal [except whales]66 or native bird" was 
prohibited, except in accordance with a permit. Permits could only be issued for 
specific purposes (to provide food, specimens for scientific study, or for museums, 
zoological gardens or other educational or cultural institutions) and were to be limited 
to ensure that the natural ecological balance was maintained. Harmful interference with
60. The wording here is taken from the UK draft at the first consultative meeting (D ocP18 ,1961).
61. The British favoured a convention but others were less supportive, favouring a code or 
recommendation. The US delegation was concerned that they would not be able to get Senate 
ratification of a conservation convention (Myhre 1986:47-48).
62. In his analysis of the preparatory meetings for the third consultative meeting, Myhre (1986:48- 
53) discusses the difficulties the delegations had in respect of what form these measures should 
take - a convention, a code or some other form of agreement Differences of opinion related to 
the national processes required to give effect to different types of agreements.
63. This did not happen. The United States, for example, did not adopt legislation to give effect to 
the Agreed Measures until 1978. By 1983 Japan still had not ratified them although legislation 
had finally been passed in 1982 which enabled Japan to do so (Bush 1982:169). Japan’s 
ratification was deposited before the 1985 consultative meeting.
64. This became a standard formula in respect of conservation and other recommendations that still 
had to be ratified by Governments in accordance with legislative procedures and which might 
take some time. Of course it also raises the question that the recommendation establishing 
interim guidelines had itself to be ratified.
65. It was suggested that the Treaty Area be declared an "International Wildlife Reserve". 
Argentina and Chile wanted the word "international" removed; the Soviet representative wanted 
it kept in. The US representative said his government would accept a phrase such as Special 
Conservation Area, Protected Natural Haven or Nature Sanctuary (see Doc/.l, 1964).
66. Whales are specifically excluded because they are only to be found in the high seas regions of 
the Treaty Area and because they were already under the protection of the International Whaling 
Convention.
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the normal living conditions of native mammals and birds was to be minimised. The 
introduction of non-indigenous species, parasites and diseases except in accordance 
with a permit was prohibited.67 However, the permit system allowed each state to 
operate unilaterally.68 Thus the Agreed Measures and the issuing of permits did not 
affect the juridical position of states on territorial sovereignty in Antarctica (Colson 
1980:853).69
Areas of outstanding scientific interest could be designated Specially Protected Areas 
(SPAs) and accorded special protection to preserve their unique ecological system.70 
Strict guidelines were established on the types of activity which permitted in SPAs. 
The Measures also provided for the designation of Specially Protected Species (SPSs). 
No SPAs or SPSs were designated at this meeting, even though the draft 
recommendation contained suggestions for both.
Documents show that the measures could well have been stronger. Australia 
unsuccessfully lobbied for the inclusion of a clause specifying that permits should not 
be issued for the killing of females except in unavoidable circumstances. A US 
suggestion that harmful interference should include "polluting waters adjacent to the 
coast or ice-shelves" and "undertaking any kind of construction within seal or bird 
colonies" (with an exception for existing stations) was not adopted (see Doc.1, 1964).71 
Neither were British and Chilean suggestions for "absolute sanctuaries".
The Agreed Measures echo article VI of the Treaty in both its coverage (south of 
60°South, including all ice shelves) and its saving of high seas freedoms. The 
prevailing opinion is that the Measures therefore apply to the continental shelf and the 
ice sheet, but not to off-shore waters (Boczek 1983-4:370; Bush 1982:147). Australia 
argued that the Agreed Measures should cover "all areas of floating ice" (Doc.1, 1964),
67. Permits are to be issued by an "appropriate authority" defined as "any person authorised by a 
Participating Government to issue permits" (article 11(d) of the Agreed Measures).
68. Myhre (1986:53) notes that neither Argentina nor Chile would allow anything in the Measures 
"to hint at a lessening of national sovereignty".
69. There is nothing to indicate whether parties are required to respect each others permits or to give 
national recognition of all SPAs (Boczek 1986:92).
70. See Boczek (1986) for a detailed analysis of SPAs.
71. The Belgian delegation wanted this exception removed. It is unclear what the implications of 
the Belgian proposal would have been, given that it appear to have meant that any station 
already constructed which was within a seal or bird colony would be in contravention of the 
Agreed Measures. Governments were urged to take all reasonable steps towards alleviating 
coastal marine pollution (article VIII) although this was not specifically defined as harmful 
interference. The UK proposed a draft recommendation (Doc/P5, 1964) on oil pollution which 
referred to existing international conventions and suggested that governments convey to the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMO) the need to find a solution to the 
problem of oil pollution in the Southern Ocean to prevent further harm to the wildlife of the 
Antarctic Treaty Area. It was not adopted, most probably because of the suggestion that the 
issue be addressed by another institution.
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presumably to extend the measures to cover seals, believing that without such coverage 
the Measures would lose much of their effectiveness. Many delegates apparently 
agreed on the desirability of effective protection for animals on drifting ice, but were 
reluctant to exceed the limits of article VI of the Treaty.72
While the format of the Agreed Measures allowed governments to take appropriate 
legislative steps to give effect to there conservation principles, there is no way to 
enforce the Measures in practice. No compliance mechanisms are adopted. Bush 
suggests that the Agreed Measures imposed a "relatively low level of obligation" (Bush 
1990:127). Participating governments are simply urged to "take appropriate measures 
to carry out these Agreed Measures".73
SCAR was encouraged to continue its interest in conservation matters and was asked to 
advise on those matters it considered should be listed in the annexes to the Agreed 
Measures.74 Wyndham (1980:187) suggests that a "careful analysis of the specially 
protected areas adopted ... will show signs of continuing sensitivity" on the claims 
issues. At the 4th consultative meeting in 1966, Australia proposed three SPAs, the 
United Kingdom eight, and the US and NZ jointly proposed four.75 The claimants (NZ, 
UK and Australia) proposed only areas within their claims. These SPAs were adopted 
under recommendations IV-1 to 15. Under recommendations VI-16 and 17 Fur Seals 
and Ross Seals were designated Specially Protected Species.76
72. Norway and the US in particular thought the Australian proposal could not be admitted as it 
stood. New Zealand suggested that the question of the protection of seals might be dealt with 
separately.
73. A suggestion that governments should "take appropriate action including such legislative and 
regulatory measures as may be required to carry out these Agreed Measures" proved to be 
contentious. The Chilean representative proposed that the phrase underlined above be removed: 
the Soviet and the US representatives supported its retention. In the final event the Chileans 
prevailed (see Doc/P.1,1964).
74. The British delegation had suggested (Doc/P3, 1964) that SCAR be invited to prepare, every 
three years, an independent scientific report in the light of the Agreed Measures, making 
suggestions on the collection of records, issuing of permits and schedules of SPSs and SPAs.
75. The proposals were based on suggestions made by SCAR at its September 1966 meeting. A 
paper tabled by the UK listed these 15 proposed areas, and left two ‘slots’ blank few areas 
proposed by France. Further details about those two areas appear not to have been forthcoming, 
as only 15 SPAs were adopted at ATCMIV.
76. At ATCM-III the US suggested that elephant seals should also be included. Recommendation 
IV-18 adopted a New Zealand suggestion for cooperation between governments in issuing 
permits where more than one government was working in the same area. A standard form for 
the exchange of information on permits issued, and the status of native mammals and birds, is 
adopted under recommendation IV-19 and SCAR’s decision to study these matters was 
welcomed. Recommendation IV-20 urges governments to accept recommendations 1 to 19 as 
interim guidelines until the Agreed Measures become effective. It does, however, raise the 
interesting dilemma that a recommendation urging acceptance of interim guidelines would not 
itself become effective until agreed to by all governments.
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After this meeting only minor adjustments were made to the Agreed Measures and these 
focussed on the permit system. In 1968 (ATCM-V) article 11(d) of the Agreed 
Measures, which defined the "appropriate authority" to issue permits was amended (in 
recommendation V-6) to ensure that the functions of a person so authorised would be in 
accordance with the Treaty, scientific principles and the Agreed Measures.77 Boczek 
(1986:91-2) suggests that this was to allay concerns that issuing permits might be used 
for political reasons in a way that prejudiced claims.78 At ATCM-VIII (1975) the 
Agreed Measures were amended to require permits for entry into SPAs for a 
"compelling scientific purpose".79 No guidelines were given on how such a purpose 
might be defined.
Between 1966 and 1983 only two more SPAs were designated even though they were 
central to the protection of the Antarctic environment.80 In the same period three SPAs 
were terminated. In 1968, only two years after its designation, an SPA on the Fildes 
Peninsula of King George Island in the South Shetlands was modified to make it much 
smaller (recommendation V-5) because of the construction of two scientific stations in 
the area.81 Construction had begun after the adoption of the Agreed Measures 
(although they were not yet formally effective) and thus violated at least the spirit of the 
Measures. In other words, when the protection of an SPA conflicted with human 
activity, the latter use prevailed.
In 1975 (ATCM-VIII) this designation, along with two other SPAs, was terminated 
(recommendation VIII-2) and downgraded to a lesser protective category of Site of 
Special Scientific Interest.82 Thus, ten years after the Agreed Measures had been 
adopted, areas deemed in need of protection because of their unique ecological nature 
were being denied that protection.
A report on the purposes and designation of SPAs prepared by the SCAR Working 
Group on Biology was presented to the seventh consultative meeting (1972) by the 
British delegation. SCAR was concerned that existing SPAs were not fully
77. This was done at the urging erf Chile (see documents ANT.3; ANT.3 Rev 2,1968).
78. Under the rules of article IX of the Treaty, this recommendation technically amended a prior 
recommendation which was not yet formally in force.
79. This followed recommendation VI-8 (1970) by which governments were urged to prohibit entry 
into a Specially Protected Area except with a permit
80. The Coppermine Peninsula on Robert Island was designated a SPA under recommendation VI- 
10 in 1970. Chile withdrew its proposal for ‘Island Decepcion’ to be so designated. 
Annotations to the provisional agenda (ANT/2, 1970) indicate that there was disagreement 
between Chile and the UK on this, but give no further details. It seems that the area proposed 
included off-shoe waters thus raising questions about high seas freedoms and jurisdiction over 
territorial waters. Litchfield Island in the Palmer Archipelago was designated as an SPA under 
recommendation VIII-1 in 1975.
81. The bases were the Soviet Bellingshausen and the Chilean Teniente Marsh.
82. This redesignation seems to have been in response to SCAR’s suggestions (see A N T /1 ,1975).
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representative of major Antarctic land and freshwater ecological systems.83 
Recommendation VII-2 suggested that Specially Protected Areas be reviewed "in due 
course" to include areas with unique complexes of species, areas which were the only 
known habitat of a particular species, or contained interesting breeding colonies, or 
areas which should be kept ‘inviolate’ for future comparison with disturbed areas. 
SCAR was invited again to conduct this review.84
After ATCM-VIII (1975) the preservation and conservation of fauna and flora on land 
dropped off the agenda until the 11th consultative meeting85 in 1981 where no 
recommendations were adopted.86 Three new Specially Protected Areas were 
established at the 13th consultative meeting (1985) (recommendations XIII-10, 11 and 
12).87 By this time the consultative parties were addressing these issues in the context 
of public debate about the adequacy of conservation measures in the Antarctic and the 
exposure by NGOs of violations of the Agreed Measures. This debate is examined 
below.
ii. Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs)
The designation of Sites of Special Scientific Interest grew out of the experience of 
Specially Protected Areas under the Agreed Measures although this new category was 
not incorporated into the Measures. Scientists were concerned that some method was 
needed to protect areas which were important to scientific investigation from wilful 
interference. SPAs could not be used for this purpose because they were specifically 
designed for the protection of fauna and flora rather than broader scientific values.
At ATCM-VII (1972) the British delegation suggested (ANT/8, 1972) that there should 
be special study areas where scientists could be confident that long or short-term 
experiments would not be disturbed.88 The category of Site of Special Scientific 
Interest was established under recommendation VII-3. Unlike SPAs, each SSSI was to
83. In 1970 the British delegation had tabled a document which collated information on numbers of 
animals killed and captured in the Treaty Area between 1964 and 1969. This paper observed 
that "clearly there is at present no serious direct threat to Antarctic mammals and birds. This 
does not, however, rule out the possibility of very restricted over-exploitation of some local 
populations" (A N T /14,1970).
84. The number of SPAs was to be kept to the minimum in number and size to meet the 
requirements, in keeping with a British suggestion that some of the SPAs were too big. SCAR’s 
report suggested that there be no change to the criteria for selection of SPAs (A N T /1,1975).
85. The Final Report makes no statement on this what was discussed under this agenda item.
86. The question of marine fauna was addressed in the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources, both of 
which are discussed in chapter four.
87. The description of SPA No 7 was amended (recommendation XIII-13). Recommendation XIII- 
14 proposed that these recommendations would be considered interim guidelines until they 
became effective.
88. The US had made a similarly suggestion at the preparatory meeting.
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have a management plan. SCAR was asked to make suggestions for appropriate sites 
and plans for consideration at the 8th consultative meeting.89 Under recommendation 
Vni-4 (1975) seven sites proposed by SCAR were established.90 Responsibility for 
initiating SSSIs therefore clearly lies with SCAR.
An eighth site was designated in 1979.91 At the 13th consultative meeting in 1985, 13 
new sites approved by SCAR were designated (recommendation XM-8).92 A further 
four terrestrial sites, proposed by the United Kingdom, were adopted at ATCM-XIV in 
1977.
While there were few difficulties with the designation of terrestrial SSSIs, marine sites 
proved to be contentious. The issue was on the agenda for twelve years before 
agreement was finally reached. The designation was contentious because of concerns 
about infringements of high seas rights under article VI of the Treaty. It also raised the 
issue of whether immediate off-shore areas were high seas or territorial seas, a point on 
which the parties could not agree.
Several national committees expressed an interest in the designation of marine SSSIs at 
the 13th SCAR meeting in 1974. The question of Specially Protected Marine Areas and 
Marine SSSIs was inscribed on, and then deleted from, the agenda for the 8th 
consultative meeting (1975). At the 9th consultative meeting in 1977 Chile proposed 
two marine sites. Boczek (1986:96) suggests that Chile’s motivation was the political 
consideration of asserting its jurisdiction over offshore waters. In the absence of 
consensus SCAR was invited to consider this issue. SCAR’s recommendations on this 
issue (along with Chile’s proposals) were discussed by a working group at ATCM-X in 
1979, but again differences could not be resolved.
89. Which it duly did at its 13th meeting in September 1974.
90. These inducted the three SPAs terminated by recommendation VII-2. The relevant management 
plans were to be considered interim guidelines until formally in force. Recommendation VIII-3 
provides guidelines for SCAR to follow when designating sites and elaborating management 
plans. These criteria established by the consultative parties to guide SCAR were those already 
proposed by SCAR at its 13th Meeting and used in the management plans for the seven SSSIs 
adopted at this consultative meeting.
91. The expiry dates of the management plans for the seven SSSIs already designated were extended 
under recommendation 6 after SCAR had recommended no change to the content of these plans 
and "experience of the practical effects of the management plans ... had shown them to be an 
effective means of reducing the risk of harmful interference in areas of exceptional scientific 
interest". At ATCM-XII in 1983, the US delegation circulated a message from the President of 
SCAR explaining that SCAR had not yet reviewed the designations for SSSIs 1 to 8 which were 
due to expire before the next consultative meeting. SCAR requested that designations be 
extended until the next consultative meeting "when an informal [sic] decision could be made". 
Accordingly recommendation XII-5 extends the expiry dates for all eight SSSIs (including that 
for No 7 which had already expired).
92. The expiry dates of sites 2 to 8 were extended in accordance with SCAR’s report 
(recommendation XIII-7). Under recommendation XIII-9 the consultative parties implemented 
SCAR’s recommendation that the management plan for Site No 1 be amended.
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Marine SSSIs were discussed again at ATCM-XII in 1983. Chile, Argentina and the 
UK jointly proposed a site that was partly terrestrial and partly marine. However 
delegates decided that any such proposals should be carefully examined in the light of 
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty and other factors (Final Report 1983:9). The issue 
was deferred until SCAR had approved SSSIs partly or wholly in the marine 
environment even though this proposal had been supported at the 17th SCAR meeting.
Proposed management plans for marine SSSIs (there were now three proposals) were 
not adopted at ATCM-XIII (1985), in spite of SCAR’s concern that this issue had been 
on the table for several years.93 Several delegations also stressed the importance of the 
designation of these sites. However at least one (unnamed) delegation continued to 
argue that marine SSSIs contradicted freedom of the high seas, and consensus could still 
not be reached.94 The three marine SSSIs proposed by Chile were finally adopted at 
ATCM-XIV in 1987.95
iii. Extension o f the protected area system
Specially Protected Areas and Special Sites of Scientific Interest were the basis for a 
system of protected areas in the Antarctic.96 SCAR was involved in providing advice to 
the consultative parties on both, but all final decisions rested with the consultative 
process.
By the end of the 1970s, however, only thirteen SPAs and seven SSSIs had been 
designated (although, as noted above, the number of SSSIs increased in the 1980s). By 
1985 the protected area system covered only 0.15 percent of the ice-free part of the 
continent (Lucas and Dingwall 1987:234), the area where most human activity (and 
therefore most interference) was likely to take place.
As early as 1972 SCAR expressed concern that SPAs did not adequately represent (and 
therefore protect) Antarctic ecosystems. However it was not until the 1980s that 
consultative parties began seriously to examine the effectiveness of the protected area 
system in response to the growing international interest in the Antarctic.
93. At least one of these sites (Deception Island) had first been proposed by Chile few inclusion as a 
SPA under the Agreed Measures in 1970.
94. Confidential reports would suggest that this Party was most likely the USSR.
95. The rationale and criteria for designation of marine SSSIs (to provide guidance for SCAR) was 
set out in recommendation XIV-6 as well as the appropriate information required in a 
management plan (again following guidelines already established and applied by SCAR).
96. This system was supplemented by designation of Historic Monuments and Sites. The initial list 
of historic sites and monuments took eleven years to complete. Wyndham (1980:87) suggests 
this was directly related to sensitivity on the claims issue.
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At ATCM-XIII (1985) Australia proposed a new category of protected area97 on the 
grounds that the existing arrangements (that is, SPAs and SSSIs) were not sufficiently 
flexible to provide protection for areas with aesthetic or wilderness values but with no 
immediate scientific interest. Australia proposed a category of reserve which would 
allow for the management of areas with such values while not precluding activities 
which were unlikely to jeopardise those values. In tabling its proposal Australia 
acknowledged that it was a response to concern in the international community for 
increased levels of protection for Antarctic environments.
Several delegations expressed some sympathy for the proposal but considered that it 
required further study. Others thought such measures unnecessary (Final Report 
1985:20). Several delegations (unnamed) argued that the establishment of a new 
category of protected area could bring political problems, although what they might be 
is not specified (Final Report 1985:21).98
The US delegation thought that it was timely to ask SCAR to review the various 
mechanisms for environmental protection.99 The Australian and American proposals 
were combined in recommendation XIII-5 which requested SCAR to provide scientific 
advice on the system of protected areas in the Antarctic, and to advise specifically 
whether an additional category of protective area was required.100
SCAR’s response to recommendation XIII-5 was tabled at the 14th consultative 
meeting. It was the first comprehensive review of the protected area system in the 
twenty-year life of the Agreed Measures. SCAR made five recommendations. Periodic 
visits, it suggested, should be made to protected areas to assess whether the objectives 
for which they had been designated were being met. Information from those visits 
should be circulated among consultative parties, as well as being made publicly 
available. SCAR proposed also that management plans should be required for SPAs 
and suggested that additional protective areas should be designated to provide for 
representative examples of Antarctic terrestrial, inland water and marine ecosystems. A 
new category of protected area should be established which would "to the greatest
97. This was in spite of a lack of support for a similar proposal made at the preparatory meeting.
98. At the preparatory meeting for the 14th ATCM Australia’s proposal on additional protective 
measures was apparently seen by some delegations as a claimant plot to exclude other activities 
and nations from large areas of the continent If this is the case, given that Australia claims 42 
percent of the continent they would have to have been sizeable protected areas!
99. The US delegation also tabled a general paper on the Antarctic Treaty system as a conservation 
system. The introductory note states that for the sake of brevity, the term "conservation" is used 
in a sense which includes environmental protection (ANT/XIII/INF.9,1985).
100. There is extensive discussion on this in the final report of the meeting. Australia took a decisive 
role in proposing draft recommendations on this and other issues.
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extent possible, provide for buffer zones, multiple use, management plans and values 
other than those of a purely scientific nature" (SCAR 1987:Appendix 6).101
The Final Report notes (1987:39) that several delegations were of the view that the 
concept of multiple use was not sufficiently developed, conceptually or operationally. 
They felt that future discussion would be assisted by having before them examples of 
management plans for SPAs, as well as for possible multiple use areas. No 
recommendation was adopted. Nevertheless, as Kimball (1987d:10) notes the meeting 
"accepted in principle the need to agree on additional protective measures". The Final 
Report (1987:41-42) included a suggestion that provisional management plans for seven 
specified areas might be prepared for the preparatory meeting for XV consultative 
meeting noting, however, that this did not imply any commitment to their eventual 
acceptance.
When the issue of the protected area system came onto the agenda of ATCM-XV in 
1989 it was in the context of broader debates about environmental protection following 
the Australian/French decision not to sign the Minerals Convention and the stated 
intention of those countries to pursue the negotiation of a comprehensive environmental 
protection regime. The parties moved with uncharacteristic speed at this meeting to 
give effect to SCAR’s recommendations, although this might well have been to defuse 
the Australian and French proposals and to foreshadow anything that might be on the 
agenda of the special consultative meeting. ATCM-XV is discussed further in chapter 
seven.
The provisions of the Agreed Measures for the protection of fauna and flora and the 
adequacy of the protected area system came under increasing scrutiny in the 1980s from 
non-governmental organisations as well as from environmental management experts.
The most publicised example of violation of the Agreed Measures is the construction of 
an airstrip by the French at the Dumont D ’Urville station at Pointe Geologie.102 The 
initial environmental impact report was inadequate, a point noted by French scientists 
themselves. The construction involved blasting to create a runway strip between five 
small islands, disturbing and killing birds, even though the station had been constructed
101. Australia tabled a paper (ANT/XIV/WP/16, 1987) to show how the suggested new category 
could improve the effectiveness of protection under the Antarctic Treaty, setting out a lengthy 
‘hypothetical’ example of its possible application. Australia (ANT/XIV/WP/17, 1987) 
supported SCAR’s recommendations and stressed that the SCAR report needed "urgent and 
serious attention ... in order to properly meet our responsibilities under article IX of the treaty 
and to respond to international concerns over the adequacy of our care for the Antarctic 
environment".
102. This has been well documented by NGOs. See, for example, ASOC (1985a), Greenpeace 
(1987a, 1987b, 1989b).
120
in that location specifically because of the scientific value of the penguin rookeries 
nearby.
During construction of the Chinese ‘Great Wall’ station on King George Island, 
penguins were chased with sticks and glass and metal objects were place in nests, in 
contravention of the Agreed Measures. Considerable disruption was also caused to 
scientific experiments of German hydrologists.103 The construction of Hallett station in 
1968 resulted in the displacement of a penguin rookery covering two acres (Quigg 
1983:50-51).104 In spite of the provisions of the Agreed Measures, as Muller-Schwarze 
and Belanger (1978:380) argue, "there can be no doubt that breeding populations of 
Antarctic birds are adversely affected by direct exposure to man’s activities in 
Antarctica".105
The SPAs and SSSIs were inadequate and susceptible to human interference. The 
existing protected area system, Kriwoken and Keage suggested (1989b:36), cannot 
"adequately protect the Antarctic environment over the full range of human activities 
and their consequent environmental pressures".106 As noted above SCAR was also 
concerned about the limited scope of the protected area system.
Again as noted above, the construction of two bases on the Fildes Peninsula (King 
George Island) resulted in a decrease in the size of the SPA designated there and, 
finally, in the termination of that designation. The biologically important me It-lake 
which was included in that SPA was used by the Chilean base as a dump site (Anon 
1988j:19).
Thus both the Agreed Measures and the protected area system were subject to 
compliance problems. This aspect of the environmental regime is addressed later in this 
chapter.
103. Snow gauges, water gauges and measuring pipes were broken. China was still granted 
consultative party status in 1985.
104. There was often little attempt in the 1960s and 1970s to clean up after the construction of a base. 
For example, see Lipps (1978:348) on the construction of the US Palmer station in 1968.
105. In a single incident during the 1970/71 season a helicopter taking off over the Cape Crazier 
rookery caused several thousand incubating Adelie penguins to leave their nests in panic. Their 
eggs rolled out of the nests and were lost. This incident was either in direct contravention of the 
Agreed Measures, or it points to the inadequacy of the Agreed Measures in protecting fauna and 
flora. Navy helicopter flight patterns are argued to have caused a 50 percent reduction in 
breeding at one penguin rookery close to McMurdo (Manheim 1989).
106. See also Schofield (1976:20) who suggests that the impact and overall scope of conservation 
measures and system of protected areas are limited. Boczek (1986:84) notes that the designation 
of some SPAs has been advantageous in the protection of wildlife. He notes particularly the 
giant petrel colonies in the Rookery Islands and the fulmarine petrels and southern skuas on the 
Budd Coast See also Lucas and Dingwall (1987:233-37) for arguments on deficiencies in the 
protected area system.
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iv. Code of Conduct for Antarctic expeditions and station activities 
By 1970 the consultative parties had begun to establish rules and procedures to provide 
protection for parts of the Treaty Area, or for species found therein. Yet there was little 
guidance on what was acceptable practice outside those areas, particularly in respect of 
the general conduct of expeditions and activities at scientific stations.
In 1970 the Parties asked SCAR (in recommendation VI-4) to identify the types and 
extent of human interference and to propose measures to minimise this. In the 
meantime, governments were urged to take interim measures to reduce known causes of 
harmful interference. SCAR’s recommendations were discussed at ATCM-VEI (1972) 
and governments were urged to adopt them as voluntary guidelines for the conduct of 
their expeditions and stations, "as far as feasible and practicable" (recommendation VII- 
l).107 The item was referred to the eighth ATCM to be discussed in detail where 
delegates adopted a short "Code of Conduct for Antarctic expeditions and station 
activities", based on SCAR’s report.
Under recommendation VIE-11 the Parties were to observe the Code "to the greatest 
extent feasible". There was, thus, no formal obligation in this respect. The first section 
of this Code of Conduct recommended procedures for the disposal of solid and liquid 
waste.108 The sections on the introduction of alien species and minimisation of 
disturbance to breeding colonies and concentrations of birds and mammals simply drew 
attention to the Agreed Measures. The fourth section suggests that "in the planning of 
major operations in the Antarctic Treaty Area an evaluation of the environmental 
impact of the proposed activity should be carried out by the Antarctic operating 
organisations concerned". It stopped short of suggesting, however, that such operations 
should not be cancelled or modified if a negative evaluation was made.109 Evaluations 
may be circulated through SCAR channels to other states engaged in Antarctic 
activities.110
107. The Final Report for this meeting gives no information on this discussion or on the content of 
SCAR’s recommendations.
108. Incineration is permitted for combustible materials (except batteries which are to be removed 
from the Treaty area). Non-combustible materials may be disposed of at sea. Plastic packaging 
and plastic and rubber products are to be removed.
109. Some national Antarctic operating agencies, particularly the US, had been applying 
environmental impact procedures to their activities in the Antarctic.
110. The first environmental impact assessment in the Antarctic seems to have been conducted for the 
Dry Valleys Drilling Project in 1973 (Frazier 1974b:60) because earth scientists wanted to 
explore the geological record in rock, and biologists wanted to protect the unique valley 
ecosystems from any disturbances.
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As Auburn notes (1982:287) the Code was weaker than the SCAR proposals in a 
number of ways. Most important, he suggests, was the omission of the requirement for 
a
comprehensive statement of anticipated short-term and long-term effects 
on the environment and its ... associated macro- and micro-biota, 
together with their primary, secondary and tertiary consequences; a 
delineation of all probable unavoidable adverse effects, with suggestions 
for means of minimising them (Auburn 1982:287).
Some (unnamed) delegations felt that this recommendation could have been even
stronger, and expressed their reservations accordingly (Final Report 1975:8).111 This
code provided the only specific guidelines for expeditions for almost a decade.
The code of conduct and the issues of waste disposal and environmental impact 
assessment were not addressed again until the 12th consultative meeting in 1983, eight 
years later. By this time, the consultative parties’ implementation of the Code of 
Conduct was being publicly challenged by non-govemmental organisations and by 
others. Bonner and Walton (1985:357)112 argued that little effort was made at many 
research stations to observe the Code of Conduct113 Over the years, as Lemonick notes 
(1990:30) the consultative parties "spilled oil into the seas, dumped untreated sewage 
off the coasts [and] burned garbage in open pits".
As Campbell and Claridge (1987:333) suggested one of the greatest concerns in the 
Antarctic was the management practices, or more importantly the lack thereof, 
employed to cope with increasing densities of people at scientific stations. Indeed, the 
Parties themselves recognised that since the Code of Conduct was adopted in 1975 their 
record "has been longer on intention than action" (Handbook 1989:2103).
v. Waste Disposal
The problem of disposing of waste in the Antarctic grew with the increase in human 
activity in the 1980s. Most of the material brought into the Antarctic stayed there. 
Waste included not only sewage and food scraps, but fuel, batteries, chemicals, 
packaging, old machinery and equipment. The cumulative effects of waste disposal 
impacted on local habitats as well as being aesthetically unpleasant. A conspicuous 
feature of many Antarctic bases is their associated dumps.
111. It was at this meeting that consultative parties also adopted the general norms that no activity 
with an inherent tendency to modify the environment should be undertaken unless appropriate 
steps had been taken to exercise appropriate controls (recommendation VIII-13).
112. Scientists with the British Antarctic Survey.
113. This point has been consistently made by NGOs as well. See, for example, Merriam (1990:19- 
20).
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Schofield (cited in Campbell and Claridge 1987:332) suggests that the enormously 
accelerated rates at which materials are being introduced into the Antarctic is 
irreconcilable with ecological reality. Bonner and Walton (1985:357) explain that 
every year thousands of tonnes of cargo and millions of gallons of fuel are brought into 
Antarctica, very little of which is ever removed.114
As noted above waste disposal was addressed in the Code of Conduct of 1975. It was 
inscribed on the agenda again in 1983, but it was not until 1989 that a substantive 
recommendation was adopted.
At the 12th consultative meeting in 1983 the host Australian delegation proposed 
amendments to the Code of Conduct.115 However, while recommendation XII-4 refers 
to a general increase in consultative party awareness of the environmental impacts of 
waste disposal in the Antarctic region, governments are recommended only to seek the 
advice of their national Antarctic operating agencies on any problems which have arisen 
in implementing the Code of Conduct and the desirability of revising the Code, 
especially in respect of the on-site treatment and removal of wastes. This reflects the 
consultative parties’ assertion that practical experience (which, they argued, only they 
possessed) was the best basis for decision-making.
SCAR undertook a preliminary review of this matter and it was on the agenda for the 
13th consultative meeting in 1985. Again the Australian delegation submitted a draft 
proposal (ANT/XIH/WP 25, 1985) noting that since the 1975 Code of Conduct was 
adopted there had been changes in both the perception of what constituted pollution and 
in analytical techniques. Thus demand for new rules and procedures was in direct 
response to new knowledge. Suggested guidelines on waste disposal procedures were 
annexed to the draft but were not accepted by the meeting for inclusion in 
recommendation XIII-4. SCAR was asked to undertake a "comprehensive review" of 
the waste disposal aspects of the Code of Conduct.
SCAR’s Panel of Experts was unable to prepare a final report for the 14th ATCM in 
1987, although an interim report was available. Its efforts were hindered by "variable 
and insufficient information provided by national program operators" (Kimball 
1987d:10). Indeed, the Final Report of this Meeting (1987:31) made a point of noting 
that delegates were concerned at the limited replies received to date. National Antarctic 
operators were urged to respond promptly and as fully as possible to the SCAR 
questionnaire. No recommendation was adopted but the Final Report sets out a number
114. The US Antarctic program brings in over 6 millions gallons of fuel into the Antarctic each year 
(Merriam 1990:19-20).
115. The final report of this meeting gives little information on the debate on this issue.
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of points of agreement among the delegates on the need to improve waste management 
practices (Final Report 1987:32-34). Parties were also urged to take into account a 
number of goals in the conduct of their Antarctic activities: cleaning up existing sites, 
minimising the amount of waste, recycling wherever possible and removing waste 
which could not be disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. It was unusual for 
such a lengthy and detailed statement of action to be included in a final report.116
SCAR’s report on Waste Disposal was completed and published before the 15th 
consultative meeting where it was considered by the consultative parties. The 
recommendation adopted (XV-3) not only revised the Code of Conduct but went further 
than the SCAR suggestions, in an attempt to improve waste disposal practices in the 
Antarctic (see chapter seven).
In improving waste disposal rules the consultative parties were mobilised by the activity 
of non-governmental organisations.117 As noted earlier in this chapter, Greenpeace had 
begun to conduct environmental inspections of Antarctic stations and to make the 
results of these widely known. In doing so, they exposed poor waste disposal practices 
and minimal compliance with the code of conduct.
As an example, they found 47 drums of discarded fuel (many of them leaking) near the 
airstrip of an abandoned UK base on Deception Island (Anon 1988k: 18). At the US 
Palmer station, raw sewage, plastics, rusting metal and laboratory chemicals were 
disposed of into the sea. The waters near McMurdo (the main US base and the largest 
in the Antarctic) were found to contain high levels of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 
and heavy metals than would be permitted in the US.118 Again, compliance went to the 
heart of the issue of environmental protection.
vi. Environmental Impact Assessment
The question of the utility of EIA procedures in the Antarctic was also raised in the 
1980s in the context of a reassessment of the adequacy of the Code of Conduct. Debate 
on this issue continued to be marked by resistance to centrally imposed rules which 
might be seen to compromise national autonomy over the conduct of Antarctic 
activities. The debate was also hampered by the fact that many of the consultative
116. The Final Report was adopted by consensus so it is fair to assume that all parties were in 
agreement with this statement Its status with regard to the requirement of governments to take 
action is unclear.
117. For example, ASOC members had conducted a survey of states waste disposal practices and 
suggested a model waste disposal program which they produced in a paper for distribution to the 
consultative parties. (See ECO XLV(l), October 1987)
118. A report in The Guardian of 20 February 1989 noted that seven 40 gallon drums of untreated 
waste had been collected from the McMurdo outfall, and that the waters contained levels of 
cadmium which would be illegal in the US.
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parties had little or no domestic experience of EIA procedures even though they had 
become a more widely applied procedure in domestic circumstances during the 1980s.
Environmental impact procedures were on the agenda at ATCM-XII in 1983. As the 
UK and Australia noted119 activities in Antarctica were not generally subject to prior 
scrutiny of their potential environmental effects. They recommended the adoption of 
interim guideline procedures which they annexed to draft recommendations.120
Under recommendation XII-3 detailed assessments were to be conducted for activities 
with the potential for significant impact, in accordance with national procedures. Only 
research and logistic activities were covered and assessments were not to prejudice 
scientific investigation. There was no requirement that assessments should be 
circulated to other Parties or made available for public comment. This recommendation 
also reasserted the consultative party belief that "states involved in Antarctic research 
activities are in the best position to assess potential environmental impacts of such 
activities and to develop assessment procedures".
While the recommendation noted that a measure of comparability between national 
procedures might become desirable in the future, there was clearly no intention at this 
stage of imposing comprehensive procedures. Some (unnamed) representatives urged 
caution in the search for "whatever element of comparability it might be found prudent 
to apply, on a national basis, to such procedures" (Final Report 1983:6, my emphasis).
There was also some resistance from the scientific community to ELA procedures which 
they argued would interfere with freedom of scientific research. However, given that as 
the practical enforcers of existing environmental protection rules the scientific 
community had to take some responsibility for compliance problems, self-regulation 
was a potentially flawed strategy.
SCAR was invited to offer advice on categories of scientific and logistic activity which 
might be expected to have a significant impact on the environment, and on the 
elaboration of assessment procedures which might be applied "on an experimental 
basis".121
119. ANT/XII/1,1983 (UK) and ANT/XII/l/REV 1,1983 (Australia)
120. These procedures were based on a detailed international study by the Scientific Committee on 
Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), a committee of the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (of which SCAR was also a committee) (Handbook 1989:2104). The work of SCOPE 
was also referred to in the draft recommendation.
121. The interim guidelines suggested by the British were not appended to this recommendation, but 
the Final Report contained steps found in some national EIA procedures which, it was 
suggested, might be useful to SCAR in considering this matter.
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No recommendation was adopted at ATCM-XIII in 1985, but there was extensive 
discussion.122 SCAR’s report123 duly included categories of activity that were likely to 
have a significant environmental impact. There was some concern among delegates 
about the implications of such a list, and resistance to the idea of mandatory ELA 
procedures being imposed on national Antarctic agencies.
The British delegation attempted to alleviate these concerns so that consensus could be 
reached. In a discussion paper (ANT/XIII/INF 7, 1985) the UK suggested that "our 
purpose ... is to ensure that forethought is exercised with respect to the environmental 
impacts that scientific and logistic activities might have in Antarctica ... not to provide 
that any activity which is likely to have a significantly adverse impact should not go 
ahead for that reason alone" (emphasis in original). SCAR’s list, the British suggested, 
was much less forbidding if it was taken as indicative only of the sorts of activity for 
which an assessment should be prepared.124 On the understanding that any 
recommendation would be hortatory rather than mandatory the British though that the 
potential for conflict between national legislation and Antarctic procedures could be 
minimised. The Final Report noted that ELA procedures "do not presuppose any 
mechanism for coordination" (1985:20).125
The British submitted a draft recommendation (ANT XIII/WP 20, 1985) on assessment 
guidelines.126 Although a number of delegations indicated they were in a position to 
accept the proposal, others raised questions of a scientific and operational nature and 
agreement on the form of a recommendation could not be reached. However, the 
British guidelines were annexed to the Final Report and a number of delegations 
indicated their intention to adopt them.
At this meeting the consultative parties also adopted a recommendation, XIII-6, on the 
siting of scientific stations. Where stations were established in the same vicinity, 
national Antarctic operating agencies were urged to consult together to safeguard
122. The United States, Britain, New Zealand and France tabled examples of environmental impact 
assessments prepared for proposed Antarctic activities.
123. Benninghoff and Bonner (1985).
124. The British position is significant in that Nigel Bonner, one of the authors of the SCAR report, 
was also a member of the UK delegation and would, one assumes, have had some input into the 
drafting of the British paper.
125. There was some perception that this was a mechanism to increase international control over such 
activities. An article in The Times (21 October 1985) noted that a bid to increase international 
control over scientific experiments in Antarctica and their effects on the environment had been 
defeated, observing that it will be up to each government to decide whether the environmental 
impact of its scientific program is acceptable.
126. This draft distinguishes between initial environmental assessment and detailed Environmental 
Impact Statements which are to be carried out if the initial assessment indicates the likelihood of 
a significant environmental impact The British draft also provides an illustrative list of the sorts 
of research and logistic activities that might reasonably be subject to this process.
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scientific activities, and to avoid operational logistic difficulties and undue adverse 
environmental effects arising from cumulative impacts.127 This problem was related 
also to wasted scientific efforts.128 Some of the newer parties, in attempting to fulfil the 
scientific activity criterion for consultative party status, were simply duplicating 
scientific work being done by stations in the same area rather than conducting new 
work.129 Indeed, the status of science and the quality of the scientific research 
undertaken in the Antarctic has become a serious issue in the Treaty system although it 
has not yet been addressed formally.
At the 14th consultative meeting in 1987, the UK indicated that it would be seeking to 
have the ELA guidelines tabled at ATCM-XIII adopted in a formal recommendation and 
submitted a modified version (ANT/XIV/4, 1987) of its 1985 draft. 130
The Parties finally agreed to new rules on ELA under recommendation XIV-2. A 
comprehensive environmental evaluation (CEE) is required where an initial 
environmental evaluation (IEE) determines more than a minor impact is likely. Under 
this recommendation a CEE should include a description of the activity (and possible 
alternatives) and the estimated impact (including second order and cumulative effects). 
Other Parties are to be given an opportunity to comment on the evaluation.131 
Considerable attention was paid to what constituted a significant environmental impact. 
Although some delegates were keen to "introduce a measure of comparability" between 
assessment procedures the final decisions and the development of appropriate criteria 
for procedures is left, again, to each national authority.
Thus, in accordance with the sovereignty norms that dominate the Treaty system, there 
is to be no centralised oversight of the procedures nor any means to enforce compliance. 
Indeed, it was resistance to any centralised or imposed rules which had contributed to 
the length of time taken to adopt new EIA rules.
127. The two new consultative parties, Uruguay and China, had established bases on King George 
Island where the problem of station crowding was most acute.
128. This point was made in interviews by several senior Antarctic diplomats.
129. The kind of work being undertaken by some of the newer parties focussed primarily on 
measuring and monitoring, particularly in the field of meteorology, rather than new and 
Antarctic-specific primary research.
130. The illustrative list of activities included in the earlier UK draft has been dropped. Its proposal 
generally tracks the goals and principles on EIA adopted by the Governing Council of UNEP in 
June 1987.
131. The British suggestion that SCAR be involved in this process was not adopted. The UNEP 
principles, upon which these guidelines are based, suggested that countries consider the 
comments of government agencies, members of the public or relevant experts or interested 
groups, a provision not adopted by the Treaty parties.
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vw. Tourism and non-governmental expeditions132
This item was first inscribed on a consultative agenda in 1966 (ATCM-IV).133 The 
consultative parties sought to regulate tourism and non-governmental activity on the 
grounds of protecting the environment but it raised the difficult question of jurisdiction 
over ‘unofficial’ persons.134 This has always been a contentious issue and few 
substantive rules on tourism have been adopted even though the issue has been on the 
consultative agenda for over twenty years. The debate about a statement of accepted 
practices has been protracted and the idea of special tourist areas has not yet been 
satisfactorily resolved because the parties have no individual or collective jurisdiction to 
constrain access of non-governmental persons to any part of the Antarctic.
Generally speaking, neither consultative parties nor the scientific community looked 
favourably upon tourist and other non-government activity. This was in part because it 
reinforced the idea of Antarctica as subject to the ‘law of open spaces’ and because it 
challenged consultative party control over the Antarctic. There was nothing in the 
Treaty or international law that required tourism operators or non-governmental 
expeditions to ask permission of any state or person to visit the Antarctic. Scientists 
were irritated by constant interruptions to their work by tour parties wanting to visit 
stations, and there was the very real problem of ill-prepared expeditions requiring costly 
and time-consuming emergency assistance.
The first commercially organised ship-borne tourist expedition visited the Antarctic in 
1966 (Handbook 1989:2201).135 At ATCM-VI (1966) a short recommendation was 
adopted recognising that tourist expeditions could prejudice the conduct of scientific 
research, the conservation of fauna and flora and the operation of Antarctic stations. 
The government of a country in which an expedition was being organised was requested 
to advise other governments whose bases the expedition planned to visit. This 
notification is provided for pragmatic reasons rather than as a matter of jurisdictional or 
territorial right (Colson 1980:865).
132. Non-governmental expeditions differ from tourist activity (which is, o f course, also non­
governmental) in that the latter are "for the most part... recreational and adventurous ... having 
little more than notional support from the government of the country in which they are organised 
[andl ... being heavily dependent on sponsorship or other private contributions in cash or kind" 
(Handbook 1989:2201).
133. Information on non-govemmental expeditionary activity was set down in recommendation I-VI 
(1961) as one of the items which should be included in the annual exchange of information 
between Treaty parties.
134. See Boczek (1988) on the legal status of tourists and other visitors in the Antarctic.
135. For a discussion of tourist activity in the Antarctic see, inter alia, Mussack (1988), Boczek 
(1988:457-462) and Reich (1980).
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Governments were also asked to advise tour operators of conditions upon which they 
would grant permission for visits to their Antarctic stations.136 Such permission, it was 
suggested, should be withheld unless reasonable assurances were given on compliance 
with the Treaty and its recommendations. There is an implicit recognition here that 
governments do possess some jurisdictional rights over their stations in the Antarctic.137
This matter was again discussed at the sixth consultative meeting in 1970. 
Recommendation VI-7 restated concerns about the growth in tourist activity and set out 
suggested restrictions on tourist and non-governmental expeditions to ensure that 
visitors comply with environmental protection measures already applicable to official 
expeditions. Visitor entry to SPAs was to be prohibited and Historic Monuments were 
to be respected.
At the seventh consultative meeting in 1972, the UK delegation floated the idea of 
designating Special Tourist Areas to which visitors could be encouraged to go so that 
environmental impact could be minimised and localised (ANT/8, 1972). As well as 
incorporating this suggestion, recommendation VII-4 acknowledged that a statement of 
accepted practices in the Treaty Area would be of benefit to unofficial visitors and 
should be considered further at the 8th consultative meeting.138 Consultative parties 
were urged to consult well in advance of ATCM-VIII on the possibility of designating 
such areas and to "use their best efforts" to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty and 
recommendations on the conservation of fauna and flora were applied in practice to all 
visitors not sponsored by them.139
While the Parties recognised at ATCM-VIII (1975) that "tourism is a natural 
development in [the Treaty] Area and ... it requires regulation" (recommendation VIII- 
9, my emphasis), they were clearly unsure how to do this. This recommendation refers 
to an annexed Statement of Accepted Practices and an annexed list of areas to which 
tourists will be encouraged to go but no annexes were adopted. It was intended that 
they be completed at the 9th consultative meeting. A draft Statement was discussed at 
ATCM-IX but because of time constraints (according to the Final Report) it was again
136. At ATCM-V (1968) several delegations provided information on tourist expeditions proceeding 
from their countries, and on conditions of access to stations which had been adopted.
137. Draft recommendations circulated by several delegations observed specifically that "tourism is 
not mentioned in the Antarctic Treaty" (Doc No 44, 1966) but this qualification did not survive 
to be included in the final recommendation.
138. It was suggested that such a statement should also stress the need for self-sufficiency and prior 
notification.
139. The Soviet Union suggested that the Agreed Measures could be extended to non-governmental 
expeditions and tourist activity.
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deferred to the next meeting.140 Similarly, no action was taken to list or define areas of 
Special Tourist Interest.
Under recommendation X-8 (1979) a draft Statement was adopted, six years after it was 
first proposed.141 The Statement, intended as a guide for tour operators, sets out
principles deriving from the Treaty and subsequent recommendations on the protection
\
of the Antarctic environment, as well as the substance of recommendations adopted by 
the consultative parties to this end.142 It restates the administrative requirements 
elaborated in earlier recommendations on tourist activity.143 Given that this is all it did, 
there is no justifiable reason for the length of time it took to reach agreement. 
Recommendation X-8 also included a section on ‘Guidance for Visitors’ for distribution 
to tourists as a guide to good conduct in the Antarctic.144
The issue of Special Tourist Areas was again deferred. At the 11th consultative 
meeting (1981) work was begun on the principles that might be adopted if such areas 
were to be designated, but there was some doubt as to whether it would be prudent to 
proceed further with this matter. It was agreed, therefore, that there should be further 
study of these issues with a view to considering them again at the 12th consultative 
meeting.145
No recommendation was adopted at ATCM-XII (1983).146 The difficult question of 
who was responsible for ensuring compliance by tourists and non-government
140. However the draft statement was annexed to the Final Report
141. This statement was to be incorporated into the annex of recommendation VIII-9 adopted in 
1975. The Working Group which considered this matter also had before it a paper on tourist and 
private expeditions to the Antarctic, from the SCAR Working Group of Logistics.
142. For example, on the protection of native fauna, on harmful interference, on SPAs and SPSs, 
historic monuments, SSSIs, pelagic sealing, and waste disposal.
143. For example, the need for advance notice, assurance of compliance with relevant provisions of 
the treaty and recommendations.
144. This guide is a short and simple list of ‘do’s and don’ts*. While this recommendation focuses on 
tourist activity, it also suggests that consultative parties may request information about a non­
governmental expedition if they are asked for help or advice. Such expeditions are urged to 
carry adequate insurance. The fourth section of the recommendation urges Governments to 
advise commercial aircraft operators that present levels of commercial overflight activity in the 
Antarctic exceeded existing capabilities for air traffic control, communication and emergency 
and search and rescue services. This assessment was to prove tragically correct and at ATCM- 
XI Representatives expressed, in recommendation XI-3, their deep sympathy following the Mt 
Erebus disaster of 28 November 1979, and recommending that the site of the accident be 
declared a tomb and left in peace.
145. Delegates also considered adopting a common response to requests for assistance from non­
governmental expeditions but this matter was also deferred.
146. Discussion focussed on the issue of providing emergency assistance to non-govemmental 
expeditions. Concerns were raised about the disruption to scientific work, the expense of 
providing assistance and possible danger to life, in spite of humanitarian obligation to provide 
assistance. A recommendation affirming the traditional Antarctic principle that expeditions 
render all assistance feasible in the event of an emergency request for help had been adopted at 
the first consultative meeting (recommendation I-X).
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expeditions with the Treaty and recommendations was again raised. It was suggested 
(see Handbook 1989:2207) that this should rest with "those States whose physical or 
juridical persons organise such expeditions". A draft recommendation to this effect was 
withdrawn when no consensus could be found. At the 13th consultative meeting, this 
issue was again deferred, on the grounds of "insufficient time" to give it adequate 
attention (Final Report 1985:25).147
The UK delegation proposed a code of practice for tourist and non-governmental 
expeditions at ATCM-XIV (ANT/XIV/WP/16, 1987) which sought to consolidate 
various existing provisions into a single statement. Concern was expressed both about 
the complexity and the possible inadequacy of existing measures on tourist and non­
governmental activity. However in what was by now a familiar pattem no 
recommendation on this matter was adopted: it was again deferred to the next
consultative meeting. Several delegations expressed concerns about the increase in 
tourist and non-governmental activities and their impacts on localised environments 
(noting that there was some evidence that violations of existing standards had occurred), 
about disruption to the conduct of scientific research by increasing number of tourist 
visits to stations programs,148 and about the increasing possibility of accidents (Final 
Report 1987:50-51).149
The same sorts of concerns were again raised at the 15th consultative meeting in 1989 
in the context of debates on comprehensive measures for environmental protection. The 
Meeting agreed that a comprehensive review of the issue was required, possibly leading 
to further measures to regulate tourist and non-governmental activities. It was agreed 
that such a review should be undertaken by the special consultative meeting to be 
convened to discuss further the matter of comprehensive measures for protection of the 
Antarctic environment. This issue is taken up again in chapter seven.
The consultative parties had done little but review the issue. Indeed by this time North 
American operators of ship tours had released their own environmental guidelines for
147. The delegation from FRG presented an information paper which summarised the obligations of 
consultative parties with respect to tourism and non-govemmental expeditions, and it is likely 
that the British delegation was suggesting a strengthening and unifying of various procedures 
that applied to tourist and non-govemmental expeditions. At that Meeting the British delegation 
suggested that it might be appropriate to attempt to codify existing recommendations. It is not 
clear exactly what this point in the Final Report of the 13 th meeting means. SCAR also 
presented a report to ATCM-XIV on non-govemmental activities in the Antarctic, 
recommending the preparation of a handbook and a uniform code of conduct (Kimball 
1987d:25).
148. The US provided information (ANT/XIV/INF/43, 1987) on the steps it had taken to limit the 
number of tourist visits to its accessible Palmer station, because of concerns about the 
interruption to scientific research and the effect on the surrounding environment.
149. The Lindblad Explorer ran aground on at least two occasions, one requiring the crew to abandon 
ship (Dingwall 1990:10).
132
expeditions.150 The only substantive recommendation adopted by the consultative 
parties did little but recall the provisions of the Treaty and subsequent 
recommendations. The difficult issue of Treaty parties obligations with respect to 
enforcing compliance with these rules by tourist organisers was not resolved. This has 
continued to be contentious issue within the Treaty system as discussed below in 
chapter seven.
Regime efficiency
The environmental regime described above was established and consolidated by the 
consultative parties in the 1960s and 1970s. This regime, nested as it was within the 
broader normative and procedural framework of the Treaty system, was shaped by the 
dominance of sovereignty norms in the Antarctic Treaty system. The US described it 
this way: measures were developed in advance of potentially disruptive activity but 
only after sufficient interest in taking action had been expressed to create the political 
will to act. This interest was in turn driven by technological developments and an 
increase in human activity (ANT/XIII/INF.9, 1985).
The principles and norms of this environmental regime were generally not called into 
question. What was debated was how those principles and norms were to be interpreted 
and whether the rules and procedures adopted, constrained as they were by the political 
requirements of the Treaty system, were adequate. This assessment of regime 
efficiency can be addressed in two related questions. First, how successful were the 
rules and procedures of this regime as environmental management mechanisms? 
Second, have the rules, such as they are, been properly implemented and observed?
These were predominantly questions of the late 1970s and the 1980s and were raised in 
response to changing knowledge about the Antarctic environment and new ideas and 
values about environmental protection and environmentally acceptable behaviour. That 
new knowledge was generated, for the most part, by the scientific community but the 
debates about its implications for environmental protection were mobilised by non­
governmental organisations. On both counts the consultative parties came in for 
criticism. "With exceptions", Auburn has suggested (1987:6), "the past record of the 
consultative parties in environmental assessment and protection is properly open to 
attack".
The rules of the environmental sub-regime established guidelines for the conduct of 
human activity in the Antarctic, including the construction of stations, the conduct of 
support activities and the disposal of waste so that Antarctic fauna and flora, and the
150. Ziolkowski (1990:18) reports that NGOs considered the voluntary guidelines a welcome first 
step but generally were thought not to go far enough.
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environment generally, would be minimally disturbed. The main features of this 
environmental regime are the lack of institutional framework and linkage between 
recommendations, implementation based on self-restraint rather than compliance rules 
and slow decision-making as a result of the need to maintain a consensus and avoid 
conflict. As Kriwoken and Keage argue (1987:6), this has resulted in a flawed 
management mechanism. The slowness of decision-making has proved to be a problem 
when activities on the ground have come to move far more quickly than the Treaty 
negotiations. In other words, decision-making was out of step with knowledge.
The discussion in this chapter draws attention to the slowness of the decision-making 
process, the limited rules that were adopted and the problems of violations and 
subsequent localised impact on the Antarctic environment. The impact of human 
activity in the Antarctic has been well documented, by scientists as well as by NGOs, 
and points to the limitations of the measures in place in meeting the environmental 
principles articulated by the consultative parties.
The newer Antarctic parties, especially those which have become active in the 1980s, 
often have a much better record than the ‘old hands’. Indeed the Soviets observed that 
"among the most backward stations are the two major expeditions, the American one 
and ours".151
The question of adherence to the environmental regime raises the issue of compliance. 
As noted in this chapter, compliance mechanisms were avoided in accordance with the 
political demands of the system which resisted anything that seemed to erode national 
autonomy and sovereignty over the conduct of activity in the Antarctic. The 
consultative parties argued that the inspection procedure was an adequate mechanism 
for ensuring compliance with environmental rules. However, the rules on inspection 
were included in the Treaty primarily to oversee the demilitarisation provisions. Not 
only did the potential for inspection fail to ensure compliance, no steps were taken by 
the parties when violations of the rules were revealed by inspections.
For example, a 1971 US inspection report indicated that at both Casey (an Australian 
base) and Mirny (a Soviet base) dogs were running free in contradiction of the Agreed 
Measures. Yet neither the US nor any of the other parties to whom the inspection report 
was circulated, raised this issue in a consultative meeting. In 1985 a US inspection 
team found hydrocarbon seepage at every station visited, and reported that those 
stations also burned plastic or used plastic garbage bags for trash disposal at sea in
151. R epot on a Soviet inspection in Pravda, 2 March 1989, cited in ECO, LXXII(l), 9 May 1989.
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contravention of the Code of Conduct. Again, this violation was not raised at a 
consultative meeting.
As Kimball notes (1988c: 18) "parties to the treaty have traditionally been reluctant to 
‘rock the boat’ by asking too many questions about each others activities in Antarctica". 
This arose first, because violations of the environmental rules were not considered 
destabilising to the regime whereas disputes over them might well have been. Second, 
many of the consultative parties were, at some time, in violation of the rules. Thus 
there was, in effect, an ‘in-club’ conspiracy of silence.
It was the NGOs outside the formal boundaries of the regime who brought questions of 
compliance to public attention.152 The consultative parties have responded to this 
external pressure in what is, for the most part, a state of imposed accountability. For 
example after an NGO report detailed inadequacies of US waste disposal practices in 
the Antarctic (Manheim 1988) (acknowledged by the National Science Foundation to be 
accurate (International Herald Tribune, 17 August 1988)), the NSF took steps to 
improve practices at US bases and produced its own report on US environmental 
practice (NSF 1989d).153 The Foundation has asked for increasing funding ($30 million 
over five years) "to clean up the debris of past operations and to bring present 
operations into agreement with current regulations, prevailing attitudes and current 
technology" (CAN # 68, 1989).154 Nevertheless in doing so they noted that clean-up 
and compliance with environmental rules should not interfere with or delay scientific 
work (Anon 1990j:2).155
Nigel Bonner156 suggests (CAN #68, 1989) that the improvement in environmental 
practice found during a joint New Zealand/UK inspection was due in large part to 
Greenpeace visits the year before. Claude Lorius157 has suggested (1990:8) that 
conservation organisations "have sensitised scientists and logistics people to inadequate 
controls and misbehaviour in the past".
152. In its regular inspections of stations Greenpeace has also been at pains to draw attention to 
instances of compliance with the rules. For example, the Brazilian commanding officer who 
sends his twelve winterers out with trash bags to hunt rubbish (Anon 1988k: 19).
153. This report recognised, for example, that the sewage discharge systems at both Palmer and 
McMurdo did not meet the Code of Conduct (NSF 1989d:27) and that solid and hazardous waste 
management practices at McMurdo did not conform to sound environmental practice in the 
Antarctic.
154. The NSF held meetings with NGOs in February 1989 to discuss the clean-up initiative.
155. In another example, 40 tonnes of waste, including discarded machinery and leaking tins of 
caustic soda were cleaned up at the Australian Casey base following public criticism by a British 
scientist
156. Former Deputy-Director of the British Antarctic Survey.
157. Former President of SCAR.
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Nevertheless the widening of the environmental agenda and improvements in practice 
did not overcome the problems of complexity and fragmentation which were at the core 
of the environmental regime. That required a comprehensive reassessment of the 
measures. This issue is taken up again in chapter seven.
Conclusion
The process of decision-making on the environmental sub-regime rested, as it did in the 
Treaty system generally, on negotiation rather than imposition by a hegemonic state. 
Consultative parties were engaged in a joint-problem solving exercise focussed on 
common, but limited, environmental objectives. The development of the regime 
effectively resulted from incremental change within the Treaty system.
The bureaucratic actors who were the core of Antarctic decision-makers applied the 
broader norms of the Treaty system, into which they were socialised, to environmental 
issues. It was these actors who effectively ‘owned’ the issue. The scientific community 
was an important participant as a source of knowledge and advice but it did not adopt an 
advocacy position. Further it was an interested actor in that most of the rules were 
designed to regulate the conduct of scientists and scientific research. In this respect the 
role of the scientific community, as a potential epistemic community, in encouraging 
compliance with environmental rules must be questioned.
By the late 1970s, rules and procedures were in place for the protection and 
conservation of fauna and flora and the designation of SPAs and SSSIs. The 
consultative parties had begun to consider how to regulate tourist activity (but made 
little progress) and put in place a general code of conduct for scientific expeditions. 
While these recommendations imposed obligations, they incorporated no enforcement 
rules. Implementation and, to a great extent, interpretation were the responsibility of 
individual governments and national operators. Most of those issues, as shown, 
continued to be of importance in the 1980s. However the agenda of the 1980s also 
widened to include a more detailed consideration of waste disposal procedures, 
environmental impact assessment and the adequacy of the Antarctic protected area 
system.
New issues were added to the agenda in response to the increase in human activity as 
well as to new knowledge about the Antarctic environment. The consultative parties 
sought to regulate human activity not only because of the environmental impact of such 
activity, but also because of fears that unregulated activity might have the potential to 
upset the Treaty system and its political compromises.158 Thus incremental change
158. This view was put to me by more than one senior Antarctic diplomat.
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was a process of both individual and institutional learning. National interests (that is, 
policy goals and the means to achieve them) were defined (or redefined) to include 
Antarctic environmental protection in a way that reflected the new rules and procedures 
adopted by the Treaty system. However, this process of incremental change, and the 
ad-hoc, issue-specific approach to decision-making in the Treaty system, meant that the 
measures adopted lacked integration.
The lack of minutes from any of the consultative meetings means that it is difficult to 
assess whether any state, or states, took a leadership role on environmental issues. 
Nevertheless the documents tabled at these meetings make it possible to suggest that a 
number of countries were at the forefront of putting proposals to meetings. Those 
countries were the United Kingdom, the US, Australia, Chile and, to a lesser extent, 
New Zealand. Of those, Britain seems to have seen itself as the foremost advocate of 
‘quiet diplomacy’ as the basis for negotiation and consensus. Its approach to decision­
making in the Treaty system generally was to take a long-term view and seek to build 
consensus incrementally. The British tactic was to define problems clearly in the belief 
that agreement on the nature of the problem would advance consensus on the nature of 
the solution. At least one observer has argued that the British were the only party with 
concern for the environment which was able to effectively initiate solutions to 
environmental problems.159 Nevertheless, because of the perceived need to balance 
political interests with environmental ones those solutions were increasingly out of step 
with protection. This approach also precluded long-term planning and the elaboration 
of clear goals for environmental management in the Antarctic.
The late 1970s and the 1980s were marked by a growth in environmental consciousness 
on the part of the public and, to some extent, policy-makers. In the 1980s there were 
demands, by NGOs in particular, for an end to the piecemeal and disjointed approach to 
environmental decision-making and the permissive approach to compliance which 
characterised the environmental sub-regime. This push for a more comprehensive 
approach took place almost entirely outside the formal bounds of the Treaty system.
The consultative parties argued that the rules and procedures adopted to protect and 
manage the Antarctic environment were adequate to the task and provided evidence of 
the strength and flexibility of the Treaty system in that it could respond to changed 
demands and needs. However this judgement of success rests on political criteria in 
that environmental regime has been developed in such a way as to not undermine the
159. This comment is taken from a confidential report The British position may have been helped by 
the fact that SCAR was headquartered in England at the Scott Polar Research Institute, and 
senior Foreign Office Antarctic diplomats have always had close ties with both SPRI and the 
British Antarctic Survey (both of which are in Cambridge).
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compromise on sovereignty. The environmental rules adopted did not compromise the 
fundamental national interests of the Treaty parties outlined in chapter two and thus 
they contributed to the internal coherence of the regime. From the perspective of their 
ability to protect the Antarctic environment from adverse effects of human activity, a 
different judgement is made: the environmental regime was, in the final analysis, 
flawed.
C hapter four
LIVING ‘RESOURCES’ AND THE LIMITS TO CONSERVATION
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Introduction
The question of resource use in the Antarctic, which was inscribed on the consultative 
agenda from early on, raised not only environmental concerns, but also the question of 
economic interests, as well as the usual political and legal dimensions of the Antarctic 
Treaty system. Thus it added a new factor to the calculus of Antarctic decision-making.
The resource issue fell into two categories - first, living ‘resources’ or marine fauna 
which raised questions of species conservation and second, mineral resources which 
raised questions of the direct and adverse environmental impact of mineral extraction 
activity. The consultative parties negotiated three conventions on resource use - the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Convention on 
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA). The separate 
convention model (rather than consultative recommendations) was adopted, first, 
because these were activities of interest to non-Treaty parties. Rules established under 
consultative recommendations would have regulated and constrained consultative party 
activity but not that of non-Treaty states. Second, in the case of seals and marine living 
resources, the activities to be regulated were primarily high seas activities which were 
outside the direct control of Treaty recommendations given the provisions of article VI 
which protected high seas freedoms. Finally, rules established under a convention 
would be legally binding on all signatories.
This chapter addresses the living ‘resource’ issue. It describes the process of the 
negotiations for CCAS and CCAMLR and analyses the conventions in terms of the 
fundamental characteristics of the Antarctic regime set out in chapter two. Finally, it 
assesses the conventions as conservation agreements.
Both CCAS and CCAMLR were negotiated in accordance with article IX(f) of the 
Antarctic Treaty which explicitly allowed the consultative parties to establish measures 
for the protection and conservation of living resources. (The negotiations for 
CRAMRA on the other hand, which are dealt with in the following chapters, sought to 
regulate an activity on which the Treaty gave no guidance). The use of the word 
‘resource’ in this connection implies that marine fauna was something which was 
potentially exploitable, even if under strict rules.
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Consensus decision-making guided the negotiations which were restricted to the 
consultative parties and were held, as usual, behind closed doors. Both conventions 
were negotiated in advance of extensive interest in the exploitation of marine resources 
with the intention of thus limiting adverse impacts of over-exploitation of the marine 
ecosystem as well as possible conflict over resource use.1 To this extent they were 
consistent with the "prevention rather than cure" (Handbook 1989:1101) approach to 
environmental issues within the Treaty system. However, in neither case were the 
consultative parties prepared to prohibit the exploitation, on any comprehensive basis, 
of the ‘resource’ in question.
Both conventions were characterised by the dominance of sovereignty norms in the 
institutional, decision-making and compliance rules adopted. Regulatory and decision­
making authority remained in the hands of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. 
Compliance and enforcement rules were limited. Thus the conservation components of 
both conventions were limited by political factors in the same way as were the 
environmental protection measures examined in chapter three. While styled as 
conservation agreements by the consultative parties, both conventions favoured political 
and economic interests over environmental concerns, a factor which has given rise to 
doubts about their effectiveness as conservation instruments.
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals
The consultative parties negotiated CCAS in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There was, 
at that time, little international interest in the Antarctic and the NGO presence and the 
challenges from non-Treaty states that characterised later negotiations were absent. 
There was, then, little need for an accommodation with external interests. The internal 
accommodation between the consultative parties was also less troublesome than it was 
to be in later negotiations. No consultative state had entrenched commercial interests in 
sealing, although Norway’s experimental catch of crabeater seals in 1964 provided 
some incentive to advance the negotiations. Sealing activity on the high seas did not 
impinge upon territorial rights or the exercise of maritime jurisdiction. Nevertheless 
conservation values were set against political and (potential) economic interests in the 
negotiations. Differences among the consultative parties focussed particularly on 
whether to prohibit or regulate sealing activity and, if it was to be regulated, the extent 
of compliance and enforcement rules that were acceptable.
The question of how to protect seals on the high seas (including floating ice) arose 
during the negotiation of the Agreed Measures (see chapter three), which established 
rules only for the taking of seals on land.
1 . The consultative parties were also concerned that agreement among them would be more 
difficult in the face of entrenched economic interests once commercial activity had begun.
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At ACTM-III (1964) Australia, concerned about the inability of the Agreed Measures to 
protect seals on the high seas or on floating ice, tabled a proposal (Doc/P4, 1964) to 
prohibit pelagic sealing.2 While the Treaty parties were generally sympathetic to the 
protection of seals, mindful of the results of unregulated sealing in the nineteenth 
century, there was some opposition to a complete ban on sealing.3 The UK, for 
example, thought that "it would be better to anticipate the establishment of a rationally 
controlled industry ... rather than to attempt any direct prohibition of sealing".4 In other 
words, conservation and utilitarian values were to be balanced.
As with the Agreed Measures the form of an agreement on sealing was disputed (see 
Myhre 1986:56-58). Some delegations favoured something akin to the Agreed 
Measures and others argued that a separate convention would be more appropriate.5
At this meeting, the Parties agreed to voluntary regulation (not prohibition) of pelagic 
sealing and the taking of fauna on pack ice, on a national basis, to ensure the survival of 
the species and avoid serious disturbance to natural ecological systems. Any suggestion 
of collective enforcement was avoided. Governments were asked to consider this 
matter "on as broad a basis as practicable" in preparing for ATCM-IV.6
Interim Guidelines for the Voluntary Regulation of Antarctic Pelagic Sealing were 
adopted at ATCM-IV in 1966 (recommendation IV-21).7 These guidelines, based on 
SCAR proposals, identified seal stocks as a "resource of potential value" which should 
not be depleted by overexploitation. While the guidelines provided for an annex on 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) levels for seal catches and the establishment of 
sealing zones, no MSY levels were included in the annex to the recommendation and no
2. Pelagic sealing is defined as the "killing or capturing for commercial purposes [of] any member 
of the order Pinnipedia on floating ice or in the sea" (D oc/P4,1964).
3. Myhre (1986:57) suggests that Norway in particular was likely to have opposed any prohibition. 
In spite of this, Norway took a strong conservationist line during the negotiations. Myhre 
(1986:58) suggests that the British were also opposed to a moratorium.
4. They suggested that this could be done with relatively simple procedures of alternating open 
zones and setting maximum annual catch numbers. In looking to the lessons of the past the 
consultative parties sought to ensure that if sealing were to occur again on a commercial level, 
stocks should not be depleted to the extent that the exercise became uneconomical.
5. The UK, US, France, Argentina, Chile and Belgium initially argued for an instrument in the 
form of agreed measures. Australia, Japan and South Africa supporting a separate convention. 
The US later supported this option as well.
6. Recommendation III-XI was based on a joint proposal submitted by the US, Norway, the USSR, 
the UK and Australia (Doc/P4/Rev.l, 1964).
7. The word "Voluntary" was added to draft recommendations proposed by the United Kingdom 
and the United States delegations.
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zones were designated at this meeting.8 SCAR was asked to provide the consultative 
parties with information on both (recommendation IV-22). A revised version of the 
guidelines was prepared by SCAR’s Working Group on Biology. These new guidelines 
included provisions for a permit system for the taking of seals within designated Seal 
Reserves.9
At ATCM-V (1968) the UK government tabled SCAR’s recommended guidelines along 
with a draft convention (ANT 26, 1968) in the hopes that a binding agreement on the 
protection of seals could be negotiated.10 However there was still no consensus among 
the Parties on the form of an agreement. Governments were urged to "voluntarily take 
account" of the modified guidelines (recommendation V-7) and to study the draft 
convention with a view to considering it again at ATCM-VI (recommendation V-8).* 11
In 1970 at ATCM-VI, delegates decided that the conservation of seals in the sea should 
be considered "outside the framework of the Antarctic Treaty, since [it] ... does not fall 
within the scope of the latter and is of interest to countries which are not Parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty" (cited in Handbook 1989:3102). A series of informal meetings "for 
an unofficial exchange of views" on a draft Convention was held concurrently with 
ATCM-VI (see Handbook 1989:3102).12
The Convention was adopted at a Conference on Antarctic Seals held in London from 3 
to 11 February 1972 and opened for signature on 1 June of that year.13 Although this 
diplomatic conference was separate from the consultative process14 only the twelve 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties were represented.15 Further, the draft convention 
had already been debated and virtually agreed to within the consultative process.
8. Under the guidelines the Ross Seal was to be totally protected except when taken for scientific 
purposes. At this meeting fur seals and Ross seals were also designated specially protected 
species (on land) under the Agreed Measures.
9. Those guidelines were approved by the SCAR executive at the beginning of November 1968 and 
subsequently circulated to national Antarctic committees. SCAR suggested that Seal Reserves 
could be designated for a seal breeding area or the site of long-term scientific research on seals.
10. Both were appended to the final repot of the meeting.
11. The Belgian delegation (ANT.2, 1968) suggested that measures on pelagic sealing should go 
further than the voluntary rules of recommendation IV-21.
12. A draft convention was subsequently transmitted to consultative governments for consideration. 
This Convention was now styled as a convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, rather 
than using the earlier language which had described it as a convention for the voluntary 
regulation of Antarctic pelagic sealing.
13. No negotiating documents are available from this meeting.
14. The conference was a separate diplomatic conference, not a special consultative meeting. The 
Chilean government later expressed its concern that the issue had been dealt with formally 
outside the Antarctic Treaty framework (see Bush 1982:228).
15. The FAO was invited as an observer because of its interest in Southern Ocean marine resources.
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In his opening address to the February conference, the British Parliamentary Under­
secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs observed that the Treaty 
Parties were "attempting to widen the scope of our Antarctic conservation interests to 
include the High Seas" which could not be done under the Agreed Measures (in Bush 
1982:247). He reassured delegates that the purpose of the convention was to conserve 
seals, not to encourage commercial sealing. An official US document suggests, to the 
contrary, that "during the ... negotiations it was very clear that the reason for the 
Convention was to provide for utilisation of the seal herds but prevent their 
overexploitation should harvesting begin" (Department of State 1974:24).
The Convention is designed to "promote and achieve the objectives of protection, 
scientific study and rational use of Antarctic seals" (preamble). The central principles 
of the Convention are that Antarctic seals (described as an important living resource) 
should not be depleted by over-exploitation and that a satisfactory balance within the 
ecological system should be maintained. The Convention establishes permissible catch 
levels (which are subject to review in the light of scientific assessments) for Crabeater, 
Leopard and Weddell seals. Ross Seals, Southern Elephant Seals and all fur seals are to 
be fully protected.16 The Convention sets out rules on closed and open sealing seasons, 
sealing zones and reserves and provides an indicative list of other protection measures 
which the parties may adopt. Special permits allow seals to be taken for food, for 
scientific research, or as specimens for museums, educational or cultural institutions. 
SCAR has a formal role in providing scientific and technical advice and collating 
information on seals provided by the consultative parties.17 The rules on the 
institutional framework provide that a commission and scientific advisory committee 
will be established only if commercial sealing begins.
The Convention is closely tied to the Antarctic Treaty. Control of the decision-making 
process remains in the hands of the consultative parties. States may accede to the 
Convention only on their invitation.18 Contracting Parties to CCAS affirm the 
provisions of article IV (the sovereignty article) of the Antarctic Treaty as they apply to 
the seas south of 60*South. As Bush suggests (1982:249), this represents an attempt to 
widen adherence to an important aspect of the Treaty regime. Argentina and Chile, the 
most active of the claimants, also made declarations on signing the Convention to the 
effect that it did not impair their rights of territorial jurisdiction including maritime 
zones (Bush 1990:134).
16. These seals were protected because of their already depleted populations and their vulnerability 
to exploitation. Weddell seals are subject to controls on the taking of young.
17. SCAR may seek the advice of the FAO in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention.
18. In practice a government which wishes to accede advises the Depository Government (the UK) 
which conveys this advice to existing Contracting Parties who must agree unanimously to the 
accession.
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The dominance of sovereignty norms in the Treaty system contributed to weaknesses in 
the Convention which limit its potential effectiveness as a conservation regime. The US 
suggested that opposition to its proposals for stronger protection measures, including 
observation of operations and enforcement of regulations, was based on juridical rather 
than commercial interests and went so far as to ensure that a statement to this effect was 
incorporated into the Final Act of the Conference (in Bush 1982:261-2). There is no 
collective enforcement mechanism. Each signatory party is to adopt measures for its 
nationals and flags under its jurisdiction. A system of inspection may be established but 
there is no requirement that it must be in place before sealing commences.19 Nor is any 
sealing nation specifically required to advise the other contracting parties of its 
intention to begin sealing. There are no provisions for national catch allocations.
The Convention did not enter into force until March 197820 and has never really been 
put to the test. Its institutional framework has never been activated. There is at present 
no commercial harvesting of seals in the Southern Ocean, although over the past 21 
years about 15,000 seals have been taken (ASOC 19881:1), including an ‘exploratory’ 
harvest of 4802 seals by the USSR in 1986/87.21 Several parties have not fulfilled the 
reporting requirements on this activity (USMMC 1987:85).
The first CCAS review conference was held in London in 1988 in response to the 
Soviet harvest which, while within permissible catch levels, was thought to be above 
that necessary for scientific purposes.22 No substantive amendments were made to the 
Convention, although the UK and Australia made several proposals. Only minor 
amendments were adopted. Two minor alterations to the Annex sought to encourage 
exchange of information with parties to other ATS instruments (such as CCAMLR) and 
to extend protection of Weddell seals to include pups.23 A suggestion that applications
19. Article 3(l)(k). No details are provided on how this might work in practice. Under article 
6(1 )(a) if an inspection system is established after commercial sealing is in place, decisions may 
be taken by a two-thirds majority which must, nevertheless, include all the Contracting Parties 
present at the meeting.
20. Unanimous ratification was not required. Entry into force followed upon the deposit of the 
seventh instrument of ratification.
21. Permits to takp the seals were issued for scientific purposes for a much smaller number than 
were killed. See ASOC (1988m) on the limited scientific research that was actually undertaken 
on the seals killed.
22. The Convention provides for a review conference to be held every five years. A review 
conference was not held in 1983 because, in the absence of any sealing activity, no need was 
perceived. Kimball (1990d: 11) suggests that it was held "by correspondence".
23. Both proposals were put forward by Australia. These amendments took effect from 27 March 
1990.
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for special permits be circulated in advance was resisted as an attempt to introduce 
assessment of national science programs under the rules of the Convention.24
CCAS is, in essence, an inactive convention.25 It figures in the contemporary 
environment debate to the extent that it is charged with being an inappropriate and 
inconsistent agreement. ASOC argues that changing public attitudes towards the killing 
of seals mean that an agreement which permits commercial sealing activity is no longer 
acceptable. The environmental NGOs also argue that CCAS is inconsistent with both 
the Agreed Measures26 and the ecosystem approach to marine management which exists 
(in theory at least) under CCAMLR.27
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
Once the seals convention was finalised, the consultative parties turned their attention to 
the possible impact on the marine ecosystem of the unregulated exploitation o f other 
marine resources. They were spurred by a growing commercial interest in krill (which 
began in the 1960s)28 and by the increasing exploitation of fish stocks in the 1970s.29 
Interest in harvesting the southern ocean fishing grounds grew as the declaration of 
exclusive economic zones closed traditional coastal fishing grounds in other parts of the 
world to distant-water fishing fleets.
In negotiating the Convention the consultative parties were keen to enhance their 
control over Antarctic decision-making.30 As with the seals issue, the marine living
24. The final report of the review conference did note, however, that the use and purpose of special 
permits needed clarification. An NGO report of this meeting suggested that the parties feared 
establishing a precedent for easy amendment. There were also concerns about allowing a path 
for EC entry into the Convention (ASOC 19881).
25. In spite of this, states have continued to accede to the Convention as they have become members 
of the Antarctic Treaty. As at 22 July 1991, there were 15 contracting parties to CCAS.
26. For example, commercial sealing is permitted on floating ice at sea under CCAS but is 
prohibited on land and ice-shelves under the Agreed Measures.
27. NGOs argue that the permissible catches in the annex to CCAS are based on a simplistic 
understanding of the marine ecosystem. The taking of seals, they suggest, ought to be totally 
prohibited (see Greenpeace 1988d).
28. Krill is especially important to the Antarctic food chain which, as explained in chapter four, is a 
short and simple one. Birds, seals and whales depend on it. Krill has not yet been put to any 
widespread commercial use as a food source, in spite of its high protein content, because of 
problems associated with rapid deterioration after catch and a subsequent unpleasant taste. It 
has most often been reduced to ‘fish-meal’ for pig and poultry food, or used as bait. Krill 
harvesting was begun by the Soviet Union and Japan but Poland, West Germany, South Korea, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Taiwan have also sent fishing vessels into the Southern Ocean. The 
Soviets dominate the krill industry (see McElroy 1984:242; 253-4).
29. Fish stocks which have been harvested have included cod, herring, tooth fish, southern blue 
whiting and Patagonian hake. As early as 1970 the Soviets took a catch reported to be about 
432,000 tonnes of fish (McElroy 1984:240).
30. The minerals issue was also in the minds of the consultative parties. The marine living 
resources convention was in part a test of their ability to negotiate rules and procedures on a 
resource issue which had sovereignty implications.
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resources convention was adopted at a international conference although in this case the 
negotiations were conducted in a special consultative meeting.
Both the internal accommodation among the consultative parties and the external 
accommodation with environmental and non-Treaty state interests were more 
contentious than in the seals negotiations. The negotiations disclosed serious political 
and economic divisions among the consultative parties even though, as Barnes argues 
(1982b:272), "the interests of the [Antarctic] club dominated" over those of other states. 
The claimant/non-claimant split was central to the negotiations, particularly with 
respect to the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction over maritime areas. The parties 
were also split between fishing and non-fishing states. Japan and the USSR, the two 
major fishing states, argued at every opportunity for the utilisation of resources to be 
given more emphasis and conservation values less (Barnes 1982b:282n). Non-fishing 
states, on the other hand, took a generally stronger conservation line. The demands for 
a degree of external accommodation stemmed from the interest of non-Treaty states in 
the exploitation of marine resources of the Southern Ocean and from environmental 
NGOs in conservation of those resources.
The negotiations
The consultative parties first considered this issue formally at ATCM-VLII in 1975.31 
From the beginning debates about marine living ‘resources’ were couched in terms of 
competing uses. In recommendation VIII-10, the consultative parties recognised the 
need "to promote and achieve, within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty, the 
objectives of protection, scientific study and rational use of [Antarctic] marine living 
resources" (my emphasis).32 Scientific study was identified as a necessary basis for 
effective conservation measures and SCAR was urged to convene a meeting to discuss 
and report on current scientific programmes on the Southern Ocean marine 
ecosystem.33
Interest in marine resources from outside the Treaty system was actively opposed by the 
consultative parties who were spurred to prevent any possible erosion of their authority 
over Antarctic decisions. Sri Lanka raised the question of Antarctic marine resources at 
the 1975 session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).34 A report
31. Barnes (1982b:247-8) suggests that it was raised informally at ATCM-VII in 1972. Bush 
(1982:399) notes that Chile proposed an agreement on the conservation of Antarctic marine 
resources during the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.
32. This was the w ading which also defined their approach to seals in CCAS.
33. The SCAR meeting called as a result, in 1976, established the BIOMASS (Biological 
Investigation of Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks) research programme in conjunction with 
the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR).
34. Sri Lanka’s questions about available information on Antarctica’s natural resources were made 
in the context of a debate on coastal development and the use of the seas.
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subsequently prepared by the ECOSOC Secretariat on marine resources in Antarctica 
was not circulated following objections from the consultative parties. The UN Food 
and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) also expressed interest in the question of marine 
living resources in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean. In 1976 FAO proposed a joint 
$45 million project in conjunction with the UN Development Program (UNDP) to 
develop Antarctic living resources for the benefit of all countries.35 Delegates to the 
1977 FAO Fisheries Committee argued that the resources of the Treaty Area should be 
shared by the whole international community (see Onego Vicuna 1988:474).36 This 
specific interest in living resources arose in the context of calls for a new international 
economic order and the negotiations for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, both 
of which are discussed further in the chapters on minerals.
At the 9th consultative meeting in 1977, delegates agreed to convene a special 
consultative meeting to prepare a draft agreement on marine living resources and urged 
that a definitive regime be concluded at a "decisive meeting" before the end of 1978 
(recommendation IX-2).37 This recommendation set out the principles upon which an 
agreement would be based: the prime responsibility of consultative parties for the 
protection and conservation of the environment in the Antarctic Treaty had to be 
recognised and the provisions of article IV of the Treaty, on territorial claims, were not 
to be affected. If necessary, the regime was to extend north of 60*S (without prejudice 
to coastal jurisdiction in that area) in order to ensure the effective conservation of 
species of the Antarctic ecosystem. Governments were urged to observe interim 
guidelines "pending entry into force of the definitive regime for Antarctic marine living 
resources". These interim rules required very little of the Parties: they were urged to 
cooperate in exchanging statistics on resource catches and to show the "greatest 
possible concern and care" in harvesting so as not to deplete stocks. A working group 
on marine living resources convened at ATCM-IX agreed that "conservation" would 
include rational use and that harvesting would not be prohibited38 and a statement to 
this effect was included in the Final Report of the meeting. Thus conservation was 
perceived not to be incompatible with exploitation.
Only the consultative parties were eligible to participate in the Second Special 
Consultative Meeting which was convened for the negotiation of an agreement on
35. The proposal was put to the FAO by the Group of 77. In 1976, after UNDP approved a much- 
reduced $202,500 budget for the FAO information program, following Treaty party objections, 
on the Southern Ocean, Argentina, Chile, Australia and the UK reminded the FAO not to 
overlook the consultative parties role and responsibility in the area (Barnes 1982b:278n).
36. In 1977 FAO produced three reports on southern ocean marine resources.
37. The intention conveyed in recommendation IX-2 was the SCM would draft the Convention but 
that it would be adopted at a separate conference.
38. The regime was also to exclude catch allocations and other economic regulation of harvesting 
(Final Report 1977:340).
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marine living resources.39 Three formal and two informal negotiating sessions were 
held prior to the "decisive" conference at which the Convention was adopted.40 As was 
usual Treaty practice, the negotiations were conducted in secret.41
At the first session in Canberra (in February/March 1978) eight draft conventions were 
tabled.42 A single negotiating text was produced by the Chair as a basis for further 
discussion. This meeting was followed by another in Buenos Aires in July at which 
negotiations almost broke down because of intransigence on a number of issues 
including sovereignty and jurisdiction, conservation standards and decision-making 
rules (see Barnes 1982b:251-55). A draft convention which was acceptable to most 
delegates, except the French, was produced at an informal meeting in Washington in 
September 1978. French objections were directly related to its sovereignty concerns.43 
France advised that it was not prepared, at that stage, to attend an international 
conference (Barnes 1982b:255).
A second informal meeting in Berne, Switzerland in March 1979 also failed to conclude 
negotiations.44 Informal consultations at the tenth consultative meeting in 1979 
produced a statement to be attached to the Final Act of the SCM which addressed 
French concerns on coastal state sovereignty.45
39. There were by now thirteen consultative parties, with Poland having become an ATCP in 1977. 
See appendix 5 for SCM-II sessions.
40. There are a number of useful analyses of the negotiation of CCAMLR, including Gardam (1985) 
and Frank (1983-4). The most comprehensive is probably that by Barnes (1982b) who was a 
non-governmental organisation representative on the US delegation.
41. The US argued unsuccessfully for open negotiations and publication of the negotiating texts but, 
as Barnes observes (1982b:281n) they expended little political effort on this. A decision was 
made at ATCM-XVI (1991) to make documents from these negotiations public.
42. Argentina, South Africa, Poland, Japan, Australia, Chile, France and the USSR. An American 
proposal was tabled later (Barnes 1982b:281n).
43. Their specific concern related to their right to establish conservation measures in the 200 mile 
F.FZ around Kerguelen and Crozet islands, sub-Antarctic islands over which French sovereignty 
was not disputed but which fell into the area covered by the draft convention. The draft 
contained no recognition of jurisdictional rights of coastal states because of the territorial dispute 
on the Antarctic continent. See Bush (1982:405-6) for a list of islands in the CCAMLR area 
north of 60*South. Other countries with islands in the same geographic and juridical position 
were happy with the draft Some delegates apparently wondered whether France was serious 
about having the convention finalised. Barnes (1982b:257) suggests that French intransigence 
may have been a delaying tactic while a bilateral fishing agreement with the USSR on access to 
Kerguelen fishing grounds was completed.
44. Australia proposed the Berne meeting. It is not clear why this meeting was held in Switzerland, 
which was not a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty. At ATCM-X (1979) governments were urged 
to seek an early conclusion to the negotiations and entry into force of a convention 
(recommendation X-2).
45. Several nations were as yet unwilling to agree formally to this statement.
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Delegates met again in Canberra on 5-6 May 1980 to complete preparations for the 
international conference at which the convention (discussed below) would be adopted.46 
The formal conference began on 7 May. Both West and East Germany,47 as well as 
several interested organisations48 were invited as observers. Their participation, 
however, was constrained by Soviet objections to their presence and they were not 
permitted to speak at any of the sessions.49 Barnes’ account (1982b:259) suggests that 
the final conference was dominated by ten days of fruitless negotiations and that a 
compromise package that would attract a consensus was put together in late-night 
weekend session.
The convention was adopted on 20 May and opened for signature by the fifteen 
participating consultative parties in September 1980.50 The Convention entered into 
force on 7 April 1982 after the eighth instrument of ratification had been deposited.51
The Convention
Areas of disagreement during the formal negotiations included the area of application of 
the convention, the type of conservation and management principles that would be 
adopted, the exercise of coastal-state jurisdiction, the nature of decision-making rules 
and participation in the negotiations and the Convention. The final convention is a 
compromise on all counts. On these crucial issues, the hierarchy of values inherent in 
the Treaty system dominated. Political and economic interests overrode environmental 
ones and ultimately weakened the conservation potential of the agreement. The 
agreement is tied closely to the Antarctic Treaty and decision-making remains under the 
control of the consultative parties. Boczek (1983-4:375) describes the Convention as an 
agreement "with limitations which may have an adverse impact upon the functioning of
46. The Netherlands (a non-consultative party) and the Republic of Korea (not at that stage an 
Antarctic Treaty signatory but engaged in fishing in the Southern Ocean) had asked to attend this 
meeting (and the final conference) but were blocked by Poland and the USSR (Barnes 
1982b:258). Taiwan (also not an Antarctic Treaty signatory) was also apparently excluded from 
the final conference on political grounds (Barnes 1982b:272) although he does not say what they 
were.
47. Both were Treaty parties but not yet consultative parties although West Germany had indicated 
its wish to be considered for consultative party status. They were invited because of their 
demonstrated interest in Southern Ocean fishing.
48. Representatives from SCAR, the FAO, the European Communities, the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission (IOC), International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN), International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the Scientific Committee on 
Oceanic Research (SCOR - another ICSU committee) attended. The question of ASOC 
attendance was raised but according to Barnes (1982b:259) the UK, Chile and the USSR 
privately told Australia that they had reservations about this.
49. The USSR initially proposed that all working group and committee meetings be closed to 
observers. This would have included EEC representatives, a suggestion that the British would 
not countenance (Barnes 1982b:258-9).
50. The 11th ATCM welcomed, in recommendation XI-2, the conclusion of the Convention, and 
urged governments to seek the earliest possible entry into force of the Convention.
51. Bush (1982:422) notes that an early draft would have required ratification by all states.
149
the conservation regime". Frank (1983-4:313) calls it a "self-serving Convention in the 
guise of an international conservation regime”.
The objective of the Convention is the development of suitable machinery and measures 
for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. Any harvesting activities 
must be conducted in accordance with the Convention. It establishes a Commission, a 
Scientific Committee and a secretariat. The Commission, which is to meet annually,52 
is charged with implementing the objectives and principles of the Convention, 
facilitating research, compiling data, analysing and disseminating information, 
identifying conservation needs and formulating and revising conservation measures. In 
doing so, it must also take full account of any relevant measures or regulations 
established or recommended by consultative meetings.
The Scientific Committee is established as a consultative body to the Commission. It 
provides a forum for consultation and co-operation on the collection, study and 
exchange of information on marine living resources, provides scientific advice, 
develops standards for conservation measures and conducts other activities as the 
Commission may direct.53 The secretariat, to be headed by an Executive Secretary, was 
the first (indeed, to date, the only one) to be established within the Antarctic Treaty 
system.54 It is to perform functions entrusted to it by the Commission.
The Convention applies to marine living resources55 south of the Antarctic 
Convergence.56 The definition of the scope of the Convention was a contentious issue 
during the negotiations. The UK, Norway, New Zealand and the US supported a 
definition of the Antarctic Convergence based on biological and scientific grounds 
which tied it to the southern ocean ecosystem. France, South Africa, Chile and 
Argentina favoured geographic coordinates (Barnes 1982b:281n). As a compromise the 
Convention implies in article 1(4) that the Antarctic Convergence can be identified by
52. Meetings of the Commission can be also be convened if one-third of its members so request. In 
any event, this has not happened.
53. However the list of Scientific Committee functions do not include conducting scientific 
research. The conservation minded countries were unsuccessful in their attempt to have 
harvesting tied to research programs designed and approved by SCAR or the Scientific 
Committee (Barnes 1982b:263).
54. Although the Minerals Convention created a secretariat it has not been established given the 
effective demise of that Convention (see chapter seven).
55. Marine living resources are defined in the Convention as "populations of fin fish, molluscs, 
crustaceans and all other species of living organisms, including birds, found south of the 
Antarctic convergence" (article 1(2)). Article 1(1) says that only those marine living resources 
between 60*South and the Convergence which form part of the Antarctic ecosystem are covered. 
This general definition is wide enough to include seals and whales even though seals were 
already the subject of the Agreed Measures (when on land) and the CCAS (when on floating ice 
on the high seas) and whales were subject to the International Whaling Convention of 1946.
56. The Antarctic Convergence is a zone of transition where the cold southern waters meet, and sink 
beneath, warmer waters.
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the northernmost limits of the Antarctic ecosystem but it also sets out a series of co­
ordinates to further define this limit.57
The debate about the area of application was susceptible to political interests. 
Argentina successfully requested a redrawing of the co-ordinates of the Convergence, in 
the Drake Passage, further away from its territory.58 As noted above, France was also 
concerned about its rights to a 200 mile EEZ around Kerguelen and Crozet Islands 
(which lie outside the Antarctic Treaty Area but inside the Antarctic Convergence). 
While not successful in having co-ordinates redrawn, it did manage to have a statement, 
which effectively gave France control over conservation measures in the area around 
Kerguelen and Crozet, included in the Final Act of the Conference.
The Convention adopts an innovative ‘ecosystem approach’ to the conservation of 
marine living resources, rather than the single-species approach common to most 
fisheries agreements.59 This management standard was linked to the adoption of the 
Convergence as the defining boundary of the Antarctic marine ecosystem and the 
Convention. Specific conservation principles in support of the ecosystem approach are 
set out in article II. Any decrease in the size of harvested populations to levels below 
those which ensure its stable recruitment is to be prevented. Ecological relationships 
between harvested, dependent and related populations are to be maintained and changes 
in the marine ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades 
are to be prevented.
This multi-species approach was spearheaded by the US. The fishing states preferred a 
weaker management standard based on single-species total allowable catches (TAC) 
and the USSR and Japan argued strongly against an ecosystem conservation standard. 
They acquiesced because of the requirement for consensus in decision-making and the 
inclusion of an objection provision.
The rule that Commission decisions on matters of substance are to be taken by 
consensus (article X II(l))60 constitutes a potential flaw in the Convention giving, as it
57. The exact boundaries of the Convergence cannot be precisely defined by geographic 
coordinates. The coordinates used in the Convention roughly approximate those used to define 
FAO statistical reporting areas.
58. The Argentinian instrument of ratification included a statement to the effect that nothing in the 
Convention affected or impaired its rights of sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in the areas 
covered by the Convention under its sovereign control (in Bush 1982:431).
59. Conservation is defined, in accordance with earlier decisions, to include ‘rational use’.
60. The question of whether an issue is one of substance or not is also one of substance, and is 
therefore to be decided by consensus. Non-substantive matters are decided by simple majority. 
An early proposal would have established a weighted voting procedure to favour ATCPs over 
any other Contracting Party to the Convention (Barnes 1982b:245). Proposals were also put 
forward for a two-thirds majority and the first draft of the Convention incorporated this proposal
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does, a veto over conservation measures to any fishing state. The US, UK and Japan 
wanted a majority-based system, but Argentina, Chile, Poland and the Soviet Union 
opposed it.61 Any member of the Commission also has 90 days to advise that it is 
unable to accept any conservation measure, adopted nevertheless by consensus, and is 
therefore not bound by it. This ‘opt-out’ clause, which might seem something of a 
superfluous requirement given the consensus rule, entrenches a double veto. The 
conservation measures thus comes into effect except for any state which ‘opts out’. 
This limits the potential effectiveness of the conservation measures if the objecting 
states are the fishing states.
There were differences between the claimants and the non-claimants during the 
negotiations over the rights of the claimants, as coastal states, to exercise jurisdiction in 
economic zones and the distribution of any benefits of resource activity in those zones. 
Both related directly to the sovereignty issue. The issue was complicated because, 
within the area covered by the Convention, were islands over which sovereignty was 
not disputed and over which the relevant claimant could exercise coastal state 
jurisdiction. The claimants argued that this right should apply to all territory. The non­
claimants refused to make any concessions on these issues.62
A so-called ‘bifocal’ approach to the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction was therefore 
adopted, reflecting the contrived ambiguity of the Antarctic Treaty on the sovereignty 
issue. Article IV of the Convention can be interpreted differently by claimants and non­
claimants. Article IV(2)(b) states that nothing in the Convention, nor acts or activities 
taking place while it is in force, shall:
be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party 
of, or as prejudicing, any right of claim or basis of claim to exercise 
coastal state jurisdiction under international law within the area to which 
this Convention applies.63
The claimants can interpret this as referring to the undisputed islands north &f 60*S and 
the disputed territorial claims south of that area, while the non-claimants can interpret it 
as referring only to the former.64 While, as Triggs argues (1985:203), this "contrived
for all but decisions on quotas and establishment of fishing subareas, with no provision for 
objection. Barnes (1982b:254) suggests that at the Buenos Aires meeting Japan actively 
opposed the consensus requirement - however it is likely to have done so only if there was an 
opt-out clause.
61. This was an instance on which the USSR and Japan, the two major fishing states, did not agree.
62. The USSR proposed that the Convention should state that the claimants did not have the right to 
exercise sovereignty in coastal areas. The claimant response was to suggest that special rights 
for claimants be incorporated, including economic benefits from catches by other states in their 
EEZs (Barnes 1982b:2534).
63. This article essentially repeats the provisions of article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.
64. Argentina and Chile both made proposals on environmental grounds which had political 
significance for the claims. Argentina advocated a "reserved" zone around the continent in 
which fishing activity would be prohibited. This was opposed on the grounds that it could
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result achieved by such a dual interpretation is of dubious legal value" it did enable 
agreement to be reached. The Convention, however, makes no specific reference to 
access to EEZs or to the distribution of economic benefits.
The primacy of the Antarctic Treaty is established in article V which requires 
Contracting Parties to CCAMLR which are not parties to the Antarctic Treaty to 
acknowledge the special obligations and responsibilities of the ATCPs for the 
protection and conservation of the Antarctic Treaty Area. Australia unsuccessfully 
proposed that this be deleted on the grounds that it could be interpreted as ascribing a 
degree of exclusivity to the Antarctic Treaty parties that was both unreasonable and of 
dubious legal effect (Bush 1982:407). Contracting Parties must also agree to observe 
the Agreed Measures and other measures adopted by consultative parties in fulfilment 
of this environmental responsibility.65 Thus the Convention requires acceding states to 
accept the "de facto control of the Antarctic Treaty parties over any decisions 
concerning the ... continent and surrounding waters" (Barnes 1982b:240). Furthermore, 
parties to the Convention are required to be bound by articles IV (on the claims) and VI 
(on high seas rights) of the Antarctic Treaty.
All states which participated in the final conference (that is, the consultative parties plus 
East and West Germany) were eligible to become original signatories to the 
Convention. Subsequent accession to the Convention was limited to states with an 
interest in research or harvesting activities related to Southern Ocean marine living 
resources. However a state must be actively engaged in such activities to become a 
Commission member. Thus the two-tier membership criteria of the Antarctic Treaty is 
replicated here. Britain, France and Belgium argued that the EEC should also be a full 
participant in the Convention but there was opposition to this from the Soviet Union and 
Poland (Barnes 1982b:256). The compromise solution was that the EEC could accede 
to the Convention (but could not be an original signatory) and would then be eligible for 
membership of the Commission. Its accession would, however, be subject to consensus 
agreement among the members of the Commission.66
The Convention sets out principles upon which a system of observation and inspection 
should be based, but includes no specific rules and procedures on this.67 The 
elaboration of such a system is the responsibility of the Commission. There is no
enhance the position of the claimants on maritime jurisdiction. Chile proposed banning all land- 
based fishery support facilities. (Barnes 1982b:252).
65. Contracting Parties are thus obliged to protect marine fauna when on land where they are more 
susceptible to exploitation.
66. Indeed, there was some opposition to EEC accession and consultations were held before 
consensus could be reached.
67. The UK, US, Norway and New Zealand favoured an inspection and observation system being 
included in the Convention (Barnes 1982b:251).
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provision for a centralised or independent inspection system. Inspectors are to report to 
their own governments who report in turn to the Commission. Any prosecutions or 
sanctions are the responsibility of the flag state of the offending vessel.
To meet the demands of the external accommodation the Commission and the Scientific 
Committee are required, "as appropriate", to develop cooperative relationships 
(including entering into agreements) with international organisations with overlapping 
interests and competence on southern ocean issues. Article XXIII specifically mentions 
FAO, SCOR and the IWC in this connection. This cooperation has most often involved 
according observer status to relevant organisations. There was some concern expressed 
at the first CCAMLR meeting that the rules on observer participation were unduly 
restrictive (CCAMLR 1982:3).68
Leadership
No one state seems to have taken a firm leadership role in the negotiations for 
CCAMLR. Young suggests (1990b: 14) that the US acted as a structural leader in 
articulating the Convention although he provides no analysis of the negotiations. He 
describes structural leadership as the deployment of bargaining power to influence the 
behaviour of other participants by bringing pressure to bear on them to accede to the 
term of the proposed agreement (Young 1990b: 10). That bargaining power, he argues, 
arises from asymmetries among the participants which is likely to take one of two 
forms. Either an actor (the structural leader) has less to lose from no agreement than the 
others and thus its bargaining power lies in its willingness to bring pressure to bear by 
threatening not to accept proposals to the detriment of those who require a cooperative 
outcome, or an actor has more to gain than the others, which inspires it to use side 
payments and promises of rewards to engender support for its cooperative proposals 
(Young 1990b: 11-12). However it is not clear that the US had either more or less to 
lose than the other participants in the CCAMLR negotiations, nor that it exercised 
bargaining power of the sort Young suggests. Indeed, it was unsuccessful, as noted 
earlier, in persuading other states to adopt its conservation proposals.
The main fishing states (the USSR and Japan) and the claimants (especially France) 
were able to exercise their issue-specific bargaining power within the Treaty system and 
the CCAMLR negotiations, to ensure that their interests were protected in the 
bargaining process. Their support was essential to a successful conclusion to the 
negotiations. However, this represents the negative exercise of structural power within
68. Observers may be barred from session meetings if any Commission member so requests; 
members may object to observers speaking. No distinction is made between observers from 
states and those from international organisations. Observers may submit documents for 
distribution although no translation services are provided unless a member of the Commission 
requests it (see Kimball 1988d:44).
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the process of institutional bargaining. Their bargaining positions were marked by a 
refusal to accept certain proposals rather than a positive leadership role in offering 
institutional options or brokering the interests of other actors to reach an agreement. 
Particular individuals may well have exercised entrepreneurial leadership in moving the 
negotiations forward although, unlike the minerals negotiations which followed, there 
was no continuity of chairpersons. Ambassador Rowland, of Australia, who chaired the 
first negotiating session compiled the initial draft which established the shape of the 
final convention. John Negroponte (of the US) was instrumental in finding a way 
around the impasse on the northern islands issue and the exercise of coastal state 
jurisdiction caused by the French.
The scientific community
A degree of intellectual leadership was exercised by the scientific community during the 
negotiations for CCAMLR in its advocacy of the ecosystem model. Barnes 
(1982b:250) suggests that the US Marine Mammal Commission (USMMC) first 
articulated this as an appropriate conservation standard for Southern Ocean fisheries. 
There was certainly support from the Antarctic scientific community generally (Powell 
1990:61). Richard Laws, from the British Antarctic Survey, was especially effective in 
convincing non-scientific delegates of the soundness both of the Antarctic Convergence 
as an appropriate boundary and of the ecosystem approach as a conservation standard 
(Barnes 1982b:281n).69
However, while the scientific debates played an important role in the early negotiating 
sessions they were soon overshadowed by political and economic concerns. Barnes 
notes (1982b:266) that there was only a small number of scientists on the delegations 
and that their lack of political power in the negotiations reflected a general lack of 
power in both national and international arenas. As a result, the role of the Scientific 
Committee within the Convention was limited. Barnes (1982b:266) suggests that "no 
delegation was willing to expend political capital to assure that the Scientific 
Committee had the power, staff, funding, and independence that arguably would be 
required to furnish advice grounded in fact and risk assessment, instead of economics 
and politics".
Government officials, in particular foreign ministry representatives, rather than 
scientists have been the main participants in the Commission. Heads of CCAMLR 
delegations are frequently individuals who also have a high profile in Antarctic Treaty
69. Barnes also refers to the role of Professor Moiseev in convincing his Soviet colleagues (and 
Japanese as well, Shapley suggests (1985:151)) to accept the ecosystem approach. While Bames 
doesn’t identify him as a scientist, Shapley does (1985:151) noting also that it was Moiseev who 
first raised the question of krill and its exploitation at a SCAR symposium in 1968.
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consultative meetings and are socialised into the norms of the Treaty system. In most of 
the Convention states there is little domestic interest in the Antarctic fisheries resource 
issue because they have no long distance fleets interested in southern ocean fishing. 
Where those interests do exist, the political process within the Commission, particularly 
the emphasis on consensus for the adoption of conservation measures, enables national 
economic interests to override scientific or environmental interests.
CCAMLR is a Convention in which knowledge is an essential component of successful 
implementation and therefore there is, in theory at least, a potentially powerful role for 
scientists. However, the Scientific Committee has generally not been as effective as it 
might because of the dominance of the Commission in decision-making and because of 
the continuing paucity of scientific data upon which to base conservation decisions. 
The generation of that data is constrained by political factors (in that it requires fishing 
states to report their statistics accurately and in full which they are reluctant to do) and 
by financial constraints (the research programs required to compile adequate scientific 
evidence in support of ecosystem models are expensive).
Much of the Scientific Committee’s time in the early years after the Convention’s entry 
into force was spent in disputes over the role of the Committee70 and between those 
states who wanted maximum data to be reported and the fishing states, especially Japan 
and the USSR, who opposed this.71 Further, the scientists who participate in the 
Committee’s meetings do so ultimately as national representatives, not as independent 
scientific experts. This constrains the extent to which they can function as an effective 
epistemic community.
Puissochet72 suggests (1991:73) that relations between the scientists on the Scientific 
Committee and government officials in the Commission have not always been as 
smooth as they might be. However, it was not until the late 1980s that scientists on the 
Scientific Committee began to express openly their concern that their views and 
judgements on conservation measures were being ignored by the Commission.73 This 
may well have had some impact in terms of the more recently adopted conservation 
measures discussed below.
70. States such as Australia, the US and the UK wanted the Scientific Committee to fulfil its 
consultative functions and to provide scientific evidence upon which management decisions 
would then be based. The USSR perceived it much more as a political body, responding to 
national interests (see Orrego Vicufla 1991:30-31).
71. Gulland (1988:232) suggests this was because they felt that data reporting requirements had 
been used against them in the IWC to strengthen restrictions on whaling.
72. Puissochet is a senior French Antarctic diplomat
73. For example, in 1989 the convenor of the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment made an 
official statement that deplored the fact that the opinions of the Scientific Committee had been 
disputed or rejected by certain members of the Commission (Puissochet 1991:73-4).
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Non-governmental organisations
The CCAMLR negotiation has been described as the issue on which NGOs "cut their 
teeth" (Bush 1990:143). Bush (1990:137) suggests that the substantial interest and 
pressure from environmental groups was a new factor in these negotiations (Bush 
1990:137).74 However, the various accounts of the negotiating process make little 
reference to NGO activity or argument, with the exception of the International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature which is not an advocacy organisation. The US 
delegation included two NGO representatives but it seems to have been the only one to 
do so.75 Barnes suggests (1982b:280n) that the International Institute for Environment 
and Development was the main NGO trying to keep the public informed of the 
negotiations but this does not seem to have extended to a direct lobbying function.
Rules in the Convention do allow for participation by non-governmental organisations 
where those organisations can contribute to its work.76 The Convention parties have 
been slow to involve environmental NGOs in subsequent debates, although the US, 
Australia, New Zealand and the UK now include NGO representatives on their 
delegations. ASOC and Greenpeace International first applied to the Commission for 
observer status in 1983 but it was not until 1988 that ASOC (but not Greenpeace) was 
granted this status. This delay was because of doubts expressed by some parties about 
what kind of contribution ASOC could make to the work of the Commission.77
NGOs have continued to monitor the performance of CCAMLR and have maintained a 
lobbying presence at Commission meetings. The Greenpeace Antarctic expedition has 
also monitored fishing vessel activity in the southern ocean (Greenpeace 1990b). 
NGOs have sought on this issue, as with others in the Treaty system, to increase the 
accountability and transparency of practice under the Convention. NGO policy has 
generally been not to oppose harvesting but to advocate that more stringent 
conservation measures be adopted and that implementation be improved. In seeking to 
influence the CCAMLR process in this respect, the NGOs must rely on their 
presentation of scientific argument: the conservation of fish and krill is an issue on 
which it is difficult to stimulate public or political attention.
74. Bush suggests (1990:137) that the convention contains a number of provisions which reflect the 
interests of those groups, but he does not elaborate.
75. The two were the Director of the Sierra Club International Office and the Director of the Center 
for Law and Social Policy (Kimball 1988d:36). Although Kimball does not name the Director 
of CLASP, it is likely to have been Barnes.
76. Non-governmental, in this case, includes bodies such as SCAR, SCOR, ICSU and the IUCN.
77. This application was not without precedent. Greenpeace and ASOC have observer status with 
the IWC, for example, which is responsible for whales in the Southern Ocean. Greenpeace was 
not granted observer status to CCAMLR on the grounds that it is a member organisation of 
ASOC.
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Success as a conservation instrument
The Convention and its implementation have come in for considerable criticism with 
particular emphasis on its limitations as a conservation agreement. The Convention 
permits fishing activity unless it can be shown on the basis of sound scientific data that 
it should be controlled. As noted above, the provision and interpretation of sound 
scientific data has been problematic. Kimball (1990d: 15) suggests that the fishing 
states should be required to prove that conservation goals will not be adversely affected 
by harvesting.
The decision-making process is inherently slow and subject to national interests and 
political bargains. The Convention’s decision-making organ, the Commission, meets 
only once a year for approximately twelve days. Decision-making under the 
Commission constitutes a collection of national representatives who meet to try to 
merge their governments’ individual policies into decisions that accord with the goals of 
the Convention (Powell 1990:68).78 They have not been successful in doing so because 
of the clash of exploitation and environmental interests in the context of the consensus 
rule. Under this rule, the fishing states have successfully opposed conservation 
measures which run counter to their short-term economic interests.
CCAMLR meetings have focussed predominantly on the management of fish stocks. In 
the first five years only seven conservation measures were adopted and Howard 
suggests (1989:131) that they contributed little to the protection of the marine 
ecosystem.79 These measures have not prevented the depletion of fin fish stocks. 
Indeed, measures have been not usually been adopted until stocks are already depleted, 
thus negating the precautionary approach which the consultative parties argue 
characterises the Convention.
The issue of conservation measures for the krill fishery was not addressed until 1989 
and measures were not adopted until 1990.80 Those moves were opposed by Japan and 
the USSR on the grounds that adequate scientific data was lacking (Nicol 1990:6).81 As 
an Australian official recently observed "it is difficult to argue that CCAMLR is being 
successfully implemented when there is no agreed conservation approach to the largest 
fishery [krill] in the area" (Heyward 1990:5).
78. Powell is the Executive Secretary of CCAMLR.
79. These measures were of two types only - restrictions of mesh size and the closing of certain 
fisheries (see Howard 1989:131-135) for details.
80. Part of the difficulty with adopting conservation measures for krill is that not enough is known 
about either their biology or ecology to enable the design of workable management models 
(Powell 1990:66). Krill catches are presently thought low enough to not have an impact on 
related and dependent species.
81. They have also argued that they have no plans to extend their krill fleets.
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The rules that have been adopted have differed little from measures adopted under 
ordinary fisheries agreements which are not based on an ecosystem model (Puissochet 
1991:74).82 The practical problems of implementing an ecosystem approach have been 
compounded by inadequate and incomplete submission of data which has contributed to 
uncertainty in establishing conservation measures.83 This scarcity of information and 
the related difficulty of establishing what is the best scientific evidence available upon 
which to make decisions has resulted in less rather than more caution. The fishing 
nations in the Commission have often opposed restrictions on catch levels on the 
grounds of insufficient data existing to support such measures. It is the fishing nations, 
however, who are one of the major sources of data.
The Convention also gives no guidance on procedures for the division of species and 
total allowable catches between fishing states. The establishment of national catch 
limits is not specifically listed in the Convention as a conservation measure because of 
sovereignty and autonomy implications.
A limited inspection system was not implemented until the 1989/90 season. Inspections 
must be brief (one or two hours) and involve one or two inspectors only (Puissochet 
1991:75). As Powell (1990:67) observes, a system that permits foreign nationals to 
board one’s vessels has not been easily accepted by the fishing states.84 This concern 
has prevented observation rules, which would involve the presence of observers on 
board during a voyage, from being resolved.
Australia and New Zealand have been the leading states in expressing concern at the 
inadequacy of measures adopted and in seeking to push the Commission towards the 
ecosystem approach advocated in the Convention.85 However, the consensus 
requirement, and a lack of issue specific power (within CCAMLR at least) on the part 
of both countries, meant that neither was particularly successful in the early years of 
CCAMLR.86
82. At time of writing there were fourteen conservation measures in effect Others which had been 
adopted have superseded or ceased to be effective. Seven more conservation measures are due 
to come into effect on 3 May 1992.
83. See Basson and Beddington (1991) on the problems of implementing article II of the Convention 
which sets out the principles of the ecosystem approach.
84. See Howard (1989:140-145) for details.
85. See, for example, Antarctic News, #2 (1984), #3 (1986) and #5 (1987), Moseley (1986:48) and 
Kimball (1987c).
86. Australia may have a situational or ‘psychological’ advantage as the state in which the 
CCAMLR institutions are located and where the Commission and Scientific Committee 
meetings are held. Australian decision-makers and scientists are able, at least, to be in close 
informal contact with the secretariat
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There has recently been some movement within the Commission to adopt more wide- 
ranging conservation measures. Fifteen measures were adopted at the 1991 
Commission meeting. They include steps to minimise incidental mortality of seabirds, 
requirements for notification of new fisheries and procedures to protect sites in which 
studies are being undertaken for the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program 
(CEMP). The CEMP protection measure (Conservation Measure 18/IX) requires the 
adoption of a management plan which may include a hortatory code of conduct.87
Nevertheless, these new measures, while going further than previous ones, still fall far 
short of what is required to give effect to the ecosystem approach and to ensure that the 
marine fauna of the Southern Ocean is properly protected.
Conclusion
Both CCAS and CCAMLR extended the legal framework of the Treaty system. They 
widened the scope of cooperation among the consultative parties, strengthened their 
hold on Antarctic decision-making and ensured that conflict among them could be 
avoided. To this extent they met the test of success within the Treaty system. However 
both conventions are flawed as conservation instruments if judged from the perspective 
of environmental values. In both cases, the conservation rules and procedures were 
compromised by political and economic demands. Thus the hierarchy of values in the 
Antarctic Treaty system was reinforced. In both conventions, conservation values were 
important in principle but the rules and procedures adopted and, in the case of 
CCAMLR, the record of implementation, did not match this commitment.
Implementation of conservation measures under CCAMLR was subject to the same 
problems which bedevilled other environmental protection measures under the Treaty 
system. The decision-making process, which required consensus for all decisions, 
while politically important, was flawed in terms of ensuring that good environmental 
rules would be adopted. The reluctance, on political grounds, of some states to agree to 
centralised or independent monitoring, enforcement or inspection provisions, meant that 
the fishing states have been free to act as they will, with little oversight or recourse on 
the part of the conservation-minded states. Although CCAS has not been implemented 
to any degree except for the reporting requirements which, as noted earlier, have not 
always been met, it is likely that the same weaknesses would have met with a similarly 
limited success as a conservation instrument.
87. Although conservation measures are the responsibility, under the Convention, of the 
Commission, any ATCP may request that a Commission resolution on CEMP site protection be 
discussed at a regular consultative meeting (CCAMLR 1991:6-12).
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Nevertheless, as noted above, there have been some changes in the operation of 
CCAMLR. Those changes, which signal at least a degree of willingness by the fishing 
states to modify their interpretation of what can best meet, or at least not compromise, 
their national interests, may be attributed to an informal and doubtless uncoordinated 
‘coalition’ of the conservation-minded states, the scientific community and the NGOs. 
Both the conservation-minded states within the Commission and the scientific 
community have taken a much firmer line on the need for scientific advice to be 
accepted and for effective conservation measures to be adopted. Those changes can 
also be located within the context of intensified debate on the way in which the 
consultative parties have, or have not, exercised their environmental stewardship of the 
Antarctic, a debate mobilised to a great extent by the NGOs. This debate was especially 
important during the minerals negotiations, which I turn to in the next chapter.
C hapter five
ANTARCTIC MINERALS: PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES 1970-1988
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Introduction
The third of the resource conventions negotiated by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties was the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. 
The minerals issue brought into the open tensions among the consultative parties which 
had been more easily managed in the living resource negotiations. It was the issue on 
which competing national interests were most in evidence, and the issue which 
throughout its negotiation and afterwards challenged the stability of the Treaty system. 
It was the pivotal issue in bringing Antarctic environmental protection to the forefront 
of public debate and the one which generated the most critical attention from states 
which were not members of the Antarctic Treaty.
The Antarctic Treaty contains no reference to mineral resources or their management. 
This omission was deliberate. Shapley says (1985:95) that nothing in the notes of the 
pre-conference negotiations indicates it was discussed there.1 If not, then it was 
certainly discussed at the 1959 Washington Conference. Sollie suggests (1977:8) that a 
proposal to include a provision on economic activities in the Treaty was tabled and 
rejected.2 Mineral resources involved questions of ownership and rights to exploitation 
which, in the face of differences over sovereignty, would have rendered agreement 
between the claimants and non-claimants almost impossible in the late 1950s. Given 
that minerals activity was unlikely in the near (or even not so near) future, this was an 
issue that the original signatories felt could be sidestepped in the negotiations in 1959.
Little interest was expressed in Antarctic mineral exploitation in the 1960s. However in 
the 1970s the minerals issue presented the Treaty parties with a major challenge to the 
accord between them. Commercial interest in Antarctic mineral resources increased 
with the 1973 oil price rise and the Arab boycott of oil exports to western industrialised 
states. Several Treaty Parties were approached by companies wanting to undertake 
prospecting in the Antarctic area and seeking information on the conditions under which 
they could secure exclusive rights to minerals in the Treaty area. The United Nations 
negotiations for the third Law of the Sea Convention (which began in 1973) and calls 
from less developed countries for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s
1. Sollie (1983:318), on the other hand, suggests that some mention was made of the minerals issue 
at those meetings.
2. Wyndham (1980:183), an officer with Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs, suggests that 
one of Australia’s aims at the Washington Conference was to avoid any reference in the Treaty 
to the economic exploitation of Antarctica, although he does not indicate why this policy was 
pursued.
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began to direct attention towards the global commons which, in this argument, included 
the Antarctic. This interest from a diversity of parties impelled the consultative parties 
to inscribe the question of minerals exploitation, somewhat cautiously, onto the 
consultative agenda.
In the 1980s this issue, more than any other, ensured that the benign neglect with which 
the rest of the world had generally treated the Antarctic gave way to increasing 
attention. Non-Treaty states actively challenged the rights of the Antarctic club to 
negotiate a regulatory regime for mineral resources in an area argued to be a global 
commons and therefore, as with the deep seabed, subject to the common heritage 
principle. NGOs focussed on the importance of environmental protection in the 
Antarctic and the extent to which this was, or ever could be, compatible with 
development of mineral resources. In both arguments, the interests of the international 
community (seen to lie either in freedom of access to resources or in environmental 
protection) were set against those of the Treaty parties.
While the consultative parties responded to external factors in first addressing the 
minerals question, the subsequent debate and negotiations on minerals exploitation in 
the 1970s and 1980s was shaped primarily by tensions internal to the Treaty system. 
Consideration of what to do about this issue opened a Pandora’s box of contentious 
matters relating to the differing juridical positions of the consultative parties which they 
had previously sought to avoid. Other divisions, which cut across the fundamental 
claimant/non-claimant split, also arose within the ranks of the consultative parties.
This playing out of differences took place at both a normative and procedural level as 
an exercise in joint-problem solving and institutional bargaining. The minerals issue 
raised two questions crucial to cooperation under the Antarctic regime. First, how 
could the Parties cooperate to arrive, through the process of institutional bargaining, at a 
consensus agreement that maintained their interests (individual and collective) and, 
second, how could they structure activity-specific cooperation within that agreement. 
They had to consider not only what principles were appropriate in shaping cooperation 
on minerals activity (the normative level), but also what rules and procedures could best 
give effect to those principles (the procedural level) and, at the same time, satisfy the 
matrix of competing state interests while not undermining the Treaty system which 
served the collective interests of the consultative parties. There is no doubt that it was 
the hardest challenge they had faced, not excluding the formulation of the Treaty itself.
This chapter deals primarily with the first of those debates - that is, how the process of 
institutional bargaining proceeded with respect to the challenge described above. It 
briefly discusses mineral resources in the Antarctic and introduces the fundamental
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collective interests of the Treaty parties with respect to the minerals issue. It then 
discusses how the consultative parties addressed the issue in the 1970s and describes the 
formal negotiations for the minerals convention in the 1980s in the Fourth Special 
Consultative Meeting.
The next chapter examines the resolution of those questions and competing interests. It 
focuses particularly on the settlement of the internal and external accommodation and 
the playing out of the hierarchy of values during those negotiations which saw politics 
and economics again take precedence, in the final analysis, over environmental 
concerns.
Mineral resources in the Antarctic
A great deal remains to be learned about the geology of the Antarctic (especially the 
ice-covered regions). Assessments of Antarctic mineral resources are consequently 
incomplete and highly speculative.3 The probability that mineral deposits exist in the 
Antarctic is quite high: the chances of finding them are considered to be small (Wright 
and Williams 1974:1). Even if minerals were to be found in large quantities, there are 
technological, economic and environmental obstacles to their successful exploitation.
Speculation on mineral potential in the Antarctic focuses on hard-rock (on-shore) 
minerals and hydrocarbons4 and relies substantially on analogy with those continents 
which, along with Antarctica, were once part of the supercontinent Gondwanaland. The 
existence of mineral bearing structures in those parts of Australia, South America and 
Africa which were contiguous with the Antarctic margins has suggested to geologists 
that similar structures are likely to exist in the Antarctic. Although traces of a large 
number of minerals have been reported in the Antarctic,5 no such analogous mineral 
bearing structures or large deposits have yet been found.6
3. The geology of East and West Antarctica differ. East (or Greater) Antarctica is largely a 
precambrian shield laid down over 570 million years ago, with later precambrian and paleozoic 
sediments around its margins. West Antarctica, which includes the Antarctic Peninsula, is 
younger, dating to the Mesozoic (about 200 million years ago) and consists of a series of islands 
of igneous rock. See, for example, Thomson and Swithinbank (1985) and Spletstoesser (1985).
4. There has also been some discussion on the potential for ice as an Antarctic resource. Ice is 
basically a renewable resource and raises quite different technical questions than either on or 
off-shore non-renewable resources. Manganese nodules from the deep sea-bed are thought to be 
of interest because of their high content of copper, nickel and cobalt, rather than their manganese 
content (Anon 1977:20). However it is thought that the mineral content of nodules is latitude 
dependent, and that they are much richer closer to the equator. Southern ocean nodules are 
therefore unlikely to be mined.
5. Stewart (1963) listed 222 mineral species, sub-species and varieties, including some 
questionable occurrences, that had been reported in the previous 70 years. He noted that many 
of these had been found only in minute amounts with some having been described only after 
microscopic examination. See also Potter (1969:17-19).
6. Further, the Gondwana analogy is subject to some modification. While comparisons are made 
between the geology and plate techtonics of the Antarctic Peninsula and the South American
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Iron ore has been located in the Prince Charles Mountains, and in the Dufek Intrusion in 
the Pensacola Mountains (see attached map). Coal occurrences are widespread in the 
exposed areas of the continent, particularly in the TransAntarctic Mountains where coal 
deposits are speculated to be extensive.7 The Dufek Intrusion, which compares 
geologically with the South African Bushveld (Zorn 1984:5-6), has also been identified 
as a possible site for chromium, platinum, nickel ore, cobalt and copper although only 
traces of these minerals have been found there. The difficulties of locating extensive 
deposits,8 if they do exist, arise because so much of the land mass is buried under ice.
Much more attention has been paid to the possibility of finding off-shore hydrocarbons. 
The most favourable locations for hydrocarbon deposits are considered to be the basins 
of the Weddell9 and Ross Seas, the continental margins of the Bellingshausen and 
Amundsen Seas, and the Prydz Bay area off the Australian Antarctic Territory. 
Indications of hydrocarbon potential have been found, most often during routine 
scientific geological research,10 but no confirmed hydrocarbons have yet been located 
in the Antarctic.
Andes, this applies mainly to the southern reaches of the mountain chain which are "relatively 
barren in mineral deposits when compared with the Andes farther north" (Splettstoesser 
1985:43). Sediments in the Bass and Gippsland Basins of Australia which are used as analogous 
examples for hydrocarbon potential were formed after the breakup of Gondwana (Thomson and 
Swithinbank 1985:34). Crabbe (1985:366) points out that the Gippsland Basin is not part of the 
southern Australian marginal rift and is therefore not relevant to the Antarctic margin at all. 
Quilty suggests (1986-87:117) that such minerals as may have existed in Antarctica following 
the break-up of Gondwana "would have been removed through long periods of glaciation".
7. Nevertheless the coal that has been found is of low grade with a high ash content. It would 
require considerable processing to produce a burnable product in any quantity (Potter 1969:27).
8. A mineral occurrence is the presence of a mineral, often in very small quantities. A deposit is a 
more substantial quantity and a reserve is a deposit whose size and extent has been measured or 
calculated and that is known to be of commercial value now or is expected to become so in the 
future (Holdgate and Tinker 1979:14).
9. Although seismic reflection profiles collected from the continental margin of the Weddell Sea 
by the West German Federal Institute of Geosciences and Natural Resources contained volcanic 
layers rather than sedimentary rock, indicating that this area might be less prospective for 
hydrocarbons than previously thought.
10. In 1973, the US research ship Glomar Challenger found traces of ethane and methane in three of 
four holes drilled while carrying out scientific work in the Ross Sea. The Glomar Challenger 
was not searching for oil or gas. The Ross Sea holes were cemented to prevent gas leaks, and 
scientists aboard said that no conclusions could be made about possible deposits (Shapley 
1985:124). These finds have been cited as evidence of hydrocarbon potential although as Elliot 
(1977:111-5) points out, methane is "not considered an indicator o f ... hydrocarbon deposits" and 
neither is the presence of hydrocarbon reservoirs necessarily mandated by the presence of 
ethane. Sediments taken from the Bransfield Strait in 1985 were considered by West German 
researchers to provide evidence of oil deposits at lower depths. A 630 metre core drilled from 
McMurdo sound by a joint US-NZ glaciological research team contained asphaltic residue 
indicating that hydrocarbons had been present at some stage (possibly millions of years ago) but 
had later leaked out
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Minerals in the Antarctic: locations mentioned in the text
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Studies over the past twenty years have argued that no commercially exploitable 
deposits of minerals are known to exist in the Antarctic.11 In spite of this the Antarctic 
is often presented as a storehouse of mineral riches with hypothetical predictions of the 
extent of mineral finds in the Antarctic abounding. Bertram’s assertion (1958:4) that "a 
great deal of nonsense has been written on the subject" has not lost any o f its validity. 
The most frequently-cited figures are US Geological Survey estimates from the 1970s 
that the continental margins of West Antarctica might contain discoverable12 deposits in 
the order of 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, quantities 
which would have almost matched proven US reserves.13 Although no attempt was 
made to verify this estimate, which has been dismissed by subsequent scientific reports 
as "based on unacceptable processes of extrapolation" (Holdgate and Tinker 1979:16), it 
continues to be cited as authoritative, particularly in the media. Similarly impressive 
and equally hypothetical estimates have been made since.14
Throughout the period under discussion (from the late 1950s onwards) statements on 
the commercial potential of Antarctic minerals resources have (with one or two 
exceptions) been consistently pessimistic in contrast to the possibly unwarranted 
optimism for finding deposits.
11. Stewart (1963) observed that "as far as may be ascertained, no commercial deposits have been 
discovered ... ". Potter (1969:29) in a study for Resources for the Future suggested that the 
"chances of [the Antarctic] having commercial minerals are probably less than one percent of 
those of the ‘related’ continents, South America, Australia and Africa". A report for the US 
Geological Survey concluded that "Antarctica ... has no known economically recoverable 
resources of any category" (Wright and Williams 1974:2). Crabbe stated (1985:365) that 
"despite much speculation, there are still no known petroleum or mineral resources in 
Antarctica". Laws (1990:9) has more recently argued that "there are no proven commercial 
resources, either of hard rock minerals or of hydrocarbons. Their actual occurrence is 
speculative".
12. Only about one-third of discoverable reserves are considered to be recoverable.
13. (SCAR/EAMREA 1979:14) notes that there is some doubt that these were official USGS 
estimates. They were not included in the USGS circular on mineral resource potential (Wright 
and Williams 1974). The report of the group of experts convened at ATCM IX cautioned that 
these were speculative figures and "should not be cited unless supported by much firmer 
evidence" (in Handbook 1989:3345) and noted that it had been advised that these figures 
originated from an unpublished, highly provisional calculation in an internal USGS document 
(see also Mitchell 1977b:91). They were formally attributed to USGS by Spivak (1974). 
Nossiter (1977) argues that these papers were written at a time when the Ford Administration 
was eager to find new oil resources under the threat of a future Arab boycott He suggests that 
the Carter administration later downplayed these figures because of a desire, shared by the oil 
companies, to convince the public that oil was a scarce resource and it was therefore reluctant to 
advertise any possible new finds.
14. In 1979 a Gulf Oil representative was reported as suggesting that the two most likely Antarctic 
sites in the Ross and Weddell Seas could yield up to 50 billion barrels of oil (Bell 1982:24). 
Japanese estimates in 1980 were in the order of 45 billion barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion cubic 
metres of gas. A 1980 report prepared for the West German Federal Institute of Geosciences 
and Natural Resources estimated recoverable oil reserves of 4 billion tonnes (30 billion barrels) 
and 4 trillion cubic metres of gas (Zom 1984:4).
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Even if minerals deposits were to be found, there would be enormous physical barriers 
to their exploitation, both on and off-shore. The continental ice sheet would make land- 
based mining activity difficult. The climate and the dangerous and unpredictable 
weather conditions would compound the hazards. The months of almost total darkness 
during the Antarctic winter would limit the working season. Access to the continent by 
sea is impossible for a large part of each year because of pack ice. Mineral processing 
requires water which, surprisingly enough, is in short supply in the Antarctic.
Operational obstacles would also arise with respect to the extraction of offshore oil and 
gas, should deposits be found. The Antarctic continental shelf is much deeper than 
most other parts of the world15 although the extent to which this would be a major 
barrier to drilling is disputed.16 Icebergs, which are more numerous and often much 
larger17 in Antarctic waters than in the Arctic would present a danger to drilling rigs. 
Bottom-scouring bergs18 could severely damage well-heads and any submarine 
pipelines laid to carry oil.
Economic obstacles also arise. All equipment and personnel would have to be 
transported long distances. Transportation costs, the distance from markets and the high 
salaries that would have to be paid for work in such difficult environment means that 
deposits which might be commercially attractive elsewhere in the world would not be 
so in the Antarctic.19 Thus "the economics of Antarctic land minerals seem utterly 
impossible" (cited in Financial Times, 26 August 1983).20
With respect to hydrocarbons it is likely that only a supergiant field would ever be 
commercially attractive. Crabbe suggests (1985:366) that any discovery smaller than a 
field of at least 500 million barrels21 would not be economically viable. A Gulf Oil
15. An average depth of 500 metres compared with an average depth of 200 metres elsewhere. The 
continental slope is also steeper.
16. Experts at a 1985 conference held in the Antarctic observed that, in contrast to exploration 
techniques which made it nearly possible to conduct exploration drilling in the Antarctic, 
production systems suitable for potential hydrocarbon exploitation in Antarctica were still in the 
development phase. Complete sub-sea production systems were argued to be required because 
the water depths were too great to permit floating operations (Polar Research Board 1986a:265).
17. The berg known as B9, for example, was 110 by 50 kilometres in size.
18. In 1978-79 a Norwegian expedition found iceberg scouring at depths of up to 400 metres in the 
Weddell Sea with "plough marks" 25 to 50 metres wide and 5 metres deep on the sea bed (Zom 
1984:6).
19. There are also known mineral deposits in parts of the world which are far more accessible.
20. This observation was made by a consulting geologist for Rio Tinto Zinc.
21. By way of contrast, the Alaska North Slope oil field is believed to contain around 8 billion
barrels (Wilson 1983:78).
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official22 argued "that we would have to find an awful lot of oil to support commercial 
production"23 (cited in International Herald Tribune, 31 December 1981).24
The environmental risks of Antarctic minerals activity must be also be considered and 
should be a vital factor in assessing minerals exploitation.25 Land-based support 
facilities would compete with wildlife and scientific stations for space on the limited 
ice-free coastal areas. Increased human activity would cause further disturbance to 
wildlife, and compound the problems of local pollution and waste disposal which arise 
from scientific activity. The "construction and maintenance of ... a small town could 
bring environmental problems not yet experienced with previous human activities" 
(Thomson 1982:8).
The greatest area of concern is the potential for, and environmental impact of, oil 
contamination. A major oil spill could result from a tanker accident, accident to a drill 
rig or production pipeline, blowouts during drilling or leakage from or damage to 
storage tanks.26 Accidents are likely to occur not only because of the physical obstacles 
and navigational hazards described above but also because the potential for human error 
increases in the stressful and rigorous Antarctic environment.
Biological decomposition of oil is slow in the cold temperatures of the Antarctic.27 
Antarctic wildlife, much of which lives on or near the sea, could be affected directly 
and indirectly by oil spills. Oil contamination could also affect phytoplankton and krill 
stocks and thus impact on the Antarctic food chain. Scientific research in the Antarctic, 
which relies on an unpolluted environment for the conduct of baselines studies and for 
monitoring global ecological change, would also be adversely affected.
22. John Garrett who served on the US Slate Department’s Antarctic Advisory Committee.
23. Various in-depth studies carried out on the economic potential of minerals exploitation have 
made similar pessimistic predictions. See, for example, Potter (1969), Elliot (1977).
24. In the late 1950s Lawrence Gould, chief scientist and second-in-command on the first Byrd 
expedition in 1928 (Quigg 1983:29), suggested that "clearly there is no present and no probable 
immediate future for exploitation of mineral resources" (cited in Potter 1969:3). Gould restated 
this belief at the US Congressional Hearings on ratification of the Antarctic Treaty in 1960 
when, in his capacity as Chair of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Polar 
Research, he said "My profession is geology and I would not give a nickel for all the mineral 
resources I know in Antarctica".
25. See Zumberge (1982:134-144) for a concise summary of the environmental impacts of minerals 
exploration and exploitation in the Antarctic. Zumberge is, nevertheless, conservative in his 
assessment of the need to restrict minerals activity.
26. Joyner (1985:181) suggests that Treaty parties would also be bound by other international 
obligations on marine pollution.
27. If the spread of oil could not be contained before the winter pack ice advanced, nothing could be 
done during the months when the continent is inaccessible and its surrounding waters covered by 
ice. Indeed, the technology to clean up an Antarctic ice spill may not even exist. Polluted ice 
could reduce the reflectivity of the ice-sheet which might have impacts on local temperatures, 
thus affecting biological communities.
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Interest in minerals
These operational, economic and environmental concerns did not forestall interest in 
mineral resources by the Treaty parties and by industry.28 Antarctic scientific programs 
have included geological research with a focus on expanding knowledge about mineral 
occurrences.29 The mining industry has also exhibited interest in scientific research of 
this nature as well as a more direct interest in undertaking exploratory ventures,30 an 
interest which the British suggested was "intrinsically speculative reflecting the need of 
prospecting companies to keep occupied rather than a world need for minerals" 
(ANT/17, 1972).31 However none of the investigation to date yet constitutes a 
systematic search for mineral deposits of the order that would provide adequate 
information upon which to commence extensive exploration.
Potential access to mineral resources was one reason for the increase in accessions to 
the Antarctic Treaty in the 1980s.32 China’s accession to the Treaty in 1983 and its
28. One of the earliest interests expressed was from the whaling company Messrs Chr. Salveson 
which, in 1912, gained a lease from the British Colonial Office to explore for minerals in 
Graham land (Antarctic Peninsula) (Thomson and Swithinbank 1985:32).
29. A 1970 US Presidential directive included the prediction and assessment of resources in a 
discussion of scientific research needs in the Antarctic (Quigg 1983:88). President Nixon set up 
a White House sponsored group to examine Antarctic oil potential (Observer News Service 
1982). In 1975 the Soviets established a new Antarctic station (Druzhnaya) with a view to 
conducting extensive mineral geological research in the area west of the TransAntarctic 
Mountains (Pallone 1978:547). A committee of Australian scientists recommended in the mid- 
1970s that the Australian government establish a planning committee to coordinate the search 
for minerals in Antarctica (Anon 1977:22). West German research has had a strong geological 
emphasis. Scientists aboard the research ships Meteor and Polarstern have reported locating 
evidence of hydrocarbon potential. In the summer of 1986/87 part of the Brazilian scientific 
program involved a 5000 kilometre seismic and drilling survey in the Bransfield Strait, carried 
out in conjunction with the Antarctic Special Unit of the Exploration Division of Petrobras, the 
Brazilian oil and gas company (Wallace 1988a:23). In 1984 the US research ship Samuel P Lee 
conducted hydrocarbon investigations under a US-NZ-Australian resource appraisal plan. The 
ship was co-sponsored by the Circum-Pacific Council for Energy and Mineral Resources whose 
chairman was a Texas oilman and energy advisor to US President Reagan.
30. Texaco approached the US government in 1970 for an exploration licence, but was turned down 
because the US government considered that it had no authority to issue licences. Several 
unsuccessful attempts were made by oil companies in the 1970s to form international 
consortium to conduct seismic surveys in Antarctic waters (Quigg 1983:195-6). Gulf Oil was 
reported to have a seismic survey ship in the South Georgia region in 1979-80 (Bell 1982:24). 
In 1980-82 the Japanese research ship Kajurei-Maru was despatched by the Japan National Oil 
Corporation as part of a Japanese scientific survey of possible oil deposits in the Bellingshausen 
Sea (International Herald Tribune, 25 November 1980). In 1981-82 the Institute Fran^ais du 
Petrol examined parts of the East Antarctic coast (Shapley 1988:320). British Petroleum also 
established a department for Antarctic mineral resource assessment (Tucker 1983).
31. The 1973 Nansen Meeting noted that almost all the inquiries received by one Treaty government 
(unnamed) were from companies registered in a country which had not acceded to the Antarctic 
Treaty (also unnamed). This could possibly have been West Germany which did not accede to 
the Treaty until 1979, gaining consultative party status in March 1981.
32. There were nine accessions to the Antarctic Treaty in the 1960s and 1970s only one of which, 
Poland, became a consultative party in that time. In the 1980s there were seventeen accessions. 
Twelve states were granted consultative party status in the 1980s, three of which had acceded to 
the Treaty in the 1970s, the rest in the 1980s.
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subsequent application for consultative party status was in part, the Peoples' Daily 
noted, because "according to preliminary exploration, the Antarctic is rich in petroleum, 
gas, rare metals" (cited in Financial Times, 12 May 1983). South Korea, which acceded 
to the Treaty in 1986 also observed (incorrectly) in an official report, that "the 
Antarctic, man’s last remaining treasure trove of rich natural resources, abounds in 
minerals deposits" (House 1988:112).
Outside the "club": Third World interest
Interest from non-Treaty parties in the Antarctic and particularly in the minerals issue, 
began to take shape in the 1970s, albeit in a rather nebulous fashion, when calls for a 
new international economic order (NIEO) were most salient. This interest was further 
shaped during the negotiations for the third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
continued, after UNCLOS, in a series of UN resolutions directed specifically at the 
Antarctic Treaty system.
While the demands for a new international economic order were directed particularly at 
the liberal financial and trading institutions of the Bretton Woods era33 those parts of 
the world argued to be global commons, and therefore not open to exclusive 
appropriation by any state or group of states, were also the subject of growing interest.34 
In 1975, the Executive Director of UNEP sponsored a program, which was resisted by 
the consultative parties, which sought to extend the Antarctic Treaty with particular 
attention to both environmental and resource issues.35
33. The NIEO was supported and given shape by the Group of 77, which was formed at the first UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 and consolidated in the 1973 Non- 
Aligned Movement meeting in Algiers. The NIEO called specifically for a restructuring of the 
post-war economic order, and particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
in order that less developed countries would not be disadvantaged and would benefit positively 
from the international order. The NIEO was given concrete expression in the Declaration of the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted at the Sixth Special Session of 
the UN General Assembly in May 1974 and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties adopted 
later that year at UNGA’s 29th session. See Pirages (1978:53-59) for a short summary of the 
NIEO principles and demands.
34. During a 1971 UN debate on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) 
suggested that areas beyond national jurisdiction, including Antarctica, were part of the 
international domain and should be subject to international regulation and responsibility. In the 
same year an annex on the natural resources of Antarctica was included in an information 
document prepared for the ECOSOC Committee on Natural Resources (see Orrego Vicufla 
1988:473).
35. This proposal included a suggestion that a group of experts be convened to elaborate criteria for 
the exploration and exploitation of Antarctic resources. The Director suggested that 
consultations be held with interested governments (including, but not exclusively, the Treaty 
Parties) and cabled the 8th consultative meeting to this effect. The Treaty Parties responded 
with recommendation VIII-13 which set out details of the special legal and political status of the 
Antarctic and their obligations and responsibilities on environmental protection in the region.
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The Antarctic was not a specific concern during the UNCLOS negotiations, which 
began in 1973.36 However the negotiations within UNCLOS on a regime for the deep 
seabed had implications for the Antarctic in at least three ways. First, whether the 
International Seabed Authority would have, or could be argued to have, jurisdiction 
over the Southern Ocean seabed within the Antarctic Treaty area.37 Second, the G-77 
sought to have the common heritage principle, by which resources beyond national 
jurisdiction were deemed the property of the whole international community to be 
managed accordingly (and particularly for the benefit of developing countries), given 
substance in the seabed regime. Developing countries argued that the resources of the 
Antarctic were, similarly, the common heritage of humankind. This argument was first 
raised by Malta’s Ambassador to the UN, Arvid Pardo, in 1967. At the 1975 General 
Assembly session Sri Lanka’s UN representative, who was also the President of 
UNCLOS, argued in support of the internationalisation of the Antarctic. Third, 
UNCLOS enshrined the right of coastal states to establish an exclusive economic zone 
beyond its territorial sea, up to 200 miles from its coast (see Oxman 1983:153) and this 
had implications for the territorial claims in the Antarctic and for the exercise of coastal 
state jurisdiction under an Antarctic minerals regime.
At the signing of UNCLOS in 1982 (the year the consultative parties began formal 
negotiations for a minerals convention) the Malaysian delegate argued that it was time 
to focus attention on "that other area of common interest ... Antarctica" (in Beck 
1984:169-70). That is what the developing countries, led by Malaysia, did. The 
Seventh Summit Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1983 called for a 
comprehensive study of the Antarctic issue and a resolution to this effect was 
introduced into, and adopted by, the 39th UN General Assembly session that year.38 
The ‘Question of Antarctica’ has been on the General Assembly agenda each year since 
then.39 During the minerals negotiations UN resolutions included demands that the
36. Onego Vicufla (1988:475) suggests that attempts were made to include it on the agenda of the 
seabed component of UNCLOS but that it was resisted by the consultative parties. Barnes 
(1982b:244) cites the President of UNCLOS as privately saying that it was left out because of 
the additional strain its introduction would have caused.
37. In 1977, Libya and Algeria proposed that the Antarctic be placed under the International 
Authority which would be established by the Law of the Sea convention. In 1984, Pakistan and 
the Philippines made a similar suggestion during the General Assembly debate on the Antarctic.
38. Some states wanted the General Assembly to establish an ad hoc committee on Antarctica, to 
investigate whether it should be formally declared the common heritage of humankind. The 
Secretary General’s lengthy report on the Antarctic was distributed in 1985. India had attempted 
to have Antarctic inscribed on the General Assembly agenda in 1956 and 1958 to ensure that the 
continent would be utilised for peaceful purposes and the welfare of the whole world (Beck 
1984:168) while also suggesting that the claims need not be relinquished. The 1956 attempt was 
thwarted by opposition from Argentina, Chile and the UK and by 1958 the pre-conference 
negotiations for the Antarctic Treaty were underway.
39. As well as being on the UN agenda, the question of Antarctic has also been discussed in a 
number of Third World fora including the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African
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consultative parties defer their deliberations until the whole international community 
could participate in decisions about the exploitation of Antarctic resources.40 In 
response, the Treaty parties have adopted the formal position of not participating in UN 
votes or debates on Antarctic matters (as opposed to not attending, or abstaining) .41
The Treaty parties reject the assertion that the Antarctic (and its mineral resources) are 
subject to the common heritage principle. The claimants deny that the Antarctic is 
beyond national jurisdiction. The non-claimants suggest that it is an area which is 
susceptible to national appropriation (unlike the seabed or outer space) and is therefore 
not a global commons. Further, the Treaty parties collectively assert that the Antarctic 
is already subject to a legal regime which maintains peace and stability in the region 
and which functions, they suggest, better than any universal regime under the United 
Nations could. They also charged that the common heritage principle under UNCLOS, 
if applied to the Antarctic, would be inherently exploitative rather than protective of the 
Antarctic environment.
The inscription of the minerals issue on the consultative agenda, coupled with 
statements by some Treaty parties and industry sources on the extent of minerals in the 
Antarctic, created expectations of economic benefits and did nothing to dispel the 
perception held by non-Treaty parties that the consultative parties were seeking to 
appropriate the (alleged) wealth of the Antarctic for themselves. Statements to the 
contrary by the consultative parties had little impact. The Treaty habit of conducting 
discussions and negotiations behind closed doors, and making little effort to respond to 
outside criticism, contributed to the impression of exclusive appropriation. In this 
context it was difficult for scientific evidence and advice to be assessed properly and 
incorporated into political discussions.
Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Organisation 
of Eastern Caribbean States and the Caribbean Community and Common Market.
40. Annual resolutions also called for the Secretary-General to update his report on the Antarctic 
and for a Secretariat representative to be invited to consultative meetings. Resolutions also 
called for the consultative parties to expel the apartheid regime of South Africa from the 
Antarctic Treaty.
41. A number of Eastern Bloc Treaty states have voted in favour of the resolution against South 
African participation. Likewise, some non-Treaty parties have joined in the non-participation 
roll call, including Afghanistan, Albania, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, 
Israel, Laos, Nicaragua and Vietnam. The Latin American states may well have been influenced 
by Argentina, an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement Colombia, Ecuador and 
Guatemala have since become signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. Until recently, Australia 
spoke on behalf of the informal New York group of Treaty parties. Initially it was intended that 
the ‘spokespersonship’ would rotate alphabetically through the consultative parties but some, 
further down the alphabet, were reluctant to take on this task because (in the case of Brazil, for 
example) they did not want to alienate Third World colleagues, or because of a lack of expertise 
or experience. Australia’s Ambassador to the UN, Richard Woolcott, also accumulated a great 
deal of experience and ability in speaking for the Treaty Parties. The mantle, however, has now 
been passed on to Germany.
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The consultative parties later admitted that they had contributed to these erroneous 
assumptions by not explaining adequately the reasons for their negotiations or in putting 
speculation on resource potential to rest.42 However it is doubtful whether better 
communication would have resulted in the challenges from either non-Treaty states or 
NGOs being withdrawn. Further, while it is the case that the reasons for inscribing the 
minerals issue on the consultative agenda were much more complex than simply to 
facilitate minerals exploitation, the consultative parties were concerned to protect the 
Treaty system from instability and to strengthen their authority, and collective right, to 
make decisions about all Antarctic issues.
The 1970s: principles and objectives
In the 1970s the consultative parties sought to establish the principles upon which a 
minerals regime would be based. Their debates were characterised by the usual degree 
of secrecy, by consultative party control of the process and by the general lack of 
involvement of other organisations. The scientific community provided information on 
the scientific, technical and environmental aspects of minerals activity and contributed 
to SCAR reports and consultative working groups, but made no collective judgement on 
whether or not such activity should occur. Industry groups were also involved in at 
least some delegations to consultative meetings although their interests were based on 
an ‘in principle’ interest in mineral resources rather than on any substantive and 
immediate economic interests. In the 1970s non-governmental organisations were only 
beginning to focus on the Antarctic as an environmental issue and had little impact on 
these early debates.
In defining the minerals ‘issue’ in the 1970s the consultative parties sought first to 
clarify the legal position under the Antarctic Treaty with respect to the exploitation of 
mineral resources and the regulation of that activity. They then moved to reach a 
consensus on whether minerals activity would be banned or permitted, in principle at 
least. It was only then that the more specific principles and objectives of a minerals 
regime were addressed in detail.
Approaches from commercial enterprises interested in the possible mineral potential of 
the Antarctic presented the consultative parties with a dilemma which took some time to 
resolve. Nothing in the Antarctic Treaty expressly prohibited or permitted minerals 
activity in the Antarctic. The general principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty 
were the only guide for consultative parties in their responses to inquiries from
42. See, for example, Beeby (1986:269).
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commercial operators. Should those operators choose to explore, no rules or procedures 
were in place to regulate their activities.
If the consultative parties did nothing, there was some concern that exploration licences 
might be granted unilaterally by Treaty parties or that unregulated minerals activity was 
possible. They feared, in a worst case scenario, that conflict and a weakening of the 
Treaty system might result. The minerals issue was perceived as one which "in the 
future could undermine the foundations of [the] Antarctic brotherhood [sic] which has 
cost us so much and of which we are proud" (Final Report 1972:37).43 Unilateral action 
by a non-claimant in a claimed area, by a claimant in its own area,44 or by one of the 
claimants to the area of overlapping claims could, the Parties thought, lead to 
confrontation between them. Unregulated commercial activity, especially if it involved 
non-Treaty states not bound by the other provisions of the Treaty, might result in 
confrontation between competing operators. Unregulated activity was also more likely 
to result in severe impact on the Antarctic environment. In such a situation, especially 
if exploitable minerals were discovered, the consultative parties were concerned that it 
would be difficult for them to reassert their authority over Antarctic matters or to 
negotiate some kind of regulatory mechanism in the face of entrenched economic 
interests.
Nevertheless, moving to negotiate a regulatory instrument would require the 
consultative parties to consider contentious issues which they had deliberately kept off 
the consultative agenda. Regulating minerals activity is an exercise of territorial 
sovereignty. The differences between the Treaty parties on the questions of sovereignty 
and related issues of jurisdiction would therefore have to be addressed.
In the final analysis, the consultative parties’ collective judgement was that the spectre 
of conflict raised by doing nothing was worse than that raised if they moved to meet this 
challenge. It was less likely that the Antarctic "would become the scene or object or 
international discord" (in the words of the Antarctic Treaty) and less likely that the 
Treaty system, which protected their individual and collective interests, would be 
undermined. The consultative parties addressed the question of minerals activity for 
fear that if they did not the Treaty system would be challenged and undermined. The
43. This comment was made by Oscar Pinochet, in his opening statement on behalf of the Chilean 
delegation at ATCM-VII in 1972. France suggested that "the search for a solution to this 
problem must be subordinated to the solution of the problem of how to avoid rivalries the 
consequences of which would inevitably be borne by the powers in possession of Antarctic 
territory" (A N T /2,1972). Argentina, urging caution in dealing with this issue, asked "should we 
... let ourselves be carried away by the interests of economic concern ... to the detriment of the 
purpose of maintaining peace and avoiding conflict" (ANT/37, 1972).
44. This is based on the assumption that a claimant would not undertake minerals activity outside its 
claimed territory.
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logic of this was summarised by the British (FCO 1988:5-6): the absence of a consensus 
on a permanent moratorium, they suggested, necessarily carried with it the need to 
negotiate a minerals regime. There was no guarantee that, even in the absence of rules 
and security of title to resources, risks would not be taken by operators. If such risks 
were taken, the Antarctic Treaty system would not survive. Consequently, the risks to 
the consultative parties attendant upon doing nothing were unacceptable. Therefore a 
minerals regime had to be negotiated. Such a regime would not, however, prejudice 
whether minerals activity in Antarctica would, or would not, take place.
The consultative parties were not unaware of the potential for adverse environmental 
impact as a result of mineral exploitation and the need to exercise their responsibility 
for the protection of the environment.45 However their concerns at this early stage were 
with the political and legal aspects of the issue. The potential for environmental 
damage did not translate into a philosophical debate about whether the Antarctic should 
be declared ‘off limits’ to mineral resource exploitation.
The internal differences raised by the minerals question reinforced the need for 
consensus which characterised the Treaty regime. Whatever was agreed upon had to 
have the support of all consultative parties in order that conflict could be avoided. 
There was consensus on the need to keep any negotiations which might be undertaken 
within the Antarctic Treaty forum. Caution and the need for consensus were keywords.
The incrementalism that characterised Antarctic decision-making generally was 
particularly in evidence in the consultative discussions on the minerals question in the 
1970s. It took just over a decade for the consultative parties to progress to a point 
where they agreed to convene a special consultative meeting to negotiate a minerals 
convention.
The minerals issue was on the agenda of every consultative meeting from 1972 to 1981. 
A recommendation on this issue was adopted at each of those meetings. The principles 
and objectives adopted through those recommendations reflected the normative 
concerns of the Antarctic regime which focussed on political stability, the need for 
consensus and maintenance of the compromise on sovereignty. A number of groups of 
experts were convened at consultative and preparatory meetings. Political and legal 
issues were always dealt with independently of scientific, technical and environmental 
issues.
45. This principle was explicitly adopted at ATCM-VI in 1970 under recommendation VI-4.
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The following table sets out the tortuous eleven year process which led to the convening 
of formal negotiations for a minerals convention. The discussion which follows focuses 
on those parts of that process which were important in defining the principles and 
objectives and advancing the parties towards the final agreement.
Table 1
Progress in the 1970s on the question of mineral exploitation and exploration
Year Meeting/action
1970 ATCM-VI. Informal discussion
1972 ATCM-VII. Recommendation VII-6 adopted
1973 Nansen Foundation Meeting. Working Group on Legal and Political Questions; Working 
Group on Scientific and Technical Questions
1975 ATCM-VIII. Recommendation VIII-14 adopted.
1976 SCAR Secretariat paper "Antarctic Resources - effects of mineral exploitation" and 
SCAR Working Group on Geology paper "Mineral occurrences and mineral exploration in 
Antarctic; prepared in response to recommendation VIII-14.
1976 Special Preparatory Meeting, Paris. Legal and Political Working Group; Scientific 
and Technical Working Group.
1977 Report of the SCAR Working Group on the Environmental Impact Assessment of Mineral 
Resource Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica (EAMREA).
1977 ATCM-IX. Working Group on Legal and Political Aspects; Group of Experts on 
Exploration and Exploitation; recommendation IX-1 adopted
1979 Preparatory Meetings for ATCM-X. Group of Ecological, Technological and Other 
Related Experts on Minerals Exploration and Exploitation (held in accordance with 
recommendation IX-1); preparatory meeting on legal and political aspects of mineral 
exploitation.
1979 ATCM-X. Working Group on Legal and Political Aspects; Working Group on Scientific 
and Environmental Aspects; recommendation X-l adopted.
1980 Preparatory Meeting, Washington DC, December
1981 Report of the SCAR Group of Specialists on Antarctic Environmental Implications of 
Possible Mineral Exploration and Exploitation (AEIMEE)
1981 ATCM-XI. Claimant caucus meeting; no information on working groups; 
recommendation XI-1 adopted.
ATCM VII, 197246
The minerals issue was first raised, by New Zealand, at the preparatory meetings for 
ATCM-VI in 1970.47 An informal and off-the-record discussion was held at the sixth
46. ATCM-VII took place just after the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm 
which put environmental concerns firmly on the international agenda.
47. R B Thomson (of the New Zealand Department of Scientific and Industrial Research) was 
reported as saying that expected diamond and platinum finds would lead NZ to raise the subject 
of exploitation (Christian Science Monitor, 6-8 June 1970). New Zealand had also received an 
application to prospect and develop off the Ross Sea (Colson 1980:884). The issue was dropped 
at the third preparatory meeting which nevertheless confirmed a consensus understanding that 
without prejudice to the position of members concerned chi territorial issues, no unilateral action 
should be taken with respect to the problem of mineral prospecting in Antarctica (Doc ANT/2, 
1970). The US and UK delegations raised the question again as a possible agenda item, at the 
fifth preparatory meeting.
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consultative meeting.48 There was, as Wyndham notes (1980:192) "not even a 
chairman...!” for this.
A more substantive debate on minerals discussion at the seventh consultative meeting 
related particularly to the question of urgency which, as Beeby argues (1983b: 192) 
always had more to do with political than economic factors. Chile characterised the 
minerals issue as a grave problem "which could put an end to the Antarctic Treaty, 
bringing to light once more the troubles over sovereignty, creating problems of 
jurisdiction and opening up rivalry and discord" (ANT/44, 1972) and cautioned against 
any unseemly pressure to authorise commercial exploration.
Others cautioned against delay. The UK delegation, for example, noted that "the 
subject raises problems certain to multiply ... which cannot be evaded indefinitely 
without becoming increasingly difficult to solve" (ANT/17, 1972).49
Delegates discussed the possibility of a moratorium on minerals activity to prevent any 
activity which would "prejudice continuing deliberations" (ANT/48, 1972).50 As 
Oxman observes (1978:295-6) the "demands by territorial claimants for a moratorium 
pending consent by each of them to an exploitation regime may be more closely related 
to sovereignty considerations than to environmental concerns". Various time frames 
were favoured.51
In spite of lengthy discussion the consultative parties could go no further than to recite a 
number of general principles which applied to their deliberations on this issue and 
recommend that it be considered again at the following ATCM. Those principles 
related to the use of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes, the special responsibility of the 
consultative parties to protect the Antarctic environment and ensure that no-one 
engaged in activities contrary to the Treaty and an oblique reference to the "special
48. This issue was addressed under‘Any Other Business’. No mention of this discussion was made 
in the final report of the meeting.
49. One participant (Edvard Hambro, who had headed Norway’s delegation to the 1972 Meeting and 
would be chairman of the 1975 ATCM) expressed his irritation with the "great hesitation and 
reluctance in this field. This unwillingness to face the problem" he said "cannot go on much 
longer" (Hambro 1974:222).
50. The British cautioned against unilateral action by any Treaty party which could "damage the 
working of the Treaty" (ANT/17, 1972). They also believed that the problem could be 
approached without going into the jurisdictional question.
51. See Wallace (1988a:6). Chile favoured an indefinite moratorium, France (ANT/2, 1972) 
suggested at least 10 to 15 years, a position also supported by Argentina and the USSR. The 
United States was opposed to any prohibition on minerals activity. The draft recommendation 
tabled by the UK suggested that there be a moratorium until such time as any agreed measures 
might become effective and it was thought that world interests would not be harmed by such a 
moratorium.
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situation" of the Antarctic (regarding the territorial issue).52 Orrego Vicuna (1988:48) 
called it a "timid attempt to spell out the legal foundations of the competence which was 
beginning to be exercised on the matter".
Nansen Meeting, 1973
An informal conference on Antarctic resources was convened at the Nansen Foundation 
in Oslo in 1973 to facilitate an "unofficial discussion ... of problems arising in 
connection with the growing interest in exploration of Antarctic mineral resources and 
potential exploitation of such resources" (Nansen 1973:1).53 Two working groups were 
convened at the Nansen meeting, one to consider legal and political questions, and the 
other to focus on scientific and technical aspects. Experts from all twelve consultative 
parties attended in their personal capacities.54
Minerals activity was accepted as a peaceful purpose under article I of the Antarctic 
Treaty and therefore a legitimate issue for the Treaty agenda. A collective approach by 
the consultative parties was favoured over unilateral action.55 There were, however, 
differing opinions on whether minerals activity was implicitly permitted or prohibited 
under the Antarctic Treaty.56 Differences on the degree of urgency with which 
decisions had to be made were not resolved.
The Scientific and Technical Working Group concluded that unless the Treaty Parties 
decided to prohibit minerals exploration and exploitation altogether, there was some 
urgency in negotiating regulatory mechanisms. The group suggested that the "present 
relatively undisturbed state of the Antarctic environment rendered its continued 
protection a matter of greater rather than lesser importance" (Nansen 1973:9). The 
severe environmental hazards of extracting Antarctic oil and gas were argued to be so 
great as to be out of proportion to the small gain in energy in world terms. Some 
participants expressed the "philosophically attractive" view that if the prospect of a 
world energy crisis was as bleak as some portrayed it then the world’s scientific
52. This recommendation also referred to technological developments and the need for further study 
and deliberation.
53. The invitation from the Nansen Foundation to convene this meeting had been confirmed by the 
Norwegian delegation at ATCM-VII.
54. The meeting lasted from 30 May to 9 June 1973.
55. The Nansen meeting rejected the idea of either a condominium or the common heritage 
approach (see Shapley 1985:158-160).
56. Some participants in the Legal and Political Working Group argued that, as minerals 
exploitation was not expressly permitted, it could not proceed. Others suggested that as it was 
not expressly prohibited, it could proceed but that it might well be contrary to the purposes and 
objectives of the Treaty unless all consultative parties consented to any activity. Others 
suggested that such activity could be undertaken, without multilateral consent, as long as it was 
consistent with the objectives of the Treaty.
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capacity would be better applied to the development of alternative energy sources rather 
than a search for Antarctic oil (Nansen 1973:13-14).
While the Nansen Meeting was not a formal part of the consultative process, the report, 
which summarised the views expressed but made no recommendations, was circulated 
to consultative party governments in advance of the 8th consultative meeting, which 
was also scheduled for Oslo in 1975.57
ATCM-VIII, 1975
The question of mineral resources was a dominant agenda item at ATCM-VIII with the 
potential for political instability again being emphasised.58
The consultative parties accepted that a formal instrument was essential and determined 
that it was within their competence to make decisions on minerals activity. They had 
not yet decided whether to permit or prohibit minerals activities. New Zealand pressed 
for a permanent moratorium on minerals activity (and for the Antarctic to be declared a 
World Park) on environmental grounds.59 There was some support for this suggestion, 
or at least for the moratorium component of it, but the US in particular was strongly 
opposed.60 Indeed, the United States applied some pressure to its Treaty partners to 
make progress by suggesting that without an agreement "those countries who do not 
recognise claims to sovereignty would surely have to assert the right to commence 
mineral resource activities at their will, subject only to the applicable provisions of the 
Antarctic Treaty" (Mitchell 1977b:96).61 Nevertheless, this was not so much the action 
of a hegemon, as of one state with issue-specific power (among many) operating in a 
unanimity system to protect its interests.
57. At least ten of the 29 Nansen participants were on delegations to that consultative meeting.
58. Belgium reminded delegates that this subject "by its nature, could either destroy the spirit of the 
Treaty or develop and strengthen it by extending cooperation to new fields" (Final Report 
1975:52). The British raised the spectre of an unregulated scramble bringing "large numbers of 
men [sic] swarming into the continent" (Final Report, 1975:61). The Argentinian delegation 
exhorted the meeting to "take up resolutely and calmly the challenge implicit in these 
controversial issues" (Final Report 1975:50).
59. New Zealand, at this time, had a Labour government which had taken a strong internationalist 
and independent foreign policy line. ASOC suggests (1989g:6) that the New Zealand proposal 
also suggested UN involvement in the administration of the Antarctic, and that claimants give up 
their claims. There was some informal support for the New Zealand suggestion for a permanent 
moratorium from Argentina and Chile (Wallace 1988a:6). This may have been motivated as 
much by concerns about sovereignty as about environmental protection and would certainly 
have not included support for UN involvement or a relinquishing of claims.
60. A senior US Department of State official explained later that this was because the US felt that a 
moratorium was not so much a delay to permit rational consideration as a decision not to 
examine the issue at all (Quigg 1983:194).
61. The US did support a multilateral solution in spite of attempts within the US administration, 
from the Federal Energy Administration and the Department of the Interior to push for US 
policy to support unilateral resource exploitation (see Pallone 1978 :555).
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In the absence of a consensus, no moratorium was adopted. However the Parties urged
states and persons to refrain from actions of commercial exploration and 
exploitation while, acting as Consultative Parties, they seek timely 
agreed solutions to the problems raised by the possible presence of 
valuable mineral resources in the Antarctic Treaty Area (Final Report 
1975:9-10).62
Recommendation VIE-14 adopted at this meeting was marked by a degree of caution 
and uncertainty. The consultative parties were simply urged to "seek to develop an 
approach" to the problems raised by the possible presence of minerals in the Antarctic. 
The body of the recommendation focussed on the need for further study of the technical 
and environmental aspects of minerals activity in the face of inadequate data.63 The 
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research was invited to make an assessment of 
possible environmental impacts if minerals activity "were to occur" (my emphasis).64 
The item was referred to the agenda for ATCM-IX .
Paris special preparatory meeting, 1976
In accordance with recommendation VIII-14 a special preparatory meeting was held in 
Paris in July 1976.65 The consultative parties were by now beginning to address the 
difficult questions of the form and content of an agreement. The Paris meeting set 
about clearly defining for the first time the substantive issues that would need to be 
addressed in a minerals regime.
No state was openly talking about engaging in exploitation. Nevertheless, as the 
problems were raised in earnest, delegations began to adopt negotiating positions based 
primarily on perceptions of their political and economic interests. Mitchell (1977b:96-
62. This was included in the Final Report of ATCM-VIII. It is not clear whether the reference to 
"states and persons" applies to consultative states or whether it is designed primarily to 
discourage non-Treaty states. This sentiment was not included in the lengthy recommendation 
(VIII-14) adopted at this consultative meeting. Recommendation VIII-14 refers to the "need for 
restraint" but it does not specify by whom or exactly what this means. Recommendation VIII- 
14 also refers to "possible action by others" indicating that it is most likely intended to 
discourage states other than consultative parties.
63. Representatives also drew attention to their awareness of developments in polar mineral 
technology but also that more information was needed on the environmental effects of minerals 
activities, and on the geological structures of the Antarctic.
64. The degree of importance that the consultative parties attached to this exercise may be measured 
by the suggestion in this recommendation that "if possible and appropriate, Governments may 
wish to assist their National Antarctic Committees in this undertaking by appropriate means" 
(para 3(i)). SCAR functioned on a limited financial base while being required to deal with more 
complex and extensive requests from the consultative parties. SCAR is also asked to continue to 
coordinate geological and geophysical research to provide fundamental scientific data.
65. No public report was made at its conclusion and no communique or statement was issued. Two 
working groups were established, one to consider scientific and technical aspects and a second 
on legal and political aspects.
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7) suggests that the Paris meeting was a difficult one and that it proved impossible at 
that stage to convene another formal meeting specifically on the minerals issue.
The claimant states were adamant that they should benefit from any resource 
exploitation to the maximum extent (Talboys 1978:10)66 and that they should have 
some control over access to resources in their territory. The US, on the other hand, took 
the position that they "would be unwilling to take any steps which directly reduced the 
freedom of American companies to go where they wanted in the Antarctic and do 
whatever appeared to be commercially attractive" (cited in Mitchell 1980:17).67 
Mitchell (1977b:99) suggests that the claimants displayed some willingness to 
compromise but that the United States would not.
The question of whether minerals activity would be permitted was still not settled. The 
Soviet Union in particular continued to advocate a long-term moratorium.68 A number 
of countries, including Australia, the Soviet Union, Argentina and Chile (see Mitchell 
1977b:97), also raised concerns about the environmental impact of minerals activity.69
In the light of these divisions, agreement was reached at Paris only upon the most 
general of principles upon which a regime might be based although it was those 
principles which were to guide all subsequent discussions. These principles addressed 
general aspects of the internal and external accommodation. The consultative parties 
would continue to play an active and responsible role in decision-making; the Antarctic 
Treaty would be maintained in its entirety; protection of the environment should be a 
basic consideration and any regime should not prejudice the interests of all mankind 
(Report of the Working Group on Legal and Political Aspects 1976). No direct mention 
was made of the sovereignty issue in these principles.
66. At the Paris preparatory meeting, New Zealand also proposed a possible solution to the 
"ownership" problem. Minerals activity would be prohibited in certain areas for environmental 
reasons. Applicants wishing to explore in other areas would submit a proposal to a Regulatory 
Committee consisting of the twelve consultative parties. This proposal would contain details of 
proposed activities and an environmental impact statement, and should demonstrate that such 
activity would not substantially or materially damage the Antarctic environment. It would 
require the unanimous approval of all consultative parties, although operators wight come to an 
informal arrangement (on payment of royalties for example) with the relevant claimant (or 
claimants) to forestall a veto. See Mitchell 1977b: 101). New Zealand also suggested in a 
discussion paper that the consultative parties should recognise the need for the proceeds of 
resource exploitation should be shared on a just and equitable basis with the international 
community (Bell 1982:26)
67. The US tabled a paper which provided an informal assessment of mineral resources in the 
Antarctic which helped to focus the discussion of the technical group (Colson 1980:891).
68. The USSR did not have the technology to engage in minerals exploitation and a moratorium 
would have been one way of preventing the US gaining a exploitation foothold.
69. Australia (RPS-11, 1976) suggested that the present Agreed Measures were not sufficient to 
protect the environment from the effects of resource exploitation. The USSR also expressed 
concern about the environmental effects of an oil spill on krill fisheries.
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SCAR’s report/EAMREA
The Paris meeting considered SCAR’s initial response to recommendation VIII-1470 
and asked SCAR to undertake a more detailed assessment of the environmental impact 
of mineral resource activity.71
SCAR’s report took the inevitability of environmental impact as its starting point and 
explored "in a preliminary way the possible effects on the ecosystem of ... one or more 
of the extractive industries in Antarctica" (SCAR/EAMREA 1979:2-3). This report 
provided the consultative parties with an assessment of localised and widespread 
environmental impacts of both on and off-shore exploitation, and in terms of short and 
long term effects. Local impacts, it suggested, might be severe and irreversible. 
However, because each of the areas involved would be small in relation to the total area 
of coastline and exposed areas it suggested that the overall effects might not be 
significant in terms o f the Antarctic as a whole. Large-scale effects were thought likely 
to be more serious than the sum total of local effects. SCAR’s report makes no 
judgements, however, about the desirability or otherwise of minerals activity.
ATCM-IX, 197772
Discussion at this meeting signalled the intention of the consultative parties to begin a 
more concerted process towards an agreement. In a lengthy recommendation (IX-1) the 
consultative parties endorsed the Paris principles as the basis for a minerals regime. 
They added a requirement that the provisions and principles of article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty (on sovereignty) should not be affected. This recommendation 
recalled again the general principles of the Antarctic Treaty which were applicable to 
the minerals issue.73
70. The SCAR secretariat prepared a short paper entitled "Antarctic Resources - effects of mineral 
exploitation”. Appended to this was a statement by the SCAR Working Group on Geology 
entitled "Mineral occurrences and mineral exploration in Antarctica".
71. SCAR established a Working Group of Specialists on the Environmental Impact Assessment of 
Mineral Resource Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica (EAMREA) and its report was 
distributed to consultative governments in 1977. This was not a formal environmental impact 
assessment It was, rather, a general analysis of how the environment might be affected 
generally if minerals activity were to proceed.
72. Reports from the Paris special preparatory meeting and EAMREA were available to delegations 
at ATCM-IX in 1977. This meeting established a working party on the legal and political 
aspects of Antarctic minerals resources. This working party established its own drafting 
committee which met twice before submitting a draft recommendation. With the exception of 
three proposed paragraphs (content unknown, although the content of at least one paragraph was 
apparently also being addressed by the working party on marine living resources) on which 
agreement had not been reached). Two delegations objected to the paragraphs (see ANT/IX/85, 
1977).
73. These included the consultative parties’ special responsibilities to ensure that international 
discord did not result from any activities (including mineral activities) in the Antarctic or result 
in danger to the Antarctic environment, disruption to scientific investigation or be otherwise 
contrary to the principles or purposes of the Antarctic Treaty.
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These general principles established the rationale and justification for the operative 
paragraphs of the recommendation.74 The consultative parties are also to
urge their nationals and other States to refrain from all exploration and 
exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources while making progress 
towards the timely adoption of an agreed regime ... They will thus 
endeavour to ensure that pending the timely adoption of agreed solutions 
pertaining to exploration and exploitation of mineral resources no 
activity shall be conducted to explore or exploit such resources.
This paragraph is generally taken to enact the principle of voluntary restraint which 
established a conditional moratorium.75 Triggs argues (1984a:535) that this article is 
"vague and unclear [with] no mandatory injunction". It is not clear what the Parties 
could do to prevent non-Treaty states from undertaking minerals activity. Further, even 
with respect to their own nationals, the consultative parties are merely urged rather than 
required to enforce compliance (Bush 1982:347). However the consultative parties 
considered it to be an effective constraint upon their own activity.
A Group of Experts convened at this meeting to address technical and environmental 
aspects of mineral resource exploitation76 concluded that "discussion of the technical 
aspects ... showed that the question of the impact of these activities on the environment 
has been studied inadequately and that there is an urgent need for a further examination 
of this problem" (cited in Handbook 1989:3344).77 They suggested that more 
knowledge was needed about the Antarctic environment and geology so that adequate 
protection measures could be established in the event of minerals activity going ahead.
74. The recommendation referred to the SCAR/EAMREA report, the report of the Group of Experts 
presented at that 9th consultative meeting, and the Paris special preparatory meeting.
75. Bush (1982:347) suggests that it applies to both commercial and non-commercial enterprises.
76. This group had before it a lengthy study on a framework for assessing the environmental impact 
of possible Antarctic minerals development (Elliot 1977) conducted by the Institute of Polar 
Studies at Ohio State University for the US State Department Elliot argued that all resource 
exploitation would have an impact on the environment but that the scale of the impact would 
depend on the nature of the resource being extracted, the degree of processing undertaken and 
the location of the activity. This report observed again that "there are no known exploitable 
mineral deposits" (Elliot 1977:111-1). As with other reports it identified gaps in the data. He 
concluded that mineral resource activity could result in severe local impacts on both the 
continental and marine environments, with possibly irreversible changes to the continental 
environment (Elliot 1977:xiv-xv). "There is no question that any resource exploitation will 
cause severe, and in many cases permanent, local impact on the environment because of the 
extremely slow rate of recovery that can be expected" (Elliot 1977: VII-I). It suggested that 
"even the most regulated activity will still be attended by some risks" (Elliot 1977:xx).
77. They suggested that there "would need to be a system providing immediate warning of an 
accident leading to significant pollution and monitoring of the dispersion and effects of the 
pollutants released, and of the effectiveness of any measures for containment or recovery. This 
would be particularly difficult under Antarctic conditions" (Handbook 1987:3346).
183
This report was stronger in its warning of environmental damage and the 
unacceptability of such risks than SCAR’s EAMREA report.78
The consultative parties recognised the inadequacy of scientific data on harmful 
environmental impacts and noted that unregulated minerals activities could adversely 
effect the environment. Recommendation IX-1 called for, inter alia, further study on 
the environmental implications of mineral resource activities (and suggested convening 
yet another group of experts on this topic).
However, in spite of recognising this lack of knowledge (which had been noted by all 
the scientific and technical reports so far) and the difficulties this could bring to the task 
of monitoring environmental impact of minerals activity, the consultative parties 
continued to press ahead in their negotiations.
Two more meetings of experts were convened prior to ATCM-X. In March 1979 the 
Rockefeller Foundation sponsored a workshop at the Bellagio Centre in Italy on oil and 
other minerals in the Antarctic with special attention to the environmental implications 
of possible mineral exploration and exploitation.79 In conjunction with the preparatory 
meeting for ATCM-X and in accordance with recommendation IX-1 a Group of 
Ecological, Technological and Other Related Experts on Minerals Exploration and 
Exploitation in Antarctica, met in Washington in June 1979.80
78. There are references throughout the report to the lack of knowledge on many aspects likely to be 
important in the event of minerals activity. For example, there was insufficient knowledge to 
permit a reliable estimation of the impact of oil spills on the ecosystem. The report also drew 
attention to the need for a sufficient environmental data base. Several members of the SCAR 
group of experts (EAMREA) contributed to this Working Group.
79. The report erf this meeting, known as the Bellagio Report, was published by SCAR (Holdgate 
and Tinker 1979). It noted that the unique scientific nature of Antarctica, as well as its unique 
political nature, represented "major assets which might be affected by mineral development" 
(Holdgate and Tinker 1979:5). This meeting brought together experts from the 
SCAR/EAMREA group and the Group of Experts from ATCM-IX (1977) as well as other 
participants.
80. This working group was charged with developing scientific programs aimed at improving 
predictions of the impact of exploration and exploitation techniques, and developing measures 
for preventing damage to the environment and for its rehabilitation. The report of that Group of 
Experts suggested that "sharply focussed programs primarily devoted to the marine 
environment" were called for and listed several areas of research on which to focus (see Final 
Report 1970:103). It was appended to the final report of ATCM X. A preparatory meeting on 
the legal and political aspects of minerals issues was also held.
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ATCMX, 197981
Most of the opening statements at ATCM-X referred to the challenges presented by the 
question of mineral resource activity.82 Themes that had been articulated at earlier 
meetings were raised again: the need to protect the Antarctic environment and avoid 
environmentally unacceptable activities, to deal with the question of jurisdiction and 
differences between consultative parties on territorial sovereignty, and the need to 
establish regulatory mechanisms.
Several of the claimants continued to argue that any regime should guarantee protection 
of their interests and an appropriate economic return. Argentina, stressing the "political 
realities" of the Antarctic, advised delegates that it could not "give its sovereign consent 
to any agreement which [did] not take [these realities] into consideration" (Final Report 
1979:70). The NZ delegation again suggested that a regime should ensure that some 
benefits were offered to the international community at large (Final Report 1979:78).
Recommendation X -l moved the Parties further towards the formal negotiation of a 
minerals convention. It elaborated the principles (agreed to at earlier meetings) upon 
which it should be based and the types of rules and procedures that should be 
included.83 The Parties agreed that a minerals agreement should include means for 
assessing the possible impact of mineral resource activities, determining whether such 
activities would be acceptable, and elaborating procedures to govern the ecological, 
technological, political, legal and economic aspects of mineral activities. Rules relating 
to the protection of the environment and rules for ensuring compliance were also to be 
devised.84 The issue was put onto the agenda of ATCM-XI with the suggestion that a 
special meeting "to consider a regime" be held prior to this.
81. ATCM X also adopted a recommendation on hydrocarbon contamination of the Antarctic 
marine environment (recommendation X - l ) .  Chile observed, in a paper tabled for that topic 
(ANT/X/23, 1979) that damage to the ecosystem would be greater because of the scant oil 
degradation in the Antarctic environment, noting also that distance makes it impossible to take 
rapid steps to combat the spill.
82. Two working groups on minerals were again convened at this consultative meeting, one which 
concentrated on the legal and political aspects and one which attended to scientific and 
environmental aspects. The report of the legal and political working group was appended to the 
final report While this is a brief report it notes that "representatives were mindful of the 
developments likely to result from the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea" 
(Final Report 1979:101). The report also notes an exchange of views on the differing positions 
on sovereignty, but suggests that while these differences are fundamental all representatives 
believed an accommodation could be found. Both groups prepared draft recommendations 
which were then combined to provide the basis of recommendation X-l.
83. The preambular paragraphs focus particularly on protection of the Antarctic ecosystem and the 
need for further scientific information.
84. SCAR was asked to carry out further work on retrieving and analysing relevant information, and 
developing new programs to improve information required to assess environmental impacts. 
Consultative governments were again urged to support national Antarctic programs and 
committees in this.
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Governments were urged to take note of the progress being made towards timely 
adoption of a regime to reinforce that the conditions for maintaining the voluntary 
moratorium were being met. It is doubtful, however, whether this could be called 
timely progress. It had already been on the agenda for seven years with little progress 
being made. The Parties had still not begun to negotiate a regime, only to continue to 
debate how they might approach the task.
SCAR's second report: AEIMEE, 198111983
Recommendation X -l asked SCAR to devise scientific programs which would assist in 
improving predictions of the environmental impact of activities and technologies 
associated with mineral resource exploration and exploitation. In response, SCAR 
established a Group of Specialists on Antarctic Environmental Implications of Possible 
Mineral Exploration and Exploitation (AEIMEE).85 The first AEIMEE report, tabled at 
ATCM-XI, stressed the need for a scientific data base to assist in decision-making on 
minerals activity and for both basic and applied research to produce that data.86 A 
second AEIMEE report, focussing on off-shore hydrocarbon development, was 
produced in 1983.87
ATCM-XI, 198188
The Final Report of this meeting notes only that there was a "full discussion of the 
subject at different levels" (in Bush 1982:437).89 Divisions between the claimant and 
non-claimant states were marked. The claimant delegations met together each morning 
in an effort to reach a common and unified position (Quigg 1983:199). Delegates were 
aware of the looming conclusion of the Law of the Sea negotiations and the potential 
for Third World states to turn their full attention to the Antarctic.
Recommendation XI-190 adopted at this meeting finally established the formal 
negotiations for a "regime on Antarctic mineral resources" which was to be "concluded 
as a matter of urgency". It recommended that a special consultative meeting be
85. Recommendation X-7 on oil contamination also asked for SCAR’s contribution and advice.
86. In 1986 SCAR published this report and a second AEIMEE report from 1983.
87. This reports examined a number of problems associated with this. It considered the possibility 
of retrieving and analysing existing data, of adopting present scientific programs and the 
urgency of establishing new programs so that these problems could be dealt with. See 
SCAR/AEIMEE (1986:15) for a summary of results.
88. A special meeting on Antarctic minerals was held in Washington in December 1980. The Chair, 
in presenting a personal report of the meeting, drew attention to the need for an internal 
accommodation on sovereignty and an external accommodation with the international 
community (see Brennan 1983b:219 and Beeby 1983b: 194).
89. The draft final report (ANT/XI/34, 1981) indicates that Plenary decided that the question of 
minerals exploration and exploitation in Antarctica should be subject to informal discussions 
between the Chair of the meeting and heads of delegations.
90. Recommendation XI-1 is set out in full in appendix 7.
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convened to determine the form of a regime (including whether an international 
convention was necessary) and to establish a schedule for negotiations.
Paragraph 5 set out the principles upon which such a regime should be based. As well 
as those elaborated at the Paris preparatory meeting in 1976 a regime was also to ensure 
that
the provisions of article IV of the Antarctic Treaty should not be affected 
by the regime. It should ensure that the principles embodied in Article 
IV are safeguarded in application to the area covered by the Antarctic 
Treaty.91
Paragraph 6 reinforced the importance of article IV in stating that any agreement
should be acceptable and be without prejudice to those states which have 
previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica as well as to those states which neither recognise such rights 
of or claims to territorial sovereignty nor ... assert such rights or claims.
With respect to the specific rules which were to be included in a minerals regime, 
recommendation X I-1 repeated the provisions of recommendation X-l (see above). The 
regime was to apply to all minerals activity on the continent and offshore areas (without 
encroaching on the deep seabed) and include provisions to protect the consultative 
parties’ responsibilities on the environment. It also specified that a regime should 
include procedures for adherence by parties other than consultative parties and 
provisions for cooperative arrangements with other organisations. The voluntary 
moratorium on minerals exploration was to continue as long as timely progress was 
being made.
The 1970s revisited
In the 1970s, the consultative parties edged only slowly towards a minerals agreement, 
focussing on the internal accommodation (particularly between claimants and non- 
claimants at this stage). They were guided by their understanding of the political 
imperatives of the Treaty system which encouraged them to avoid conflict and maintain 
consensus at all times. They moved to settle the broad shape of the agreement in the 
normal consultative process, as one of a number of agenda items, before feeling 
confident enough to convene a special consultative meeting committed to formal and 
directed negotiations in which they would bargain over their national political and 
economic interests.
91. This principle was also included in recommendation IX-1 adopted in 1979.
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The 1980s: the formal negotiations
This part of the chapter chronicles the process of the formal negotiations.92 In these 
negotiations the consultative parties sought to establish an institutional arrangement that 
would meet their individual national interests without undermining their collective 
interests. While the key points of difference among the Parties were identified there 
was no agreement, or even a clear idea, on how to overcome them.
The issues addressed and the compromises reached during those negotiations are not 
dealt with in any detail here. Their complexity does not lend itself to a chronological 
analysis. The particular coalitions of state and non-state actors which were brought to 
bear on the negotiations, and the resolution of their interests in the Minerals 
Convention, are the subject of the next chapter.
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities was 
negotiated at the Fourth Special Consultative Meeting which met for its first session in 
1982. Over a period of six years, twelve formal negotiating sessions and three informal 
intersessional meetings were held. Fourteen consultative parties began negotiating the 
convention in July 1982. There were twenty consultative parties when the Convention 
was finally adopted in June 1988.93
The negotiations were dominated by the same bureaucratic elite involved in the normal 
consultative process. Foreign ministry officials (especially from legal divisions) were 
prominent. A large number of delegations included representatives from resource 
ministries, although only a few included mining industry representatives. There were 
few scientists involved and even fewer officials from environment ministries.94 
Andersen (1991:96) suggests that continuity in negotiating teams was an asset in 
seeking to advance particular interests. Consultative party delegations which changed 
personnel frequently, as well as the new consultative parties, "undoubtedly found the 
negotiations complicated" (Andersen 1991:96).
92. The discussion of the negotiations here draws on secondary source material (some of it 
nevertheless written by participants in the negotiations) and on NGO reports. Primary sources 
from the negotiations were not available when research for this thesis was undertaken. The 
consultative parties did not decide until October 1991 (at ATCM-XVI) that documents from 
SCM-IV would no longer be confidential.
93. The fourteen were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and the USA. They were joined by Brazil and India from January 1984, by China and 
Uruguay from April 1986, and by the German Democratic Republic and Italy from January 
1988.
94. Australia and the United States seem to have had the most complete coverage of domestic 
interests, including NGOs, environment ministries, industry representatives, resource and 
finance ministries as well as representatives from national Antarctic operators.
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Within the forum of the special consultative meeting, the negotiations were conducted 
to a great extent in an informal and flexible manner. Little time was spent in plenary 
session. Much of the discussion and debate, and working out of differences, took place 
in standing and ad hoc working groups. The negotiations were held behind closed 
doors. No observers were invited and no interim reports were issued.
There was a considerable amount of coffee break and corridor diplomacy. Andersen 
(1991:104) describes the process thus:
during the minerals negotiations friendships, mutual respect and trust, as 
well as insight into one another’s personalities, contributed much to the 
final outcome. Informal gatherings, talks over coffee, as well as working 
lunches and dinners, were often instrumental in breaking an apparent 
deadlock.
The personal diplomacy and commitment of the Chair of the SCM, New Zealand 
diplomat Christopher Beeby, was crucial to the conduct of the negotiations. He 
consulted widely with the convenors of the working groups and with Heads of 
Delegations. Rather than adopt a single negotiating text, he prepared subsequent 
versions of an informal draft which was presented to delegates as his personal report.95 
While these documents were confidential, non-governmental organisations made them 
public "in order that the world is able to participate in a more informed manner" (ASOC 
1984b: 1).
Although never formally specified it was clear that the negotiations would have to 
proceed on the basis of consensus. During the SCM negotiations this search for 
consensus was given explicit expression through the mechanism of Beeby’s personal 
report. This assisted the search for compromise because the parties could move, 
however slowly, towards an agreement without making a formal commitment.
It was also important, from the perspective of reaching an agreement on the internal 
accommodation, that the negotiations were conducted within a limited membership 
forum. As Oxman observes (1986:246), in the context of the Antarctic ‘club’, "the 
states concerned may well make concessions to each other that they might never 
consider making in a universal negotiation".
Non-governmental organisations
NGOs were active during the SCM, especially the latter sessions, through the 
coordinating activities of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition and Greenpeace
95. These reports were known formally as MR/17 and subsequent revisions I to V/Corr.l. 
Informally they were referred to as Beeby I to VH. Beeby VII was presented as a formal draft 
convention.
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International (itself a member of ASOC). The values and ideas that the NGOs brought 
to the debate on minerals and the extent to which they were, or weren’t, acknowledged 
is discussed in chapter six.
They monitored the formal sessions and liaised closely with NGOs representatives on 
national delegations.96 Only three consultative party delegations included NGO 
representatives. The US did so from the first negotiating session in 1982. Australia 
adopted this practice from the July 1983 meeting and New Zealand from May 1984.97
As well as lobbying delegates they produced a series of detailed information and policy 
papers on specific issues under debate. They also produced sophisticated analyses of 
the Beeby texts and lengthy reports on the negotiating sessions.98 They drew attention 
to environmental weaknesses in the texts and suggested detailed improvements. NGOs 
relied on their own legal and scientific experts in compiling critical analysis and 
suggestions for improvement to the environmental provisions of the draft conventions.
They held press conferences, produced press releases and published editions of the 
environmental newspaper ECO which were available to delegates as well as to the 
media.99 In doing so they sought to impose a degree of transparency and 
accountability, to counter the secrecy of the negotiations, especially with respect to the 
consultative parties’ exercise of their responsibility for environmental protection.
What is of interest is that the NGOs continued to be given access to delegates despite 
their trenchant public criticism and the fact that they released the confidential Beeby 
drafts and had drawn attention in other fora to consultative party violations of 
environmental protection measures.
Negotiating sessions100
Delegates to the 11th consultative meeting accepted an invitation from New Zealand to 
convene the first session of the Fourth Special Consultative Meeting. At that session in 
Wellington, delegates drew up and approved a Schema for an Instrument on Antarctic 
Mineral Resources "for the guidance of the subsequent discussion and as an aid in 
negotiation, without prejudice to any decision on the format and structure of the
96. This access was normally coordinated through the secretariat for each meeting.
97. The Danish (NCP) delegation also included an NGO representative from February/March 1985 
when NCPs were first able to attend the SCM.
98. See, especially, the entry under ASOC in the bibliography to this thesis.
99. They were usually granted access to delegates at coffee breaks. They hosted dinners, had 
informal meetings with delegates and were sometimes invited to receptions held by consultative 
party embassies.
100. Table 2, attached, sets out the process and outcomes of the negotiations in summary form.
T ab le  2
F O U R T H  A N T A R C T IC  T R E A T Y  S P E C IA L  C O N S U L T A T IV E  M E E T IN G  
M IN E R A L S  N E G O T IA T IO N S
S ess io n A ctio n  apd O u tco m e
1 W ellin g to n , N ew  Z ea lan d  
14-25 Ju n e  1982
S ch em a for an In s tru m en t o n  A n ta rc tic  M in era l R esources .
2 W e llin g to n , N ew  Z ea lan d  
17-28 Jan u a ry  1983
In fo rm a l W o rk in g  G roups: A rea  o f  ap p licab ility ; M in e ra ls  to b e  
co v e red  and  stages o f  ac tiv ity ; E n v iro n m en ta l issues. B eeb y  I  
p ro d u ced .
3 B o n n , W est G erm an y  
11-22  Ju ly  1983
E n v iro n m en ta l C o n tac t G roup .
4 W a sh in g to n  D C , U S A  
18-27 Jan u a ry  1984
B e e b y  I I  p ro d u ced .
5 T o k y o ,J a p a n  
23-21 M ay  1984
6 R io d e  Jan ie ro  
26  F eb ru ary  - 8 M arch  1985
W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  o b jec tiv es  and p rin c ip le s  o f  the  reg im e ; W o rk in g  
G ro u p  on  p ro sp ec tin g ; W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  legal issu es and  d isp u te  
se ttlem en t.
7 P aris , F ran ce
23 S e p tem b er-4  O c to b e r
1985
W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  leg a l issues (liab ility  and  d isp u te  se ttlem en t); 
W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  g u id e lin es  fo r o p era to rs ; W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  
E x p lo ra tio n  and  E x p lo ita tio n ; In fo rm al W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  K ey  
Issues.
8 H o b art, A u s tra lia  
14-25 A p ril 1986
W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  L eg a l Issu es; In fo rm a l H eads o f  D e leg a tio n s 
m e e tin g  o n  K ey Issu es. B eeb y  H I  p ro d u ced .
F irs t In  te rse  ss io n a l M eetin g , W h an g aro a , N ew  Z ea lan d , 1986 
C la im a n t cau cu s , S an  D iego , la te  1986
9 T o k y o ,J a p a n
27  O c to b e r-12 N o v e m b e r
1986
L eg a l Issu es  W o rk in g  G ro u p ; E x p lo ra tio n  and  D ev e lo p m e n t W o rk in g  
G ro u p ; C o n fid en tia lity  o f  D a ta  W o rk in g  G ro u p ; K ey  Issu es G ro u p ; 
In fo rm a l g ro u p  o n  en v iro n m en ta l issues.
S e c o n d  In te rse ss io n a l M ee tin g , W h an g aro a , N ew  Z ea lan d , M arch  1987. B ee by  IV  p ro d u ced .
10 M o n tev id eo  
1 1 -20  M ay  1987
W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  K ey  Issu es; W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  L eg a l Issu es; 
W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  E x p lo ra tio n  and  D ev e lo p m e n t; In fo rm a l g ro u p  
o n  fu n c tio n  o f  th e  A d v iso ry  C o m m ittee ; b u d g e ta ry  an d  fin an c ia l 
p ro v is io n s ; c o n fid en tia lity  o f  d a ta ; a rea  o f  ap p lica tio n .
T h ird  In te rse ss io n a l M ee tin g , A u ck lan d , N ew  Z ea lan d , N o v em b er 1987. B ee b y  V p ro d u ced .
11 W e llin g to n , N ew  Z e a lan d  
18-29 Jan u a ry  1988
W o rk in g  G ro u p  o f  the  W h o le  (a r tic le -b y -a itic le  re v ie w ); K ey 
Issu e s  G ro u p ; D raftin g  C o m m ittee ; In fo rm a l w o rk in g  g ro u p s  o n  
a rea  o f  ap p lica tio n ; fin an c ia l m atters; an ti-su b sid y  p ro v is io n s
12.1 W e llin g to n , N ew  Z e a lan d  
2 -1 9  M ay  1988
O u ts tan d in g  K ey  Issu es  W o rk in g  G ro u p ; W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  M atte rs  
o f  L ess-th an -k ey  im p o rtan ce ; D raftin g  C o m m ittee . B eeb y  V I (D ra ft 
C o n v e n tio n ) p ro d u ced .
12.2  23-31  M ay  1988
F in a l C o n fe re n c e  (2 Ju n e)
O u ts tan d in g  K ey  Issu es  W o rk in g  G ro u p ; W o rk in g  G ro u p  o n  M atte rs  
o f  L ess-th an -k ey  im p o rtan ce ; D raftin g  C o m m ittee . B eeb y  V H  (D raft 
C o n v e n tio n ) p ro d u ced .
C o n v e n tio n  o n  th e  R e g u la t io n  o f  A n ta r c t ic  M in e r a l  R e s o u rc e  A c tiv itie s .
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regime" (in Bush 1982:450).101 This provided a reasonably comprehensive framework 
(but no detail) and it gave some form to the principles set out in recommendation XI-1. 
As well as the usual headings in an international agreement (preamble, definitions, 
objectives and principles for example) it listed those matters likely to be most difficult: 
financial questions, applicable law and jurisdiction, and provisions to ensure the regime 
was acceptable and without prejudice to the consultative parties.
This first session reached an understanding that it would be almost impossible to 
negotiate a detailed mining and environmental code which would set out rules and 
procedures to cover all possible problems and activities. This was because of the 
internal differences, especially over sovereignty, and the lack of knowledge about 
mineral resources and future technologies and activities. While political and legal 
differences were uppermost, the consultative parties agreed that any agreement had to 
establish a "climate of confidence ... [ensuring] security of title for the operator, the 
protection of investment and certainty of regulation" (Beeby 1983b: 194).
The consultative parties met again in Wellington in January of 1983 to continue their 
discussions.102 At the conclusion of that session Beeby tabled his first informal 
personal report (known colloquially as Beeby I).103
According to Beeby (1985:22-23) the focus of debate at these first two sessions was on 
where the powers required to regulate mineral activity should be located. Non­
claimants favoured collective and non-discriminatory regulation. Claimants advocated 
regulation by states (preferably the claimants themselves over their own territory) acting 
individually, even if they did so in accordance with general guidelines. The Beeby text 
was offered as a means of avoiding a deadlock on this by switching attention to the 
institutions and procedures of the regime.
Beeby I set out draft articles based on the discussion to date. The objectives of the 
regime were set out in line with recommendation XI-1. An indicative list of
environmental principles was included. The provisions of article IV on the claims were 
reproduced, with the inclusion of a reference to coastal state jurisdiction in recognition 
of the different juridical positions with respect to the continental shelf and Exclusive
101. Beeby (1983b: 193) says that the possibility of incorporating a minerals regime into a 
consultative recommendation was not totally excluded at this meeting. The other possibilities 
which were considered were a protocol to the Treaty or a separate convention.
102. At the Wellington meeting a number of informal groups were established to consider the 
technical definitions of the area of applicability of the regime, the minerals that would be 
covered by the regime, and the stages of minerals activity. A third informal group on 
environmental aspects met briefly in preparation for the forthcoming Bonn meeting.
103. The Beeby drafts, as they addressed the crucial issues in the negotiations, are discussed more 
fully in chapter six.
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Economic Zones. This draft also reflected the intention of the consultative parties to tie 
the regime closely to the Antarctic Treaty.
There was some agreement on the institutional structure by this stage (a Commission, 
an Advisory Committee and an Executive Secretariat) although the functions and 
membership of those institutions and the relationship between them proved to be 
contentious throughout the negotiations. The Parties also agreed upon a three-stage 
approach to minerals activities - prospecting, exploration and development - although 
no definitions were yet settled upon. Beeby I provided the basis for discussions at the 
next two sessions.
In anticipation of further discussion on environmental matters at the third session in 
Bonn, the Parties were urged to include on their delegations people with expertise in 
technical and environmental issues and people familiar both with administering 
environmental laws and with procedures for translating environmental principles into 
reality (Kimball 1983a: 15). This doesn’t seem to have happened.104
Only modest progress was made at the Bonn meeting.105 The Chair referred to the 
difficulty of negotiations at this session saying "we have discussed a number of very 
abstract and complicated models on which we were not in agreement" {The Guardian 
23 July 1983).
The fourth session convened in Washington in January 1984.106 "Sources close to the 
talks" were reported as saying that little of substance was agreed to and no conclusions 
were reached {The Guardian 18 February 1984). All delegations with the exception of 
France were prepared to agree that all areas south of 60*S would remain closed to 
mineral development unless a decision was taken to open them. France wanted the 
reverse (CAN #5, 1984). Following this meeting Beeby, who was to chair all the 
remaining negotiating sessions, prepared a second version of his personal report (Beeby
104. The Environmental Contact Group anticipated at the Wellington meeting met chaired by the 
UK’s John Heap.
105. Although Chris Beeby, as head of the New Zealand delegation, had chaired the first two sessions 
in Wellington, the Bonn meeting was chaired by the head of the West German delegation, Ernst 
Jung. Francioni (1986:178) refers to a West German draft text of 15 May 1984. It is not clear 
whether this was offered as the next stage in the negotiating process, as an alternative to Beeby 
II, or simply as one of many documents tabled containing suggested draft provisions. For some 
reason Chris Beeby did not chair the Bonn meeting, It was chaired by Emst Jung from West 
Germany. This was the fust negotiating session outside New Zealand and it is likely that the 
consultative parties thought at fust to adopt the practice of consultative meetings in appointing 
chairpersons from the host country.
106. The Environmental Contact Group did not meet at this session.
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n) 107 although several delegations apparently did not receive it until shortly before the 
Tokyo negotiating session in May 1984.
A full reading of the second Beeby draft was not completed at Tokyo.108 The Tokyo 
meeting decided that non-consultative parties (NCPs) would be invited to future 
sessions as observers.109 NCPs therefore attended the following session held in Rio de 
Janiero in February 1985.110
Much of the negotiation and the search for consensus was by this stage being conducted 
in informal meetings. At the Tokyo meeting, working groups addressed the objectives 
and principles of the regime, prospecting and, for the first time, legal issues and dispute 
settlement. This last group addressed in detail the question of compliance and 
enforcement, as well as liability, compensation for damages, procedures for withdrawal 
from and amendment to the regime. Beeby was reported {Financial Times, 13 March 
1985) as saying that progress had been made but that the toughest meetings were yet to 
come as the real issues separating the claimants from non-claimants were approached.
The Treaty parties met again in Paris from 23 September to 4 October 1985.* 111 Beeby 
continued to consult informally on key issues - the composition and decision-making 
procedures of the institutions to be set up by the regime, international participation in 
benefits from the regime, and the internal accommodation between claimants and non­
claimants (Kimball 1985f:2-3).
The eighth session of the SCM was held in Hobart, Australia, in April 1986.112 Again 
Beeby conducted important negotiations at Head of Delegations meetings and a number 
of small private meetings from which NCPs were generally excluded. Following this 
session, he produced a third version of his personal report (Beeby III).
107. NGOs felt that the second draft contained some welcome additions, but that other aspects were 
disappointing (ASOC 1984b: 1)
108. There is not a great deal of information available on this meeting. It was held at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs which was declared out of bounds to NGOs.
109. They would be permitted to speak, receive copies of documents and submit information papers 
and attend all plenary and formal committee and working group meetings but could not 
participate in the decision-making process.
110. A decision was made at the 12th ATCM in 1983 to invite NCPs to future consultative meetings. 
However the consultative meeting took the view that the question of NCP attendance at the 4th 
SCM was a matter for that forum to decide. Some commented on the difficulty of trying to 
figure out the underlying aspects of the negotiations (Kimball 1985b:7). It is likely that at this 
stage all relevant documentation was not automatically made available to NCPs (IIED 1986:4).
111. One working group was set up to consider legal issues (focussing on liability and dispute 
settlement), another to consider guidelines for operators. The prospecting working group from 
the Rio session met in Paris as the Exploration and Development working group.
112. The Legal Issues group met again, but the working groups on environment, and on exploration 
and development met only informally because, according to ASOC, "no competent or willing 
chairers could be found" for them {Antarctic News #4,1986:3).
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Later in the year Beeby convened an informal intersessional meeting in Whangaroa, 
New Zealand, to discuss Beeby HI.113 According to an NGO report only the US, 
USSR, UK, France, West Germany, Argentina and New Zealand were invited to 
participate (Antarctic News #4, 1986:6). A claimant caucus was held a few weeks later 
in San Diego.
The Parties met again formally in Tokyo in October/November 1986.114 Beeby 
convened a key issues group. After the Tokyo meeting Beeby called a second informal 
intersessional meeting in Whangaroa in March 1987.115 Fourteen governments were 
represented.116 Following this meeting his new report, Beeby IV, was circulated.
Negotiations continued in Montevideo in May 1987.117 Beeby IV was modified 
considerably in the working groups (Antarctica Project 1987b).118 At this meeting the 
Head of the Chilean Delegation, Fernando Zegers, suggested during an informal 
meeting that Antarctica could be designated an Antarctic Treaty Park if no more 
progress were possible in resolving certain key issues (ECO XLVH(6) 1988:1). While 
this was hailed by NGOs as a "clever new development of the World Park idea" 
(Antarctic News #6, 1987:2), it may have been a suggestion borne as much out of 
frustration with slow progress as out of environmental concern. A third intersessional 
meeting attended by 15 nations was held in November 1987, this time in Auckland, 
New Zealand. Following this, Beeby V became the basis for negotiations held in 
Wellington at the beginning of 1988.119 In December 1987, the US government made 
Beeby V public "so that those interested in or potentially affected by the future 
agreement may review and analyse it" (Kimball 1988a: 1).
113. The Soviet Union was initially opposed to Beeby III although it is not clear on what grounds.
114. Several working groups, both formal and informal, met. The Legal Issues groups continued to 
deal with questions of dispute settlement, liability, compliance, inspection and monitoring. The 
Exploration and Development group was convened again to consider the membership and 
decision-making rules in institutions and the functions of these bodies. A confidentiality of data 
group was convened and a small informal group of New Zealand, Australia, USA, Chile, 
Argentina and the UK met to consider environmental provisions.
115. A "Statement of Concern" signed by 32 prominent New Zealanders was sent to the Whangaroa 
meeting, calling for Antarctica to be administered as a "region of wilderness, peace and 
scientific cooperation ... to be held in perpetuity as part of the common heritage of humankind" 
(Antarctic News # 5,1987:14).
116. Neither Belgium nor South Africa attended any of the informal intersessional meetings.
117. The Working Groups on Key Issues, Legal Issues, and Exploration and Development all met. 
Several smaller informal sessions were held on the functions of the Advisory Committee, on 
budgetary and financial provisions, on confidentiality of data, and on the area of application of 
the regime.
118. See chapter six for a discussion of the changes in the Beeby drafts.
119. The analysis in chapter six indicates that the NGOs believed Beeby V was a major concession to 
mining interests.
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At the January 1988 meeting in Wellington, delegates committed themselves to holding 
only one more negotiating session at which the convention would be concluded, even 
though there were many outstanding issues. NGOs expressed their concern that this 
would result in hasty compromise decisions.
The January session120 convened a working group of the whole, which conducted an 
article-by-article review of Beeby V except for those articles being considered by the 
Key Issues group. The Key Issues group discussed provisions on liability, dispute 
settlement, judicial review of decisions taken by institutions, inspection, compliance 
and approval procedures. Membership of the Key Issues group changed depending on 
the issue under discussion. A drafting committee was also established.121 A number of 
small informal groups also met to consider the area of application, financial matters and 
anti-subsidy provisions.122
The final session convened at the beginning of May 1988 again in Wellington. All 
twenty consultative parties and thirteen of the 18 NCPs attended.123 The first part of 
the session (2 to 19 May) divided into three groups: an Outstanding Key Issues group 
chaired by Beeby, a group to focus on matters of less-than-key importance,124 and the 
Drafting Committee.125 NCPs were generally excluded from the Key Issues group 
which met in small informal discussions followed by larger groups in the afternoons, to 
deal with a long list of still unresolved issues. Those issues included decision-making 
in the Commission and Regulatory Committees, composition of the Regulatory 
Committees, dispute settlement, liability, financial issues, participation, definition of 
sponsoring state, operator and the area of applicability, compliance, entry into force, the 
composition of the Commission and the Special Meeting of Parties, anti-subsidy 
provisions and languages of the text (ASOC 1988n:2).
120. This session was not attended by India or Uruguay (ATCPs) nor by seven of the NCPs.
121. The drafting committee, charged with ensuring that versions in all four official Treaty 
languages, plus Chinese, were consistent with each other, was more contentious than originally 
anticipated. West Germany insisted on being represented. Other delegations argued that if there 
was a possibility of a German text, then their languages should also be represented. The Beeby 
VI draft left open the possibility that authentic texts might also be agreed to in German, 
Japanese, Norwegian and Portuguese. This committee continued its work at an intersessional 
meeting in Washington DC (March 14-29).
122. A report in ECO (XLVII(6) 1988:1) suggests that the US proposed a series of new draft articles 
which would completely reorient the power structures within the Convention, but gives no 
further details.
123. Hungary, North Korea, Spain, Cuba and Austria were absent.
124. This working group met each morning. It also considered some issues not resolved in the 
article-by-aiticle review at the January meeting.
125. The Drafting Committee met every afternoon to tighten up the language and ensure consistency 
between the four official languages.
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Delegates took a break between 19 and 22 May. In the four day break, Beeby 
consolidated a new negotiating text which was presented as a Draft Convention rather 
than a personal report.126
At the beginning of the second part of the session, which convened again on 23 May, 
delegations met in plenary to discuss the draft convention. Beeby apparently stressed 
the necessity for delegations to forego their preferred positions in order to find 
"tolerable common ground" if agreement was to be reached (ASOC 1988n:3). After the 
plenary the three working groups from the first part of the session met again with the 
Key Issues group. The drafting group meeting late into the night. An all-night session 
was held on 30 May, attended by twelve consultative parties only (ASOC 1988n:3 - the 
twelve are not named). The following morning a second version of the draft convention 
was distributed.127 A third plenary was convened with most delegations apparently 
satisfied with the Convention before them. ASOC suggests (ASOC 1988n:4), in its 
report of this meeting, that India and China remained dissatisfied with the compromise 
on decision-making and would have preferred consensus as the rule, while Australia 
continued to lobby for the inclusion of an anti-subsidy provision.
The Final Act of the Special Consultative Meeting, with the Convention appended, was 
distributed to delegations shortly before the final plenary on 2 June 1988. It was signed 
at a special ceremony after the formal close of the SCM.128 Christopher Beeby hailed it 
as "an historic occasion which I believe will go down in Antarctic history as the most 
important political development regarding the regulation of Antarctica since the 
Antarctic Treaty itself’ (SCM-IV 1988b: 1)
The Convention, which is described and analysed in the next chapter, was the product 
of an institutional bargaining process. To recall chapter one, Young suggests (1990b) 
that the exercise of leadership is an important determinant of the success of this process. 
This crucial leadership role, in the minerals negotiations, was taken by Beeby.
Beeby and leadership
Beeby falls neatly into the category of entrepreneurial leader described by Young 
(1990b: 16-25). In preparing subsequent versions of what was, informally at least, a 
single negotiating text, and maintaining contact with all delegations through his 
informal key issues contact group, he sought to devise options to overcome bargaining 
difficulties and to line up support for those options (as Young 1990b: 18-19) describes
126. In effect this was the 6th Beeby draft
127. Beeby VII - MR/17 Rev V/Corr. 1
128. The drafting committee met again in Sydney, Australia, in September 1988 to develop the 
Chinese text provided for in article 67.
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the role of an entrepreneurial leader). He represented the "common memory base" 
(Andersen 1991:103) and provided continuity in the negotiations.
Young (1990b:20) suggests that the work of an entrepreneurial leader is facilitated by 
that person being an agent of a powerful state in the bargaining process although he 
does acknowledge that this is not a necessary condition for the successful exercise of 
this type of leadership.129 In the case of the minerals negotiations, New Zealand 
possessed no more issue-specific power (as a claimant and consultative party) than a 
number of other states involved in the negotiations. Indeed, it is possible to argue that 
New Zealand’s issue-specific power in the negotiations may have been augmented by 
Beeby’s role as Chair of the negotiations rather than the other way around.130 Beeby 
was clearly respected as a diplomat and one who had been involved in Antarctic affairs 
for many years.
Young also argues (1990b:22) that entrepreneurial leaders are strictly self-interested 
actors and that they act for personal gain rather than some sense of responsibility or 
obligation to the community (although he offers this as a source of comfort, suggesting 
that such actors are likely to be more predictable in their actions).131 This is a 
proposition which, when applied to any particular individual engaged in leadership, is 
almost impossible to test and it is the case with Beeby.
Conclusion
As Bilder notes (1982:199), the consultative parties had a "strong mutual interest in 
reaching an agreed and orderly solution to the issue of mineral resources". In first 
addressing this issue in the early 1970s the parties responded to external interests 
(which were generated by technological developments) which raised the spectre of 
conflict over the exercise of sovereignty, of a potential weakening of the Treaty system 
and consultative party authority over Antarctic decision-making as well as 
environmental damage. Thus the demand for cooperation, for a regime on minerals, 
was in response to pressures outside the Treaty system.
This was also, in Stein’s typology (1983), a dilemma of common aversion. The 
consultative parties were jointly agreed on the outcome they wished to avoid (conflict 
and the demise of the Treaty system) but there was no common agreement on the
129. Young does not specifically define a powerful state in this context but his general argument 
about leadership would lead to an assumption that it is a state which is in a position to exercise 
structural leadership within an institutional bargaining process.
130. The delegation list from the final negotiating sessions shows that as Chair of the SCM Beeby 
was not, formally, a member of the New Zealand delegation.
131. Young also notes (1991:297) that the achievement of success may also constitute a form of 
payment for entrepreneurial leaders.
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outcome they preferred. Individually, each state had different preferences set by its 
political (especially territorial) and economic interests.
Decisions, in as much as they applied to the technical aspects of minerals activity, were 
based on a degree of scientific uncertainty and the Parties sought to improve their 
scientific knowledge by commissioning repons from scientific expens. Indeed, the 
paucity of knowledge on Antarctic minerals and the impact of minerals activity on the 
environment was a major theme in the debates of the 1970s. However, once the formal 
negotiations began in the 1980s, this problem was not addressed again in such detail. 
SCAR, for example, as the primary source of knowledge in the Treaty system, had no 
input into the minerals negotiations.132
Once the in-principle decision was made that minerals activity in Antarctic was a 
legitimate activity and would be permitted, debates in the 1970s focussed on how to 
define the collective interests of the consultative parties. The principles adopted 
ensured that those collective interests would be met: the Treaty system would be 
maintained and consultative party authority over Antarctic decision-making would be 
extended. However, in spite of agreement on principles, there was little insight into the 
terms of the constitutional contract that would regulate minerals activity. In other 
words, as Young suggests (1990b:4) in his analysis of the process of institutional 
bargaining "the range of feasible options and the outcomes associated with these 
options [were not] well-defined at the outset".
The institutional bargaining process in the 1980s was characterised, within the formal 
Special Consultative Meeting, by informality and flexibility. The Parties sought to 
maintain consensus and to avoid public dissension over the differences between them. 
There is no doubt that the negotiations were difficult. They were advanced, albeit 
slowly, through Beeby’s exercise of entrepreneurial leadership and, in particular, his 
informal and personal report which gave shape to the constitutional contract. In doing 
so, he sought to ensure that the participants would be reluctant to abandon what had 
already been agreed upon when the tough issues were debated.
The negotiations for the minerals convention in the 1980s sought to define and 
reconcile individual interests within the confines of those collective interests. 
Differences derived from divisions on legal and political grounds (on sovereignty and 
jurisdiction) and economic grounds (especially the interests of mining states and 
developing states). It was those divisions, not environmental concerns, which gave rise
132. It was, for example, not invited as an observer to the negotiations and was not asked to provide 
any further reports on the scientific, technical or environmental aspects of minerals activity or to 
comment on the proposed rules in the convention.
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to the key issues which remained unresolved until the end of the negotiations. In this 
respect, the hierarchy of values that characterised the Antarctic regime generally also 
applied here. Environmental concerns, while not dismissed, were fitted into the 
solutions to political and, to a lesser extent, economic concerns. Those individual 
interests, and their reconciliation in the minerals convention, are the subject of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter six
THE ANTARCTIC MINERALS CONVENTION (CRAMRA) 
Introduction
The consultative parties perceived the minerals issue primarily as a political rather than 
an economic problem. In particular, it raised the problem of sovereignty and the 
territorial claims directly. Their collective interest in avoiding conflict among them and 
maintaining the Treaty system provided the imperative for the negotiations and 
overcame their reluctance to address this issue.
They reached agreement as early as the 1976 Paris preparatory meeting on the 
principles and objectives which would shape the convention and cooperation among 
them on this issue. It was in the negotiating sessions of the Fourth Special Consultative 
Meeting, described in chapter five, that the Parties tackled the difficult, indeed some 
thought impossible, task of satisfying the competing interests of the Treaty parties in 
giving effect to those principles and objectives which were determined primarily by the 
political imperatives of the Treaty system. They sought to ensure that any minerals 
agreement would not result in conflict, would strengthen their authority over Antarctic 
decisions and would not undermine the compromise on territorial sovereignty. Within 
this framework of political values they also sought to protect the Antarctic environment.
This chapter describes the main procedural and institutional features of the Minerals 
Convention. It then provides an analysis of that agreement which focuses on three 
aspects. First, it examines the competing national interests of the Treaty parties and the 
nature of the final consensus on the internal accommodation among those interests. 
Second, in doing so, it shows how the Convention conformed to the fundamental 
normative and procedural dimensions of the Treaty regime and how both the existing 
hierarchy of values and sovereignty norms were maintained. Finally the chapter also 
explores how that hierarchy of values shaped the environmental principles and rules 
adopted.
The Convention1
The Convention agreed to by the twenty consultative parties in June 1988 was titled in 
full The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities.2 It is
1. The Convention is included at appendix 8.
2. Treaty parties have acknowledged that this is not the most auspicious title for a convention 
which, they argue, does not presuppose minerals activity and was not negotiated for the purpose 
of encouraging such activity. It is most often referred to as the Minerals Convention, the 
Wellington Convention, or by its less revealing acronym CRAMRA (pronounced as it is 
spelled). At the Rio meeting in 1985, the head of the Swedish delegation (at that stage a non-
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a framework convention which establishes principles, prescribes general rules and 
procedures and creates institutions for the purpose of regulating Antarctic mineral 
resource activities should they be considered acceptable.
The Convention is a compromise document. It is a pragmatic, although complicated, 
agreement. In providing general guidelines only, it leaves the detail to be "hammered 
out on a case-by-case basis" (Beeby 1985:23) because of the difficulties of 
incorporating all the details of an internal accommodation in the text. Much of the 
administrative machinery is established only when, and if, any party wishes to explore 
for minerals. Kimball (1987c: 13-14) describes the decision-making process as a 
threshold-cascade one. The broad-brush principles within the regime are to govern 
every decision taken and every measure adopted. Those guidelines must translate into a 
"cascade of ever more detailed requirements" once the threshold decision to open an 
area is made.* 3
Only signatories to the Antarctic Treaty (both ATCPs and NCPs) may become parties to 
the Convention. The Convention establishes a Commission,4 and a Scientific Technical 
and Environmental Advisory Committee, and provides for a regulatory committee to be 
established for each area identified for exploration and development It also establishes 
an Executive Secretariat and makes provision for a Special Meeting of Parties.
Membership of the Commission is restricted to Parties to the Convention who were also 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties on 25 November 1988, the date on which the 
Convention was opened for signature.5 Any other Party to the Convention which is 
engaged in research in the Treaty area of direct relevance to decisions about minerals 
activities (most likely to be any new or aspiring consultative party) and any other Party 
which is sponsoring exploration and development6 may also become a member of the 
Commission. Any Party to the Convention which meets none of these conditions is 
granted observer status to the Commission, which is also available to any Antarctic 
Treaty Party which is not a party to the Convention.
consultative party) suggested the title "The Antarctic Protection regime ... in relation to Mineral
Resources" (SCM-IV 1985:5).
3. Although this is argued to make environmental protection more stringent, it was also an 
approach favoured by mining interests. The American Petroleum Institute ([n.d.]) supported a 
framework regime which provided for a series of increasingly specific steps. It was only in this 
fashion, the Institute suggested, that private enterprise would be likely to consider the Antarctic 
as a viable area of economic endeavour.
4. Article 20(5) provides that the Commission may decide to establish a permanent headquarters in 
New Zealand.
5. By this date the number had increased to 22 with the addition of Spain and Sweden to the ranks 
of the consultative parties.
6. In the case of a Sponsoring State which does not meet any of the other criteria, its membership 
on the Commission holds only while the management scheme regulating that activity is in force.
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The Commission is charged, inter alia, with facilitating and promoting the collection 
and exchange of scientific, technical and other information necessary to predict, detect 
and assess possible environmental impact, and with adopting measures for the 
protection of the environment as well as on prospecting activities.7 It also has an 
important role in identifying an area for possible exploration for, and development of 
mineral resources (described further below).
Membership of the Advisory Committee, established under article 23, is open to all 
Parties to the Convention. Observer status on the Advisory Committee is granted to any 
non-Convention state which is a party to the Antarctic Treaty or to CCAMLR. The 
Advisory Committee provides a forum for consultation and cooperation among the 
Parties but has no decision-making powers. The Commission and regulatory 
committees must take "full account" of the Advisory Committee’s advice.
Minerals activity may only be undertaken in accordance with the rules of the 
Convention. The Convention recognises three stages of minerals activity - prospecting, 
exploration and development - and establishes broad guidelines and procedures in 
respect of all three. Prospecting, that is the conduct of activities aimed at identifying 
areas of mineral resource potential, must be conducted in accordance with the 
Convention but does not require prior authorisation by any institution. Nevertheless, 
nine months notification of an intention to prospect must be provided by any state 
which sponsors prospecting.8 Detailed information must be provided on the proposed 
activity, including an assessment of environmental and other impacts and the measures 
which will be taken to avoid harmful consequences or undue interference with other 
uses in the Antarctic. Prospecting confers no rights to any mineral resources.
The Antarctic is closed to all minerals activities (except prospecting) until a consensus 
decision is taken by the Commission to identify an area for possible exploration and 
development activities. Any Party may request such an identification which must 
include, inter alia, a detailed assessment of the environmental impact of likely minerals 
activity in that area. This consensus requirement thus entrenches an effective veto for 
any member of the Commission.
The decision to open an area must be made on the basis of information which is 
adequate to enable informed judgements to be made. This must include a confident 
assessment that such activities will not cause significant environmental impacts, that 
technology and procedures are available to provide for safe operations and limited
7. Article 21 includes 25 sub-paragraphs which list the functions o f the Commission.
8. That state must be a Party to the Convention.
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environmental impact, and that the capacity exists to monitor key environmental 
parameters and to respond effectively to accidents (article 4).
If consensus is reached, the Commission will identify the area for the possible 
exploration and development of specified mineral resources.9 This is, in effect, an ‘in 
principle’ decision that minerals activity may (but not necessarily will) proceed in a 
particular area. In reaching its decision, the Commission must take into account the 
advice of the Advisory Committee and the conclusions of, and views expressed at, a 
Special Meeting of the Parties (at which all Parties to the Convention, including 
Antarctic Treaty NCPs, are represented).
For each area identified for possible exploration and development, a ten member 
regulatory committee is established.10 Membership of each regulatory committee is 
determined by the Commission according to a complex formula. Under this formula, 
four committee members must be claimant states, including the claimant(s) to the area 
being opened. The remaining six (non-claimant) members must include the US and the 
USSR. Three of the ten must be developing countries.* 11 Membership should also 
include those parties which have contributed substantial scientific, technical and 
environmental information relevant to the identification of the area. The membership 
rules also provide for any state with a direct interest in the activities of the regulatory 
committee with respect to its area of competence to be a member of the committee (in 
addition to the ten) while that direct interest remains.12 Any Party may attend meetings 
of a regulatory committee as an observer.
9. If the same area is to be open for exploration of different minerals to those already specified, the 
application procedure to the Commission must be repeated, although the same regulatory 
committee will be responsible for establishing any management scheme.
10. In Beeby I (art XXIX) a separate regulatory committee was to be convened in respect of each 
exploration application. Beeby II adopted a US suggestion that one regulatory committee be 
established for each area identified for possibly activities. The US initially proposed (at ATCM- 
XI in 1981) that the Antarctic could be divided into four quadrants, an idea subsequently 
dropped at the January 1983 meeting of the SCM (CAN #5,1984). The suggestion was that 8 of 
the then 14 consultative parties would sit on each panel, although none would sit on more than 
two. Each panel would set up terms for the operation of would-be oil producing groups under 
the guidelines of a minerals commission which would comprise all fourteen countries (cited in 
Dawn, 22 November 1983).
11. Developing countries, a term which is not defined, is normally taken to include the claimants 
Chile and Argentina. This means that if the area to be opened is outside the area of the 
overlapping claims, at least one of these two is nevertheless likely to be included on the 
regulatory committee.
12. If this is the Party which submitted notification of an area for identification, then it will be a 
member until such time as an application for an exploration permit is lodged or, if it is a party 
lodging an exploration permit, while that application is considered, or while the management 
scheme for which it is the sponsoring state of an operator is in force. The addition of extra 
members with a direct interest in the area was added at the suggestion of Japan and West 
Germany (Antarctica Project 1987b: 3).
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The regulatory committee adapts the Commission’s guidelines and identifies general 
requirements for exploration and development in its designated area. Any Party which 
wishes to sponsor minerals activities in that area can then apply to the regulatory 
committee for an exploration permit. Exploration activities are those aimed at 
identifying and evaluating specific mineral resource occurrences or deposits. The 
application must contain a detailed description of the Operator, its proposed activities, 
including environmental and other impact assessment, its capacity to respond to 
accidents, to comply with general guidelines and its technical competence and financial 
capacity.
The regulatory committee will then meet to elaborate a management scheme for the 
proposed activity. It may decline the exploration application if it considers that the 
proposed activities are not consistent with the Convention. The management scheme, 
which is effectively a contract between the committee and the Operator, is drawn up by 
a sub-committee of the regulatory committee and sets out specific terms and conditions. 
If it is approved by a two-thirds majority of the committee (which must include a clear 
majority of both claimants and non-claimants) an exploration permit is issued. It is the 
function of the regulatory committee to monitor compliance with the management 
scheme and the Convention and to monitor effects on the Antarctic environment.
If an Operator wishes to proceed to development of mineral resources (defined as 
activities aimed at exploitation of specific resource deposits) the Sponsoring State must 
lodge an application to this effect. This application must contain updated information 
as appropriate, including detailed environmental assessment. The regulatory committee 
considers whether the planned development would cause previously unforeseen 
impacts. If modification to the management scheme is not needed, or if modifications 
are approved, then a development permit is issued. There is no specific procedure for 
declining a development application, although the Convention contains a general 
procedure for the modification, cancellation or suspension of the management scheme.
The Convention also sets out general principles on compliance, monitoring and liability. 
Each Party is required to take appropriate measures within its competence to ensure 
compliance. Regulatory Committees are required to monitor Operator compliance with 
management schemes and, one assumes, may use the results of this as grounds for 
modifying, suspending or cancelling a management scheme or permit.13
13. The regulatory committee is required to inform, as appropriate, the Commission and Advisory 
Committee (article 52(3)) of its actions in this respect. The Commission is required to consider 
these reports (article 21(l)(u)) but it is not clear what it can do with them. Presumably they can 
be used as the basis for a member of the Commission to raise concerns about the consistency of 
operations with the Convention, in accordance with article 49.
204
Inspections under the Convention may be conducted unilaterally by the consultative 
parties in accordance with the rules and procedures of article VII of the Antarctic 
Treaty. The inspection procedures established by the Antarctic Treaty are extended to 
include all stations, installations and equipment relating to mineral resource activities 
(article 11). Inspectors may also be designated by any member of the Commission, by 
the Commission itself or the relevant regulatory committee. Procedures for inspection 
in an area must be in place before exploration or development can proceed in that 
area.14
Detailed dispute settlement procedures are elaborated (articles 56-59) and an Arbitral 
Tribunal is established under an annex to the Convention. Article 8 sets out rules and 
procedures for response action and liability. Operators are to be strictly liable for 
damage to the environment and loss of or impairment to established uses in the 
Antarctic. The Convention also provides for residual state liability. Liability is 
exempted in the case of unforeseen natural disasters and acts or armed conflict 
(including terrorism). Further rules and procedures on liability are to be elaborated in a 
separate Protocol which may establish limits to liability. The Protocol must be in force, 
for the Party making the application, before an application for an exploration or 
development permit can be made.
The Convention was opened for signature on 25 November 1988 for one year by those 
consultative parties which had participated in the final negotiating session, plus any 
other state which had achieved consultative party status by that date. After that period 
any other signatory state to the Antarctic Treaty could accede to the Convention. Under 
the provisions of the Convention, it would enter into force after sixteen of the 
consultative parties which had participated in the final session had ratified the 
agreement.15 However, under the rules of the Convention and the interpretation 
included in the Final Act, that sixteen had to include all seven claimant states, as well as 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and represent five developing and eleven 
developed countries.16 The Final Act of the SCM provided that the voluntary 
moratorium on minerals activities, as these activities were defined in the Convention 
(thus including prospecting), would continue pending the Convention’s entry into force.
The Minerals Convention was an integral part of the Antarctic Treaty system. As noted 
above and in chapter five, a primary purpose of the minerals negotiations in elaborating
14. Reports from inspectors are to be transmitted to the Commission and to the appropriate 
regulatory committee (article 12).
15. It was acknowledged that this process could take some time.
16. There were differences of opinion in the negotiations on whether a high majority of ratifications 
would be sufficient to effect entry into force or whether full concurrence was necessary (Kimball 
1987c: 12).
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a convention was to manage the internal accommodation among the Treaty parties. 
This part of the chapter examines the competing interests of the parties and the extent of 
their reconciliation in CRAMRA.
Maintaining the Antarctic Treaty
The Paris principles, subsequently incorporated into recommendation X I-1 which 
formally established the Special Consultative Meeting, required that under a minerals 
regime the Antarctic Treaty be retained in its entirety. Experience within the Treaty 
system generally had shown that cooperation under the norms and rules of the Antarctic 
regime, which was centred on the Treaty, and adherence to particular normative 
behaviour, such as the search for consensus, recognition of the sovereignty compromise, 
reliance on limited enforcement rules and an ‘arm’s length’ attitude to outside interest, 
served to maintain the Treaty and protect both collective and individual national 
interests.
The rules of the Convention therefore had to be consistent with the Antarctic Treaty and 
with the consultative recommendations adopted in accordance with it, including respect 
for environmental protection rules. This meant also that minerals activity should not 
result in the Antarctic becoming the scene or object of international discord and that 
scientific cooperation and investigation should not be compromised by minerals 
activity.
This principle was explicitly included in the Convention. The preamble refers to the
special legal and political status of the Antarctic and the special 
responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to ensure that 
all activities in the Antarctic are consistent with the purposes and 
principles of the Antarctic Treaty.
It notes that "a regime governing Antarctic mineral resource activities will further 
strengthen the Antarctic Treaty system". The Convention is to be "an integral part of 
the Antarctic Treaty system" (article 2(1)) and mineral resource activities must be 
conducted "in a manner consistent with all the components of the Antarctic Treaty 
system" (article 2(2)). Antarctic mineral resource activities, should they occur, must be 
compatible with scientific investigation in Antarctica and other legitimate uses of 
Antarctica (article 15). This reflects the intention of the Treaty parties not only to 
balance competing uses in the Antarctic, but also to ensure that minerals activity, in 
principle at least, did not take precedence over other activities in the Antarctic.17
17. Article 10 specifies further that there must be consistency with the other components of the 
Antarctic Treaty system.
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The internal accommodation: states interests
The fundamental differences in the negotiations arose between the claimants18 and the 
non-claimants on the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction and the ownership of 
resources. The claimants wanted regulation based on individual authority and a 
recognition of their special status. The non-claimants envisaged no special role for the 
claimants.
Other cleavages cut across this division. Throughout the negotiations the divisions 
between the claimants and the pro-development states became increasingly entrenched. 
The likely mining non-claimant states (the US, West Germany and Japan) argued for 
non-discriminatory access to mineral resources and for regulatory rules and procedures 
that facilitated minerals activity. They were joined, to some extent, by the UK and 
France who were also potential mining states but who also had claimant interests to 
protect. The developing non-claimant consultative states (China, India, Uruguay and 
Brazil) wanted access to technology (in which they were joined by the USSR) and a 
share in the benefits from exploitation. Countries with established mining industries, 
such as Australia and South Africa, were, to some extent, supportive of non- 
discriminatory access but were also concerned about competition with their own 
industries (although in Australia’s case this was moderated by its claimant interests). 
They also sought provisions to prevent resource poor countries subsidising minerals 
activity.
The non-consultative parties also brought particular interests to bear on the negotiations, 
particularly in ensuring that, if they acceded to the Convention, they were guaranteed 
some role in its institutions and decision-making processes.
Environmental interests further contributed to the complexity of the negotiations. Some 
states, such as Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Chile, took a much stronger view 
on the need for stringent environmental protection provisions than the pro-development 
states. As Orrego Vicuna notes (1988:186) the countries of the southern hemisphere 
"have a particularly keen awareness of the environmental factor".
Contentious issues arising from these cleavages included the nature of the institutional 
structure and relationships, financial provisions, enforcement and compliance rules, 
dispute resolution and liability and environmental regulations. Specific questions to be 
resolved included who would authorise minerals activity, under what authority would 
appropriate control over resource activity be exercised, and how would payment of 
taxes and royalties be settled.
18. To recall, the states which claim territory in the Antarctic are Argentina, Australia, Britain, 
Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway.
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The internal accommodation: the compromise over sovereignty
The differing positions on the validity of the territorial claims and the exercise of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction were a central pan of the legal and political dialogue within 
the Treaty system. The territorial dispute remained "the single most difficult problem 
confronting Treaty parties in their attempts to devise management regimes for the area" 
(Mitchell 1980:17).
It was one of the main difficulties foreseen by the consultative panies in their attempts 
to negotiate a minerals regime. The British Foreign Office observed (cited in Beck 
1986b:136) that "[t]he divide between Claimants and non-claimant[s] ... regarding the 
role to be played by States assening sovereignty is at the hean of the negotiations for a 
minerals regime. It is the principal cause of the difficulties encountered in the 
negotiations so far".
Recommendation X I-1 specified not only that the provisions of article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty should not affected by a minerals regime but that the principles 
embodied in that article also had to be safeguarded. Those principles were not explicit 
in article IV but were, as chapter two has explained, a foundational principle of the 
Antarctic regime. They had come to be interpreted as requiring differences on the 
territorial question to be put to one side, the compromise on sovereignty maintained and 
that no state would seek to advance its position on sovereignty to a logical conclusion.
The demands that these provisions and principles be safeguarded were easier to specify 
than to meet. It seemed doubtful that the ambiguity of article IV of the Antarctic Treaty 
could be reproduced in a minerals convention which had to address directly the question 
of ownership of non-renewable resources. It was also doubtful whether, in the 
institutions and procedures of the regime, the interests of both claimant and non­
claimants could be met. As Beeby noted (1982:6), "neither the claimant states nor the 
non-claimants could reasonably expect that the Special Consultative Meeting [would] 
endorse a solution either founded exclusively on the existence of the sovereignty claims 
... or [one which] ignores the fact of those claims".
The Convention manages to step around the difficult sovereignty question. Like the 
Antarctic Treaty and subsequent instruments negotiated by the consultative parties, it 
does not solve the matter, but reproduces the creative ambiguity of article IV. It 
reproduces the general statement of principles in assening that
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a regime for Antarctic mineral resource activities must be consistent with 
article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and in accordance therewith be without 
prejudice and acceptable to those states which assert rights of or claims 
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, and those states which neither 
recognise nor assert such rights or claims, including those States which 
assert a basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
However statements of principle were not enough. The crux of the minerals 
negotiations were the specific mechanisms of representation and process in which 
claimant and non-claimant interests would have to be reconciled. The generally held 
view among the Treaty parties was that the key to finding an accommodation between 
claimants and non-claimants would be found "largely within the institutional structure 
of the regime" (Beeby 1985:21-22). Thus the negotiations raised the question, as noted 
above, of the relative role for the claimant and non-claimant states on the institutions of 
the Convention and on specific issues such as who would issue licences and what the 
distribution of taxes and royalties would be.
The claimants’ relative numerical power continued to decline within the Treaty system 
as more states acceded to the Treaty and as the number of consultative parties grew. 
Yet they still maintained issue-specific power in a consensus-based system and were 
able to function as a relatively cohesive coalition. Their position was that unilateral 
control over activities in their territory, including exploitation of resources, was a 
sovereign right. While they would not achieve this in the Convention, as they had not 
achieved it in the Treaty system generally, they were not prepared to forego some 
acknowledgement of their status especially in the institutions and decision-making 
procedures. The non-claimants would not acquiesce to the exercise of claimant control 
over resources and were reluctant to agree to any special privileges for the claimant 
states. However it was more difficult for the non-claimants to maintain unity generally 
within the negotiations because, apart from the specific issue of the exercise of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction, they were a diverse group with competing interests. 
Andersen (1991:105) suggests, however, that they were able to maintain a degree of 
cohesion on this aspect of the internal accommodation.
Claimant authority over regulatory mechanisms
Of particular concern to the claimants was their position on the important regulatory 
committees. Their goal during the negotiations was to retain as much power as possible 
in these organs because it was here that detailed rules for minerals activity were set and 
individual applications decided upon. Because of the smaller size of the regulatory 
committees, claimant power vis-a-vis the non-claimants was stronger than in the
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Commission.19 In the regulatory committees the claimants would be able to bargain for 
financial concessions and for influence over management schemes.
The size of the regulatory committee was determined by political considerations. There 
was, as Andersen notes (1991:100) a practical need for a body smaller than the 
Commission to undertake regulatory tasks and to establish contracts. However this 
could easily have been accomplished by a small group of three or four states. The 
demands of the claimants meant that the regulatory committees would have to include 
at least three claimants.20 The demand for political balance ensured that non-claimant 
numbers would be similar. Initial proposals for regulatory committee membership 
envisaged a split of four claimants and four non-claimants. The number was increased 
to ten to accommodate the subsequent demands, including developing states and mining 
interests (Andersen 1991:100).
The claimants were accorded a degree of influence on the regulatory committees. Each 
10 member committee must include four claimants (article 29(2)(c)(i)) including the 
claimant (or claimants)21 in the identified area (article 29(2)(a)).22 Early Beeby drafts 
proposed that four of what was then to be an eight member regulatory committee would 
be claimants. There was some concern expressed that giving claimants equal weight to 
non-claimants could lead to side deals between claimants and mining companies when 
the management scheme was elaborated, on royalties for example, that could possibly 
give substance to their claims (see Antarctica Project 1984a).
The claimant to the area for which a regulatory committee has competence is able to 
nominate the other claimant members of the committee. This rule was adopted after the 
claimants submitted a written demand at the Montevideo meeting. By contrast, non­
claimants members of the Commission may only "present views" to the Commission 
chair when the other four non-claimants, besides the superpowers who sit on every 
regulatory committee, are selected. However, while the claimants have a guaranteed 
position on the regulatory committees, this may not be "interpreted as affecting article 
IV of the Antarctic Treaty" (article 29(7)). In other words, it does not amount to any
19. Non-claimant miner states opposed the concentration of claimant decision-making in the 
regulatory committees (Antarctic News #7, 1988:2). However, both claimants and pro-mining 
non-claimants wanted as much power to reside in the RC as possible, without significant review 
by the Commission, a position opposed by the USSR, Poland, developing states and many NCPs 
(Antarctica Project 1987b:4).
20. This was because of the area of overlapping claims. All of the three overlapping claimants 
(Argentina, Britain or Chile) would have demanded some say over this area.
21. In their declarations made on signing the Convention, Argentina, Britain and Chile signalled 
their willingness to work together and consult with respect to any minerals activity in their 
commonly claimed area (Beck 1991:249-50).
22. Both clauses indicate that these members are to be identified by reference to article 9(b) which 
also refers to claims (inter alia) to exercise coastal state jurisdiction.
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recognition of claimant sovereignty over territory or resources and cannot be used by 
the claimants as evidence of such. This ensures that participation in regulatory activity, 
or specific minerals activity, cannot be used to support or deny a claim.23
In the determination of regulatory committee membership, it is the superpowers rather 
than the claimants or non-claimants who have benefited most. Under the rules of article 
29 they are members of every regulatory committee.24 This was, in part, because both 
maintain a basis of claim to the Antarctic and because they are the two states with the 
largest presence in the Antarctic. In this context, they were able to argue for a 
‘permanent presence’ on the regulatory committees.25
As well as seeking a central role on the regulatory committees, the claimants would 
ideally have liked a veto over all regulatory committee decisions. This proposition was 
anathema to the non-claimants. The rules governing decision-making in the regulatory 
committees on issues of substance require a two-thirds majority which must include a 
clear majority of both claimants and non-claimants.26 In the drafts up to and including 
Beeby V regulatory committee decision-making was to be by a simple majority, but 
with a veto provision for both the claimant(s) and the sponsoring state. This was 
dropped in Beeby VI.
This chambered voting system means that neither claimants nor non-claimants have an 
absolute veto. However, neither can each group be ‘out-voted’. In this respect they are 
treated equally. However, this provision modifies the accepted norm in the Treaty and 
consultative process where claimant (and non-claimant) interests are protected by 
consensus. It does so to the potential disadvantage of the claimants some of whom at 
least wished to maintain an absolute veto over decision-making. In this context, there is 
no rule that the claimant majority must include the claimant to the area over which the 
regulatory committee has competence and no procedure for a Party to declare itself not 
bound by regulatory committee decisions against its wishes.27 It is therefore technically 
possible for the required majority of three of the four claimants not to include the
23. A non-claimant cannot use its membership of a regulatory committee or its conduct of minerals 
activity either on the continental shelf or the continent proper, to argue that the relevant claimant 
is relinquishing its sovereign rights to control access to its resources. Neither can a claimant use 
the argument in reverse.
24. Given that both states maintain that their activities in the Antarctic provide them with a basis of 
territorial claim, this participation in all regulatory committees could raise some interesting 
theoretical legal debates about the strength of their possible claims if the Treaty should ever 
collapse. They were referred to as the two members which "at the time of entry into force of the 
Antarctic Treaty, maintained the largest presence in Antarctica" a reference which was inserted 
in Beeby III and later dropped.
25. It would also have been difficult to include one of the superpowers and exclude the other from 
this guaranteed position on all regulatory commiuees.
26. In other words, three out of the four claimants and four out of the six non-claimants.
27. As in the opt-out clause in CCAMLR, for example.
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relevant claimant. It is unlikely, however, that any claimant would refuse to support 
another claimant in respect of its territory. Such a refusal would carry the implication 
of interference in the exercise of territorial rights as well as raising the prospect of a 
reciprocal withdrawal of support at some time in the future. Thus claimant solidarity in 
this respect rests on diffuse reciprocity.
The claimant states also argued that they should prepare any management schemes for 
activity in their area, a proposal that was included in Beeby I.28 The pro-mining states 
would have preferred that the management scheme be drawn up by the Operator and the 
Sponsoring State and submitted to the regulatory committee with the application for an 
exploration permit. In an attempt to forestall suggestions that regulatory committees 
should automatically include any relevant mining states, which the claimants perceived 
as an erosion of their power, they modified their preferred position and proposed that a 
technical subcommittee of the regulatory committee should discharge be responsible for 
the management scheme.29 The rules adopted provide that regulatory committees must 
have recourse to the Sponsoring State and the relevant claimants and, as may be 
required, one or two additional members of the regulatory committee in preparing the 
management scheme (article 46). Given that the management scheme has to be 
accepted by a majority of the claimant states it makes sense to have them involved in its 
preparation. The decision to issue a development permit, however, is made by the 
whole regulatory committee (article 54).
Claimants and economic rights
Claimant concerns about their rights to economic benefits, such as royalties and taxes, 
were also an important part of the internal accommodation. During the negotiations 
they advanced proposals for revenue-sharing as well as for control over inspectors and 
other aspects of compliance. They wanted at least a 50 percent levy on any taxes on 
royalties and taxes upon other revenue to accrue to them (Triggs 1988:208). The non­
claimant states argued that the Sponsoring State should have the right to tax any 
revenues. In determining the disposition of surplus revenue the Commission must
ensure that the interests of the members of Regulatory Committees 
having the most direct interest in the matter in relation to the areas in 
question are respected in any disposition of that surplus (article 35(7)(b); 
my emphasis).
While this does not refer specifically to the claimants it can be interpreted in this light. 
However it can also be interpreted to refer to any state which is sponsoring minerals
28. Developing countries opposed this provision, concerned that they would have almost no 
influence over the management scheme.
This tactic was not successful, however, in preventing automatic membership for relevant 
mining states, although this does apply only while that state is sponsoring specific activities.
29.
212
activity in that area. The claimants were therefore unsuccessful in securing explicit 
reference in the Convention to their right to a share of revenues from minerals activities 
but do not specifically cede taxing rights to ‘foreign’ governments.30
Claimants and jurisdiction
Another difficult question with implications for the accommodation between claimants 
and non-claimants was the question of jurisdiction in the area covered by each 
regulatory committee. In other words, whose laws would apply to private enterprises 
and their employees engaged in minerals activity.31 The claimants would have 
preferred claimant law. West Germany (a likely mining state) argued that the law of the 
sponsoring state should apply. At the January 1988 meeting the USSR, Poland and the 
US suggested a compromise to the effect that if jurisdictional disputes arose, then the 
parties should consult.32 The Convention effectively adopts this approach and thus 
leaves the question unanswered. The management scheme is required to include 
reference to the applicable law only "to the extent necessary" (article 47(q)). This 
follows the Treaty system practice of avoiding difficult questions or leaving them to be 
dealt with at a later date. It is likely that applicable jurisdiction would follow the 
unstated practice of the Treaty by which nationals are subject to the law of their own 
state, or to the law of the sponsoring state in the case of a joint venture or where the 
operator is not from the sponsoring state.
Claimants and non-claimants revisited
The Convention manages skilfully to maintain the compromise between the claimants 
and non-claimants. Neither group attained its preferred outcome but that was unlikely 
from the beginning.
30. Argentina and Chile made explicit declarations on signing the Convention on economic benefits 
as understood in article 35. Argentina identified the claimants as those with "the most direct 
interest" (Beck 1991:249). Chile expressed its understanding that nothing in the Convention 
impeded or affected agreements which the claimants might negotiate "to give effect to the 
economic benefits to which they were entitled (Beck 1991:249). Paul Keating, then Treasurer of 
Australia, suggested in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the UK and France had 
conceded at Wellington instead of continuing with Australia to press for a specific revenue share 
to be specified in the Convention. Their decision, he said, reflected the favourable outcome in 
respect of equity participation (that is, no formal requirement for Third World participation in 
consortia) and their position as major potential explorers and developers in Antarctica (P 
Keating [letter] 1988).
31. As chapter two indicated, the question of jurisdiction for anyone other than inspectors was 
effectively sidestepped in the Treaty so that all states could continue to exercise jurisdiction on 
their own grounds.
32. Jurisdictional disputes are specifically excluded from the formal dispute settlement procedures 
established in the Convention. The Convention echoes the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty in 
providing simply for the disputing parties to consult together with a view to reaching a mutually 
acceptable solution on disputes over jurisdiction (article 7(3)).
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The claimants made concessions on their preferred position on control over resources 
and possibly, in so doing, over the strength of their claims to territory. As Triggs 
(1985:204) suggests, with respect to the inclusion in the Convention of the article IV 
provisions, "it is doubtful that any such provision could protect the claimant states 
against a conclusion that their sovereignty in Antarctica, if it exists, has been 
diminished, were they to ratify a minerals regime which gives access to third states to 
resources within their claimant territory".
Claimant concessions were, primarily, to the likely mining non-claimants, rather than to 
the non-claimants generally although a clear answer to the question of whether either 
group lost or gained disproportionately is elusive. The Convention leaves much of the 
detail of the compromise between claimants and non-claimants still to be hammered out 
on a case-by-case basis once minerals activity begins. The decision-making procedures 
established under the Convention, especially in the regulatory committees, ensure that 
both claimants and non-claimants (especially mining non-claimants) have the 
opportunity to continue to press their particular interests.
Area of applicability
As well as the specific questions of influence in the institutions of the Convention and 
authority over resource activity, the sovereignty issue was also an important factor in 
determining the area of applicability of the Convention. The Parties had to confront the 
disputed status of the continental shelf (where much of the hydrocarbon potential was 
thought to lie) and the rights of the claimants, as coastal states, to declare Exclusive 
Economic Zones.
The continental shelf is contiguous with land and is thus, in international law, part of 
the territory of a coastal state, rather than part of the deep seabed which lies beyond 
national jurisdiction. For the claimants, therefore, the Antarctic continental shelf was 
territory under their national jurisdiction. The non-claimant position denies the exercise 
of national, and therefore coastal state, jurisdiction in the Antarctic. However, under 
the Law of the Sea Convention, resources in the deep seabed and subsoil thereof beyond 
national jurisdiction are part of the global commons.33 Thus if no national jurisdiction 
is judged to exist in the Antarctic, then the continental shelf, technically, shares the 
legal status of the deep seabed. The logical outcome of this could well be that the 
authority of the International SeaBed Authority (ISBA) established by UNCLOS to 
manage deep seabed resources for the benefit of the international community could
33. The Law of the Sea Convention is not yet in force and so it might be disputed to what extent it 
creates customary international law with respect to the deep seabed and the common heritage 
principle. Nevertheless, with respect to the Antarctic, the dispute was not whether the deep 
seabed was a global commons, but where the deep seabed stopped with respect to a continent 
argued by much of the international community to be beyond national jurisdiction.
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extend to the land margins of the Antarctic continent. The non-claimants shared the 
claimant opposition to this proposition, but were reluctant to agree to anything that 
appeared to give legitimacy to the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction in the Antarctic.
In defining the area of applicability the general principles of the Convention apply to 
the Antarctic Treaty area (article 5(1)). On the area in which authority over regulatory 
activity may be exercised, the consultative parties adopted a legal cleverness which 
avoids any direct mention of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf but 
which nevertheless provides that the Parties jointly exercise regulatory control over off­
shore areas. Article 5(2) specifies that
the Convention shall regulate Antarctic mineral resource activities which 
take place on the continent of Antarctica and all Antarctic islands, 
including all ice shelves, south of 60‘South latitude and in the seabed 
and subsoil o f adjacent offshore areas up to the deep seabed (my 
emphasis).34
Adjacent offshore areas are therefore distinguished from the deep seabed. The deep 
seabed is defined in article 5(3) as
the seabed and subsoil beyond the geographic extent of the continental 
shelf as the term continental shelf is defined in accordance with 
international law (my emphasis).35
Thus, when these articles are read together, the continental shelf (which is not part of 
the deep seabed) can be equated with adjacent offshore areas over which the Parties 
assert regulatory control (but do so without any reference to coastal state jurisdiction). 
While the continental shelf is not explicitly defined in article 5(2) as part of the 
continent (in the way that ice-shelves are) neither is it excluded from regulatory 
coverage.36 The Convention also effectively ensures that decisions on regulating the 
continental shelf stem from the authority of the Commission which comprises the 
consultative parties acting collectively.
Under international law coastal state rights to the continental shelf are inherent (Triggs 
1987b:90). No formal declaration of sovereignty is required. Therefore any assertion 
by a claimant that it is exercising jurisdiction over the continental shelf of its territory
34. The Final Act noted that the area of regulation does not extend to the continental shelf of islands 
situated north of 60*South.
35. The Final Act noted that the geographic extent of the continental shelf would be determined by 
reference to paragraphs 1 to 7 of article 76 of UNCLOS.
36. The continent is thus, to some extent, implicitly defined by what it is not (that is, it is not deep 
seabed) rather than what it is. Nevertheless these articles do not provide any justification for the 
Treaty Parties collective right to exercise jurisdiction (or regulatory control) over "adjacent 
offshore areas".
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would technically not contravene article IV(2) of the Antarctic Treaty which forbids any 
extension of claim (although it may well be taken to contravene the spirit of the 
compromise).37
The situation on the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction, and enlarging of a claim, 
differs with respect to EEZs. Under international law a coastal state must declare its 
jurisdiction over an EEZ. In the Antarctic, such a declaration by a claimant could well 
be interpreted as an enlargement of a claim.38 The Convention makes no reference to 
this matter and thus continues the Treaty practice of avoiding difficult jurisdictional 
questions.
The compromise on sovereignty is effectively maintained. However the solution in the 
Convention does focus on the exercise of joint regulatory authority, and thus has the 
potential to contribute to the erosion of the claimant position which emphasises 
individual regulatory authority.
The internal accommodation: institutions, rules and interests 
As observed above, the cleavages between the claimants and non-claimants over the 
exercise of sovereignty, while fundamental, were not the only competing interests that 
had to be addressed. Others included the relationship between the consultative parties 
and the non-consultative parties, and developing and developed states. The task of 
elaborating an institutional compromise which would meet both the collective and 
individual interests of the negotiating parties was difficult. Further, whatever 
compromise was acceptable to all parties also had to embody rules and procedures that 
would function satisfactorily once the Convention came into effect.
The focus of this settling of competing interests was in the membership rules and the 
decision-making rules. The normative and procedural dimensions of the Antarctic 
regime favoured control in consultative party hands, an effectively restricted 
membership and consensus decision-making. With the exception of consensus 
decision-making the parties adhered to these unwritten rules of the Antarctic regime in 
elaborating the Minerals Convention.
Membership rules
Membership rules were important with respect both to accession to the Convention and 
to participation within the institutions of the Convention as each state, or group of
37. It does, however, raise the issue of whether claimants will be recognised as such on regulatory 
committees when the area under control is an offshore area. However most of the claims extend 
in their delimitation to (or beyond) 60*South, thus including the continental shelf.
Such actions would have extended the area under national (coastal state) jurisdiction.38.
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states, sought relative power to protect its interests. The general membership rules give 
priority to the Antarctic Treaty Parties and thus serve to tie the Convention to the 
Antarctic Treaty. Specific rules on participation within the Convention give priority to 
the consultative parties. There was a general uncompromising opposition by the 
consultative parties to non-consultative party (NCP) wishes for a share in decision­
making.
The NCPs were unsuccessful in their quest for a substantial role within the Convention. 
This was because they had no formal role in the minerals negotiations and thus had 
limited bargaining power. As noted in chapter five, they were generally excluded from 
contact groups where the key issues were thrashed out. Further, the negotiating process 
was well underway by the time they were invited to attend the special consultative 
meeting.
While the Convention provides, in principle, that participation in mineral resource 
activities should be open to all states which have an interest in such activities and are 
prepared to subscribe to a regime governing them, only states which are already 
Antarctic Treaty parties may accede to the Convention and participate in its institutions. 
Thus subscribing to a regime governing minerals activity requires also subscribing to 
the Antarctic Treaty. From the consultative party point of view, which is that the 
Minerals Convention is an integral part of the Antarctic Treaty system, this was logical 
and acceptable. It is also a way of maintaining ‘ownership’ of the Antarctic issue. 
From the point of view of non-Treaty states there is something of an internal 
contradiction in a convention that purports to be open to all but which puts restrictions 
on that openness.
Further, while no state may sign the Convention unless it is already an Antarctic Treaty 
signatory, any state which has signed the Antarctic Treaty but has not subsequently 
signed the Convention, nevertheless has the right to participate to some extent in the 
institutions of the Convention.
The institutional membership rules mirror the Antarctic Treaty. Original signatories to 
the Convention automatically meet the requirements for permanent Commission 
membership, whereas others may hold membership only while they meet an activities 
criteria. Although the Minerals Convention is separate from the Antarctic Treaty, 
institutional, and thus decision-making, power resides directly with the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties.
Each Party to the Convention which was a consultative party on the day the Convention 
opened for signature (25 November 1988) automatically qualifies for Commission
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membership. Any other Party to the Convention which is actively engaged in research 
that is directly relevant to decisions about Antarctic minerals resource activities may 
become a member of the Commission (article 19(2)(6)).39 Where that Party is a 
consultative party,40 then it is deemed to have met the requirements for Commission 
membership unless more than one-third of existing Commission members object.41 
Any Party to the Convention which sponsors exploration or development and which 
does not fall into either of the two categories above (most likely a NCP)42 may be a 
member of the Commission only while the appropriate management scheme is in force 
and only if its membership is accepted by all Commission members.43 In other words, 
non-consultative parties are treated differently from consultative parties in the 
institutions of the Convention.
Any party to the Convention which is a non-consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty 
must, in applying for Commission membership, declare its intention to abide by 
recommendations made under the Antarctic Treaty.44 This serves to tie participation in 
the institutions of the Convention to the Antarctic Treaty and widen adherence to its 
principles and rules. Any Convention Party which meets none of the criteria for 
Commission membership activities may become an observer to the Commission. So 
too, however, may any Antarctic Treaty party which is not a party to CRAMRA.
Membership of the powerful regulatory committees is determined by the Commission 
(which is dominated by the consultative parties). Given the complicated formula 
established for regulatory committee membership,45 NCPs are unlikely to sit on a 
regulatory committee unless they are sponsoring minerals activities.
39. This refers to Treaty parties which were not ATCPs on 25 November 1988 - in other words a 
state which attains consultative party status after that date, or a non-consultative party.
40. In which case it would have attained that status after 25 November 1988. It is more likely that a 
state in this category would be a new ATCP rather than a NCP given that consultative party 
status under the Treaty requires certain activities criterion, particularly scientific research, to be 
m et It may also apply to a state in the process of applying for consultative party status.
41. In earlier Beeby drafts this category of membership was specifically defined as "each other Party 
... during such time as it is an Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party".
42. That is, it was neither an ATCP on 25 November 1988, nor is it engaged in activity relevant to 
decisions on mineral resource activity.
43. These categories of membership were effectively established in Beeby I although the relevant 
article went through a series of redraftings which distinguished between those Parties which 
were ATCPs at the time the Convention was adopted, and those which attained that status 
subsequently.
44. Under Treaty practice, NCPs are not bound by consultative meeting recommendations unless 
they specifically declare themselves bound.
45. Each 10 member regulatory committee must include four claimant states (including the 
claimants) to the area over which the committee has competence), both the US and the USSR, 
as well as four other non-claimants. Of those 10, three must be developing states. States which 
sponsor mining in the area must also be represented.
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Membership of the Advisory Committee (which is not a decision-making body) is open 
to all Parties to the Convention.46 However, the meeting schedule and rules of 
procedure of the Advisory Committee are subject to approval by the Commission and 
are, therefore, under the control of the consultative parties.47 The consultative parties 
also rejected a proposal at the Tokyo 1987 meeting that the Advisory Committee, to 
which NCPs belong, should be able to declare a management scheme unacceptable.48 
Thus the authority of the institutions in which the NCPs participate as of right was 
diluted during the negotiations.
The Special Meeting of Parties49 to which many ATCPs were completely opposed, has 
an advisory role only with respect to the decision to identify an area. The NCPs wanted 
a substantial role for the SMP and were supported by China and the USSR in this. At 
the Rio meeting (March 1985) Beeby proposed that the decision to on open an area 
should be made not only on the basis of a consensus among consultative parties but also 
a majority of NCPs, with the decision taken not by the Commission but by the Special 
Meeting of Parties. The ATCPs were apparently "extremely hostile" (Antarctic News 
#4, 1986:3) to the idea and moved to block any power-sharing. The creation of the 
SMP was itself a concession to NCPs, but the only one they were successful in 
achieving. Unless they are sponsoring minerals activity, NCPs are unlikely to be 
members of either of the decision-making institutions of the Convention. They 
therefore have little effective power in the minerals regime.
The primacy of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties on the Commission, which 
takes the decision to open an area, and on the regulatory committees (responsible for the 
management scheme and the development of specific guidelines and the issuance of 
exploration and development permits) means that mineral resource activities continue to 
be under the effective control of the consultative parties. Thus their interests and their 
values, and their ‘ownership’ of Antarctic issues, prevail. The consultative parties 
justified their right to make exclusive decisions on the minerals issue, vis-a-vis the 
NCPs and non-Treaty parties, by reference to their scientific and diplomatic experience 
in the Antarctic and their obligations under the Treaty to maintain peace and stability in 
the region and to protect the Antarctic environment.
Decision-making rules
Consensus decision-making under the Antarctic Treaty ensured that any measures 
adopted were not contrary to the interests of any one state or group of states. Where
46. That is both consultative parties and non-consultative parties.
47. Observer status is granted to any non-Party which is nevertheless a signatory to the Antarctic 
Treaty or CCAMLR.
48. This was included in Beeby IV but was dropped in Beeby V.
49. This includes all parties to the Convention. The SMP is not a formal decision-making body.
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that ruled was modified, as in CCAMLR for example (see chapter four), decisions 
likely to affect fundamental political or economic interests were still subject to 
consensus. There was a similar need to ensure that fundamental interests could be 
protected under CRAMRA and that the decision-making rules would be workable.
There were differences of opinion during the negotiations on whether the unanimity rule 
should apply to decision-making under the Convention. The Soviet Union for example 
favoured a broad consensus approach to decision-making as well as opposing unfettered 
power for the regulatory committees. Australia and the US argued that the possibility 
of a veto by any one state should be avoided (Triggs 1984a:542), although they 
probably did so for different reasons. On the one hand, the claimants (including 
Australia) were concerned that under a consensus rule they could be denied access to 
resources in the areas of their claims. Pro-development states such as the United States 
feared that a consensus rule would provide an opportunity for proposals to be blocked 
on environmental grounds. A US Department of State official explained that the 
"consensus requirement was particularly difficult for the United States to accept since it 
... has an interest in access to mineral resources (if they exist)" (Scully [letter] 1989).
From a procedural perspective, a requirement for consensus in such a complex decision­
making process as that established under CRAMRA might well have resulted in 
paralysis. Early Beeby drafts provided for a two-thirds majority within the Commission 
even on the decision to open an area and on financial issues.50 A proposal was made at 
the final negotiating session for a qualified majority rule to apply to the identification of 
an area for exploration and development (ECO XLVIII(6), 1988).
Consensus is not adopted as the general rule in either of the decision-making 
institutions of the Convention.51 Consensus, which is defined as "the absence of a 
formal objection" (article 22(5)), is required only in the Commission and only for the 
important threshold decision to identify an area for possible exploration and 
development,52 for the adoption of the budget and for decisions on budgetary and
50. A proposal was made at the Rio meeting that the decision to open an area should be made by the 
SMP under a consensus rule (see text above).
51. There is, however, nothing in the rules to prevent the Parties seeking to attain a consensus. The 
Advisory Committee is not a decision-making institution. The only reference to voting 
procedures in the Advisory Committee is to a two-thirds majority required to adopt rules of 
procedure, which are subject to the Commission’s approval anyway. In presenting its reports to 
the Commission and any regulatory committee, the Advisory Committee is required to reflect 
the conclusions reached as well as all the views expressed. Similar guidelines apply to the 
Special Meeting of Parties.
52. If the Chair of the Commission determines that an objection is likely with respect to the decision 
to open an area for minerals activity, then he (or she) shall consult with members of the 
Commission and convene those members most directly interested to seek to reconcile those 
differences and produce a generally acceptable proposal.
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related matters. Matters of substance in the Commission (including whether a matter is 
one of substance) require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. A simple 
majority rule applies to procedural issues within the Commission.
Although decision-making in the regulatory committees does not require a consensus 
the rules ensure that neither claimants nor non-claimants can dominate. On substantive 
issues a chambered voting system applies (described above). A two-thirds majority is 
required53 but decisions to approve a management scheme or to issue a development 
permit must include three of the four claimants and four of the six non-claimants on the 
regulatory committee. Decisions on revising the guidelines or general requirements 
applicable to the area for which the regulatory committee is responsible must be 
approved by at least two claimants and at least three non-claimants.54
As noted above, there were economic as well as political interests to be taken into 
account in settling the internal accommodation. In this respect, the interests of the 
likely mining states were set against those of the claimants (discussed above) and 
against the interests of developing states within the Treaty system.
The interests of the mining states
The likely mining states (Japan, West Germany, the US and the claimants France and 
the UK), and mining industry interests generally, were keen that the Convention 
facilitate minerals activity and, particularly, non-discriminatory access to mineral 
resources. In this respect their interests differed markedly from the claimant and the 
developing states. They were also keen to ensure security of ownership of any 
resources found or extracted, security of investment and protection against arbitrary 
interference with minerals activity.
As noted above, in the discussion on claimant interests, the potential mining states were 
successful in arguing that any regulatory committee should include states sponsoring or 
conducting minerals activity in the area of competence. Thus they had a guaranteed 
role in decision-making. The terms and conditions of management schemes guarantee 
title over resources to the relevant Operator as a result of exploration or development 
(but not prospecting). Operators are also permitted to retain commercially sensitive and 
valuable data. There are no formal requirement for joint ventures with, or technology 
transfer to, developing states.
However the mining states do not have the right, which they sought, to draft 
management schemes prior to their presentation to regulatory committees. Further,
53. In early Beeby drafts this was to be a simply majority.
54. These rules do not prevent a regulatory committee from endeavouring to reach a consensus.
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exploration and development permits may be cancelled in the event of likely (or actual) 
environmental damage.
The interest of states with established minerals industries in seeking anti-subsidy 
provisions in the Convention was not met. Australia was particularly active, but 
unsuccessful, in arguing for Beeby III provisions which required the conduct of 
minerals activity in an "economically rational manner" to be retained. The Final Act 
contains a rather general, and probably unenforceable, suggestion which notes that 
"unfair economic practices including certain forms of subsidies could cause adverse 
effects to the interests of Parties ... and that such effects should be addressed in the 
context of the relevant multilateral agreements" (SCM IV 1988c:2-3). Those 
agreements are not specified but the reference is doubtless to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.55
The interests of the developing states
As well as settling the balance between the interests of the claimants and non-claimants 
and the relative power of the consultative and non-consultative parties, the interests of 
the developing countries within the Treaty system had to be given some weight. Some 
attention to the interests of developing states within the Convention would provide the 
consultative parties with an argument (not altogether water-tight) to deflect criticism 
that they were a group of western industrialised states monopolising decision-making 
on, and the resources of, the Antarctic.
The relative strength of the less-developed consultative parties grew as the negotiations 
progressed. The ranks of the ATCPs swelled to include Brazil and India from 1983 and 
China and Uruguay from 1985.56 The developing countries established their own 
power base within the negotiations and eventually became a group to be reckoned with 
(Andersen 1991:106).
Their interests primarily lay in participation in resource exploitation and some 
distribution of benefits as well as a say in decision-making.57 These interests were in
55. Parties to the Convention are to determine how such multilateral agreements will apply to 
Antarctic mineral resource activities.
56. Argentina and Chile were also taken to fall within the ‘developing country’ definition, even 
though the term is not defined. However their interests were dominated by their claimant status. 
Developing countries who were NCPs at the time included Cuba, Ecuador, Papua New Guinea 
and Peru. No African or Middle-Eastern countries are signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, and 
those Asian countries which are would no longer be considered developing (with the possible 
exception of North Korea).
57. At the plenary session of ATCM-XIH (1985) Peru (a NCP) observed that "as a traditional 
mining country, Peru is particularly concerned that the future regime for ... Antarctic resources 
should take into account the interests of mineral producing developing countries" (Final Report 
1985:195). Peru also referred to the need to safeguard the regional ecology.
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conflict with those of the technically advanced states, particularly the likely mining 
states, who were determined not to be required to share technology or to enter into 
mandatory joint ventures with less developed states.58
There are references throughout the Convention to the interests of developing countries 
which are party to the Convention but nothing on developing countries which are not 
signatories.59 International participation in Antarctic mineral resource activities by 
interested Parties to the Convention, in particular developing countries (whether ATCPs 
or NCPs), is to be encouraged although exactly how is not specified. At least three 
members of each regulatory committee must be developing countries.60 Brazil, China, 
India and Uruguay tabled this proposal at the Montevideo meeting to secure some 
balanced representation on the regulatory committees and a role in decision-making. 
The Final Act also noted that it was desirable that the two-third majority for regulatory 
committee decisions should include at least one developing country.61
Some recognition is given to the difficulty of participation in Antarctic activity faced by 
developing countries. In disposing of surplus revenue (from fees, levies, and other 
payments) the Commission is required, inter alia, to promote participation in scientific 
research in Antarctica (especially related to the environment and resources) by all 
Parties but in particular by developing country Parties.62 However this does not 
specifically facilitate participation in minerals activities.
Developing country ATCPs, supported by the Netherlands and East Germany, joined 
the NCPs in advocating a stronger role for the Advisory Committee which they saw as 
an important source of advice and assistance in areas in which they did not have 
expertise.
58. The American Petroleum Institute expressed its views forcefully. "With the debacle of 
UNCLOS HI fresh in our collective minds, the spectre of creating formalised institutions that 
would encourage joint ventures with developing countries should be anathema" (API, [n.d.]).
59. For a developing country to become a party to the Convention, it must also become a signatory 
to the Antarctic Treaty.
60. They may be claimant or non-claimant members. It was initially included in the drafts as one or 
two developing countries from among the claimants, and one or two from among the non­
claimants. The final number adopted was argued (SCM-IV 1988c:5) to reflect the balance 
between developed and developing countries at the time. The Final Act recognised that if the 
balance was altered significantly there would be a case for an amendment to the membership 
provision.
61. The entry into force requirements of the Convention require ratification from five developing 
countries who participated as ATCPs in the final session of the SCM. As this is normally taken 
to include Argentina and Chile (whose signatures were also required as claimant states) the 
others who meet this criteria would be Brazil, China, India or Uruguay.
62. In 1984 Chile suggested that a fund be established under the Minerals Convention to facilitate 
developing nations participation in Antarctic science (Kimball 1985a: 10).
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The developing countries also argued that, in the authorisation of minerals operations, 
priority should be given to those operations which included opportunities for 
international participation and developing state involvement.63 In dealing with 
competing applications for exploration permits regulatory committees are required, all 
other things being equal, to give priority to applicants with the broadest participation 
including developing countries. It may therefore be in the interests of the likely mining 
countries to involve developing countries in some way.64 The Commission is also to 
elaborate joint ventures and other participatory opportunities with particular relevance 
to developing countries which are party to the regime. While developing states got very 
little from the Convention in terms of assistance for minerals activity, their guaranteed 
position on regulatory committees would enable them to continue to advance their 
interests.
The external accommodation
In spite of claims to the contrary, the external accommodation was not high on the 
agenda of concerns. The two major aspects of this related to the interests of non-Treaty 
parties (discussed earlier in this chapter) and some role for international organisations 
including non-govemmental environmental organisations. NGOs interests in the 
environmental dimension of the minerals convention are discussed later in this chapter.
The interests o f all  ' mankind'
The consultative parties adopted the principle, echoing the Antarctic Treaty, that "in 
dealing with the question of mineral resources [they] should not prejudice the interests 
of all mankind [sic]". The Convention pays some lip-service to these interests but 
makes no concrete moves in this direction.
The interests of humankind, which the consultative parties sought not to prejudice, have 
never been clearly specified. In the 1960s and 1970s the consultative parties argued 
that the interests of the international community with respect to the Antarctic were met, 
first, by the peace and stability which the Antarctic Treaty (and, by implication, the 
consultative parties) had brought to the region and, second, by advances in scientific 
knowledge (which was to be made freely available) as a result of scientific cooperation.
The exploitation of minerals resources, more so than marine resources, raised the 
question of access by non-Treaty states to the benefits of resource activity in an area 
they argued to be a global commons (see chapter five). Non-Treaty states charged that
63. Other states stressed that financial soundness, technological expertise and a commitment to 
environmental protection should be determining factors (Newman 1987:432).
64. In Beeby III and IV procedures for dealing with competing applications for exploration permits 
were to be decided on a first come, first served basis.
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Antarctic resources were thus the common heritage of humankind and that any 
decisions about their management should be made by the whole international 
community, not a self-selected, predominantly industrialised part of it. Indeed, as 
chapter five has suggested, it was the minerals issue more than any other which 
mobilised this external attention. That interest arose in the context of the demands for a 
New International Economic Order in the 1970s and the negotiation of the third UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea with its related exposition of the common heritage 
principle.
This argument was not favoured by the consultative parties who were, nevertheless, 
aware of the need to make some concession to these interests to provide an argument on 
which to base the legitimacy of the Convention and their right to negotiate it. The 
Convention notes that
the Antarctic Treaty system has proved effective in promoting 
international harmony in furtherance of the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations ...
it is in the interest of all mankind [sic] that the Antarctic Treaty shall 
continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes ... [and]
the effective regulation of Antarctic mineral resource activities is in the 
interests of the international community as a whole
Beyond these general principles, there were differences of opinion among the 
consultative parties on how to manage the external accommodation. In particular there 
was debate on whether an open participation regime should be established or whether 
joint ventures or a fund to assist with scientific work should be actively encouraged.
The need to "take into account the interests of the international community as a whole" 
is included in the specific objectives and principles of the regime (article 2(3)(g)). Yet 
there is no concession, beyond these general principles, to the demands of non-Treaty 
states. While participation in Antarctic mineral resource activities "should be open to 
all states which have an interest in such activities", accession to the Convention is, as 
already noted, limited to signatories of the Antarctic Treaty (article 61). The question 
of developing state participation was dealt with as part of the internal accommodation. 
There is nothing in the Convention on the general sharing of benefits with the 
international community. Woolcott argues (1985b:23) that the idea of revenue-sharing 
with the international community was premature because development of mineral
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resources was so far away. However, neither the claimants nor the potential mining 
states were likely to relinquish any economic benefits of resource exploitation.65
International organisations
Both non-Treaty states and NGOs criticised the secrecy of the Treaty system and called 
for procedures to encourage greater input from the international community and 
improved transparency and public accountability on the part of the consultative parties.
The general practice of the ATCPs was to discourage close working relationships with 
other organisations unless such cooperation was essential to the conduct of activities in 
Antarctica and only where that interest was limited to scientific and technical issues.66 
However, as Kimball argues, (1983a:7) "[t]he ATCPs ... can no longer ignore those who 
insist upon public accountability in this area, because otherwise they undermine their 
own credibility as responsibly exercising obligations to protect the Antarctic 
environment".
The usual approach was modified to a degree in CRAMRA, in line with a slowly 
changing attitude among consultative parties to their relationships with organisations 
outside the Treaty system and on the opening up of the Treaty system.67 They provided 
for limited participation by international organisation in the procedures of the 
Convention and some degree of transparency although a great deal of this is 
discretionary.
The views of interested international organisations may be considered by the Advisory 
Committee on matters before it. The Committee may establish procedures to transmit 
relevant information to such organisations although this process is subject to review by 
the Commission. Information and advice from other scientists and expens or scientific 
organisations may also be sought by the Advisory Committee on an ad hoc basis.
NGOs wanted procedures for the participation of interested conservation organisations 
in the processes of the Convention. The Commission shall, as appropriate, cooperate 
with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(IUCN) and "with other relevant international organisations, including non­
governmental organisations". These organisations may be accorded observer status on
65. On 8 June 1988, at the request of Malaysia, the UN circulated a statement from 19 states 
expressing "their utmost regret and deep concern" about the adoption of the Minerals 
Convention (Beck 1989c:25).
66. As in the case of the World Meteorological Organisation for example,
67. Those changes were discussed in chapter two. The IUCN was invited to ATCM-XIII as an 
observer. The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition was granted observer status to CCAMLR 
in 1988 after many years of lobbying.
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the Commission and the Advisory Committee (and, by default, to the Special Meeting 
of Parties).68 The Commission may also enter into agreements with such organisations. 
SCAR thought it that it should be given observer status on the Commission and the 
Advisory Committee (Final Report 1989:190). While SCAR is not specifically 
mentioned by name in this context, it is identified (article 34) as a component of the 
Treaty system with which the parties to the Convention should cooperate. Generally, 
there was little formal role for SCAR in the institutions and procedures of the 
Convention.
Article 34 also establishes that the Commission shall cooperate with the United Nations, 
its relevant specialised agencies and "as appropriate, any international organisation 
which may have competence in respect of mineral resources in areas adjacent to those 
covered by this Convention". This is an oblique reference to the International SeaBed 
Authority established under the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
However these provisions in the Convention are vague and susceptible to interpretation. 
Granting observer status is the prerogative of the consultative parties in accordance with 
the rules of the Convention. It is they who will interpret what "as appropriate" means. 
Further, the reference to non-governmental organisations is not specifically directed 
towards environmental interest groups. Rather, it enables working relationships to be 
established with organisations such as SCAR, SCOR and the IUCN.
On the whole, however, like the NCPs and non-Treaty states, international organisations 
were marginalised in the Convention.
Transparency and accountability
The rules on public availability of information under the Convention are more extensive 
than those adopted for the consultative process. The Commission is required to give 
advance public notice of matters on which it has requested advice from the Advisory 
Committee. This would include the decision to open an area for potential exploration 
and development The Advisory Committee is also required to give advance public 
notice of meetings and matters before it in order to permit the receipt and consideration 
of views from international organisations.
The Commission must also ensure that a publicly available record is maintained of its 
meetings and decisions, and of information, notifications and reports submitted to it 
including, therefore, Environmental Impact Assessments (ELAs) and regulatory
68. It is unclear what role has been ascribed to observers, but under the consultative process, 
observers (whether NCPs or other invited observers) have been able to speak at meetings 
although they do not participate in formal decision-making.
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committee monitoring reports. The Advisory Committee must also make public reports 
of its meetings and decisions but they must first be circulated to all Parties and 
observers. Regulatory committees are similarly obliged to ensure that a record is 
available of all their decisions and management schemes in force. However 
commercially sensitive data is exempted from this requirement. This includes the 
results of prospecting, which is often little different from scientific geological 
research.69
However there are no guidelines on the content of repons of meetings.70 These rules 
also do not require that any documents tabled at meetings be made public. Generally 
these transparency rules relate to the transmittal of information but not to procedures for 
public input. Further, the requirements are most limited with respect to the regulatory 
committees, which is where major decisions on exploration and development, as well as 
compliance, are taken. This has implications for public debate on environmental issues, 
as discussed below.
Protection of the environment under the Minerals Convention
Non-governmental environmental organisations
The environmental protection dimension of the negotiations was monitored closely by 
non-governmental organisations who, as described in chapter three, were active in 
challenging and exposing the environmental record of the Treaty system. They 
challenged the assumptions upon which the negotiation of the minerals convention were 
based. They suggested that the principle of environmental protection was inherently 
incompatible with the objectives of regulating minerals activity and that any impact on 
the environment was unacceptable. As Schofield argued (1976:20) "[L]ost somewhere 
in all the rhetoric ... is the very first question that ought to be asked about the possible 
exploitation of Antarctica’s mineral resources: not how, when or by whom, but whether 
to exploit them at all" (emphasis in original). NGOs argued that it was not possible to 
reconcile the two objectives of minerals activity and environmental protection.
This position shared by some in the system. Hambro (1974:223) argued "It is quite 
clear that any mining ... activity on a grand scale will give rise to pollution and will 
endanger the ecology of the continent and thereby be in contradiction with one of the 
underlying aims of the treaty system and in violation of several recommendations 
already adopted". Not all consultative parties accepted this view. The British Foreign 
Office argued that it did not accept "that environmental risks of Antarctic mining are
69. Geological research under the rules of the Antarctic Treaty, on the other hand, must be 
exchanged among the consultative parties at least (although this was not always fully observed 
in practice).
The Final Reports of consultative meetings, for example, are summaries of debates but do not 
provide detailed minutes.
70.
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intrinsically unacceptable" (FCO 1989b:2) although it did suggest that they could be 
unacceptable in any particular case.
NGOs also argued that exploitation of mineral resources, even under the auspices of an 
international agreement, threatened to "exacerbate tensions between claimants and non­
claimants, undermine the spirit of cooperation in scientific research and destabilise the 
security of the region" (ASOC 1989b:6).
The NGOs adopted a dual strategy during the negotiations. Generally they opposed the 
negotiation of a minerals convention, arguing instead that the Antarctic should be 
permanently off-limits to minerals activity and should be declared a World Park. 
However, activists who were close to the meetings, or who were on national 
delegations, lobbied within the Treaty system for stringent environmental protection 
mechanisms in the event (which seemed most likely at that stage) that the Convention 
was successfully negotiated and implemented.
As well as directing their attention to the negotiations themselves, NGOs also sought to 
influence the national policy decisions on minerals activity by lobbying at a domestic 
level, especially in those countries where they had access to the policy process, and by 
drawing public attention to the negotiations. Support was provided through 
transnational networks for national NGOs to keep them advised of the progress of the 
negotiations and to provide lobbying assistance.
A convention for protection or development?
The key dimensions of the internal accommodation were political and legal ones which 
sought to satisfy the interests of the Treaty parties in the institutional bargaining 
process. It was the solutions to these accommodations which gave shape to the 
Convention. However the consultative parties justified their negotiation of the Minerals 
Convention in part on the need to ensure that the fragile Antarctic environment would 
be protected if minerals activity went ahead, and their special ability and knowledge to 
undertake this task. Beeby emphasised that "the objective of the Antarctic countries 
during the course of [the] negotiations ... had always been to preserve and strengthen 
the ATS and to ensure that the unique and fragile environment should not be damaged 
by mining activity" (SCM-IV 1988a: 1; my emphasis).
The consultative parties argued that the growing interest in the mineral resources of the 
Antarctic would (if they took no action) result in an unregulated scramble which could 
have dire environmental consequences. The Convention, they suggested, was necessary 
to prevent this. NGOs disagreed with the logic of an ‘unregulated scramble’. They 
suggested that mining interests would be reluctant to undertake exploratory activities in
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the absence of any certainty of their rights to exploit any minerals found.71 This view 
has some support. Crabbe (1985:367) argues that "no private or government enterprise 
would be willing to commit vast sums of money for exploitation or development prior 
to the establishment of international agreements on minerals rights". Quilty72 suggests 
(1986-87:117) that the absence of a regime "allowing for secure tenure of title ... [is a] 
severe hindrance to commercial minerals exploitation". Wallace (1988a:9) cites the 
argument of a US oil consultant that "Antarctica does have the potential for large 
hydrocarbon reserves and the technical expertise is available. The sole hindrance is 
jurisdiction - from whom do we get a drilling permit" (my emphasis).
Whether intended or not, the practical effect of the Convention would be to provide a 
secure tenure of title over resources discovered to operators. If the Convention was 
based on the premise that minerals activity might occur at some stage, then it is doubtful 
that it could have avoided providing such rights for operators. Indeed, Beeby argued 
(1985:21) that a convention would "need to ensure that, if mining does take place ... 
those who undertake it have security of title [and] have their investment protected". In 
this respect, NGOs argued that the Convention was a precondition for development and 
were concerned that, once in place, mining industry interests would want to put it to the 
test.
The question of environmental protection principles and rules in the Minerals 
Convention was part of the internal accommodation to the extent that it set pro- 
development interests against environmental protection interests. It was also part of the 
external accommodation in its response to NGO arguments and public concerns. Two 
caveats must, however, be noted. First, positions among the consultative parties on 
protection of the environment were not cut and dried. All states were agreed that 
environmental protection rules were necessary - they differed on the extent of those 
rules. Second, as set out below, the Convention does indeed contain extensive and, in 
theory at least, strong provisions which are designed to factor environmental concerns 
into the decision-making process under the Convention.
However there are two areas of concern in this respect which relate to the question of 
regime efficiency and the record of compliance raised in chapter three. First, were the 
environmental rules adequate? Second, were the rules on monitoring, compliance and
71. NGOs argued that their argument on property rights was vindicated after they obtained, through 
the US Freedom of Information rules, a partially declassified 1975 National Security Council 
memo to the US President. With respect to economic interests in non-living resources, it 
suggests that US interests are to "facilitate an increase in the global supply of resources through 
(i) defining property rights to Antarctica [sic] mineral resources; (ii) ensuring reasonably 
conditions of investment consistent with US interests..." {Antarctic News #9, 1989:4) although 
those interests are also stated to include environmental protection.
72. Quilty is a scientist with the Australian Antarctic Division.
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enforcement were likely to ensure adequate implementation? On the first, the 
traditional Antarctic hierarchy of values which places political concerns, in the end, 
above environmental ones in the negotiations. Environmental rules and principles were 
watered down in the search for compromise on political issues. In the second case, the 
dominance of sovereignty norms once again placed limits on what states would accept 
in terms of monitoring and enforcement institutions and rules. Thus their ability to 
ensure compliance must be questioned.
Principles, rules and procedures
Recommendation XI-1 (which formally established the minerals negotiations) 
determined that any agreement on minerals activity had to include rules for the 
protection of the Antarctic environment and means for assessing the possible impact of 
mineral resource activities on the Antarctic environment in order to provide for 
informed decision-making.
There are extensive environmental principles and rules in the Convention which impose 
obligations on the Parties. The preambular paragraphs of the Convention refer to the
unique ecological, scientific and wilderness value of Antarctica and the 
importance of Antarctica to the global environment...
and note that
Antarctic mineral resource activities could adversely affect the Antarctic 
environment or dependent or associated ecosystems [and that] the 
protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems must be a basic consideration in decisions taken on possible 
Antarctic mineral resource activities (my emphasis).
Damage to the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated ecosystems is defined 
as
any impact on the living or non-living components of that environment 
or those ecosystems, including harm to the atmospheric, marine or 
terrestrial life, beyond that which is negligible or which has been 
assessed and judged to be acceptable pursuant to this Convention (article 
1(15)).
Therefore, in spite of an obligation to protect the environment, this article introduces the 
principle of acceptability of impact.
The general principles of the Convention (article 2) acknowledge the special 
responsibility of the consultative parties for the protection of the environment and the 
need to:
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(a) protect the Antarctic environment;
(b) respect Antarctica’s significance for, and influence on, the global 
environment;
(d) respect Antarctica’s scientific value and aesthetic and wilderness 
qualities; [and]
(e) ensure the safety of operations in Antarctica.
The Convention sets out more specific norms with respect to environmental protection 
in the event that minerals activity proceeds. No minerals activity may occur unless 
adequate information is available to enable informed judgements to be made about its 
possible environmental impact (article 4). Resource activity must not cause:
(a) significant adverse effects on air and water quality;
(b) significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial or marine 
environments;
(c) significant changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity 
of populations of species of fauna or flora;73
(d) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species, or 
populations of such species; or
(e) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of special biological, 
scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance.
Similarly, no activity may take place until it is judged that it would not cause 
"significant adverse effects on global or regional climate or weather patterns" (article 
4(3)). Technology and procedures must be available to ensure compliance with these 
norms and to ensure safe operations. Operators must demonstrate a capacity to respond 
effectively to accidents and to monitor key environmental parameters and ecosystem 
components. Thus environmental protection obligations are linked to a sufficiency of 
knowledge principle. However this is a problematic concept, as the experience of 
CCAMLR shows.
Unless otherwise specified, minerals activity is prohibited in any area designated as a 
Specially Protected Area (SPA) a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) or in any 
other protected area. The Commission may prohibit or restrict minerals activities in any 
area which, for historical, ecological, environmental, scientific or other reasons, it 
designates a protected area (article 13(2)). It may also designate a buffer zone around 
any area in which minerals activities are prohibited or restricted. The Commission is 
required, inter alia, to facilitate and promote the collection and exchange of scientific, 
technical and other information and research projects necessary to predict, detect and 
assess the possible environmental impact of resource activities, and to adopt measures
This principle was included in Beeby I, dropped in Beeby II and then reinstated. This 
reinstatement seems to have been on the insistence of Australia which tabled a paper at the 
Tokyo session proposing comprehensive principles including the protection of endangered 
species.
73.
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for the protection of the Antarctic environment and associated and dependent 
ecosystems. It is also required to keep the conduct of minerals activities under review 
with a view to safeguarding the protection of the Antarctic environment in the interests 
of all humankind.
The rules and procedures adopted generally embody a precautionary approach. Any 
request for the Commission to identify an area for possible exploration and 
development must include a detailed environmental impact assessment (article 
39(2)(e)). The same applies to applications for an exploration permit, which can be 
declined by the regulatory committee if it believes that consistency with the 
Convention, including its environmental provisions, cannot be ensured.
There were lengthy debates about the need for summary dispute settlement in 
emergency circumstances where, for example, environmental damage seemed 
imminent. Article 6(3) of the Annex to the Convention (which sets out procedures for 
convening an Arbitral Tribunal) establishes such a procedure for disputes relating to 
environmental protection measures, compliance, response action to environmental 
damage, inspection, non-discrimination, other uses of Antarctica, and prospecting. The 
Convention provides also that these matters may not be excluded from any of the 
disputes resolution procedures.
In his June 1988 press statement Beeby called these the "most stringent safeguards ever 
negotiated in an international treaty" (SCM-IV 1988b:2). He argued that the approval 
process was a rigorous one. Because minerals activity is prohibited until specifically 
permitted, supporters of the Convention argue that the burden of proof is on potential 
operators to show that activities will not unduly damage the environment, rather than on 
those interested in protecting the environment to prove that it will. This, in fact, 
reverses the major premiss of CCAMLR which permits harvesting of marine resources 
unless scientific evidence shows that conservation measures should be put in place.
Supporters of the Convention argued not only that these were stringent protection 
measures, but also that they were the best that could have been achieved given the 
competing interests that had to be met. The IUCN suggested (1987b) that any attempt 
to impose a rigid regime which would promote conservation interests to such an extent 
that minerals activity would be unlikely, would be unacceptable to most of the Treaty 
parties. This pragmatic approach was adopted by the consultative parties who argued 
that the Convention was "the best deal for Antarctica and the Antarctic environment that
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[was] attainable in an imperfect world. Tougher environmental provisions were just not 
negotiable" (C Keating [letter] 1988).74
This raises the fundamental question of whether the best that could be achieved, given 
political constraints, was good enough to ensure protection of the environment 
especially on a localised basis. As chapter three shows, there was a growing tendency 
in the 1980s for this question to be answered in the negative not only by NGOs but, as 
chapter seven will show, by politicians and by an increasingly environmentally 
conscious public.
NGO concerns
Environmental organisations argued that the Convention was essentially a pro-mining 
document which lacked adequate environmental protection mechanisms. A Greenpeace 
USA spokesperson argued that "[although the text’s environmental provisions appear 
to be substantial, in practical terms there are major loopholes that will enable miners to 
escape the consequences of the inevitable environmental damage" (in Anon 1988h:12). 
It was, NGOs argued, a "fundamentally flawed document from the standpoint of 
environmental protection, as well as public review and accountability" (ASOC 
1988n:7).
They argued that terms like "adequate"75 and "significant" with respect to 
environmental information were vague and open to interpretation. They suggested that 
there were insufficient details on the content of EIAs or processes to be followed in 
carrying them out.
Although a consensus is required in the Commission for an area to be identified, NGOs 
were concerned that pressure could be brought to bear on any state attempting to 
exercise a veto on environmental grounds, especially given the reconciliation process 
written into article 22(5).76 Although NCP mining states may have Commission 
membership,77 there is no provision for environmentally minded NCPs to have full 
membership to balance mining interests.
74. Keating was a New Zealand Ministry of External Relations officer.
75. The American Petroleum Institute, in an undated paper, argued that this was an "undefined and 
possibly undefinable concept" and perceived the "apparent fixation" on adequate information as 
a "thinly veiled attempt" to place all of Antarctica off-limits to minerals resource activities.
76. This article provides that, if the Chair of the Commission determines that there is likely to be an 
objection to the identification of an area for minerals activities, he or she shall convene the 
members most directly interested with a view to reconciling the differences and producing a 
generally acceptable proposal.
77. Consultative parties which sponsor minerals activities have automatic Commission membership 
by virtue of their consultative party status.
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NGOs were particularly concerned that, even though prospecting notifications required 
an environmental impact assessment78 and a description of the measures which would 
be adopted to avoid harmful interference, no prior authorisation of prospecting activity 
was required. Article 38 does provide for steps to be taken if a member of the 
Commission is concerned about prospecting activity, but this is a reactive approach.79
It was the composition and role of the regulatory committees that concerned NGOs 
most from an environmental viewpoint. They maintained that the complex membership 
formula, which was a response to political interests, would mean that "[n]ations in the 
regulatory committees will trade environmental protection for political and economic 
gain" (Antarctic News #8 1988:1). NGOs were worried that management schemes, 
which were to include specific terms and conditions for the protection of the 
environment and for timely response action, would be compromised by political 
tradeoffs in the regulatory committees.
They feared that this could result in different rules being established for different 
management schemes which apply to the same area. NGOs pointed to the difficulties of 
setting environmental rules for any specific area when the ecosystem should be dealt 
with as a whole. NGOs were also concerned that, once a management scheme had been 
established, and an exploration permit issued, progress to a development permit was 
almost automatic with few opportunities for independent reassessment of the project.80
The environmental NGOs monitoring the minerals negotiations argued, in their analysis 
and lobby documents, for a number of changes to the Convention which they suggested 
were essential to improve its environmental protection mechanisms (see ASOC 1988g). 
They argued that provisions were essential for a negative decision at the development 
permit stage. They advocated a stronger role for the Advisory Committee and provision 
for the Commission to review regulatory committee decisions. NGOs argued that there 
should be an independent Antarctic Environment Protection Agency which, if 
necessary, would be responsible for monitoring, enforcement and judgements of 
environmental acceptability of any activity within a minerals regime. The criteria for 
environmental protection procedures should, they argued, be more clearly spelled out 
and better compliance, enforcement and liability rules were necessary. Finally, they 
demanded improved opportunities for public participation.
78. The American Petroleum Institute considered this provisions to be "wholly unnecessary" (API 
[n.d.]).
79. While the prospecting party is required to adhere to certain rules it is not clear what can be done 
to stop prospecting which is in contravention of those rules.
80. Procedures are established in the Convention for the Commission to review the decision of the 
regulatory committees but in doing so they may not perform the function of the regulatory 
committee and may only request the Committee to reconsider its decision.
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While NGOs argued that the Convention was a fatally flawed document as far as its 
environment protection rules were concerned, mining industry comment on the 
Convention was also unfavourable. The Director of the US Bureau of Mines 
commented that "there is nothing in this Convention to encourage industry to expend 
any money to prospect, explore or develop resources. The Convention is anti-mineral 
development ... and will only serve as a deterrent... [I]t is not a workable convention 
under which minerals will be developed" (Ary [n.d.]). This view was shared, at least 
early on, by the American Petroleum Institute ([n.d.]) which referred to the "excessively 
anti-development bent that currently permeates the draft regime".81
Environmental rules and institutional bargaining
Earlier chapters in this thesis have demonstrated that the decision-making process 
within the Antarctic regime, dominated as it was by the need to settle political 
differences, was flawed from the perspective of negotiating good environmental rules 
when judged from the priority of environmental protection. The minerals negotiations 
followed a similar path. Laws82 observed (1985:54) that "discussions on environmental 
matters have so far received less attention than the organisational structure of [the] 
regime". Kimball (1983:15) suggested that concern for the environment coexisted in 
"tenuous harmony" with other imperatives in the negotiations (such as the sense of 
urgency to complete the negotiations and the internal accommodation between the 
claimants and non-claimants).
NGOs similarly argued "providing a political solution to the Treaty partners internal 
conflicts is an objective that has overridden protection of [the] environment" (cited in 
Shapley 1985:166). They suggested that the lawyers and diplomats who negotiated the 
convention had underestimated the natural and scientific values of the Antarctic and 
overestimated the ability of an unenforced set of rules to modify the hazardous 
behaviour of oil companies and other operators working at the limits of technology in 
extreme conditions (ASOC 1984b:3).
The powers of the Commission vis-a-vis the regulatory committees, NGOs argued, had 
been progressively restricted during the negotiations. They felt that environmental 
protection interests could be best served if the Commission was given relatively more 
functions and powers. NGOs also supported larger regulatory committees83 with the 
power to authorise exploration and development permits returned to the Commission.
81 Although this is an undated paper, these comments appear to be relevant to Beeby II.
82. Director of the British Antarctic Survey and now President of SCAR.
83. They suggested a membership of twelve, with eight non-claimants
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It certainly was the case that regulatory powers were progressively transferred from the 
commission to the regulatory committees during the negotiations. In Beeby I and II, it 
was the Commission, rather than the regulatory committees, which was responsible for 
authorising permits for exploration and development, and approving (or disapproving) 
management schemes.
NGOs also argued that the powers of the Advisory Committee, which is the locus for 
environmental and scientific expertise, had been progressively weakened during the 
negotiations to the extent that it was given a limited advisory role only with no power to 
initiate reports even on matters of concern. They felt that a strong and independent 
Advisory Committee would be able to act as a balance to the politically-appointed 
regulatory committees.
Again, there is some evidence to support this charge. In Beeby IV, regulatory 
committees were required to refer any application for an exploration permit to the 
Advisory Committee for an assessment. The Advisory Committee was to identify the 
environmental risks, and advise whether the application would (or would not) involve 
such a risk if approved. If the Advisory Committee advised that a risk would be 
involved, the regulatory committee was required to reject the application, or to refer it 
to the Commission which could authorise the regulatory committee to proceed subject 
to such conditions as the Commission saw fit. Applications for development permits 
were also to be reviewed by the Advisory Committee in Beeby IV (article 51) and the 
Advisory Committee could send guidelines to the regulatory committee to modify a 
management scheme if it deemed changes necessary. The regulatory committee was 
required to make those modifications. All these Advisory Committee functions were 
removed in Beeby V after the third intersessional meeting of the minerals negotiations.
Beeby IV also provided that both the Advisory Committee and the regulatory 
committee would monitor compliance. In Beeby V this was to be the function of the 
regulatory committee only. The Advisory Committee’s access to information was also 
increasingly limited in subsequent drafts. In Beeby V, rather than seeing the whole of 
an application for exploration, the Advisory Committee was to see only those parts of 
an application determined by the regulatory committee to be relevant. NGOs suggested, 
with some apparent justification, that Beeby V represented major concessions to mining 
interests (ECO (XLVII(l) 1988:2).
Accountability, monitoring and compliance
Not only were the institutional relationships weakened from an environmental 
protection perspective but the rules on compliance and liability, which adhere to normal 
Treaty practice, are limited. There is no provision for independent monitoring of
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minerals activity and environmental impact. There are few sanctions against non- 
compliance with either the principles of the Convention or its specific rules and 
procedures except where that non-compliance results in unacceptable environmental 
damage (and even then a Party must be willing to raise the issue of violation).
The inspection procedures in the Convention can be used to monitor compliance with 
environmental protection rules although inspection has proved an ineffective instrument 
under the Treaty in this regard. The Commission is to consider regulatory committee 
monitoring reports but there is no specific guidance on what it may then do. Only 
Parties to the Convention (but not observers) may raise concerns about activities that 
affect the implementation of the Convention, including environmental impact issues.84 
The Commission may also appoint inspectors who would, one assumes, report directly 
to the Commission (although that is not the case with CCAMLR). Again there are no 
specific procedures for action in instances of non-compliance identified by inspections.
A member of either the Commission or a regulatory committee may request (within a 
one month time limit) a review of the approval of a management scheme or 
development permit for its consistency with the Convention. The Commission, 
however, can only request the regulatory committee to reconsider its decision. Only a 
regulatory committee may suspend, modify or cancel a management scheme (and thus 
the permits issued in conjunction with it), or impose a monetary penalty, if it determines 
that activities have resulted, or are likely to result, in environmental impacts beyond 
those judged acceptable. Thus, if an environmental impact has been judged acceptable 
under the terms of the Convention, these procedures cannot be invoked. The concern 
here is also whether a complaint of environmental non-compliance would stand in the 
face of mining interests on the regulatory committee.
The extent of liability and the issue of residual state liability were contentious issues 
during the negotiations. Australia, Argentina and Chile had argued that no defences 
should be permissible (ASOC 1988f) and were supported in this by France, Norway, the 
USSR and NZ. Japan opposed the suggestion that damage to the environment and 
dependent ecosystems should be covered by the liability provisions.
The liability rules require timely response action, including prevention, containment, 
clean up and removal, if an activity results in or threatens to result in damage to the 
Antarctic environment (article 8(1)). Strict liability for environmental damage was 
generally agreed upon at Montevideo. However, while operators are to be strictly liable
84. The Commission may also draw the attention of any party to activities affecting the 
implementation of the Convention, as well as to any non-Convention state if activities by it or its 
nationals are in contravention of the Convention.
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for damage they are not required to restore the environment to the status quo ante. 
However an operator is not liable if the damage is caused by an event which, in 
Antarctic circumstances, could be defined as an unforeseen and exceptional natural 
disaster, or as a result of armed conflict or an act of terrorism.
A Sponsoring State must accept residual liability if damage, including environmental 
damage, has occurred because it has not fulfilled its obligations. Article 8 provides that 
further rules and procedures on liability are to be elaborated, by consensus, in a separate 
protocol and that minerals activity (except prospecting) cannot proceed until the 
Protocol is in place. The Protocol must function to enhance the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems but may also allow for 
defences to liability to be determined.
NGOs argued that these liability provisions were neither strict enough nor detailed 
enough.85 They were especially concerned that defences to liability could be 
established under the Protocol and called for strict and unlimited liability, with no 
defences possible.
NGOs also argued that there was not enough in the Convention to encourage 
transparency and accountability. They charged that the confidentiality of data rules 
established under the Convention (with respect to information deemed commercially 
sensitive) could prevent information necessary to make informed judgements on 
environmental impacts from being made public. "Full availability of information", they 
argued, was "vital to the success of all environmental protection measures ... openness 
is crucial to organisations outside the Convention wishing to comment on an 
application" (ECO XLVII(5) 1988:2). There was, in particular they argued, insufficient 
provision for adequate review of environmental impact statements and management 
schemes by observers and experienced NGOs.
SCAR also supported early and timely release of data from minerals activity mainly 
because of the benefits to increasing scientific knowledge (Final Report 1989:190). As 
noted earlier in the chapter, the institutions of the Convention are required to maintain 
public records. However, as Kimball (1988b: 19-20) notes, incidents which potentially 
affect the implementation of the Convention are not automatically circulated to observer 
organisations. Neither are inspection reports. Discussions on monitoring and 
compliance in the regulatory committees are not open to observer organisations.
85. They did, however, support the financial penalties provisions because, even though it would not 
cure the damage, they wanted punitive measures to provide some disincentive to irresponsible 
behaviour.
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Thus the rules which were put in place to ensure compliance on environmental 
protection were constrained by both political and economic interests. As with the 
Treaty system generally, there was a reluctance to accept independent monitoring or 
inspection. In this regard alone, the ability of the Convention to protect the Antarctic 
environment, especially on a localised level, must be questioned.
Conclusion
The Minerals Convention balanced various national interests in a way that enabled each 
Party to accept that its basic interests had not been compromised, even if it was not the 
best that could have been hoped for individually. States within the Treaty system were 
able to use the bargaining process to ensure that some of their demands were 
incorporated into the Convention. However the focus on the internal accommodation 
meant that little real attention was paid to the external accommodation, except in terms 
of broad statements of principle.
The Convention enshrines the fundamental principles of the Antarctic regime. 
Consultative party authority is guaranteed in the institutions of the Convention, 
especially in the decision-making bodies, the Commission and the regulatory 
committees. Regime stability, through a political balancing act, is the focus of the 
structure of the regulatory committees. As Joyner (1988d: 141) notes, both these 
principles "occupy a higher place in the hypothetical hierarchy of principles than that of 
environmental protection".
The Convention introduces new balances of power into the Antarctic regime 
particularly with respect to the role of developing consultative states and, in this case at 
least, of the mining interests. In doing so, the power of the claimant states was 
diminished.
Experience of the Treaty system had convinced the consultative parties, and the 
bureaucratic elites responsible for Antarctic policy, that environmental issues could 
only be addressed in the context of a wider agreement on political problems. The belief 
that the disputes over sovereignty and jurisdiction would limit what could be negotiated 
on environmental rules, especially with respect to monitoring and compliance, was 
strong.
Environmental rules adopted in the Minerals Convention were precautionary and, 
unlike CCAMLR, the Minerals Convention prohibits activity until judgements are made 
that it can be permitted to proceed. But monitoring and compliance is still based 
predominantly on sovereignty rules which favour national autonomy, little independent 
oversight and, more importantly, few sanctions.
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Minerals activity, and decisions on its regulation under the Convention, are based on 
adequacy of knowledge provisions. Yet the procedures for increasing that knowledge, 
and for according a central role to environmental and scientific experts, are weak. 
Environmental factors are crucial in the decision to open an area, but once minerals 
activity begin the progression to development activities becomes harder to stop on 
environmental grounds.
The Convention rejects the non-development option. Wilson (1986:285) suggests that 
this is because Antarctic policy is fashioned principally by civil servants in foreign 
ministries who are not directly answerable to the public. No public, or political, 
discussion which might challenge conventional wisdom on the acceptability of minerals 
activity was sought.
From an environmental perspective, this process points to a crucial dilemma. Is it 
possible for a regulatory mechanism (which is required if minerals activity is judged, in 
principle at least, to be an acceptable activity) to also function as a conservation and 
environmental protection regime. The IUCN (1987b) argued that minerals activity 
"will inevitably detract from the wilderness qualities of Antarctica". The question is, 
then, how much detraction is acceptable? In the 1970s minerals activity and 
environmental protection were thought compatible. In the 1980s, NGOs argued that 
this was an unacceptable premiss but the consultative parties, already eleven years into 
their discussions on the minerals question and now formally negotiating a convention, 
did not listen. They should have done so. The internal accommodation of the Minerals 
Convention did not hold, and it did not hold because the answer to the question of 
acceptability had changed.
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C hapter 7
COM PREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: FROM CRAMRA
TO MADRID
Introduction
The Minerals Convention was the compromise product of eighteen years of debate and 
negotiation. Once opened for signature on 25 November 1988, its ratification and entry 
into force seemed assured.1 While there is always a possibility in international politics 
that a ratification process might fail at the state level if the necessary domestic support 
is not forthcoming, such an involuntary defection, to use Putnam’s term (1988:438), 
seemed unlikely in this case.2 The Antarctic was not high on the agendas of 
parliaments or politicians. Nor had it generally been an issue of high public salience. 
Further, given the strength of the normative commitment to consensus within the Treaty 
system, the diplomats who negotiated the Minerals Convention had no reason to fear 
that any consultative government would voluntarily and unilaterally abandon the 
outcome of their deliberations.
They were mistaken. This agreement among states began to unravel quickly. The 
internal accommodation did not hold.3 By May 1989 two key consultative parties, 
Australia and France, had withdrawn their support for the Convention, a defection 
which was met with strident outrage from their Treaty partners. Australia and France 
sought to replace CRAMRA with a comprehensive environmental protection 
convention (which would include a ban on mining) and to have the Antarctic declared a 
wilderness reserve. The issue of environmental protection in the Antarctic took on a 
new importance as the consultative parties took sides on whether or not to ban minerals 
activity (an option they had rejected in the 1970s and the 1980s) and argued over how 
best to improve the complex and fragmented environmental sub-regime within the 
Treaty system. By October 1991 they had negotiated a new, legally-binding agreement 
on environmental protection - the Madrid Protocol - which, as well as prohibiting 
minerals activity, established comprehensive environmental principles and standards 
against which human activity in the Antarctic would be judged.
1. Chris Beeby noted that it would probably be some years before the Convention was ratified by 
the requisite number of states given that most would need to pass domestic implementing 
legislation of some sort (Anon 1988i:15).
2. See the discussion on defection in chapter one.
3. Indeed, within days of the Minerals Convention being adopted, a bill was introduced into the 
Belgian Parliament to prohibit Belgian nationals or companies from undertaking any minerals 
activity in the Antarctic. Belgium, which was a consultative party and had participated in the 
negotiations, did not sign the Convention. While its ratification was not crucial to the entry into 
force provisions its action signalled concern on the part of a long-standing Treaty party.
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Domestic debate on national Antarctic policies, in response to NGO campaigns, was an 
important feature of this process of change in the Antarctic regime. In this way, the 
values and ideas on environmental protection advocated by non-governmental 
organisations were brought inside the Treaty system. Traditional Antarctic decision­
makers - diplomats, lawyers and scientists - were, to a great extent, marginalised by 
these events and their attempts to reclaim the issue were only partly successful.
This chapter examines the rejection of the Minerals Convention, first by Australia and 
France and then by other Treaty parties, and the subsequent negotiation of the Madrid 
Protocol on Environmental Protection.
From consensus to defection
The British government was the first of the consultative parties to begin ratification 
procedures. Its Antarctic Minerals Bill was introduced into the House of Lords in April 
1989.4 Although there was bipartisan support for the bill, Labour speakers suggested 
that it would be preferable if all countries were "to agree to leave Antarctica alone and 
not to prospect and mine for minerals there" (House of Lords 1989a:933). Lord Alsa 
made the critical observation that "the conservationists would have the support of the 
vast majority of the public if the issue was put to them" (House of Lords 1989a:934).5 
However in Britain, and in most other consultative states, the issue had not been put to 
public debate by Antarctic decision-makers. That task was taken up by non­
governmental organisations and Lord Alsa’s prediction was to prove correct not just in 
Britain but elsewhere.
4. The purpose of the Bill was to enable the United Kingdom to ratify CRAMRA. The bill 
prohibited exploration and development activities while permitting prospecting activities 
authorised by the UK government or any other contracting party to the convention. If, under the 
Convention, it was determined that exploration and development were to be permitted, then the 
Government would return to the Parliament with another bill to authorise those activities. Lord 
Glenarthur, in introducing the legislation, noted that "it has been our objective throughout the 
negotiation[s] ... to ensure that the UK ... should have the largest possible share of any benefits 
from minerals activity in the British Antarctic territory" (House of Lords 1989a:929).
5. Lord Alsa (who was at pains to point out that he had been to the Antarctic) suggested that the 
Labour peers accepted the bill "without enthusiasm ... as a recognition of man’s inability to leave 
anything in the world free of exploitation" (House of Lords 1989a:934).
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After June 1988 and the adoption of CRAMRA, NGOs reassessed their strategy:
[I]t would be wrong to assume that NGOs had ‘lost’ the battle even though we 
opposed [the Convention’s] negotiation ... One strategy for the future will be to 
try to prevent some of [the ATCPs] from signing and ratifying the Convention, 
or at least to severely delay them, which will have the effect of preventing the 
Convention from coming into force (ASOC 1988o: 10)
Their strategy was targetted at the key consultative states - the seven claimants and the 
USA and USSR - as well as Italy and West Germany.6 There were three, inter-related, 
components to the NGO non-ratification campaign which was executed at a national 
level but co-ordinated transnational^: politics, the public and the media.
In support of their campaign, and to mobilise public awareness and put pressure on 
politicians, NGOs encouraged letter-writing campaigns; they launched a number of 
successful international petitions which opposed ratification;7 they called for a ban on 
minerals activity and continued to advocate World Park status for the Antarctic. To 
reinforce their public activity they lobbied politicians, presented evidence to legislative 
committees and targetted the media in order to get their message across to a wider 
audience. In doing so, national NGOs (including Greenpeace offices and organisations 
with a broad environmental interest)8 exchanged information, advice and strategies 
through the coordinating offices of ASOC and Greenpeace International.
The anti-ratification campaign was actively supported by high profile individuals such 
as French oceanographer Jacques Cousteau and British naturalist Sir Peter Scott. 
Cousteau, in particular, lobbied politicians and state leaders, publicly and privately, in a
6. Non-ratification by any one of the claimants or the superpowers would result in CRAMRA not 
coming into force. In the case of Argentina and Chile, NGOs relied on arguments relating to 
loss of sovereignty. In both France and the UK, the campaign rested on environmental grounds 
although in both cases they recognised the task would be difficult. In New Zealand and 
Australia, NGOs mobilised public awareness both of the Antarctic and of environmental 
concerns. They were also heartened by the fact that Australia had been the last state to hold out 
on signing the Final Act of the minerals negotiations and key governmental sources had 
indicated that the government was divided on whether to sign. In the US, NGOs hoped to use 
the lengthy congressional hearing process to delay ratification. The USSR, although it was 
likely to be difficult to influence, was concerned about the US gaining an upper-hand in minerals 
exploitation technology which the USSR could not match. With respect to Norway, the NGOs 
planned to focus on Prime Minister Brundtland’s chairing of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development and its subsequent report. The Antarctic campaign was popular 
in West Germany which had a strong public environmental awareness which had translated into 
parliamentary representation. The Antarctic issue was also popular in Italy where the NGOs 
thought environmental arguments could be successful. (See Greenpeace 1988e).
7. Within three months the Cousteau Foundation petition had attracted a million signatures, a 
record for a petition in France. By April 1990 this total had reached 1.8 million. The 
Greenpeace Antarctic Declaration had been signed by 1.4 million people by May 1989, and the 
World Park petition circulated by members of ASOC attracted over 1 million signatures (ASOC 
1989b:2).
8. For example, the Australian Conservation Foundation in Australia and the Sierra Club in the 
United States.
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way that ASOC representatives could not and attracted considerable media coverage in 
so doing.
Two events early in 1989 focussed public attention on the environmental consequences 
of oil spills in polar regions. On 28 January, an Argentinian resupply vessel, the Bahia 
Par also went aground off the Antarctic Peninsula,9 spilling approximately 150,000 
gallons of oil. US officials described the spill, which affected wildlife and scientific 
research at the nearby US Palmer station, as the first big environmental threat to the 
Antarctic (Darby 1989).10 On 24 March the Exxon Valdez went aground in Prince 
William Sound in Alaska, spilling 10.8 million gallons of oil. The world wide media 
coverage of the devastating ecological consequences of the spill and the limited success 
of the lengthy and expensive clean-up attempt, created a powerful visual and public 
image with which NGOs could challenge the adequacy of CRAMRA.* 11
On 20 April 1989 the French government called for the Antarctic minerals negotiations 
to be re-opened. Prime Minister Rocard argued that in the light of the consequences of 
the Exxon Valdez accident, the environmental protection provisions in the Convention 
seemed inadequate (Reuters 1989a).12 He announced that France would "not ratify the 
treaty [sic] in its present state" (AFP 1989a).
The French announcement was the first sign of the consensus on CRAMRA breaking 
down. Its significance lay in the fact that, as a claimant state, France’s ratification of 
CRAMRA was essential to effect entry into force. Nevertheless, it was unusual that it 
should have come from this quarter - France was a likely mining state, its 
environmental record in the Antarctic was not a good one13 and it had not taken a strong 
environmental line during the minerals negotiations.
9. British (and US) maps clearly showed the channel as containing "dangerous ledges and 
pinnacles" (Manheim 1989). Yet this is an area also claimed by Argentina and the captain chose 
to take his vessel through the channel in spite of warnings from US officials. The Argentinians 
tried to downplay the environmental significance of the spill, and its lack of technology to 
respond to the emergency. Tourists on board had to be rescued by personnel from the nearby 
US Palmer Station.
10. While the United States moved brought equipment from the US to clean up the spill, in order to 
protect scientific research at Palmer and wildlife in the vicinity, the operation was difficult. In 
February 1989 the British ship Endurance sustained some damage when it hit an iceberg near 
Deception Island but was able to navigate to Esperanza Bay at the tip of the Peninsula. The 
same month, a Peruvian research vessel, the Humboldt, ran aground and leaked oil in Fildes Bay 
on King George Island (see Redgwell 1990a:474n).
11. See, for example, ASOC (1989a).
12. Early in May, Rocard told Australian Foreign Minister Senator Evans in New Caledonia that 
France would not sign the convention and would seek renegotiation.
13. See, for example, references in chapter three to the construction of the airstrip at the French 
Antarctic base, Dumont d’Urville, which contravened several provisions of the Agreed Measures 
on the protection of fauna and flora.
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The future of CRAMRA was put further in doubt when, on 22 May, the Australian 
government announced that it was now committed to a position that no mining at all 
should take place in and around the continent and that it would therefore not sign the 
Minerals Convention. This decision followed intense public, parliamentary and cabinet 
debate (discussed in further detail below). The government argued that while
the recently concluded Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activities is very much better than no protective 
regime of any kind ... we believe that it is both desirable and possible to 
seek stronger protection for what remains the world’s last great 
wilderness (Hawke et al 1989:1).14
Australia, they said, would pursue instead the "urgent negotiation of a comprehensive 
environmental protection convention within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty 
system" and, specifically, the "prospects for the establishment of an Antarctic 
Wilderness Reserve". They acknowledged that this was "a significant change of 
approach in the management of Antarctica" and that achieving consensus was "unlikely 
to be easy".
The implication in the Australian announcement was that non-signature meant non­
ratification.15 Because ratifications from all seven claimant states (that is, including 
Australia and France) as well as the USA and the USSR were required for the 
Convention to enter into force the Minerals Convention was dead unless the Australian 
government could be persuaded to change its mind.16
Thus, less than twelve months after the adoption of the Minerals Convention, therefore, 
and only six months after it was opened for signature, consensus had broken down and 
the internal accommodation was falling apart. Australia’s actions amounted to a
14. This statement was made jointly by the Prime Minister, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
and the Environment, Senators Evans and Richardson, both of whom had previously supported 
the Minerals Convention.
15. One report suggests that a cabinet submission tabled by Senator Evans included a 
recommendation that, as well as announcing that it would not sign the Convention and would 
pursue the implementation of a world park, the Australian government should also make it clear 
that it did not exclude the possibility of ultimately acceding to the convention if the alternatives 
could not be attained and there was no other way to protect the Antarctic environment 
(Houweling 1989:1).
16. Australia’s announcement that it would not sign was not of itself legally significant: a key state 
could still accede to the Convention after the period for signature had passed to meet the 
requirements for entry into force. Blay and Tsamenyi (1989) argue that Australia’s actions did 
not amount to a veto of the Convention. They suggest that this would only prevent the 
institutions of the Convention being created with respect to the Australian Antarctic Territory. 
This is not a view shared by other commentators, nor by the consultative parties themselves who 
would doubtless have seized upon this argument if applicable. See, for example, Wolfe 
(1990:2).
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voluntary defection from both the consensus on CRAMRA and from the fundamental 
norm in the Treaty system that a consensus, once reached, should be maintained.
The Australian decision took everyone, including environmental organisations who had 
campaigned against ratification, by surprise. Response to the announcement from other 
consultative governments was swift and negative. The New Zealand Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Russell Marshall, argued that "Australia will have a good deal to 
answer for if it fails" (cited in Anon 1989j:20). A former director of the Australian 
Antarctic Division predicted that "if Australia refuses to sign, she will be utterly 
discredited among the treaty nations and will be branded as naive, ignorant and 
obstructive" (Law 1989:12).
Hostility to the Australian decision (and, to a lesser extent, the French) was grounded in 
anger that both states had defected from the consensus rule. The British Parliament was 
told that
the Antarctic treaty has succeeded ... because ... no member has pushed 
its interest beyond the point where it can be tolerated by others. The 
treaty system has also depended on an implicit assumption that once an 
agreement has been reached by consensus, all parties to that consensus 
will confirm and implement the agreement. The Australian move has 
gone against both of those tenets... (House of Commons 1989:217- 
218).17
Australia, as the consultative parties saw it, had threatened the fundamental norms and 
practices of the Treaty system. For this reason, Eggar argued,
Australia’s Antarctic partners have a right to ask for its reasons for 
inflicting damage on the consensus machinery of the Antarctic treaty 
system. They have a right to ask why it has taken a path that could result 
in a collapse of that treaty (House of Commons 1989:218).
Australian diplomat John Burgess (1990:2) acknowledged that the concern which
greeted the Australian and French announcements was as much about the way of doing
things as the substance of the announcements. They had reneged on an agreement that
had taken six difficult years to negotiate. Rather than seeking to address differences
within the confines of the Treaty system, Australia and France had ‘gone public’ with
their concerns.
Environmental organisations, on the other hand, were overjoyed. The Director of the 
Australian Conservation Foundation, Philip Toyne, called it a "rare and visionary" 
action (Anon 1989k: 1). Sir Peter Scott, son of the Antarctic explorer, told the 
Australian Prime Minister that
17. This point was made by Tim Eggar, Parliamentary Under-secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs during the House of Commons debate on the Antarctic Minerals Bill.
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Australia’s magnificent stance ... may well at one brilliant stroke have 
ensured the future of the last virtually pristine continent on earth. This 
wonderful initiative gives us all new hope for the future of the planet 
(cited in Phillips 1989a:8).18
The French government now moved to align itself more closely with Australia. After 
receiving a commissioned report from Captain Cousteau, President Mitterand 
announced that he was "very taken with the idea of turning [Antarctica] into a vast 
peaceful nature reserve" (cited in Ambassade de France 1989b).19 He said that he 
would "ask the French Government to study it and see whether, along with countries 
who share our concern, this idea can be put into effect without delay" (Ambassade de 
France 1989a). The French government referred the matter to the Parliamentary 
Committee for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Options which held a 
special public hearing in September 1989.
In August 1989 the French and Australian Prime Ministers issued a joint statement on 
environmental issues which noted that
In the light of their shared concerns about the Antarctic Minerals 
Convention and other factors affecting the environment in the Antarctic, 
the Prime Ministers of Australia and France have today agreed on a joint 
initiative to promote the protection of the environment in the Antarctic ... 
[M]ining in Antarctica is not compatible with protection of the fragile 
Antarctic environment ... the two countries will be proposing that the 
Treaty Parties negotiate a Comprehensive Environment Protection 
Convention which will turn the Antarctic into a wilderness reserve ... 
(Hawke and Rocard 1989:l).20
Thus not only had both states defected from the norms of the regime, but their new 
policy initiative (which represented, in effect, redefined national interests) sought to 
depart from the traditional ad hoc and sectoral approach to environmental decision­
making in the Treaty system. In placing environmental concerns before economic ones 
and, indeed, political ones Australia and France were advocating a reordering of the 
hierarchy of values in the regime. Their task was to persuade their Treaty partners to 
support this new approach.
18. The son of another great British Antarctic explorer, Shackleton, was not so supportive. Lord 
Shackleton, while expressing his hope that minerals activity never happened in the Antarctic 
said that "undermining the consensus ... when no consensus is in sight would ... lead to tensions 
and instabilities that might well not be contained" (Shackleton 1989).
19. The report was presented to him on 10 June 1989 and his announcement favouring the World 
Park proposal was made at a "Planet Earth" international seminar at the Elysee three days later.
20. The question of the Antarctic was only one of the matters discussed, although it took up about 
half the joint statement.
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The Australian/French initiative
There were three parts to the Australian and French initiative: first, a ban on minerals 
(effectively seeking to replace CRAMRA); second, that the Antarctic should be 
declared a wilderness reserve (although just what that meant was not yet spelled out); 
and third, that a comprehensive approach to environmental protection could only be 
achieved in a wide-ranging new convention. In the context of environmental politics 
over the life of the Treaty system, these were revolutionary proposals. Their Treaty 
partners were resistant on all three counts.
A ban on minerals activity
In advocating a ban on minerals activity, Australia and France sought to redefine an 
institutional goal of the Antarctic regime and to challenge the premiss that minerals 
activity was acceptable in the Antarctic. While hastening to say that no-one was 
proposing to go to the Antarctic to mine in the short or even medium-term governments 
were reluctant to rule out the possibility that they might want to do so at some stage in 
the future.21 The US and the UK were particularly opposed to a ban. The US argued 
that "the effort to substitute a total ban on mineral resource activity is not negotiable. 
The US will not agree to such action" (Scully [letter] 1989).
Supporters of the Minerals Convention suggested that it provided an effective 
prohibition on minerals activity which could only be lifted if all consultative parties 
agreed and that, because consensus was required to open an area for mineral activity, 
Australia or France had a power of veto to enforce a prohibition.22 Australia suggested 
that it was "logical nonsense" to sign a convention which regulated minerals activity 
intending to use an effective power of veto to oppose mining (Hope 1989)23 and that to 
do so would be an act of bad faith.24
Critics of the proposal also argued that a ban would crumble as soon as there was 
economic pressure to mine and that, when it did, there would then be no regulatory 
agreement to stand in its place. Australia and France argued that a ban on minerals
21. President Bush wrote to Hawke indicating that the United States believed mining in Antarctica 
should not be ruled out for all time (Kitney 1989:5). Greenpeace US obtained papers which 
showed that a Houston-based oil exploration company was seeking backers for a seismic survey 
with a view to identifying possible hydrocarbon targets (Ward 1989:25).
22. Further, the effective veto under the Minerals Convention applied only to the identification of an 
area for possible exploration and development: it did not apply to specific activities and neither 
did it cover prospecting.
23. It is also debatable whether, as claimants, either Australia or France would have wanted to use 
their veto over activity in the territory of another claimant
24. Also, the veto can only be used if the proposed activities are inconsistent with the Convention. 
Given that the Minerals Convention accepts some environmental impact, any harm is therefore 
not "significant harm" so it is doubtful whether Australia or France could use the argument of 
any environmental impact as a reason for exercising their veto.
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activity under a comprehensive convention should not be inherently more unstable than 
the ban on military activity, nuclear explosions or disposal of radioactive waste under 
the Antarctic Treaty. If the other Treaty parties were prepared to advocate a de facto 
ban under the Minerals Convention by use of the veto why, they asked, were they not 
prepared to accept a ban in specific terms (Brown 1990a:7).25
The other consultative parties argued further that if CRAMRA’s entry into force was 
unlikely, then the voluntary moratorium on minerals activity (confirmed by the Final 
Act of the Special Consultative Meeting) was null and void. Eggar suggested that any 
state which did not ratify the Convention "would, by its actions have destroyed the 
existing voluntary moratorium ... [and] would bear a heavy responsibility for the 
consequences of its decision" (House of Commons 1989:216). Without an agreed 
instrument to regulate minerals activities, critics argued, there was no protection for the 
Antarctic environment in the event of unilateral exploration.26 However the argument 
in chapter six has shown that unilateral minerals activity was unlikely in the face of 
legal uncertainty.
Wilderness Reserve
The Australian/French proposal for a wilderness reserve was dismissed by its critics as 
little different from the World Park proposal advocated by non-governmental 
organisations. This proposal dates to the 1972 Second World Conference on National 
Parks27 and was raised in a series of international congresses over the following two 
decades including the Third World Parks Congress in 1982,28 UNEP’s Session of 
Special Character in 1982,29 and the Fourth World Wilderness Congress in 1987.30 In 
1989, the UN adopted a resolution calling for the first time for the protection of
25. A senior state department official told me that the US would be prepared to accept a de facto ban 
under the Minerals Convention because the convention nevertheless accorded with US 
philosophy of guaranteeing open and non-discriminatory access.
26. R Tucker Scully, of the State Department, said in a television interview that he thought the 
upshot of the Australian/French proposal would be a "stalemate with no rules" with the 
possibility of mineral resource activities taking place "leading to environmental and political 
damage" (Reuters 1990).
27. This conference called for the Antarctic to be designated a World Park under the auspices of the 
United Nations. The then Executive Director of UNEP, Maurice Strong, promoted the concept 
suggesting that "the surest course might well be to make the whole Antarctic region into a Duly 
international park ... which would permit continuation of its exclusive use as the site of 
important scientific research" (cited in Quigg 1983:180).
28. The wording of the resolution adopted did not specifically call for a world park. Kimball 
(1988d:38) suggests that this was because a number of participants thought it unrealistic and 
were concerned that, in the face of anticipated hostile reaction from the Treaty parties, it would 
affect their ability to influence Antarctic policies.
29. NGOs attending the special session adopted a resolution calling for the Antarctic to be declared 
a World Park. A position paper was circulated to NGO delegations calling upon the forum to 
recommend to the UN Secretary General that a special conference on the Antarctic be convened 
(ASOC 1982:2).
30. See ECO (XLV(2) October 1987:4).
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Antarctica as a nature reserve or world park and urging a ban on prospecting and 
mining.
The status of Antarctica, with particular reference to the preservation of its 
environmental values, was also debated at IUCN general assemblies in the 1980s. 
While the recommendations adopted there did not specifically call for the designation 
of a world park, they did advocate full protection of the Antarctic environment.31
The concept of a world park was refined by Antarctic NGOs and linked to their 
advocacy of a comprehensive approach to environmental protection in the Antarctic.32 
The Antarctic, as a world park, would remain a zone of peace and scientific 
investigation and cooperation. Wilderness values would be paramount. 
Environmentally damaging activities, including minerals exploitation, would be 
prohibited.33 NGOs developed detailed proposals, in the form of policy papers and 
draft conventions, to give effect to this concept. Core elements included environmental 
impact assessment, the establishment of an Antarctic Environment Protection Agency, 
legally binding compliance mechanisms and participation by the public and by public 
interest groups.34
The world park proposal was not well received by the consultative parties.35 They 
argued that it was politically unrealistic and ill-defined and that it would restrict (or 
even prohibit) scientific research. They continued to interpret it as a first step in the 
internationalisation of the Antarctic (and thus the erosion of their primacy over
31. The 1981 IUCN General Assembly strongly recommended that the ATCPs foster measures 
which would maintain the intrinsic values of the Antarctic environment, ensure that all activities 
were compatible with those values and "ascribe to the Antarctic environment as a whole a 
designation which connotes worldwide in its unique character and values" (IUCN 1981b). The 
16th General Assembly in 1984 restated these concerns and called for minerals activity to be 
prohibited "until such time as full consideration has been given to protecting the Antarctic 
environment completely and the environmental risks have been fully ascertained and safeguards 
developed to avoid adverse environmental effects" (IUCN 1984a). These resolutions were 
affirmed as a statement of IUCN policy at the 17th Assembly in 1988. IUCN urged the 
consultative parties to "adopt and implement a coherent system for the protection of areas in the 
Antarctic where such action would contribute [to] the protection of the Antarctic as a wilderness 
area" (IUCN 1989a).
32. In other words, world park status required a comprehensive approach to environmental 
protection, and a comprehensive approach to environmental protection included the designation 
of the Antarctic as a world park.
33. Proposals for a world park envisaged, however, that tourism, if properly regulated, would not be 
incompatible with protection of the environment.
34. The first detailed proposals were put before the Australian government in 1984 and were then 
distributed to the consultative parties at ATCM XIII in 1985. See, for example, ASOC 1986c, 
1988c, 1989b, 1990a, 1990e; Ecofund 1986; Greenpeace 1986b.
35. As noted in chapter five, New Zealand tentatively made this suggestion in 1975 during the early 
stages of debates about how to manage the minerals issue. There was little support for the idea 
then.
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Antarctic decision-making).36 They opposed the Australian/French proposal on similar 
grounds.
Comprehensive protection
In seeking to improve on the increasingly unsatisfactory and unwieldy sectoral 
approach to environmental protection, the Australian and French initiative required a 
rethinking of the traditional approach to environmental decision-making within the 
Treaty system (described in chapter three).37
Australia and France proposed a legally binding agreement which would contain 
general environmental principles and standards against which all activity in the 
Antarctic would be judged. They elaborated an institutional framework, including a 
new Antarctic Environment Commission which would be vested with decision-making 
powers, and improved monitoring and compliance mechanisms.
The consultative parties agreed at a preparatory meeting in early May (prior to the 
Australian announcement on CRAMRA) that the issue of comprehensive environmental 
protection measures would be on the agenda for ATCM-XV. However, while they 
agreed that environmental protection measures should be improved, they were reluctant 
to agree to the very approach that was required to achieve it. There was general 
opposition to a new convention. They were particularly opposed to any independent 
decision-making authority with responsibility for monitoring and compliance. The 
British also argued that too strict rules might unacceptably restrict the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge.38 The suggestion that a comprehensive convention should 
incorporate a ban on minerals activity and designate Antarctica a wilderness reserve 
meant, in the context of the rejection of CRAMRA, that it was received with more 
hostility than might otherwise have been the case. It was characterised as a politically 
expedient alternative to the Minerals Convention, rather than an initiative on improving 
environmental protection its own right.
As discussed in chapter three, debates about the adequacy of the environmental sub­
regime and demands for comprehensive protection took place, on the whole, outside the 
Treaty consultative process. ASOC and Greenpeace International proposals for 
comprehensive protection measures are discussed, in brief, above. The International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature also called for a new international instrument to
36. The claimants, in particular Argentina and Chile, resisted any such suggestions.
37. The Australian announcement on 22 May explicitly recognised, as noted above, that this was a 
"significant change of approach" (Hawke et al 1989:1).
38. The British referred to a "blinkered concern for the minor effects that [the] pursuit of knowledge 
is having on the Antarctic environment" which could, they implied, undermine the Treaty 
system itself (Preparatory Meeting for ATCM XV, Statement of UK Delegation).
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provide for comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment in its Antarctic 
Conservation Strategy (IUCN 1991).39 This detailed strategy included 
recommendations for stronger legal obligations on environmental protection within the 
Treaty system, a strengthened institutional framework and a prohibition on minerals 
activity. Thus the environmental rationale for an improved approach was well- 
established.
Environmental grounds for defection
Both Australia and France cited environmental grounds for their opposition to the 
Minerals Convention and their support for wilderness status for Antarctica. The most 
outspoken of their critics, particularly the US, UK and (at that stage) New Zealand, 
refused to accept and, indeed, sought actively to discredit this argument. They did so 
believing that the reasons for a defection (for the defecting state must make a 
calculation that the benefits outweigh the costs of its actions) would be found only in 
tangible and, for the most part, short-term interests.
Opponents suggested that the real reason for Australia’s decision, hidden behind the 
idealism of environmental arguments, could be found in the reality of its sovereignty 
and economic interests and domestic political concerns. New Zealand’s Foreign 
Minister suggested that the Australian decision was "dictated by political considerations 
rather than any fine feelings about Antarctica" (cited in Blay and Tsamenyi 
1990:195).40 New Zealand Prime Minister Lange described the Australian decision as a 
"road-to-Damascus-like experience that tends to put Saul rather in the shade" (Clifton 
1989:2).
The Australian Treasurer and the Minister for Resources argued against Australian 
signature of CRAMRA (in opposition to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the 
Environment)41 on the grounds, first, that the absence of guaranteed royalty payments 
in the Minerals Convention undermined Australia’s sovereignty over its Antarctic 
territory and, second, that the absence of anti-subsidy provisions could result in unfair
39. In 1980 the IUCN, with the assistance of UNEP and the World Wildlife Fund, and in 
collaboration with UNESCO and FAO, prepared a World Conservation Strategy which 
identified preservation of the living resources of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean as a priority 
for national and international action. In 1981 the IUCN Council recommended that a 
conservation strategy for the Antarctic and Southern Ocean be prepared and, in 1983, an IUCN 
advisory committee on the Antarctic was established.
40. This was a reference to the strong showing by Green Independents (in the context of a 
forthcoming federal election) in the Tasmanian state elections, following which they held the 
balance of power in the state legislature. However the Tasmanian state election had been held 
only a week before the decision against CRAMRA was made whereas there was evidence of 
dissension in the government on the minerals convention some time prior to that.
41. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Environment Minister both supported the Convention 
on the grounds that it was the best that could be achieved and provided some degree of 
protection for the environment.
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competition to Australia’s mining industry.42 Both concerns had helped define 
Australia’s position during the minerals negotiations.
The new policy initiative was also characterised as a "short term appeasement of the 
Green vote" (Fanshawe 1990). A federal election was due in Australia by September 
1990 and polls indicated that environmental issues were likely to be important. This 
perception was reinforced by the results of the Tasmanian state election early in May 
1989, following which the Green Independents held the balance of power in the state 
parliament.
Nevertheless an explanation which seeks to locate Australia’s decision simply in short­
term political and economic interests, is limited as the following discussion shows.
Domestic debate in Australia
Australia’s decision was in part a response to domestic debate which, the liberal 
tradition of international relations theory suggests, is an important factor in shaping 
international cooperation.43 On 25 November, when CRAMRA was opened for 
signature, Australia did not join a number of its Treaty parties in signing the convention. 
Instead, the Minister for Foreign Affairs tabled the Convention in Parliament for the 
express purpose of promoting community discussion.44
The tenor of that community discussion over the period to early May indicated that 
public and parliamentary support for ratification of the Convention was increasingly 
unlikely. That is, an involuntary defection was possible. Both the Federal Opposition 
and the Australian Democrats (who held the balance of power in the Senate) opposed 
signature and ratification of CRAMRA.45 In response to a motion tabled by the 
Opposition (on 2 May 1989) calling upon the government not to sign and ratify 
CRAMRA the Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, indicated that the "Government is 
considering whether we should do just that". This made it clear that the issue was open 
to the influence of public debate.
42. The Australian Mining Industry Council was in favour of signature, although it would have 
preferred an anti-subsidy clause. Its opposition to the Australian government stance was 
grounded in its belief that no area should be permanently closed off to mining.
43. For a detailed chronology of events in Australia during this time, see Bergin (1991).
44. He said that "in determining its position on the convention, the government will give 
consideration to, among other things, Australia’s principal Antarctic objectives" (Evans 1988). 
The Treasurer, Paul Keating, had already made clear his opposition to signature of CRAMRA in 
a letter to the Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, in September 1988 (Keating [letter] 1988).
45. Labor government backbenchers also announced their opposition to mining in the Antarctic 
(Peake 1989:6).
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There was, as Pascoe46 suggests (1990:106), "a high level of public concern about 
Antarctica ... which had no precedent in earlier considerations in Australia of Antarctic 
issues". The Australian environment minister, Senator Graham Richardson (when 
presented with a plan for a World Park Antarctica by sixteen conservation groups early 
in May) conceded that public opinion in Australia was increasingly opposed to 
CRAMRA (Clark 1989:4).47 That public concern was mobilised by NGOs who 
conducted an intensive and well-organised campaign in seeking to convince the 
government not to sign or ratify the Convention. Representatives from ASOC, 
Greenpeace Australia and the Australian Conservation Foundation lobbied politicians, 
conducted briefing sessions for the media and legislators and instigated successful 
letter-writing campaigns and petitions.
Divisions in Cabinet (noted above) were related not just to economic concerns. 
Treasurer Keating suggested in a letter to the Prime Minister that "Australia ... is in an 
excellent position to take a leading role in ensuring that the last wilderness is protected 
for future generations" (Keating [letter] 1989:2).48 In response to cabinet disagreement, 
opposition in parliament and public concerns Prime Minister Hawke established a 
committee to report to Cabinet on what steps would be necessary to establish the 
Antarctic as a World Park (Houweling 1989:2).49
Public and parliamentary opposition to CRAMRA can be located in a growing 
awareness of the general importance of environmental protection. As Blay and 
Tsamenyi (1990:198) note, "the success of the Green Independents [in the Tasmanian 
election] was ... an indicator of community concerns for the protection of the 
environment". In explaining the Australian decision, Prime Minister Hawke referred to 
the
changing world climate of opinion ... which is a function of the general 
concern and awareness of the responsibilities of governments in this 
generation to protect the planet generally and most particularly in regard 
to the Antarctic (cited in Bergin 1991:231).
He suggested that there was
an increasing understanding of the absolute fragility of the environment.
We don’t live in a static world and ... the attitudes of government today, 
in regard to environmental issues, is markedly different to what it was 
even twelve months ago (cited in Bergin 1991:231-232).
46. First Secretary in the Australian Embassy in Santiago, Chile.
47. The Prime Minister announced to the Australian Mining Industry Council that Australia was 
considering not signing the Convention (Blay and Tsamenyi 1990:198).
48. He had also raised this issue in an earlier letter to the Foreign Minister (see Keating [letter] 
1988).
49. This committee included officials from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, 
Department of the Arts, Sports, Environment, Tourism and Territories, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Primary Industry and Energy.
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The Minerals Convention, the Prime Minister suggested, was "based on the clearly 
incorrect assumption - current in the 1970s - that mining in Antarctica could be 
consistent with the preservation of the continent’s fragile environment" (Hawke 
1990a: 18) an assumption that Australia could no longer support. In this way, he linked 
changes in government policy (and in national objectives and interests) to changing 
values and ideas.
In exploring the credibility of the environmental rationale for Australia’s decision on 
CRAMRA, attention should also be paid to its record of good-standing on 
environmental protection issues within the consultative process. Protection of the 
environment had long been a stated objective of Australia’s Antarctic policy which also 
included economic benefit from resource exploitation.50 However, as Alan Brown51 
observes (1990a:8), "those goals [were] set in another era ... Little if any critical 
consideration [was] given at the highest level of government to whether the individual 
goals [were] compatible with each other".52 The Australian decision on the Minerals 
Convention represented a reassessment of those goals and their compatibility with each 
other. It gave, as Harris argues (1990:17), "explicit priority to environmental 
protection".
Australian advocacy of an environmental protection agreement was well established in 
Treaty meetings. Throughout the minerals negotiations Australia had been at the 
forefront of support for stringent environmental protection measures.53 Australia first 
tabled a proposal for an umbrella environmental protection agreement in 1983, an idea 
which "proved too radical" for its Treaty partners (Rowland 1988:22).54 The idea still 
proved too radical in 1989 in spite of changing ideas in the international community 
about environmental protection and increased evidence (see chapter three) of the
50. Australia’s interests and policy objectives in Antarctica can be summarised as follows: to 
preserve Australian sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory, to maintain Antarctica 
free from strategic and political confrontation, to protect the Antarctic environment, to take 
advantage of the special opportunities Antarctica offers for scientific research, to be informed 
about and able to influence developments in a region geographically proximate to Australia, and 
to derive any reasonable benefits from the living and non-living resources of Antarctica (Jackson 
1989a:6). The last objective was added in the early 1980s (Brook 1984:256, 258) and now 
includes the caveat "excluding the deriving of such benefits from mining and oil drilling" 
(Jackson 1989a:6).
51. Alan Brown is a senior officer with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
52. The question of a possible conflict between this and other policy objectives, such as benefitting 
from resource exploitation, had been debated in discussions on Australia’s Antarctic policy. See 
Spencer (1984) and Brook (1984).
53. One report suggests that members of the entire Australian delegation at the final ceremony of the 
minerals negotiations wore World Park badges (ASOC 1989g:4).
54. Rowland also notes (1988:22) that the Australian submission to the UN Secretary-General in 
1983 "was notable for containing passages about scenic and wilderness values, of a kind not 
mentioned in the statements of other countries".
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inadequacies of the Treaty system in this regard. Australia argued at the preparatory 
meeting for ATCM-XV that it saw "merit in a catch-all convention ... subsuming over 
time existing instruments”.55 Australia had also taken a lead in advocating improved 
rules on the Code of Conduct for expeditions and the protected area system and in 
pushing for better conservation measures to be adopted under CCAMLR.
Australian support for wilderness reserve status (or something akin to a world park) for 
Antarctica was new. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Australian policy­
makers were not as stridently opposed to this concept as were others. In the mid-1980s 
Australia took the view that there were
a number of problems in the proposal to declare Antarctica to be a World 
Park, not the least of which is uncertainty about the precise content and 
implications of that concept ... The Australian authorities therefore 
believe that it would be premature to raise any World Park concept in 
the Antarctic Treaty forum until there is an agreed, precise and feasible 
meaning of that concept which recognises the practical realities of 
Antarctica (Anon 1984a:97; emphasis added).56
In other words, the possibility was not totally ruled out.
Australia’s change in national interests was in response to domestic debate and to new 
ideas and values (cognitive change) set within this broader context of a well-established 
commitment to environmental protection in the Antarctic.
France and the Antarctic environment
The French position is a little more puzzling. Indeed, its commitment to environmental 
principles in the Antarctic was, with some justification, greeted with greater 
scepticism.57 Rowland (1988:28) lists France as one of the least conservationist of the 
Treaty parties. As a potential mining state it would have benefited from CRAMRA 
coming into force, and thus been less adversely affected (as a claimant) than Australia 
by the lack of specific provisions on royalties and subsidies.
55. In an informal paper (PREP/WP/14, 1989) designed to provide some direction for the 
anticipated discussion at ATCM XV, Australia described the present system on environmental 
protection as "piecemeal ... with many significant gaps” (PREP/WP/14, 1989:1). This paper 
listed the issues which would need to be addressed, and set out possible objectives and 
fundamental principles as well as institutional arrangements. The paper also referred to the 
enormous environmental consequences that could arise from mineral resource activities ”[i]f 
CRAMRA enters into force..." (PREP/WP/14 1989:3) (my emphasis) thus indicating some doubt 
on the future of the minerals convention.
56. In a speech reported in the Department of Foreign Affairs journal 18 months later, the Minister 
for Science suggested that it would be "premature to implement" such a proposal until there was 
an agreed meaning (Jones 1985:841; emphasis added).
57. As noted above the French record of environmental protection in the Antarctic had been 
criticised by environmental organisations, especially with regard to its construction of an airstrip 
at Pointe Geologie.
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Its alignment with Australia on non-ratification, following its less radical April 
announcement calling for the negotiations to be reopened, can be located firmly in 
domestic political explanations rather than characterised as building on a solid 
foundation of environmental concerns. In France, those domestic politics indicated a 
growing concern for environmental protection issues. Recent municipal elections had 
returned a 15 percent green vote, and polls showed that the green vote in the 
forthcoming European Parliament elections was likely to be higher than that (in the 
vicinity of 17 percent) (Scott 1989). NGOs conducted an active anti-ratification 
campaign with the support of Jacques Cousteau who was particularly influential in 
lobbying the French government, building on his close rapport with government 
leaders.58
As chapter one indicated, changes in policy may result from changes in government. 
The new Socialist government in France included members with strong environmental 
backgrounds. Environment Minister Brice Lalonde was a founder of Les Amis de la 
Terre, the French Friends of the Earth. The National Assembly also took a much more 
active role in the debate than previously. Indeed, the Parliamentary Committee which 
examined France’s options on CRAMRA complained that the National Assembly had 
not been given a proper role in the development of Minerals Convention.59 It supported 
the exploration of other options besides the minerals convention and recommended 
legislation to prohibit French nationals from participating in minerals activity (ECO 
(LXXIV (2) 1989:2/4).
Coalition building after defection
The Australian and French defection from consensus was directed at a particular 
outcome - the Minerals Convention. It was not a rejection of the consensus norm nor of 
the value of the Treaty system. Prime Minister Hawke emphasised that they were "not 
challenging the Treaty System or the operation of the consensus principle that has 
underpinned its operation" (Hawke 1990a: 19).60 Both states stressed their continuing 
support for the Treaty system as fundamental to their interests in the Antarctic. They 
sought to find a new consensus among the Treaty parties on a ban on minerals activity 
and on strengthening environmental protection measures. However, as Blay and 
Tsamenyi have observed (1990:201)
58. When he made his announcement calling for the minerals negotiations to be re-opened, Michel 
Rocard said that he had discussed this issue with Cousteau and referred to the Cousteau petition.
59. The President of the National Assembly, M. Fabius, had announced early in April that France 
should not ratify CRAMRA (Iggulden 1990:103).
60. Australia’s Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, also stressed that "our initiative on Antarctica is in 
no way a repudiation of Australia’s long-standing support for the Antarctic Treaty system" 
(Evans 1990a:5).
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[i]f CRAMRA is dead because of the absence of consensus, Australia 
can hardly expect to gain the consensus it will need to negotiate, let 
alone implement [their] ... proposed Convention ... It is a situation that 
could destroy the consensus approach to negotiations.
While some hoped, indeed assumed, that Australia and France would back down in the 
face of stringent and apparently unshakeable opposition from other consultative parties, 
this was not to be the case. Australia and France now sought to have their initiative 
adopted as an insitutional goal within the regime. This process, of translating individual 
learning into institutional learning, rests (in a non-hegemonic regime) on coalition­
building.
Both Prime Ministers took up the issue as a personal crusade. The Australian Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet colleagues lobbied hard on this issue.61 Australia and France 
were supported in their efforts by NGOs, through ASOC and Greenpeace International, 
who continued their public campaigns in other consultative states and lobbied 
politicians and Antarctic policy-makers.
The Antarctic issue was taken up in public and parliamentary debate in other Treaty 
states as it had been in Australia and France. These debates focussed on the general 
question of principle relating to a ban on minerals activity and the declaration of 
wilderness reserve status for Antarctic rather than on the more detailed and complicated 
question of comprehensive environmental protection measures. Consensus for 
CRAMRA began to erode further as support for the Australian and French proposal 
grew.
US State Department officials maintained their pro-CRAMRA stance in the belief that 
Australia would change its mind (Hope 1989). However not all US government 
agencies shared this view. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on 
Environmental Quality called for a review of US Antarctic policy interests to be held 
before the Convention was submitted to the Senate for ratification {ECO LXXIV(2) 
1989:2). Evidence of congressional concern came with the introduction of a Senate 
resolution on 26 September which called for full protection for Antarctica and an 
extension of the moratorium on minerals activities while a new agreement to ban 
minerals activities was negotiated.62 NGOs in the US were active in lobbying
61. Hawke included the Antarctic in his list of topics when he spoke to US President Bush in 
Washington in June 1989. He mentioned it when he addressed the National Press Club in 
Washington. He raised it at a dinner hosted by the Minister for Industry and Regional 
Development and the Associate Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris on 19 June 1989, and at 
another dinner hosted by the Lord Mayor of London on 21 June.
62. The resolution was introduced by A1 Gore, an influential pro-environment Senator. It was co­
sponsored by, among others, Senator Claiborne Pell, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. A similar resolution opposing the minerals treaty and calling for strong
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government agencies, congressional leaders and the President in support of the anti­
ratification campaign.63
India, one of the key developing states in the Treaty system, announced its support for 
the Australian initiative in June (Murdoch 1989:6). In the same month, the Belgian 
Parliament passed legislation prohibiting Belgian nationals and companies from 
undertaking any minerals activity in the Antarctic.64 The Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Mark Eyskens, stated that "the ... Convention is dangerous and it is inappropriate for us 
to approve it. The best solution is to make Antarctica a world nature reserve" 
(Pallemaerts [e-mail] 1989). In Britain, bipartisan support for the Antarctic Minerals 
Bill broke down in the House of Commons where the Labour Party moved, 
unsuccessfully, that the House decline the second reading of the bill (House of 
Commons 1989:220).65 In September the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian 
Parliament passed a (non-binding) resolution opposing the minerals convention and 
supporting world nature park status for Antarctica. The Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs informed the Parliament that the Italian Government would support the World 
Park option at the forthcoming consultative meeting (ECO LXXIV(2) 1989:1).
By this stage, it was clear that not only had the internal accommodation broken down 
but that those states which opposed Australia and France were having difficulty in 
maintaining their positions domestically.
ATCM -XV, 9-20 October 1989
Three-and-a-half months after the Australian announcement, the consultative parties 
met in Paris for the 15th consultative meeting. It provided the first opportunity for them 
to discuss in a multilateral forum the implications of the Australian and French decision
environmental protection of the Antarctic was introduced into the House of Representatives by 
Congressman Owens (HJR 418). The resolutions refer to the Antarctic as a global ecological 
commons, and suggest that CRAMRA does not guarantee protection of the fragile environment 
of Antarctica.
63. On 23 June 1989, nine major environmental organisations in the United States (The Antarctica 
Project, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace USA, the Environment Defense Fund, the Environmental 
Policy Institute, Friends of the Earth, National Audubon Society, the Humane Society of the US 
and the Oceanic Society) delivered a letter to President Bush, urging the administration to 
respond favourably to the Australian and French decisions (Antarctica Project et.al 1989). A 
week later representatives of the Antarctica Project (Evelyn Hurwich and James Barnes, both of 
whom had signed the Bush letter) wrote to the director of the US Environmental Protection 
Agency, Bill Reilly, urging the agency to "take a leadership role in developing a positive 
environmental agenda for Antarctica (Hurwich and Barnes [letter] 1989:2).
64. This Bill was unanimously endorsed by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of 
Representatives on 11 May and was approved in the Senate on 30 June.
65. This was after the visit by Australian Prime Minister Hawke to London. The debates make 
interesting reading. Essentially they pit the arguments of the Foreign Office against those of 
Greenpeace UK.
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on CRAMRA and the proposals for a wilderness reserve.66 Opening statements were, 
on the whole, restrained. Some referred to the problems of a lack of consensus or stated 
their support for the Minerals Convention, but none openly censured Australia or 
France. Nevertheless, the head of the West German delegation summed up the feelings 
of many in noting that they
share[d] the concern expressed over the fact that doubts have now been 
raised from among our ranks ... [we] believe that a divided stand of the 
Antarctic Treaty States on the Minerals Convention will lead to risks 
with implications well beyond our circle (Final Report 1989:137)67
The agenda was dominated by environmental issues. As well as comprehensive 
protection measures, delegates were scheduled to discuss waste disposal, marine 
pollution, environmental impact procedures, the protected area system, the siting of 
stations, the effects of tourism and non-governmental expeditions and environmental 
monitoring.68 These were, as chapter three shows, key issues in the environmental 
regime. Thirteen of the twenty-two recommendations adopted addressed these issues.69 
Many of them set out detailed rules and procedures for the conduct of human activity in 
the Antarctic to supplement recommendations already in place and are discussed further 
below.
The question of minerals activity was not a formal agenda item but, given Australian 
and French opposition to the Minerals Convention and their pursuit of a prohibition on 
minerals activity, it was now difficult to separate it from the question of comprehensive 
measures. Only a few of the consultative parties were convinced by the Australian and 
French argument that CRAMRA should be set aside. Fifteen had signed it although
66. In an indication of the importance the French government attached to this particular gathering, it 
was opened by the French Prime Minister, M. Rocard. He told delegates that in his view a 
comprehensive regime for protecting the Antarctic environment should take the form of a 
"nature reserve - land of science" (Final Report 1989:117).
67. An open letter was sent to delegates by HH Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Professor Arne Naess, 
David McTaggart (Chair of Greenpeace International) and Charles de Haes (Director General of 
WWF). They called "on the member states of the Antarctic Treaty, indeed all nations of the 
world, to take the first unambiguous step toward safeguarding this environment. We ask them to 
discard the Antarctic Minerals Convention and begin immediate negotiations to forever preserve 
the Antarctic environment" (ECO LXXIV(l) 1989:1). On 9 October WWF-Intemational came 
out in support of the Australian/French initiative. At the 1989 Annual General Meeting of 
Friends of the Earth, held in Washington DC, the 38 member groups unanimously agreed to a 
resolution calling on the Treaty parties not to ratify CRAMRA. FOE’s position advocated the 
negotiation of a comprehensive Environmental Protection Convention for Antarctica, a 
permanent ban on minerals activity, which together would maintain the continent as a wilderness 
reserve or Antarctic Treaty Park (ECO LXXIV(2) 1989:4)
68. The agenda item on comprehensive measures was discussed in the plenary session, and then by 
Working Group 1 which was chaired by Chris Beeby. The Chair of Working Group 1 drew up 
draft principles on comprehensive measures based but, according to the final report, the meeting 
did not have sufficient time to consider these, although a number of delegations (not specified) 
expressed reservations about them (Final Report 1989:15).
69. The Meeting also approved a declaration on the ozone layer and climate change.
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none had yet ratified it.70 There was also limited support for wilderness status for the 
Antarctic or for comprehensive measures to be adopted in the form of a convention or 
similar agreement.
Working papers on comprehensive measures were submitted by Australia and France, 
Chile, New Zealand, the United States and Sweden. All accepted that there was a need 
for improved protection measures.71 The New Zealand paper was the most detailed of 
those tabled and set out specific suggestions for improving existing measures relating to 
environmental protection, including an improved institutional framework, building on 
existing components of the Treaty system but clearly hoping to head off an instrument 
of the sort proposed by Australia and France.72 Suggestions for an improved 
institutional framework (also proposed by Australia and France) were resisted, 
according to Kimball (1989f: 15), on the grounds, that any new over-arching decision­
making body might destabilise the existing compromises in Antarctic agreements.73
The United States (XV ATCM/WP/8, 1989) argued that resource activities should 
continue to be conducted in accordance with existing agreements (including CRAMRA) 
and was reluctant to agree to any special meeting on comprehensive measures.74 In line 
with their earlier announcements, Australia and France advocated the negotiation of a
70. See list at the end of appendix 8. This fifteen included Finland and the Republic of Korea who 
were NCPs when they signed and had attained consultative status just prior to ATCM-XV. As 
well as Australia and France, other consultative parties which had participated in the 
negotiations and had not yet signed were West Germany, Belgium, Italy and India. Spain, which 
had attained consultative status after the Convention was adopted but before it was opened for 
signature had also not signed. The key ratifying states were the other claimants (all of whom 
had signed) plus the US and USSR (both of whom had signed) along with a number of 
developing states (five of the sixteen ratifications had to come from developing states). In this 
category, Brazil, Uruguay, China, as well as Argentina and Chile (who were normally counted 
by the Treaty parties to fall into this category as well as being claimants) had signed.
71. These working papers were appended to the Final Report of the meeting.
72. This included improved monitoring and compliance mechanisms and improved institutional 
arrangements, including a secretariat and possibly a Standing Environmental Working Group. It 
also drew attention to "significant gaps in the system" and noted that "implementation of some 
of the instruments previously adopted has not always been up to the required or desired 
standards" (Final Report 1989:214). The working paper (XV ATCM/WP/4,1989) was produced 
following the development of that government’s White Paper on the Antarctic environment.
73. Chile expressed particular caution on the need for any form of institutional arrangement or on 
mandatory enforcement mechanisms. Chile also suggested that a "conceptual framework ought 
to include traditional formulations that govern the Treaty system" (Final Report 1989:230). 
Although these "traditional formulations" were not stated, it is reasonable to assume that this 
was intended to refer to the protection of the status of sovereignty claims. Their working paper 
(XV ATCM/WP/7, 1989) argued that the measures already in place "configure a wide and 
profound framework of environmental protection that has no equal in the international 
community" while acknowledging that this needed improvement "in the light of the increasing 
human activity in Antarctica" (Final R epot 1989:228). The delegation was of the opinion that 
such improvement could be best met by the adoption of Approved Measures.
74. The Swedish delegation proposed the outline of a draft recommendation (XV ATCM/WP/14, 
1989) which sought to elucidate the common ground of the other proposals. Nevertheless it was 
very general in its content
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new convention and the declaration of the Antarctic as a "nature reserve - land of 
science".75 Their proposal received support from Belgium, Italy, Greece, India, and 
Spain.76
There was difficulty in taking the discussion further. The consultative parties agreed, 
however, to convene a special consultative meeting in 1990 to "explore and discuss all 
proposals relating to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment" 
(recommendation XV-1).77 This meeting would "undertake as a priority objective the 
further elaboration, maintenance and effective implementation of a comprehensive 
system for the protection of the Antarctic environment", including a review of existing 
measures to consider if and to what extent institutional arrangements might be 
necessary and the form, or forms, of legal or other measures required. The 
recommendation made no concessions to the Australian/French initiative but it was an 
acknowledgement that the issue would not fade away. It provided an opportunity for 
them to argue their case further.78
The decision to convene a special meeting on environmental protection did not prevent 
delegates adopting a number of recommendations on the other environmental issues on 
the agenda. Indeed, by doing so, the consultative parties strengthened a number of the 
rules that were to be reviewed at the special consultative meeting, possibly in the hope 
that such a review would fmd no need for a new and comprehensive convention.
Recommendation XV-3 sets out detailed agreed practices on waste disposal.79 
Governments must take measures to ensure compliance with the waste disposal rules by
75. Australia and France made suggestions on appropriate principles and procedural and 
institutional requirements, including an environmental commission with decision-making 
powers, a scientific and technical committee, an arbitration body and an inspection and 
monitoring corps. There is no specific mention of minerals activity being banned.
76. The Australian/French paper was also commended by Austria, Bulgaria, Poland and Sweden 
(Grutzner 1989:13). In a letter to the New Zealand Prime Minister, the convenor of ASOC in 
New Zealand suggested that Chile had been on the brink of publicly supporting Australia, but 
that disagreement between the two over the extradition from Australia to Sweden of a Chilean 
emigre wanted by the Chilean government caused Chile to break off talks with Australia 
(Wallace [letter] 1989). There is, however, no evidence in the Chilean proposal to indicate that 
it was close to advocating a wilderness reserve or a ban on minerals activity.
77. This recommendation is included, in full, at appendix 9.
78. The idea of a special consultative meeting on this issue was first suggested by the UK at the 
preparatory meeting, prior to the joint Australian/French announcement. The British move was 
interpreted by NGOs at that stage as a means of diverting attention away from the issue so that it 
would not be on the agenda of ATCM XV although they later supported the idea as support for 
the Australian/French initiative grew. Agreement to hold a SCM on comprehensive measures 
was reached only on the understanding that a meeting would also be held to discuss proposals 
for the liability protocol (though not to negotiate the protocol) required under article 8 of the 
Minerals Convention. At least some of the consultative parties were therefore still hopeful that 
CRAMRA could be resurrected.
79. As chapter three noted, SCAR’s report on Waste Disposal was finally available to delegates. 
Governments may adopt, on an individual basis, rules more stringent than those in the
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all those subject to their jurisdiction, including private operations.80 The Final Report 
includes a detailed statement of further work to be undertaken by the consultative 
parties with respect to improving waste disposal practices.81
The consultative parties adopted their first detailed recommendation on marine 
pollution (XV-4). It requires governments to take measures to prohibit discharges and 
disposal from vessels and to ensure that vessels comply with the relevant provisions of 
specified international conventions.82
There was considerable debate on how best to implement the EIA procedures adopted at 
ATCM-XIV.83 The view was generally held that these procedures should apply to all 
human activities, including tourism and non-governmental expeditions, but there was no 
agreement on how to extend those obligations beyond official expeditions.84 No 
recommendation was adopted on tourism but the meeting agreed, as noted in chapter 
three, that a comprehensive review was required and that it should be undertaken by the 
forthcoming special consultative meeting.85
The Meeting took a number of steps forward in extending the protected area system.86 
Management plans were now to be required for Specially Protected Areas 
(recommendations XV-8 and XV-9).87 The Meeting also approved two new categories
recommendation. For any state, rules for Antarctica should be no less stringent than those 
applied to nationals and vessels elsewhere.
80. There is an emphasis on retrograding wastes, that is returning them to the country of origin. The 
Meeting reaffirmed its agreement to encourage the implementation of new waste disposal 
technology.
81. This statement addresses issues such as appropriate technologies, the dumping of wastes at sea, 
national waste management plans, waste disposal standards for vessels and the storage and 
handling of wastes.
82. The Meeting suggested that consultative parties who were signatories to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1973) and its Protocol of 1978 
(MARPOL 73/78) consider formally proposing that the Treaty area be designated a special area 
under its provisions. This was approved by the Marine Environment Protection Committee 
(MEPC) of the IMO on 15 November 1990. The Meeting also agreed that the issues of dumping 
at sea and liability for marine damage warranted further attention.
83. The UK took the lead on this issue and circulated a draft recommendation which included a list 
of activities which would most likely invoke the preparation of a Comprehensive Environmental 
Evaluation in accordance with recommendation XIV-2.
84. Delegates compiled a number of issues relating to EIA which could usefully be considered by 
the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs in its forthcoming workshop. 
COMNAP is affiliated to SCAR and replaces the SCAR Working Group on Logistics.
85. As noted, there was agreement that EIA and waste disposal requirements should apply to non­
governmental activities (including tourism) as well as to official expeditions.
86. As chapter three has noted, these steps followed the preparation of a report by SCAR on proteted 
areas and debate at several consultative meetings on the need to improve the system.
87. The meeting also approved three new Sites of Special Scientific Interest and redesignated one 
SPA as an SSSI in order to facilitate research and monitoring under CCAMLR on the 
understanding that when that research was finished the site would revert to its original 
designation.
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of protected areas to supplement the categories of SPAs, SSSIs and historic monuments 
(which protected areas of ecological, scientific and historic value respectively). A  
category of Specially Reserved Areas was created to protect values not already covered 
by existing criteria, including scenic, aesthetic and wilderness values (recommendation 
XV-10).88 The category of Multiple-Use Planning Area (MPA) sought to minimise the 
risk of activities interfering with each other and of cumulative impacts by encouraging 
cooperative planning and coordination of activities in areas so designated 
(recommendation XV-11).
Thus in the specific measures adopted, as well as the convening of a special meeting on 
environmental protection, this consultative meeting was important in the development 
of the environmental regime within the Treaty system.
Between ATCM-XV and SCM-XI
The twelve months between the consultative meeting and the scheduled SCM were a 
period of intense diplomatic activity and public debate as Australia and France 
maintained their formal diplomatic efforts to build a coalition of support for their policy 
stance.89
In support of Australian and French leadership on this issue, NGOs maintained their 
active national and transnational campaigns.90 In Britain, where the Foreign Office was 
still adamantly opposed to a minerals ban and a new instrument for environmental 
protection, a public campaign against mining in Antarctica was mobilised by the 
"unlikely coalition of Greenpeace, the WWF and the National Federation of Women’s 
Institutes" (Porritt 1990).91 A petition circulated in Germany by members of the World- 
Wide Fund for Nature, demanding full protection for the Antarctic and a permanent ban 
on minerals activity (ECO LXXVII(3) 1990:2) collected over 300,000 signatures. The 
Antarctica Project spearheaded a collective endeavour by ASOC members to research 
and draft a model Antarctic protection convention. Jacques Cousteau continued his 
high level informal diplomacy.92
88. SRAs can also be used to protect areas of outstanding geological, glaciological and 
geomorphological value.
89. Senator Evans met with US Secretary of State James Baker in October for the Australian-US 
Ministerial talks and discussed the Australian/French initiative. In September 1990 Evans and 
the Australian Ambassador for the Environment, Sir Ninian Stephens, visited a number of Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay and Peru) during which time the 
initiative was also discussed.
90. Because of the Australian commitment, Greenpeace Australia’s Antarctic campaign focussed 
attention on other Antarctic Treaty nations (Goldsworthy 1991:7).
91. They circulated a petition and targetted the Conservative Party conference in October.
92. In February 1990, Jacques Cousteau visited Australia where he discussed the Australian/French 
initiative with the Prime Minister and other senior ministers. During his visit he was presented 
with an Honorary Companion of the Order of Australia. The Prime Minister’s press release on 
Cousteau’s visit noted that he was "remembered with particular gratitude by the people of
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When the year-long signature period for the minerals convention passed in November 
1989 only nineteen states had signed.93 Significantly West Germany, which had been 
one of the strongest pro-mining nations during the negotiations, allowed the signature 
date to pass without making a decision.94 With the exception of the UK, none of the 
signatory states had begun ratification processes.
Politicians in a number of Treaty states, including those most opposed to Australia and 
France, responded to the pressures of public campaigns and NGO lobbying, and urged a 
reassessment of national policy (and thus national Antarctic interests) upon Antarctic 
bureaucrats. The Antarctic bureaucrats, who had dominated decision-making at a 
national and international level for so long, were reluctant to respond. As a result they 
were increasingly marginalised in the political debates. Their resistance stemmed from 
their ‘ownership’ of the Antarctic issue and its decision-making processes and their 
continued belief that the regime could not function in any other way.
New Zealand
Australia and France received further support when, on 26 February 1990 the Prime 
Minister of New Zealand, Geoffrey Palmer announced that his government would set 
aside consideration of the ratification of CRAMRA and would explore the possibility of 
a "long-term legally binding moratorium on mining activity in Antarctica" (Palmer 
1990a:2). He suggested that the debate about the Minerals Convention was "diverting 
attention from the wider environmental protection issues" in the Antarctic (Palmer 
1990a:l).95 Palmer also suggested (1990a:2) that the Antarctic community had to 
"recognise that the time has come to move constructively in the direction of the 
Australian and New Zealand proposals on environmental protection measures".96 The 
Antarctic community had, to date, been reluctant to do so.
When pressed the following day by the Leader of the Opposition on whether the 
announcement meant the government might reinstate the Minerals Convention as its
Australia for his untiring efforts to preserve and safeguard the Antarctic environment" (Hawke 
1990b). From Australia, Cousteau went to New Zealand and the US where he met privately with 
President Bush in Washington in October.
93. See the list at the end of appendix 8.
94. See ECO (LXXIV(2) 1989:2). Two committees of the Bundestag had before them for 
consideration World Park motions put down by the Greens Party. It was likely that all 
opposition parties would support a ban on mining and the negotiation of a comprehensive 
convention.
95. In November 1989 the New Zealand government established a committee to examine events 
since the adoption of CRAMRA and to develop an appropriate policy in the light of ATCM XV. 
Chris Beeby was on that committee.
96. In his post-Cabinet press conference, Palmer suggested that the New Zealand government was 
"taking up the cudgels on behalf of Antarctica" (Palmer 1990b:2).
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preferred option if it did not make progress in some other form, Palmer replied "No, it 
does not"97 {Hansard. 27 February 1990:147). On 6 July Palmer announced that his 
government would promote a new protocol to the Antarctic Treaty and a moratorium on 
mining.98 On 4 August he announced to a conference of environment and conservation 
organisations that New Zealand would now support a permanent ban on mining.99
New Zealand’s decision was significant. Through Beeby it had invested considerable 
diplomatic energy in the negotiation of CRAMRA.100 As a claimant state its 
ratification was required to effect entry into force. Thus three of the nine key states had 
now put the Convention aside.101 It was a further blow to the US and UK arguments 
that Australia and France were isolated within the Treaty system.102 It was an 
important victory both for Australia and France, and for the NGO campaign in New 
Zealand.
USA
In the US, official State Department policy which supported CRAMRA and opposed 
the Australian/French proposals was under challenge in Congress amid a growing 
concern over the administration’s unwillingness to consider seriously alternatives to 
CRAMRA.103 Between February and May five legislative initiatives on the Antarctic,
97. The debate on this issue in the New Zealand House of Representatives was interesting. It was 
sought by the Opposition under Standing Orders as a matter of urgent public importance. Both 
the Government and the Opposition opposed mining in Antarctica and both now supported 
comprehensive environmental protection measures. The lengthy debate consisted, to a great 
extent, of political point scoring about who was the most environmentally sound and 
trustworthy. The Opposition characterised the Government decision as a "remarkable political 
... backdown" (Hansard 27 February 1990:157). The Government countered by claiming that the 
Opposition, when in government in the early 1980s, had diminished environmental concerns in 
the priorities of the New Zealand delegation to SCMIV (the minerals negotiations).
98. The National Party’s policy on the environment (New Zealand National Party 1990) announced 
on 13 July 1990, advocated a total ban on minerals activity, and support for the World Park 
concept On 3 August, the New Zealand leader of the Opposition, in an address to the 
Environment and Conservation Organisations of New Zealand prior to the elections to be held 
there in November, declared that his party supported a regime where mining can never be 
allowed to take place in Antarctica. He said that a National Government would "in conjunction 
with Australia actively promote the concept of a world wildlife park for Antarctica". New 
Zealand would advocate the implementation of a single convention for Antarctica, a key feature 
of which would be a total ban on mineral activities "now and in the future" (Bolger 1990:5).
99. The New Zealand government had always maintained its opposition to minerals activity in the 
Antarctic, but had previously argued that a permanent ban was not achievable.
100. The Minerals Convention is sometimes referred to as the Wellington Convention).
101. The seven claimants and the US and USSR.
102. Bob Hawke, welcomed the New Zealand government’s decision, suggesting that it would "give 
even greater impetus to Australia’s efforts with France to create an Antarctic wilderness reserve" 
(Hawke 1990a: 108). Hawke had discussed the matter with Palmer during his visit to New 
Zealand in January of that year.
103. On 9 November 1989 senior Representatives (the Chair of the US House of Representatives 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Morris Udall, together with the Chairs of his five 
subcommittees) wrote to President Bush expresing their concern over "the apparent 
unwillingness of the Department of State to at least consider alternatives other than ...
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on minerals activity and environmental protection, were introduced into the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. They sought to prevent US nationals and corporations 
from participating in minerals activity and to require the Bush administration to initiate 
negotiations with other consultative parties for an international agreement banning all 
minerals activities. They also advocated world park status for the Antarctic.104
Non-governmental organisations maintained a high profile during these debates and 
gave evidence at a number of hearings.105 Jacques Cousteau visited the US during this 
period and aligned himself closely with the senators and representatives who were 
leading the congressional debate.106
In October 1990 the joint House and Senate resolutions (introduced earlier in the year 
by Senator Gore and Congressman Owens) were adopted. Legislation on the Antarctic 
was also passed by Congress107 and US President Bush signed the Antarctic Protection 
Act into law on 16 November. US citizens or companies are prohibited from engaging 
in, financing or providing assistance to any Antarctic minerals activities, pending 
Congressional approval of a new agreement among ATCPs banning minerals activities 
{ECO LXXVH(3) 1990:1). It expresses the sense of Congress that the Secretary of 
State should negotiate one or more new international agreements to permanently 
conserve and protect the Antarctic environment, prohibit or ban mineral activities, grant
CRAMRA" and requested that the President "direct the Department of State to consider 
Australia’s proposal for an Antarctic Environment Protection Convention in lieu of the 
CRAMRA" (Udall etal 1989 [letter]:2). Congressman Vento expressed a similar concern when 
he introduced his bill to the House. Almost two months later, on 3 January 1990, Udall and his 
colleagues received a response from Janet Mullins, an Assistant Secretary in the Legislative 
Affairs division of the Department of State. She suggested that suggested that the majority of 
ATCPs supported the Minerals Convention and considered it a key element in comprehensive 
environmental measures (Mullins 1990 [letter]).
104. Congressman Conte (with co-sponsors Walter Jones (D-NC) and Representative Wayne Owens
(D-Utah) introduced the Antarctic Protection and Conservation Act 1990 (HR 3977) on 8
February. This bill stated that "the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities is not adequate to provide the necessary level of protection for the fragile environment 
of Antarctica and could actually stimulate movement toward commercial exploitation" (article 
2(5)). Companion legislation was introduced into the Senate by John Kerry (S 2575 - the 
Antarctica Protection Act). On 4 April 1990 Congressman Vento introduced his draft Antarctica 
World Park and Protection Act of 1990 (HR 4514) (see Congressional Record 4 April 1990: 
E990). In May Senator Gore introduced the Antarctic Environmental Protection Act 1990 (S 
2571) (see Congressional Record 3 May 1990: S5658-5659) which was designed to amend the 
Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. Identical legislation was introduced into the House of 
Representatives by Congressman Jones.
105. So did the Australian government through its embassy in Washington.
106. Conte was joined by Cousteau at his press conference on the introduction of his bill. In May,
Senator Gore chaired an Interparliamentary Conference on the Global Environment, attended by 
over 200 legislators from 42 nations. Senator Kerry, with the help of Captain Cousteau, co­
chaired the Conference’s Working Group on Oceans and Water Resources, which discussed the 
future of Antarctica at length.
107. The Conte bill passed in the House of Representatives and the companion legislation introduced 
by Senator Kerry was also passed in the Senate.
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special protective status to the Antarctic. Any treaty or agreement on the Antarctic 
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent was required to be consistent with this 
legislation. CRAMRA clearly did not meet these criteria. This was a further blow to 
the Department of State’s position on the Australian and French proposals. The US 
position was now one of a potential involuntary defection.
The Environmental Protection Agency wrote to the State Department requesting that the 
instructions to the US delegation to the forthcoming SCM be changed to reflect the 
substance of the new legislation (ECO LXXVII(3) 1990:4). In response to this activity 
the State Department indicated, noncommittally, that it was "prepared to consider 
means of addressing the concerns which have been raised over the Convention" (Bohlen 
1990:11). The Australian Foreign Minister reported, after a ministerial visit to the US, 
that the US would support the negotiation of a new legal instrument within the Treaty 
system to provide comprehensive environmental protection, and that they were prepared 
to consider an indefinite ban on minerals activity (Evans 1990c). This was nothing 
approaching a commitment to a permanent ban, and "indefinite" was undefined, but 
even a willingness to discuss something previously argued to be not negotiable was a 
sizeable victory for Australia and France. This shift in policy was an imposed response 
to congressional and community concerns.
Other treaty states
Statements by politicians and legislative actions in other states further undermined 
CRAMRA and contributed to the growing coalition of support for Australia and France.
On 19 January 1990, President Gorbachev announced at a World Forum on 
Environment and Development in Moscow that "the USSR is ready to participate in the 
survival of the Antarctic, of this world reserve, which is our common natural 
laboratory" (Anon 1990h:4). "Our children", he, "will never forgive us for not having 
protected this extraordinary ecosystem" (Barnes 1990d:8). Soviet Prime Minister, 
Nikolai Ryzhkov reiterated this during a visit to Australia in February.108 While 
nothing was said about the status of CRAMRA, the Australian government took these 
statements as evidence of Soviet support for their initiative. As chapter five showed, 
the Soviets had long favoured a moratorium on mining in the Antarctic in part because 
of their lack of funds and appropriate technology vis-a-vis the US. They were also keen 
to establish their environmental credentials in the post-cold war international order.
108. He told guests at a parliamentary dinner that the Soviet Union was "prepared to collaborate with 
Australia and other countries in implementing ... initiatives that cover the survival o f the 
Antarctic - a global preserve and a common nature laboratory" (Ryzhkov 1990).
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The Spanish Minister of Education and Science told the Senate (in February 1990) that 
the Spanish government "cannot help but view with sympathy ... the declaration of 
Antarctica as a world park".109 Later in the year (September 20) the Senate 
unanimously adopted a motion (tabled in July by the Parliamentary Socialist Group) 
that the government should support measures which would give the greatest possible 
protection to the Antarctic, and should not adhere to CRAMRA but support Antarctica 
becoming a nature reserve and land of science.
The German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, spoke out in support of an 
Antarctic World Park in mid-November. India reiterated its "continuing support for the 
Australian and French initiative" (Evans 1990b:5) during a visit there by the Australian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Australia took further unilateral action in support of its no mining stance. On August 
17, the Foreign and Environment Ministers announced that the government would 
introduce legislation to "ban all mining in the Antarctic to the extent of Australia’s legal 
capacity to apply such a ban" (Evans and Kelly 1990:570).110 The legislation was 
designed to prohibit mining by Australians and non-Australians alike in the Australian 
Antarctic Territory, and by Australians anywhere in the Antarctic region.* 111 Thus 
Australia was giving formal effect to its redefined national interests and policy goals.
Outside the system
Debates about the status of Antarctica and minerals activity were not confined to the 
Treaty states. In early December 1990, the IUCN held its 18th General Assembly in 
Australia and adopted a resolution on the Antarctic which stated that "any exploitation 
of minerals would adversely affect the values of the Antarctic environment" (ASOC 
1990f:13).112 The Assembly recommended that:
109. See Spain, Senate (1990). In response to a second question on minerals, the somewhat non­
committal answer was that the "Spanish Government will do all that it can in order to achieve 
the very best conservation of that part of the territory of our planet"
110. The legislation became law on 27 March 1991.
111. Because of the problem of applicable jurisdiction in the Antarctic, Australia would not have 
been in a position to prevent non-Australians from carrying out activities in the Antarctic. This 
reference may have been inserted so that, should the Australian/French initiative fail and 
CRAMRA or something similar enter into force, the Australian government would then have 
been obliged to oppose any part of the AAT being identified for exploration or development 
activities thus, supposedly, preventing such activities by non-Australians. (An officer of the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) told me that this provision was 
inserted into the legislation at the insistence of the Department responsible for the Environment 
and Territories (DASETT) to the embarrassment of DFAT).
112. The resolution was submitted by the Australian Conservation Foundation, Greenpeace 
International and the World Wide Fund for Nature.
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the ATCPs and all other interested governments and non-government bodies:
(a) Work towards the adoption of a comprehensive environmental protection 
regime for Antarctica embodied in legally binding agreements;
(b) Incorporate in these agreements a permanent exclusion of mineral 
prospecting, exploration and exploitation in Antarctica; ... (IUCN 
1990:2).
The IUCN Director-General was called upon to communicate this resolution 
immediately to the consultative parties then meeting in Chile for the first session of the 
special consultative meeting.113 This resolution, which gave further effective support to 
the Australian/French initiative, was important. A number of consultative parties were 
state members of IUCN. It was perceived by them as a legitimate and credible 
conservation organisation which represented international opinion. It had been granted 
observer status to various institutions within the Treaty system and had worked closely 
with SCAR and the consultative parties on Antarctic conservation issues.
The UN General Assembly agenda again adopted a resolution (sponsored by Malaysia) 
on the Antarctic. While it welcomed the increased support for the establishment of a 
world park and for the banning of minerals activities it also, predictably, expressed the 
view that any move to elaborate a comprehensive convention should be done with the 
full participation of the international community, within the context of the UN system, 
including the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (in Brazil, June 1992).114 However, the UN resolution can be taken as a 
signal that the protection of the environment, and consultative party stewardship of that 
environment, would be the new focus for debate and challenge to the Treaty system.
The making of the Madrid Protocol: Special Consultative Meeting XI
This special consultative meeting on comprehensive environmental protection was the 
first time the consultative parties had met in a session devoted exclusively to 
environmental issues. Four sessions were held between November 1990 and October 
1991. Over this period of less than a year the consultative parties moved from division 
to consensus on a new environmental agreement, the Madrid Protocol, which included 
an effective prohibition on minerals activity.
The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition was granted official observer status.115 
NGOs were also represented on the delegations of Chile and France, as well as the usual
113. The United Kingdom, the US and Norway indicated that, had a vote been necessary (the 
resolution was agreed to by consensus) they would have abstained on the grounds that they did 
not want to pre-empt the results of the Chile meeting (ASOC 1990f:2).
114. The Secretary General was requested to undertake a comprehensive study on the establishment 
of a UN sponsored station in Antarctica.
115. Jim Barnes from the Antarctica Project and Friends of the Earth, Maj de Poorter from 
Greenpeace International and Andrea Figari from Greenpeace Argentina were the official ASOC 
representatives. They were able to attend the plenary and working group meetings, but not the
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ones of Australia, USA, Denmark and New Zealand.116 SCAR was present as an 
observer but it was not asked to provide advice on the issues under discussion. The 
Meeting divided into two working groups, supplemented by Heads of Delegation 
meetings. Working Group 1 focussed on the issues to be considered in elaborating a 
comprehensive system. Working Group 2 reviewed existing environmental protection 
measures with a view to improving their content.
Debate over the form and content of comprehensive measures focussed initially on four 
proposals tabled at the first session and then progressed on the basis of an informal text 
drafted by Rolf Trolle Andersen, head of the Norwegian delegation. There were a 
number of contentious issues during the negotiations. There was disagreement over 
whether a new agreement was needed or whether existing measures could be updated 
and expanded. There were two major points of contention on the minerals issue. The 
first was that of a ban on minerals activity and whether, if it could be agreed to, it 
should be expressed as a moratorium or a prohibition. A moratorium implied that, after 
a given time period, mining would occur. Prohibition, on the other hand, rested on the 
principle that mining would not occur. There was also disagreement on whether there 
should be a requirement for consensus to lift a ban (fundamental to a prohibition) or, as 
favoured by the US and the UK, consensus to extend any restriction.
The need for new institutional arrangements was also disputed, especially with regard to 
a standing committee for environmental protection (especially whether such a 
committee would have independent decision-making powers) and an independent 
inspectorate. On the issue of environmental impact assessment there was disagreement 
on how to give effect to the requirement that all activities should be subject to prior 
assessment and whether this should incorporate a collective review mechanism.
Vina del Mar117
The first session was held in Vina del Mar, Chile, from 19 November to 6 December 
1990. Four proposals were tabled: the draft convention proposed by Australia and 
France, who were now formally joined by Belgium and Italy (the Group of Four); a 
draft protocol submitted by New Zealand; an outline proposal for a protocol
Head of Delegation sessions. They were able to speak, but only after the Treaty party 
delegations had spoken on any particular subject.
116. Another twenty people from ten countries worked as lobbyists outside the meeting.
117. At ATCM-XV delegates had also agreed to hold a meeting on the Liability Protocol to be 
negotiated under the Minerals Convention. By the time the Chile meeting was convened there 
was agreement that there was little purpose in holding a lengthy meeting given the almost 
certain demise of CRAMRA. The meeting lasted about half a day, and was attended by only 
about half the delegations (ASOC 1991c). There was, nevertheless, substantial support for the 
useful parts of article 8 of CRAMRA on liability, which could be used in a new environmental 
protection convention (ECO LXXVII(5) 1990:2).
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(Argentina, Norway, the UK, the US and Uruguay) which was supplemented by a draft 
UK protocol and a draft protocol and annexes from the US, and an outline working 
paper tabled by India.118
Australia and France maintained their stance against mining and in favour of a new 
comprehensive convention.119 The Group of Four (G4) proposal sought to establish 
environmental principles and a system of regulation, monitoring and enforcement which 
would be applicable to all activities in the Antarctic.120 Under this agreement activities 
would be subject to environmental impact procedures and would be categorised 
according to the risk of environmental harm as low risk, high risk or prohibited.121 
Minerals activities would be in the latter category. The Convention would establish an 
executive Standing Committee for the Protection of the Environment (which would 
prepare, apply and monitor decisions taken by the consultative parties), a secretariat, a 
Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee and an Inspectorate.
New Zealand’s proposed environment protection protocol to the Antarctic Treaty also 
included a prohibition on all minerals activities. Environmental assessment procedures 
would be required in some form for all activities and all non-negligible impacts on the 
Antarctic environment were to be avoided. A secretariat, Advisory Committee for 
Environmental Protection and an Inspectorate would be established although decision­
making would remain in the hands of the consultative parties. The draft protocol 
updated and strengthened many existing recommendations in a legally binding form.
As expected, the United Kingdom and the United States delegations were not prepared 
to accept a permanent ban on minerals activity or wilderness reserve status for the 
Antarctic. They continued to support CRAMRA and argued that the question of 
minerals activity should be dealt with separately from a comprehensive environmental 
protection convention. John Heap told the meeting that
118. The main proposals were introduced in a plenary session in order to encourage debate to gauge 
the thinking of delegations.
119. Australian Prime Minister Hawke announced that any agreement that did not include an 
effective and comprehensive ban on mining would be unacceptable and that any new 
arrangements for the protection of the Antarctic environment had to be comprehensive (Hawke 
1990d:4). French Prime Minister Rocard reaffirmed, in a press conference held jointly with 
Cousteau on 22 November, "that the protection of Antarctica is a priority for France". It was, he 
said, "totally unacceptable to open Antarctica up to any minerals activities. In Vifla del Mar the 
Antarctic Treaty parties must negotiate the right tools to protect Antarctica" (ECO LXXVII(3) 
1990:4).
120. Earlier in the year, in March, Australia and France circulated a revised proposal for a possible 
instrument on environmental protection. Prior to the SCM the Four circulated an indicative draft 
instrument in the form of a separate convention.
121. The draft convention proposed that collective authorisation would be required for certain high 
risk categories and the consensus process would be used to identify which activities would be 
exempt from collective authorisation and subject only to assessment by national authorities in 
accordance with the convention (Kimball 1991b:6).
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[t]he UK continues to believe that the minerals convention ... provides 
the only mechanism on offer that has the capacity to defuse an otherwise 
explosive political issue and regulate minerals activities in a way that 
meets all reasonable environmental demands (Anon 1990n),
thus suggesting, by implication, that the environmental demands of the Four and the
NGOs were unreasonable.122 The Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans,
observed that he could "make no secret of ... the Government’s regret that the United
Kingdom ... has so far failed to recognise [the] ground swell of national and
international opinion". He expressed his hope also "that the United States will move to
a more flexible position which reflects the growing domestic mood in that country"
(Senate Hansard 4 December 1990).
The proposal co-sponsored by Argentina, Norway, the UK, US and Uruguay, and the 
supporting draft protocol and annexes circulated by the UK and the US, made little 
advance on the existing state of affairs. There was no provision for inspection or 
enforcement procedures. Several draft annexes were also circulated which, in the main, 
reproduced existing measures. This proposal was supported by Japan (a likely mining 
state) as well as by the USSR which had previously indicated some support for the 
Australian and French position.123
The atmosphere in Working Group one, which considered these proposals, was 
generally described as tense. The head of the Belgian delegation said that "the climate 
here is not good" (Anon 1990o). He suggested that the G-4 proposal had "not been 
seriously discussed at all ... We have the impression we must buy the so-called 
American protocol" (Anon 1990o). Working Group 2, on the other hand, made steady 
progress in its review of existing measures on environmental protection. It drew on 
those measures and on the proposals included in the draft New Zealand protocol, the 
annexes submitted by the US and a working paper on ELA tabled by the Group of Four. 
Items under discussion included marine pollution, waste disposal, the Agreed Measures, 
environmental impact assessment, the protected area system, regulation of tourism and 
non-governmental expeditions, and environmental monitoring.
Nevertheless, this group’s efforts ultimately relied on agreement in Working Group 1 
on the form and content of a comprehensive agreement. That was not forthcoming. To 
prevent a potential deadlock, Rolf Anderson prepared an informal draft text for a
122. The British hoped that "once the nations had agreed environmental guidelines we can talk about 
the minerals issue". They argued that there would be no consensus on a world park (Hamer 
1990:5).
123. The US and UK proposals were also supported by Argentina, Norway, Uruguay, Brazil and 
South Africa (ASOC 1991c).
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protocol to the Treaty in consultation with heads of delegations.124 Delegates were 
prepared to use this draft as the basis for further discussions, although it was not 
accorded the formal status of a negotiating text.125
The Andersen protocol contained draft articles (many of them incomplete) on 
environmental principles, scientific cooperation, environmental impact assessment, 
compliance, inspection, response action, liability, requirements for annual reporting, 
and provisions for dispute settlement and established a Committee for Environmental 
Protection.126 It declared the Antarctic a "natural reserve, devoted to science" (article 
1). Article 6 proclaimed a ban on minerals activity although it did so in a way that 
made it clear there was still disagreement.127 The Andersen text also provided for a 
series of annexes on the specific environmental issues under consideration by working 
group 2.
The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs called the conditional acceptance of a 
restraint on minerals activities within the context of a comprehensive regime "a major 
shift compared to the hostility to those concepts" in 1989 (Evans 1990d:3969). The 
meeting agreed that the current restraint on mineral resource activities would continue. 
Thus the question of a voluntary restraint on minerals activity now appeared to be no 
longer linked to the entry into force of CRAMRA.
From Vina to Madrid
Events in the months following the Vina meeting showed that the US and UK, in 
particular, were prepared to make few concessions on the unfinished articles of the 
Andersen text. Early in 1991 the US government circulated a diplomatic note to all 
consultative parties confirming its position on Antarctic mineral resources activities,
124. Two earlier drafts were offered by a "senior member of the New Zealand delegation" but were 
rejected by delegations (Anon 1990o).
125. The New Zealand delegation considered that "in broad terms, it is a satisfactory document" 
(Anon 1990p). The Australian delegation characterised it as an important step forward, as basis 
for further negotiations. Environmentalists, although criticising a number of deficiencies in the 
Andersen draft, agreed that it would enable further discussion. They were concerned that the 
draft was less than comprehensive (compared with the G4 and New Zealand proposals) but 
acknowledged that it was an improvement on the US and UK suggestions. For a detailed 
discussion of the Andersen text see Kimball (1991b). For a critique see Wallace (1991).
126. A draft article establishing a secretariat was removed at the insistence of Argentinian delegation 
which argued that the SCM did not have the mandate to make decisions that would affect the full 
consultative process, although it agreed that the question of a secretariat and more frequent 
meetings of the consultative parties could be discussed at the Bonn 16th consultative meeting.
127. The article read "Any activities relating to minerals resources other than scientific research shall 
be prohibited ..." (ellipses included). Initially the wording had been enclosed in square brackets, 
an indication of serious reservations on the part of some delegates. The ellipses (...) included in 
the Anderson draft indicated that further elaboration was expected.
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arguing for a fixed term moratorium, with consensus required to extend it.128 This was, 
in effect, no concession at all to a ban on minerals activity, given that even the US 
government acknowledged that mining was unlikely to proceed for at least thirty 
years.129
The Four continued to mobilise support from other Treaty nations. At least eight 
‘likeminded’ countries were now identified - India, New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, 
Greece, Austria, Romania, and Ecuador. New Zealand (as a claimant state) and India 
(as a developing state) had issue-specific power in the Treaty system. The others were 
non-consultative parties (or new consultative parties)130 who had gained little from 
CRAMRA and were increasingly irritated with US and UK attempts to dominate the 
system. This coalition signalled the emergence of a pro-environment ‘caucus’ within 
the Treaty system. It showed that Australia and France were no longer isolated and also 
provided NGOs with a weapon in their domestic campaigns in states which had not yet 
changed their position.
At the end of January 1991 the Four met in Paris to consider their response to the 
Anderson draft.131 They were joined on the second day of their meeting by the eight 
likeminded states.132 All twelve met again in Rome at the end of March 1991 to 
consolidate amendments to the Anderson draft which were to be circulated to other 
Treaty parties prior to the forthcoming Madrid session of the SCM. They proposed that 
the provisions on compliance be strengthened and suggested amendments on inspection, 
response action and liability. The key elements of environmental impact assessment 
procedures were to be part of the instrument proper, rather than set out in an annex, in 
order to strengthen their application to all activities. The form of the final agreement 
was left open.133
On 25 March 1991, the British government announced that following a review of 
Antarctic policy it would support a temporary moratorium on mining so that consensus 
could be achieved, but that it would leave the elaboration of further details for debate at
128. Australian discussions with the US elicited an unfavourable response to a permanent prohibition 
from the State Department and from the Departments for Energy and for the Interior.
129. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Marine Mammal Commission supported a ban on 
minerals activity, in opposition to the Departments of the Interior, Energy and State.
130. Finland gained consultative party status on 9 October 1989 and Ecuador on 19 November 1990.
131. For the first half day, Australia and France met alone, and were joined by Belgium and Italy in 
the afternoon.
132. Sweden was also identified as a supporter of the G4 approach, and it was agreed that they would 
be invited to further meetings of this group.
133. While the Four favoured a convention, they agreed that substance was more important than the 
form in which it was expressed although they opposed any instrument which focussed on 
sectoral regulation without providing for integration of environmental protection measures and 
creating a legally binding regime.
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the April session of the SCM. This was, however, a limited concession of the order 
offered by the US and Opposition leaders in the UK criticised the government for not 
going far enough.134
However, in another significant victory for the pro-ban and wilderness reserve coalition, 
two more influential Treaty states, both supporters of CRAMRA and likely mining 
states, changed their position. Japan announced on 23 April that it would support a 
prohibition on minerals activity. Japan apparently told the US at the November meeting 
in Chile that it had not realised how strong opposition to Antarctic mining had become 
and that it would have to review its position in the light of this (MacKenzie 1990:4). 
The German Minister of Industry Juergen Moellemann announced that his government 
would now support nothing less than a permanent ban on mining in Antarctica.135 In 
redefining their policy goals, both were responding to public debate and to the growing 
strength of the pro-ban coalition.
The Madrid session of SCM XI
The second session of SCM XI was held in Madrid from 22 to 30 April 1991.136 
Working Group 1 instigated an article-by-article reading of the Andersen text.137 There 
was still no final agreement on a number of key issues - minerals, impact assessment, 
the environmental committee, compliance and the liability and response action 
provisions. Several delegations opposed anything more than an advisory role for the 
Environmental Protection Committee suggested in the Anderson draft. They preferred 
the traditional Antarctic approach of voluntary compliance on a national basis, with few 
formalised institutions, even though this had proved inadequate as a mechanism for 
ensuring implementation of environmental rules.
The G4 and ‘likeminded’ countries continued to support a prohibition on minerals 
activity.138 They were agreed that consensus should be required to remove any
134. Gerald Kaufman, British Labour Party shadow Foreign Minister argued that a "moratorium was 
a compromise which leaves open the option to mine at some future date". It was, he said, "not 
acceptable to the Labour Party" (ECO LXXX(l) 1991:1). The Leader of the Liberal Democrats 
wrote a public letter to Prime Minister Major opposing the British delegation’s position.
135. While Foreign Minister Genscher announced his support for the declaration of an Antarctic 
World Park some time prior to this, the final decision on the minerals issue lay with the Ministry 
of Industry. The Industry Minister had received tens of thousands of post-cards urging that 
Germany support an anti-mining position.
136. This followed the preparatory meeting (15 to 19 April) to set the agenda for the sixteenth 
consultative meeting to be held in Bonn later in the year. A number of issues being dealt with 
by Working Group 2 of the Special Consultative Meeting were inscribed on the agenda, 
including human impact on the Antarctic environment (a standing item), the effects of tourism 
and non-govemmental expedition, and the Antarctic Protected Area system.
137. Towards the end of the session (27 April) a drafting group was established under Working 
Group 1.
138. Some favoured a specified time frame (between 30 and 60 years): others preferred an
unqualified period.
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prohibition, with no provisions for a compulsory review. The likeminded group was 
joined by the (now united) Germany and by Switzerland, a new signatory to the Treaty. 
A further group of states, the Netherlands, Japan, Chile and India, accepted the major 
G4 principles, but wanted the protocol to require a minerals regime to be in place if the 
prohibition was lifted. This group also favoured a non-compulsory review provision.
The third major bloc, dominated by the US and the UK, and including South Africa, 
China, Uruguay, South Korea and Argentina, supported a fixed-term moratorium, which 
would lapse unless consensus could be reached to ex tend it. Most wanted a compulsory 
review process, and the requirement for a minerals regime to be in place when the ban 
was lifted. The US and the UK argued that their willingness to accept a formal restraint 
on minerals activity and a comprehensive agreement was evidence of their flexibility 
and desire for consensus and that Australia and France should respond in kind. The 
short-term moratorium was, however, a limited concession. Neither the US nor the UK 
had formally abandoned CRAMRA or willingly accepted an alternative agreement. 
Rather they had been forced into this negotiating position in the face of growing support 
for Australia and France from key states in the Treaty system.
Working Group 2 continued work on the issues it had addressed at the Chile meeting.139 
The draft annexes on marine pollution, waste disposal and protection of fauna and flora 
were almost finished. The draft annex on ELA was problematic in part because it raised 
questions about the role of the proposed Committee for Environmental Protection, and 
whether it would be advisory or have a substantive decision-making role. Some of the 
newer consultative parties, such as India, were worried also that ELA procedures would 
increase the already high costs of Antarctic research. Others, especially the UK, argued 
that it would place a restriction on the freedom of scientific research.
Andersen and the Chair of the SCM undertook lengthy informal consultations to 
produce a second version of the draft text. As a result there was a consensus by the end 
of the session on a draft Protocol to the Treaty which could be referred to governments. 
Under this proposed Protocol (the key aspects of which are discussed below) the 
Antarctic would be a natural reserve devoted to science and minerals activity would be 
prohibited. This provision could be amended at a review conference (after fifty years) 
by a majority of all Parties including a majority of all consultative parties. However for
139. The issue of dogs in the Antarctic, and whether they should be able to remain there, caused some 
debate. Only three countries continued to use dogs - Australia, Argentina and the UK. The UK 
presented scientific evidence of canine distemper antibodies in seals. Measures on tourism and 
protected areas were likely to be referred to the Bonn meeting for further discussion. NGOs 
were not completely satisfied with the content of the annexes, although they agreed that they 
were a substantial improvement on existing measures. There was also some discussion about 
adopting the draft annexes prepared by working group 2 as recommendations at the forthcoming 
consultative meeting in Bonn in October, until the new instrument came into force.
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such an amendment to enter into force ratification was required from three-quarters of 
the consultative parties, including all 26 parties who were consultative parties at the 
time the protocol was adopted.140 The G4 coalition conceded a reference to a minerals 
regime being in place if the ban were to be lifted. The requirement for something other 
than consensus to lift the ban enabled the US and the UK to agree to the provisions, 
albeit reluctantly.
The Australian government warmly welcomed "the significant progress made by 
Antarctic Treaty Parties ... in negotiating a legal instrument to protect the Antarctic 
environment" (Hawke 1991a:6880). The Protocol, as it then stood, was characterised as 
a "fitting culmination to the intensive diplomatic campaign pursued by Australia and 
France" (Hawke 1991a).141
It was still not clear, however, that this was a solid consensus. Government approval 
was still required before it could be formally adopted in the SCM. Delegates agreed to 
return to Madrid for a final meeting from 17 June.142 On 10 May, the British Prime 
Minister indicated that his government would support the Madrid agreement.143 In 
doing so he overrode the objections of the Foreign Office, and the departments of 
Energy, and Trade and Industry and removed a potential obstacle to adoption of the new 
agreement.
However, early in June the United States advised its Treaty partners that it still had 
difficulties with the consensus requirement for lifting the prohibition on minerals 
activity. It proposed that only a three-quarters ratification majority be required. The 
US also suggested that a state should be able to withdraw from the minerals ban within 
three years if that required majority was not forthcoming.144 At a drafting committee
140. Article 24(1) also provided for amendment to the articles of the Protocol (including, therefore, 
article 6 prohibiting mining) at any time in accordance with article XII(l)(a) and (b) of the 
Treaty which, in effect, required consensus to enter into force.
141. The Australian Mining Industry Council described the initiative and Australian support as a 
"political stunt" earning a swift rebuke from the Minister for Resources who said that on this 
issue "AMIC’s comments are ill-informed and out of touch with national and international 
sentiment" (Griffiths 1991:6910).
142. A drafting committee was scheduled to convene from 10 to 14 June to consider the Protocol and 
the four annexes so far agreed to on environmental impact assessment, conservation of Antarctic 
fauna and flora, waste disposal and management, and marine pollution. The drafting committee 
was unable to reach agreement on a definitive version of the marine pollution annex. An ad hoc 
contact group drew up an informal paper for circulation to the meeting. It was anticipated that 
the protocol would be opened for signature on 23 June 1991, the 30th anniversary of entry into 
force of the Antarctic Treaty. The 30th anniversary had particular significance for the Treaty 
nations. Under article XII of the Treaty, from that date a conference could be called by any 
consultative party to review the operation of the Treaty (see chapter two).
143. Major’s announcement was made in the House of Commons in answer to a written question.
144. Italy argued that this was in contravention of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by 
permitting a state to abandon some of its obligations while remaining a full and functioning 
member of the Protocol (ASOC 1991g).
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meeting in June the US delegation formally advised that it could not sign the protocol in 
the form agreed to at the April meeting.145
The Madrid session reconvened on 17 June. Delegations were angry over the US 
announcement because they perceived the Madrid agreement as a package deal in which 
they had made concessions so that an agreement could be reached. The session Chair, 
Carlos Blasco, suggested a compromise plan. A three-quarter majority would be 
required both to adopt an amendment lifting the ban and for its subsequent entry into 
force (based on ratifications) but the withdrawal provisions would apply to the protocol 
as a whole, not just the minerals prohibition as proposed by the US. This appeared to 
be an acceptable compromise and delegations were asked to forward it to their 
respective governments for consideration.
On the final working day of the Madrid session, however, the United States delegation 
indicated that its government still had reservations about the agreement, and wanted 
more time to consider alternative proposals. The head of the US delegation said that 
this should not be taken to indicate "whether the final decision will be negative or 
positive" (Anon 1991g:6). As a result, the signing ceremony scheduled for 23 June was 
cancelled. The US hold-out on the Protocol was based on its opposition, of long­
standing, to anything that closed off the Antarctic to future minerals activity.
The US announcement was not well received. Diplomats privately acknowledged that 
they were intensely disappointed at the outcome. The head of the Australian delegation 
was reported as saying that "it would be inappropriate for me to display irritation at this 
moment" (Anon 1991h:6). New Zealand Prime Minister, Jim Bolger said that he would 
be taking the issue up with the US ambassador to New Zealand.146 Prime Minister 
Hawke wrote to President Bush urging him to sign the agreement. Legislators from 
Japan, the European Community, and the Soviet Union (as well as from the US) sent 
Bush a letter from a meeting in Tokyo (see Austin 1991). The strength of the coalition 
in favour of the Protocol was by now such that the US could not translate its preferences 
into institutional action. In response to domestic and international pressure President 
Bush announced on 3 July that the United States would sign the compromise protocol 
agreed to at the June meeting.
145. On 19 June Australia led a group of 15 nations in expressing their opposition in a closed session 
to the US decision (Hunt 1991:6). They were hopeful, although not overly optimistic, that an 
agreement could still be reached.
146. This was a strong position for the new National Government to take, given that it had been 
working to improve New Zealand’s relations with the US after they had reached a low point 
during the six years of the Labour administration which had banned nuclear capable vessels 
from New Zealand ports (a ban which the National government had not reversed).
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The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was signed at the 
final session of SCM-XI in Madrid on 4 October 1991. Twenty-three of the twenty-six 
consultative parties and eight of the non-consultative parties signed.147 The Protocol is 
open for signature until 3 October 1992. The constraint on minerals activity, under the 
voluntary moratorium which dates to 1977, will continue until the Protocol formally 
comes into effect. That will happen when all twenty-six consultative parties at the time 
of its adoption have ratified it.
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty148 
The Protocol adopted at Madrid is a relatively short document of 27 articles with an 
arbitration schedule and four annexes (on the conservation of fauna and flora, 
environmental impact assessment, waste disposal and management and marine 
pollution) attached. Its purpose is to supplement the Antarctic Treaty, not to modify or 
amend it.
The Antarctic is designated a "natural reserve, devoted to peace and science" (article 1). 
The Parties "commit themselves to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems" (article 2). The protection of 
the environment and "the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its wilderness and 
aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct of research, in particular 
research essential to understanding the global environment" are to be "fundamental 
considerations in the planning and conduct of all activities in the Antarctic Treaty area".
Any activity relating to mineral resources, except for scientific research, is prohibited. 
The Protocol may be amended in accordance with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty 
at any time (thus effectively requiring a consensus decision) or through the mechanism 
of a review conference after fifty years. Adoption of a review conference amendment 
requires a majority of all Parties, including three-quarters of the twenty-six consultative 
parties at the time the Protocol was adopted, with entry into force subsequently 
requiring ratification by three-quarters of the consultative parties including all twenty- 
six original signatories. In effect, this entrenches a fifty-year ban on mining and makes 
its lifting an unlikely occurrence.149
The environmental principles (article 3) are similar to those in the Minerals Convention. 
Adverse environmental impact must be limited. Activities must be planned and
147. Japan, the Republic of Korea and India were the three consultative parties which did not sign on 
that day. The eight non-consultative parties were Austria, Canada, Columbia, Switzerland, the 
Democratic Republic of Korea, Greece, Hungary and Romania.
148. A copy of the Protocol, as adopted in Madrid, is to be found at appendix 10.
149. If the required number of ratifications are not forthcoming within three years of the adoption of 
an amendment, a state may withdraw from the Protocol (not just the minerals ban) within a 
further two years.
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conducted on the basis of information sufficient to allow prior assessment and informed 
judgements to be made about their likely impact. Significant or adverse impacts 
(although the terms are not more closely defined) must be avoided.150
Judgements on potential impact must take account of the scope of the activity, its 
cumulative impacts, and possible effects on any other activity. They must also consider 
whether the technology and procedures are available for the conduct of environmentally 
safe operations, whether the capacity exists to monitor key environmental parameters 
and ecosystem components to identify and provide for early warning of adverse effects, 
and whether the capacity exists to respond promptly and effectively to accidents. 
Activities must be modified, suspended or cancelled if they result in, or threaten to 
result in, impacts which are inconsistent with the principles of the protocol.
Environmental impact assessment is mandatory for activities conducted pursuant to 
scientific research programmes, tourism, expeditionary and station activity (both 
governmental and non-governmental) including logistic support.151 The Parties must 
also establish contingency plans for responding to incidents with potentially adverse 
impacts (article 15). Annex I sets out further procedures for environmental evaluation 
and subsequent monitoring of activities.
There is, however, no oversight of the preliminary stages of the evaluation process - the 
judgement as to whether the impact is likely to be minor or transitory, or otherwise, is 
left to the individual national operator. Nor are there any procedures to ensure 
consistency of assessment procedures between parties although there is some guidance 
on what an evaluation should contain.152
The Protocol establishes a new regime institution - the Committee for Environmental 
Protection (article l l ) .153 The Committee is "to provide advice and formulate
150. Article 3(2)(b) requires that activities shall be planned and conducted to avoid adverse effects on 
climate or weather patterns, significant adverse effects on air or water quality, significant 
changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial, glacial or marine environments, detrimental changes in 
the distribution, abundance or productivity of species or populations of species of fauna and 
flora, further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species and degradation of, or substantial risk 
to, areas of biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance.
151. The Protocol requires assessment to be undertaken for all governmental and non-governmental 
activities for which advance notice is required under article VII(5) of the Antarctic Treaty. As 
well as stations and expeditions, this includes the introduction of military personnel and 
equipment The Protocol also establishes provisions for parties to share the use of scientific 
stations and other facilities. This may make it easier for NCPs to undertake scientific research. 
In this respect it is worth noting that the Netherlands was awarded consultative party status on 
the basis of its collaborative scientific work - it had not established a scientific station of its own.
152. Cooperation on the preparation of assessments is encouraged.
153. There is nothing in the Protocol to suggest that the representatives on the Committee should 
have any particular environmental expertise. Any Contracting Party to the Protocol may be a 
member of the Committee.
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recommendations to the Parties in connection with the implementation of [the] Protocol 
... for consideration at Consultative Meetings" .154 The task of formulating 
recommendations was a concession to those Parties which wanted a more activist role 
for the Committee. However all decision-making rests with the consultative meeting, 
not the Committee, and thus the authority of the consultative parties is maintained. 
Because any measures developed pursuant to the Protocol are to be adopted at 
consultative meetings, the consensus rule applies. Any amendment to the annexes, 
however, will be deemed effective one year after the close of the consultative meeting 
at which it was adopted, unless one (or more) of the consultative parties notifies that it 
wants an extension of time or is unable to approve the measure. 155 Thus consensus is 
protected but flexibility is allowed.
The Committee may consult with SCAR and the Scientific Committee of CCAMLR as 
well as with "other relevant scientific, environmental and technical organisations" and, 
with the approval of consultative meetings, invite as observers "relevant scientific, 
environmental and technical organisations which can contribute to its work" (article 
11 (4)).156
The Protocol adheres to sovereignty norms in addressing questions of monitoring and 
compliance. The Parties must take "appropriate measures within [their] competence" to 
ensure compliance with the provisions of the protocol. Regular and effective 
monitoring is encouraged but there is no centralised responsibility for this. Inspections 
continue to be conducted under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, on an individual or 
collective basis. There is no provision for an independent inspectorate although 
inspection may be authorised by a consultative meeting in accordance with procedures 
established by the consultative process, thus opening the way for improved and possibly 
centralised inspection procedures.
The Protocol establishes binding and compulsory dispute settlement procedures with 
respect to the prohibition on minerals activity, environmental impact assessment, 
emergency response action, the annexes (unless they provide otherwise) and 
compliance with those particular provisions. 157 Any party, including a non-consultative
154. Under article 12 the Committee is to provide advice, inter alia, on measures taken pursuant to 
the Protocol and the need for updating and strengthening them, as well as the need for additional 
measures, environmental impact assessment, ways of limiting environmental impacts, the 
Protected Area System, inspection procedures, information collection and exchange, the state of 
the Antarctic environment and the need for scientific research.
155. An annex may include rules which provide for different amendment procedures for that annex.
156. However in neither case do the provisions name other organisations, in contrast with the 
Minerals Convention which referred explicitly to the IUCN. Neither does it include the 
terminology "including non-governmental organisations" adopted in the Minerals Convention.
157. The rules and procedures are almost identical to those agreed to in the Minerals Convention.
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party, can therefore raise the issue of a violation of the Protocol under these 
procedures.158 Article 6(3) of the arbitration schedule provides for emergency 
provisional measures to be prescribed in a case of emergency. There are no provisions 
on liability: rules and procedures are to be elaborated in an annex at a later date.
The Protocol includes much improved transparency requirements. Reports of 
Committee meetings, inspection reports, annual reports on steps taken to implement the 
Protocol and its provisions, waste management plans, comprehensive environmental 
evaluations and annual lists of initial environmental evaluations must be made publicly 
available. Under the fifth annex adopted at ATCM-XVI in Bonn (see below) permits 
issued for entry into protected areas and management plans for protected areas were 
added to this list. While publicly available does not always mean easily available 
(especially in the absence of a secretariat) improved transparency contributes to 
improved accountability.
The annexes to the Protocol improved existing measures on environmental protection. 
The annex on fauna and flora updated the Agreed Measures, although the provisions on 
Specially Protected Areas were removed to be incorporated into an annex (adopted at 
Bonn) on the protected area system.159 Permits for taking native fauna and fauna are 
still to be issued by national authorities. The annex on waste disposal (which is to apply 
to non-governmental activities as well) strengthens existing management provisions and 
expands the list of materials which must be removed from the Antarctic.160 The 
Committee may review waste management plans and may offer comments. The annex 
is to be reviewed regularly to take into account new waste management technology.
The marine pollution annex sets out much more specific detail than the 
recommendation adopted at ATCM XV and includes details on prohibited practices. A 
potential flaw is the provision for sovereign immunity. Article 11 stipulates that the 
annex "shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated 
by a state and used ... only on government non-commercial service" which covers many
158. The Protocol does not specify, as the Minerals Convention did, that the dispute settlement 
procedures are applicable only to disputes between States. Nevertheless, given that the 
procedure adopted is dependent on a States declaration of preferred method of resolution, made 
when ratifying the Protocol, one assumes that non-state actors cannot raise questions of 
violations.
159. The annex on fauna and flora (which updates the Agreed Measures of 1964) requires that dogs 
be removed from the Antarctic by 1 April 1994. This requirement caused much public debate 
and opposition in Australia.
160. Nevertheless, it still permits the discharge of sewage and domestic liquid waste into the sea, in 
accordance with certain guidelines, and still permits incineration of materials.
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of the vessels used by parties active in the Antarctic.161 Parties must, however, ensure 
that such ships act in a manner consistent, as far as is reasonable and practicable, with 
the Annex, and the provisions of the annex are to be taken into account when new ships 
are built.
The Protocol’s efficacy ‘on the ground’ will depend on the commitment of the 
individual Treaty states to comply with its rules and, more importantly, to take action in 
the event of violations. NGOs will continue to have an important role in creating an 
atmosphere which encourages and, if necessary, imposes accountability.
ATCM-XVI, October 1991
Immediately following the final session of SCM-XI and the signing of the Protocol the 
consultative parties met for the 16th consultative meeting in Bonn.162 Opening 
speeches were self-congratulatory on the adoption of the Madrid Protocol. Only Britain 
referred openly to the dissension caused over CRAMRA.163 Eleven of the thirteen 
recommendations adopted related to the agenda of environmental issues under the 
Protocol164 and delegates agreed to convene meetings of experts on other Protocol 
issues.165
Efforts to establish the Committee for Environmental Protection prior to entry into force 
of the Protocol were blocked although the meeting stressed the importance of early 
ratification and entry into force.166 Delegates agreed that, as far as possible,
161. An officer from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade indicated to me that the 
sovereign immunity article is intended to apply only to ‘quasi-military’ vessels such as the US 
Coast Guard ships which the American program uses, but not to other government-owned ships.
162. ASOC was included in the list of invited expert organisations and seven delegations included 
NGO representatives. The delegations which included NGO representatives were New Zealand, 
Australia, Denmark, Chile, France, Germany and the US. The United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) was also invited to attend, an invitation that had been blocked in the past by 
some delegations. The list of invited organisations were SCAR, COMNAP (the Council of 
Managers of National Antarctic Programs), ICAO (the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation), IHO (the International Hydrographic Organisation), IOC (the International 
Oceanographic Commission), IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature), IMO 
(International Maritime Organisation), WMO (the World Meteorological Organisation) and 
WTO (the World Tourism Organisation).
163. John Heap, in his opening address, noted that ”[f]or democratically expressed reasons within 
their own countries, the care that CRAMRA expressed for the environmental was seen by some 
as not being innovative enough" (Final Report 1991:199-200).
164. Ten of these were on the protected area system and one was on tourism and non-governmental 
activities.
165. The Meeting agreed to encourage the Standing Committee on Antarctic Logistics and 
Operations (SCALOP) and sub-committee of COMNAP, to convene a meeting of experts on the 
issue of marine dumping and prevention of marine pollution in close consultation with the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the IMO. The Meeting also devised 
terms of references for a forthcoming group of experts meeting on environmental monitoring.
166. Japan, the Republic of Korea and India, the three consultative parties that did not sign the 
Protocol in Madrid made a commitment to early signature and ratification.
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consultative parties would apply the provisions of the Protocol in the interim.167 There 
was still no consensus on establishing a secretariat, an essential move if the CEP is to 
carry out its responsibilities and if the Protocol is to function successfully.168 However, 
to improve the application of the Protocol, the Parties agreed to conduct a review of 
existing recommendations to identify those which are spent and those which have been 
superseded or affected by the Protocol and its annexes. The Meeting also decided that, 
to facilitate decision-making under the Protocol, consultative meetings would be held 
annually.169
Under recommendation XV-10 the meeting adopted an extensive annex to the Protocol 
on the Antarctic Protected Area system.170 It establishes two categories of protected 
area - Antarctic SPAs (for which a permit for entry is required) and Antarctic SMAs.171 
Proposals for areas, which must include a management plan (and a code of conduct for 
SMAs), may be put submitted to a consultative meeting by any Party, the Committee 
for Environmental Protection, SCAR or CCAMLR. This annex was essential to 
improve the protection of the Antarctic because, as chapter three argued, the existing 
system of protected areas had become complicated and unwieldy.
The debate on the tourism issue was described as "tense and somewhat bitter" 
(Greenpeace 1991d: 11). Debate revolved around whether a specific annex on non­
governmental activities was necessary, given that the Protocol and its annexes apply to 
all human activities in the Antarctic including ‘non-official’ activities. Opposing views 
were taken by France, who remained strongly committed to a new annex, and the US,
167. There was little advance on negotiating a liability annex to the Protocol in the face of United 
States concern that to do so could delay ratification. The next consultative meeting will decide 
how to address matters regarding the liability annex required under the Protocol.
168. The question of a secretariat was blocked again by Argentina. There is some suggestion that 
Argentina might accept a secretariat if it is located in Buenos Aires or Santiago. The Meeting 
agreed that the next consultative meeting would begin drafting the Rules of Procedure for the 
CEP.
169. This was in part a response to the EIA requirements under the Protocol which require that CEEs 
must be submitted at least twelve months in advance of the proposed activity for consideration 
by a consultative meeting. With the move to annual meetings, preparatory meetings will no 
longer be held.
170. The United States tabled two proposals to adopt one MPA and one SRA which had been 
reviewed and endorsed by SCAR. The US recognised that these categories, adopted at the 
fifteenth Meeting, had now been replaced by categories created by the new Annex. The Meeting 
agreed, in the light of this, that the Parties would voluntarily comply with the provisions of the 
Management Plans tabled by the US until the Protocol came into effect.
171. The new category of Antarctic Specially Protected Area includes all existing SPAs, Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest and subsumes the category of Specially Reserved Area established at 
ATCM-XV. The new category of Antarctic Specially Managed Area subsumes the ATCM-XV 
category of Multiple-Use Planning Area. Historic Sites and Monuments may fall into either of 
the new categories. ASPAs may be located within ASMAs. Both categories may include 
marine as well as terrestrial sites.
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who argued that no further regulation was necessary. 172 The meeting agreed, following 
a suggestion from Japan, to convene an informal group of experts to consider this 
question once more.
An assessment of the Protocol
Two themes are important in an analysis of the events described in this chapter. The 
first places the Protocol in the context of the Treaty system and the environmental sub­
regime. The second focuses on the process underlying those events.
The Protocol is, of course, a compromise agreement. The ban on minerals activity is, in 
effect, a moratorium and not a permanent prohibition. If the numbers can be found, it 
can be lifted after a period of fifty years. 173
In its institutional framework the Protocol moves only a little way from the sovereignty 
norms which characterised the resource conventions and the measures on environmental 
protection. It does, nevertheless, extend and develop the environmental sub-regime and 
to this extent it marks a qualitative change in the approach to environmental issues in 
the Antarctic regime. It is comprehensive to the extent that it establishes general 
environmental principles which must be applied to all activities in the Antarctic. It is a 
legally binding agreement. Its provisions are mandatory rather than hortatory. The 
provisions for prior environmental assessment (which are entrenched in the body of the 
Protocol), the dispute settlement procedures and the improved transparency rules 
contribute to the integrated and comprehensive nature of the agreement. The annexes 
and measures agreed to under the terms of the Protocol will continue to be dealt with on 
an issue-by-issue basis but in conformity with the principles of the Protocol. Updating 
of measures will likely be achieved by amending annexes thus avoiding the confusing 
and unwieldy proliferation of recommendations.
While sovereignty norms underpin the Protocol, the way is opened for a move towards 
interdependence norms, especially if a secretariat is established and the CEP is 
politically supported by the consultative parties. The influence of interdependence 
norms, in this context, can be located in the rules that require prior assessment, the
172. Non-governmental organisations support, in general, the US position. They suggest that only 
one subset of non-governmental activity requires specific Tiles and regulations - that of large- 
scale commercial tourism, especially with respect to compliance and liability, and on the 
obligations of the Contracting Parties with respect to regulation of tourist activities in the 
Antarctic. The recently formed International Association of Antarctic Tourist Operators 
(IAATO) has adopted a Voluntary Code of Conduct.
173. The US, argues that this does not foreclose the options of future generations (Anon 1991i) and 
does not interpret the provisions as a permanent ban. As noted in the text, the protocol does 
provide that it can be modified or amended under the terms of article XII of the Antarctic Treaty, 
but this requires consensus and is probably unlikely to happen.
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potential for a greater role for the CEP and the potential for inspection, which remains 
the main compliance mechanism, on a collective basis. The acceptance of legally 
binding environmental rules and principles, and submission to a compulsory dispute 
settlement procedure, also represent the slow incursion of interdependence norms into 
the Treaty system.
The Protocol represents changing ideas and values on how protection of the 
environment can best be achieved. In this context it represents a re-ordering of the 
hierarchy of values within the Treaty system. The move from CRAMRA to the 
Protocol required economic interests to be put to one side, albeit not always willingly. 
Political interests still dominate (although the initial defection showed that the 
collective political values could be questioned), but the acceptance of an overarching 
instrument, imposing ‘top-down’ principles and rules, signals that environmental 
interests are no longer subordinate. To this extent the Protocol represents a 
reassessment, individually and collectively, of the way the Treaty states perceive their 
national interests where these are defined as the ends and means of policy. The means 
by which the policy goal of environmental protection can be attained is rethought as is 
the priority of that goal itself.174
Institutional learning
The process of turning around the opposition to a ban on mining and then negotiating a 
new and quite different agreement (that is, a change in the regime), was a process of 
institutional learning. It rested on coalition building (following defection) and 
leadership. Australia and France sought, as structural leaders, to translate their power 
resources within the Treaty system into bargaining leverage in support of their policy 
proposals. As Young (1991:291) argues, this process is in part a matter of forming 
effective coalitions and taking appropriate measures to prevent the emergence of 
blocking or counter coalitions. The Australian Foreign Minister has characterised this 
as the exercise of ‘middle-power’ diplomacy which "exploits] networks of support and 
influence rather than hierarchical gradations of power" (Evans and Grant 1991:326). 
The formal negotiations were also characterised by Andersen’s exercise of 
entrepreneurial leadership in his brokerage of the various interests of the consultative 
parties in subsequent drafts of the Protocol.
It is also useful to consider the role of intellectual leadership here. In this regard, 
Young (1991:298-302) focuses on the generation of new ideas and "intellectual capital". 
The source of those new ideas on environmental protection were the non-governmental
174. Nevertheless, as the Swedish delegation noted at Bonn, the Protocol "is not an end in itself, and 
it must not become an end to our efforts" (Final Report 1991:196).
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organisations.175 Those ideas and values, which the NGOs had advocated over a period 
of time, were taken up first by Australia and France and then, through their coalition­
building (supported by NGOs), by the regime.
In this process of institutional learning and regime change there was also a change in 
the balance of power among actors both within and at the edges of the Antarctic Treaty 
system.
Transgovernmental elites
The first round of battles over the minerals convention and environmental protection 
took place behind closed doors during the minerals negotiations where the 
transgovemmental elite was most powerful. The second round was a more public 
debate. As Burgess notes (1990:7) with respect to the Australian decision, the 
"community that had been so influential in previous Antarctic decisions" was bypassed. 
This pattem was repeated elsewhere as this chapter has shown. Traditional Antarctic 
decision-makers - lawyers, diplomats and scientists - were marginalised when they 
either ignored or failed to respond to critical voices and changing public opinion. The 
bureaucratic elite were so well socialised into the norms and procedures of the Treaty 
system that they became a barrier to change.
Non-state actors
Non-governmental organisations played a crucial role in this change in the Treaty 
system. They sought not only to mobilise public opinion but also to "present [their] 
case to the highest levels of government" (ASOC 1989m).
Although it is easier to describe activity (as in this chapter) than to ascribe influence, the 
impact of NGOs on the Treaty system was explicitly recognised by the formal actors 
within the system.176 Australian Prime Mininster Hawke argued (1990d:2) that the 
"world-wide environment movement... has played a large part in this success".
NGO success in overturning CRAMRA (when they had not been able to prevent its 
negotiation) was in part due to their ability to encourage public debate and exploit 
domestic politics to pressure political leaders. It was also due to their increased 
experience and credibility in the system and to the transnational organisation of the
175. It is also possible to focus here on individuals who had sufficiently high profiles to carry that 
intellectual leadership forward. In this respect we can look to Prime Ministers Hawke and 
Rocard and to non-governmental representatives such as Jacques Cousteau and Sir Peter Scott. 
Cousteau "played an instrumental role in lobbying world leaders" to accept the Australian and 
French proposals (Anon 1990f:4-5).
176. As Pascoe (an Australian embassy official in Chile) noted (1990:106) "Greenpeace and the ACF 
had a particular influence in the Australian context. In France ... the role of non-governmental 
organisations [was] symbolised by the report on Antarctica of the Cousteau Foundation".
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campaign. They were thus able, as chapter one suggests is required, to deliver both 
consensus in the community and technical assistance (knowledge and policy proposals) 
in support of their goals. In this way, they also contributed to the democratisation of 
foreign policy debates and international decision-making.
The impact of public debate was also recognised. In opening the 16th consultative 
meeting, the German Minister of State at the Foreign Office noted that "one factor 
proved to be particularly helpful in ensuring the continuation of work on the Protocol ... 
public opinion" (Final Report 1991:150).177 Australian Foreign Minister Senator Evans 
suggests that "entrenched bureaucratic opposition" was overwhelmed by the "weight of 
public opinion" (1990a:4).
Not all, it should be noted, were supportive of the NGO role or welcoming of its 
influence. At least some within the scientific community were bitterly opposed to the 
growing strength of Antarctic NGOs in the regime.178
The scientific community
The scientific community was split over the Australia/French proposal. In particular, 
there was a difference in attitude between the institutional component of the scientific 
community and Antarctic scientists outside this group. A number of scientists in Treaty 
states supported a ban on minerals activity and the declaration of the Antarctic a 
wilderness reserve.179 Others, particularly those in executive positions within SCAR or 
with close ties to the diplomatic processes of the Treaty system, adopted a similar line 
to the diplomats and bureaucrats who argued against Australia and France.180
SCAR was not supportive of the Madrid Protocol nor of the process by which it had 
come about. Indeed, it had almost no involvement in these debates in contrast with its 
input into the development of the environmental rules described in chapter three. In a
177. The head of the Belgian delegation observed, at the Vifla del Mar meeting that, when the 
Minerals Convention was adopted, "we had not seen the wave of environmental concern that has 
come upon us and we must change our attitudes and reach results as rapidly as possible" (Anon 
1990r). Cook Waller observes (1989:662) that "the one consideration most responsible for 
eroding state support for the ... minerals regime [was] growing international concern for the 
Antarctic environment".
178. The President of SCAR, Richard Laws, suggested (1991b:231) that ASOC "engineered the 
wrecking of CRAMRA". He referred to them elsewhere as "vociferous [and] well-financed" 
(Laws 1991a:4).
179. Nearly 250 scientists in Britain (including some working for the British Antarctic Survey) 
signed a Greenpeace petition urging support for the Australian/French initiative (ECO 
LXXVII(5) 1990:4). There was support for a petition organised was signed by scientists in New 
Zealand. A Greenpeace publication (Patel and Mayer 1991) including articles by a number of 
leading Antarctic scientists supporting comprehensive environmental protection and wilderness 
reserve status for the Antarctic.
180. Some scientists chose to misrepresent the World Park proposal as one which involved "the total 
banning of all human activity" (Drewry 1991).
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wide-ranging speech at the sixteenth consultative meeting, Richard Laws (President of 
SCAR and formerly director of the British Antarctic Survey) argued against strict 
environmental assessment rules (on the grounds that they threatened freedom of 
scientific investigation)181 and warned the consultative parties, in effect, that they could 
no longer take SCAR for granted.182 Laws recognised NGOs as a new factor in the 
Treaty system, but one which he did not welcome. He suggested that it was their 
"disproportionate influence" which was responsible for the diminution of SCAR’s 
role.183 In this respect, the scientific community and NGOs were in competition for 
influence and power within the Treaty system.
Conclusion
The Protocol was not negotiated in a policy vacuum. It built upon existing 
environmental measures, described in chapter three, which arose through the process of 
incremental change. That change was, however, constrained by the normative and 
procedural values of the Treaty system. As also argued in chapter three, the values on 
protection of the Antarctic environment (which underpinned environmental protection 
rules in the Treaty system and the negotiation of the Minerals Convention) were 
increasingly questioned in the 1980s and were found wanting.
The Madrid Protocol arose through a process of radical change manifested, initially, in 
a defection by two key states from a substantive agreement (CRAMRA) and from the 
political norms of the Treaty system. That defection was the result of a rethinking by 
both states of their national interests in terms of priorities and policy goals. Thus it was 
a process of learning in response to changing ideas about environmental protection 
(which arose primarily outside the formal boundaries of the Treaty system) and, 
connected with this, community concern about the environmental impact of minerals 
activity in the Antarctic. In this way, the process of change emphasises the linkages 
between domestic political debate and international cooperation.
The learning process was repeated in other states and gave way to institutional learning. 
In this way, defection led not to a spiral of conflict but to an orderly change in which
181. Laws suggested that "excessive regulation and direction could lead to unproductive use of 
scientific capacity and funds" (Final Report 1991:235).
182. In this regard, he suggested that if the consultative parties failed to give reasonable weight to the 
views of SCAR (as opposed to those of the NGOs) and if the funding to undertake the tasks 
requested of it was not forthcoming, then SCAR might have to "concentrate on primary science 
and withdraw from giving advice on applied or management problems" (Final Report 1991:236).
183. He told the meeting that "Antarctic scientists are generally concerned that governments may 
respond positively to public relations pressure campaigns of some environmental NGOs with 
quite different objectives to those of scientists" (Final Report 1991:236). John Heap argued 
(199 lb: 123) that scientists were the real constituents of the Antarctic and that it was their views 
which should be taken into account when new rules were devised. He referred also to the 
"inflated media-hyped campaign about damage to the Antarctic environment".
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the minerals convention was overturned. The defection was effective, in the first 
instance, in generating an institutional response because Australia and France possessed 
issue-specific power in the Treaty system and over the entry into force of CRAMRA. 
The success of institutional change rested on the exercise of structural leadership by 
Australia and France and, especially, by the building of a coalition of support. That 
process was supported (at the state and inter-state level) by non-govemmental 
organisations. Whereas NGOs were influential actors (as a source of new ideas and in 
generating support for those ideas), the scientific community did not function in this 
process as an epistemic community (in policy advocacy) nor even successfully in 
support of its own interests in the regime. NGOs were a source of knowledge in 
competition with the scientific community and the transgovemmental elite which had 
dominated decision-making.
The Protocol does not signal a normative transformation of the Antarctic regime, but 
rather an internal re-ordering of its principles and norms. It has, however, changed the 
terms of the debate about the Antarctic continent. In this respect, it is possible to assert 
(as ASOC does (1991c)) that the Antarctic Treaty governments are now debating the 
NGO agenda.
Chapter eight 
CONCLUSION
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This thesis had three purposes. First, to explain the development of, and change in the 
Antarctic Treaty system with a particular focus on environmental issues, including the 
effect of minerals activity.
Second, to examine what this case study of environmental politics in the Antarctic tells 
us about the place of environmental issues on the international agenda.
Third, to consider what the Antarctic case and more generally international 
environmental politics might usefully have to say about the theory of international 
relations.
Given these purposes, I address here three related sets of conclusions. First, I set out 
conclusions concerning the political analysis of the Antarctic Treaty system. Second, 
this chapter reaches conclusions about the theory of cooperation and change (discussed 
in chapter one of this thesis) specifically related to the case study of the Antarctic. 
Finally, there is a set of conclusions concerning the value of the case study and its 
related theory as applied to the general problem of the environment in international 
politics.
In summing up the political analysis of the Antarctic Treaty system there is no need 
here to review in any detail the evidence and analysis of the preceding chapters. I 
concentrate, rather, on two questions. What are the distinguishing features of the 
construction and maintenance of the Antarctic regime, and its attention to 
environmental issues, with respect particularly to the role of states (the internal 
accommodation) and ideas of interstate cooperation? Second, what are the 
distinguishing features of change in the Treaty system, particularly relating to the 
minerals regime? This involves an examination not only of the role of states, but also 
of the role of non-governmental organisations and the scientific community.
The demand among states with Antarctic interests (particularly the seven claimant states 
- Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway - and the 
United States) for a cooperative regime on the Antarctic arose in response to the 
scientific interest and political actions of states outside the Antarctic ‘in-group’. The 
Antarctic Treaty system was thus constructed, in effect, as an externally imposed 
security regime. It had limited objectives: it was designed primarily to prevent conflict 
among states over territorial claims and to limit the potential for tension between the
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superpowers in the Antarctic. Its secondary focus was to encourage and facilitate 
scientific research and cooperation.
As a product of institutional bargaining, the Antarctic Treaty established the basis for a 
negotiated regime, not a hegemonic one. Although both the international hegemons, the 
US and the USSR, were participants in the regime they were not able to translate this 
into issue-specific power in the Antarctic regime. In this regard they had no more 
structural capabilities than the other Antarctic states, especially the claimants.
This bargain between states did not solve the security problem arising from the disputes 
over the territorial claims, because the problem could not be solved. Rather it 
established a form of regime which froze the issue. Thus the bargain which emerged 
sought to maintain the status quo and to entrench the internal accommodation between 
claimants and non-claimants. The Antarctic regime was thus characterised by a 
hierarchy of values that favoured political interests over other interests.
There are a number of distinguishing features in the Antarctic Treaty which have given 
shape to the regime. The values implicit in the Treaty rested on the exercise of 
sovereignty norms rather than on interdependence norms. Notwithstanding that the 
Antarctic Treaty represented a limited commitment to cooperation, nothing with the 
potential to undermine the exercise of their sovereignty by the claimant states or, more 
generally, the primacy of national autonomy over the conduct of Antarctic activities 
was acceptable. Thus no centralised institution was established and only weak 
compliance rules were adopted.
The Treaty entrenches the authority, first, of the original signatories and second, of 
states which undertake scientific research in the Antarctic. Thus, the Antarctic regime 
which developed under the Treaty was both an open and closed one. Any state could 
accede, but only a few (the twelve original signatories and those states which 
subsequently met a scientific activities criterion) were able to participate in decision­
making. In this way the Treaty privileges the conduct of science as a source of 
consultative party expertise and decision-making authority in the interests of 
maintaining the political settlement. The politics of science thus became an integral 
part of the development and maintenance of the Treaty regime. Through this the 
Antarctic scientific community was constituted as an interested actor in the Antarctic 
regime.
The Antarctic Treaty met the individual national interests of the original signatories in a 
way that unilateral action, which had been the hallmark of Antarctic politics in the 
1940s and early 1950s, could no longer do in the 1960s and beyond. Thus it became in
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their collective interests to maintain the Treaty. The protection of individual national 
interests within the Antarctic Treaty and regime was met by the adoption and 
maintenance of consensus or mutual veto as the basis for decision-making.
The Antarctic regime was consolidated in the 1960s and 1970s at a time when Antarctic 
issues were of low salience both nationally and internationally. The consensus norm, 
and the reciprocal exercise of individual restraint on the issue of the exercise of 
territorial sovereignty (in order to maintain the sovereignty compromise), underpinned 
the internal strength of the regime.
The development of a small but influential transgovemmental bureaucratic elite was an 
important factor in this. This network of individuals, socialised into the norms of the 
Treaty, became very influential in defining national Antarctic policies in congruence 
with the Treaty system. In their decision-making they gave practical expression to, and 
thus reinforced, the importance of the political values of the Treaty system. As the 
Antarctic regime developed, the overlapping of individuals among its component parts 
(the consultative meetings, the institutions of the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the Scientific Committee on Antarctic 
Research) provided a coordinating mechanism which further reinforced the regime’s 
norms.
While the Antarctic regime was negotiated as a regime of common aversion (in which 
actors wish to avoid a particular outcome), it had to function for quite a different 
purpose as an environmental regime and thus as a regime of common interests (in which 
the actors have a common interest in ensuring a particular outcome). In the Antarctic 
regime, protection of the Antarctic environment, through the management of human 
activity there, became the main focus of decision-making.
The environmental sub-regime was developed though a process of incremental change. 
The environmental agenda grew, in an ad hoc fashion, from the only explicit 
environmental issue mentioned in the Treaty - the conservation and preservation of 
living resources - to encompass protected areas, the conduct of scientific expeditions, 
waste disposal, environmental impact assessment, the impact of tourism and non­
governmental activities and the regulation of minerals activities. Rules and procedures 
on these issues were adopted in a series of consultative recommendations and in 
separate conventions.
However, in addressing these environmental issues, the Treaty parties were guided by 
the sovereignty norms and political values inherent in the agreement among them which 
privileged political concerns over environmental ones. There were three distinguishing
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features of the environmental sub-regime. First, the emphasis on political concerns and, 
particularly, the need for consensus to maintain the political compromise meant that the 
decision-making process (which was ad hoc, sectoral and resistant to compliance 
mechanisms and centralisation) was ultimately flawed in its ability and potential to 
make good environmental rules. Further, environmental protection did not take 
precedence over scientific activity, nor over economic interests in the exploitation of 
living or non-living resources.
Second, as a result of this, the environmental sub-regime thus constructed was ad hoc 
and incomplete. Institutional compliance rules were avoided and no overarching 
environmental objectives were set in place. Although statements of principle on 
environmental protection were adopted, these were not linked in any formal way to the 
rules and procedures adopted. Decision-making was frequently slow and increasingly 
unable to keep pace with changes ‘on the ground’ with respect to adverse environmental 
impacts in the Antarctic.
Finally, the rules adopted were inadequately implemented. Thus localised 
environmental damage occurred in the Antarctic because scientific stations and national 
Antarctic operators did not always observe the rules. These violations, however, were 
not considered destabilising to the Antarctic regime. States were reluctant, moreover, to 
rock the political boat by raising the issue of these violations in formal Antarctic Treaty 
meetings.
The Treaty parties sought to extend the scope of the Treaty without relinquishing any 
authority over Antarctic issues. To the extent that the development of the 
environmental regime can be described as learning (that is, a redefinition of interests in 
response to new knowledge), it falls into the category of single-loop learning. New 
instrumental policies were adopted but the ends remained unquestioned - in this case 
that environmental protection would be balanced against other uses of the Antarctic and 
against political and economic interests, and that the existing ad hoc approach was 
adequate to the task.
As well as the Antarctic Treaty states, non-state actors became important in the 
development of the environmental sub-regime and the debates about its adequacy. The 
scientific community, through the non-governmental organisation, the Scientific 
Committe on Antarctic Research (SCAR), provided advice and information to the 
Treaty parties (in response to particular requests) on environmental issues. While 
SCAR provided an institutional focus for the development of an epistemic community, 
it did not function as such. Scientists sought to avoid an advocacy role. The knowledge
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they brought to the Antarctic regime was an important factor in environmental decision­
making but the political concerns of the Antarctic regime dominated.
In the 1960s and 1970s, little external attention was paid to the environmental rules 
adopted under the Antarctic regime. However, in the 1980s, these environmental rules 
came under close critical scrutiny from non-governmental environmental organisations 
which functioned at a national and transnational level. They challenged both the 
adequacy of the rules and the Treaty parties’ record of implementation. In doing so 
they brought to the debate on environmental protection in the Antarctic new ideas and 
values about the instrinsic value of the environment and about the kinds of rules and 
procedures that were needed to protect that environment. They sought to influence 
Antarctic decision-making directly (at the international level) and indirectly through the 
mobilisation of public opinion and domestic political pressure.
They argued for a reordering of the hierarchy of values (so that environmental interests 
would take precedence) and for the kinds of rules and procedures that were more 
representative of interdependence norms. In this regard, they criticised the ad hoc 
nature of the Antarctic regime and called for a comprehensive approach and for 
centralised and independent institutions, both of which had been rejected by the Treaty 
parties as incompatible with the political constraints of the regime.
The Treaty parties must be given credit for inscribing environmental issues on the 
Antarctic agenda and for attempting to deal with the question of environmental 
protection. However, in developing the environmental sub-regime they did not respond 
adequately to new scientific knowledge, provided by the scientific community, about 
the Antarctic environment and the impact of human activity on that environment.
Nor did the Treaty parties respond adequately to changes in values and ideas in the 
international system about the protection of the environment which were forthcoming 
from non-governmental organisations. The reason they did not do so was because the 
Treaty system continued to function as a security regime in which political values were 
paramount. Actors within the system continued to see decisions on environmental 
protection as being constrained by those political concerns. Their ‘ownership’ of the 
Antarctic issue, which they had consolidated in the 1960s and 1970s, had made them 
reluctant to listen to other voices.
It was the issue of the exploitation of minerals resources in the Antarctic which 
focussed most sharply the differences between the values within the Treaty system and 
the values espoused by non-govemmental organisations. It was also the issue which 
provided, in the final analysis, the catalyst for change.
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The minerals regime, or at least the agreement on which it would be based - the 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) - 
was a product of institutional bargaining over a period of six years (following a decade 
of negotiation and debate on the fundamental principles and objectives which would 
apply to the regulation of minerals activity in the Antarctic). Its central value was that 
controlled minerals exploitation could be made compatible with environmental 
protection.
The exercise of entrepreneurial leadership by Christopher Beeby was a particularly 
important feature of those formal negotiations in the 1980s. In the institutional 
bargaining process he sought to maintain consensus, and advance the negotiations, 
through the tabling of his personal report which effectively functioned as an informal 
negotiating text.
In this bargaining process, a complex matrix of states’ interests had to be internally 
accommodated within the overarching collective interest which required the 
maintenance of the Treaty system and the political compromise on the territorial claims 
and the exercise of sovereignty which underpins it. As well as the claimant versus non­
claimant camps, the Treaty parties were also divided between the likely mining states 
and the claimants, between developed and developing states and between the pro- 
development states and those parties more inclined to restrict (or even prevent) 
development in the interests of environmental protection.
At the same time, the external accommodation with non-Treaty states and non­
governmental organisations assumed a greater importance than it had done on other 
environmental issues. Non-Treaty states challenged the negotiation of the convention 
on the grounds of its exclusivity. Non-govemmental organisations challenged it on the 
grounds of the Treaty parties’ past poor record of environmental protection and 
implementation and on the broader philosophical grounds that environmental protection 
and minerals activity were inherently incompatible.
The Antarctic Minerals Convention, which was adopted by consensus in 1988, did 
include extensive environmental principles and procedures which would identify 
potential environmental impact. However it was the compromise on sovereignty, rather 
than environmental protection, which dominated the negotiations. Further, the 
economic interests in minerals exploitation were set against environmental concerns. 
Thus the hierarchy of values (political, economic and environmental in that order) was 
maintained. On the whole, in spite of the complex institutional framework established 
by the Convention, little concession was made to interdependence norms.
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The strength of the consensus norms of the Treaty system was such that, once adopted, 
the Minerals Convention was considered secure and its ratification and entry into force 
only a matter of time.
However, this did not happen. The Minerals Convention (and the consensus among the 
Treaty states which it represented) was overturned. This process rested on an initial 
defection by two states with issue-specific power in the Antarctic regime, Australia and 
France. Not only did Australia and France defect from a formal agreement to which 
they had been party, but they also broke the central and fundamental norm of the Treaty 
- that consensus must be maintained in the collective interests of all parties. This 
defection, and the changes which it generated, was thus a process of radical change 
rather than incremental change.
In refusing to sign the Minerals Convention, Australia and France redefined their 
national interests in that they rethought and reordered their policy objectives. That is, 
they no longer counted potential benefit from minerals activity as important among 
these. Second, with respect to environmental protection, they argued that this goal 
could no longer be achieved within a minerals convention. It was thus a process of 
double loop learning. They recognised new ends as well as new means to accomplish 
them. Both argued their case for defection expressly on environmental grounds: ideas 
and values had changed since the minerals negotiations commenced and minerals 
activity could no longer be argued to be compatible with environmental protection. 
Thus the process, at this stage, was one of individual learning in response to new 
knowledge and ideas.
In rejecting the Minerals Convention and its major premiss (that at some stage minerals 
activity could be compatible with protection of the environment) Australia and France 
argued for minerals activity to be banned and a new agreement to be negotiated which 
would include comprehensive environmental protection principles and objectives 
against which all human activity in the Antarctic would be judged. Further they 
envisaged that such an agreement would replace the existing ad hoc collection of 
environmental rules and measures. Thus they envisaged a reformulation of the 
hierarchy of values (such that environmental concerns were no longer subordinate to 
political and economic ones) and a move towards interdependence norms which would 
encourage the adoption of centralised institutions with a degree (although still limited) 
of oversight and compliance powers.
Opposition to the Australian and French actions from other Treaty parties was grounded 
in anger that they had defected from, and thus brought into question the strength of, a
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fundamental norm in the Treaty system - the importance of cleaving to a consensus. 
Further, their proposals on comprehensive protection were out of line with the 
traditional, and accepted, approach to Antarctic decision-making.
How then was individual learning translated into institutional learning, especially when 
Australia and France’s Treaty partners were stridently critical of their action and 
opposed to their environmental initiative? There are a number of factors which are 
crucial to an explanation of how the minerals convention was turned around. Non­
governmental organisations and the new ideas and values they brought to the debate 
were a crucial factor in this process. NGOs mobilised national and international public 
debate as well as domestic electoral pressure to influence political leaders who had 
previously not taken much interest in Antarctic issues. Thus they brought not only new 
ideas but the political power to put those ideas on the agenda. In this way, we can point 
to a second feature of this process - as the salience of the Antarctic issue grew the 
transgovemmental elites who ‘owned’ the Antarctic issue were marginalised in the 
decision-making process.
The scientific community was an ambivalent actor in this process. The ‘bureaucratic’ 
scientists - those who were part of the international diplomatic process of consultative 
meetings and who were involved in the administration of SCAR or of national Antarctic 
programs - continued to be supportive of the diplomatic actors in the Treaty regime. On 
the other hand, scientists outside this small group were increasingly active in expressing 
their opposition to minerals activity and in support of the Australian and French 
initiatives. The bureaucratic scientists perceived their interest in freedom of scientific 
research as inextricably linked with the continuation of the Treaty system as it had 
functioned in the past. They perceived themselves as the natural constituents of 
Antarctic decision-making and the owners of the truth about scientific information. 
Thus, for them, NGOs were a competing, and often unwelcome source of information 
and knowledge.
The institutional bargaining process which led to the adoption of the Madrid Protocol, 
which enshrined a comprehensive environmental regime, was distinguished by several 
features. First, Australia and France engaged in successful coalition building within the 
Treaty system. In doing so they were effectively acting as structural leaders in the 
Treaty regime and they were able to do so because they possessed issue-specific power 
in the Antarctic regime. Second, they were supported in this by national and 
transnational non-governmental organisations and by high profile individuals who 
exercised an intellectual leadership of sorts. Third, the process by which states were 
brought around focussed first, on the moving of the debate onto national political 
agendas where politicians responded to domestic pressure as well as to growing
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evidence of changing international opinions and second, as a consequence, the 
marginalisation of traditional Antarctic elites.
The US hold-out against the Madrid Protocol at the last minute was just that - the action 
of a hold-out state rather than a hegemon. It may well have been trying to function as a 
hegemon in translating overall power into structural power within the Antarctic Treaty 
system, but in a negotiated regime which still functioned on the basis of unanimity, it 
had no more issue-specific power or bargaining leverage than any number of other 
states and it was unable to construct a coalition of support. It was on this that its 
influence over the shape of the final Madrid Protocol rested and, in the final analysis, 
that influence was small.
The question remains to be addressed as to how much of a change the Madrid Protocol 
really was. It was, in practical terms, quite a revolutionary change. It provides a 
contractarian bargain which is specifically constructed as a regime of common interests. 
It incorporates an effective ban on minerals activity (and thus an institutional policy 
objective - mining - has been redefined). It incorporates comprehensive principles on 
environmental protection and a formal requirement for environmental impact 
assessment. It also establishes an integrated set of environmental protection rules to 
replace the ad hoc, discrete and unwieldy set of recommendations which had been 
adopted over the previous thirty years.
In doing so it represents a partial reordering of the hierarchy of values in the Treaty 
system. Environmental interests have taken precedence over economic ones. To a 
degree, the decision-making limits imposed on the regime by collective political 
interests have been re-examined. There has been some movement away from 
sovereignty norms (which were part of those political constraints) and towards 
interdependence norms if, in the context of the Treaty system, we identify these in the 
legally binding nature of the Protocol and the adoption of stronger compliance rules 
than were present in earlier measures. In this regard, the Protocol also establishes an 
institutional framework which provides some centralised oversight of environmental 
protection procedures.
This shift from sovereignty norms to interdependence norms and a reordering of the 
hierarchy of values can be described as a cognitive change - that is, it occurred as pan 
of the learning process whereby individually and institutionally, Antarctic states 
responded to new ideas and values on environmental protection and redefined their 
national interests (defined as policy objectives and the means to achieve them) 
accordingly.
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It represents more than a confrontation between development and conservation. It 
focusses attention on an important dichotomy in international relations - between that 
which is perceived as realistic and that which is thought utopian and therefore 
unattainable in the real world. Thus it represents a redefining of what is possible. It 
also represents a reconstitution of the concept of national self-interest in such a way that 
the shadow of the future, or long-term interests (normally assumed to be heavily 
discounted in policy calculations) assumes a greater value in the equation. The shift 
also represents a shift in the balances of power: within the Treaty ‘club’ and from 
Treaty elites to non-governmental organisations and domestic arenas.
However, the Protocol did not change the fundamental security settlement on the 
territorial claims - indeed there was no requirement for it to do so especially as the ban 
on minerals, once agreed to, excised the previously contentious issue of ownership of 
resources. In that respect it was an easier agreement to negotiate than the minerals 
convention.
There are some judgements which cannot be made. It remains to be seen, for example, 
whether the opening up of the Treaty system to interdependence norms will ensure 
improved environmental protection and whether that process will continue. What is 
likely, however, in this regard is that the influence of non-governmental organisations in 
imposing accountability and transparency will be strengthened.
Further, it is not possible at this stage to judge the impact on the consensus norm in the 
Antarctic regime. We do not know whether the defection from consensus has 
engendered a sense of mistrust, or undermined the strength of what is the constitutive 
norm in the Antarctic regime. In short, will these first defections engender others?
We also cannot judge whether this cognitive change in the Treaty system will give way 
to a normative change, that is a radical transformation of norms, values and practices. 
However we can say that this new dimension in Antarctic politics represents a new 
(although not yet widespread) dimension in international politics - a belief that states 
(and their citizens) have an ethical responsibility to protect the environment in the 
interests of all peoples, including future generations.
It is apparent that the analytical framework developed from liberal insights into 
regimes, cooperation and change is for the most part a good fit with the analysis of the 
Antarctic Treaty system in this thesis. In the major arguments of these theories the 
propositions which follow are confirmed in this case study. With respect to interstate 
cooperation and the construction of negotiated regimes, the theory emphasises the 
processes of institutional bargaining and the exercise of leadership. These were indeed
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present and decisive in the construction and development of the Antarctic regime 
although the exercise of leadership is not always easily identified.
With respect to the maintenance of regimes, the propositions in the theory suggest that 
states cooperate over time in recognition of long-term interests and the realisation of 
joint gains. National interests come to be defined in a way that is congruent with the 
norms and rules of a regime and thus the value of the regime is reinforced. The 
Antarctic case study supports this contention. It also supports the argument that the 
exercise of diffuse reciprocity is an important factor in ensuring compliance with the 
broad principles and norms of a regime. Further the theory focusses attention on the 
importance of transgovemmental elites in ensuring compliance through socialisation 
into the regime and this was a central feature of the Antarctic regime. The theory also 
posits a role for transnational groups in developing and maintaining a regime - in the 
Antarctic case SCAR contributed to this process.
The theory is less insightful in its propositions on the process of change especially when 
conventional power-based explanations are of limited utility as is the case in the 
Antarctic and in environmental politics generally. This is because the process of change 
requires a deeper exploration of causality than does stability and thus requires more 
complex models.
Nevertheless, in examining both incremental and radical change in the Antarctic 
regime, liberal theory has some relevant observations. First, that change may occur in 
the absence of a state acting as an hegemon. Second, that defection is not necessarily 
the result of free-riding or cheating but can be used to overcome institutional inertia. 
Third, that the concept of individual and institutional learning in response to new 
knowledge provides a useful analytical tool for exploring change. Fourth, that 
understanding the processes of change requires a rethinking of the traditional separation 
in international relations between domestic and international policy arenas and an 
investigation of the nexus between the two in both an empirical and theoretical way. 
Fifth, that the role of non-state actors - both the environmental movement and the 
scientific community - is an important component in advancing (or hindering) the 
process of change. In this respect, the proposition that NGOs must develop consensus 
in the world community, and deliver technical assistance (knowledge) for their goals is 
also supported.
In exploring both the nature of cooperation on environmental issues and the processes 
of change with respect to environmental values and rules, the theoretical and indeed the 
empirical literature needs to incorporate more fully the role of non-state actors. This 
applies to the role of the scientific community, and especially the utility of the concept
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of epistemic community and the conditions under which such a community arises and 
acts. It applies also to the role and influence of transnational non-governmental 
organisations. In this exploration, the potential for conflict or collaboration between 
these two groups (the scientists and the non-governmental organisations), and the 
differing types of knowledge they bring to the debate, is also important. That is, the 
concept of knowledge and the role and influence of the ‘owners’ of that knowledge 
must itself be investigated further.
The final part of this conclusion turns to those overarching questions about the 
environment as an issue in international politics. There are three related questions 
which are raised here. First, how and why are environmental regimes formed and how 
do they change? Second, in that regard, how have environmental issues been managed 
on the international agenda? Third, is a transformation of the international system 
required to take effective care of international environmental problems?
The Antarctic case study, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, is one which 
contributes to this wider research agenda, particularly with respect to the management 
and protection of global environmental commons. It does not, however, provide 
definitive answers on this but rather raises propositions which must be tested further 
against other case studies of international environmental politics. It can nevertheless be 
said that the liberal tradition of international relations theory provides an appropriate 
model to explore further these questions in international politics.
The following observations can be made with respect to the questions posed above. 
New environmental regimes are in part a product of the learning process. That is they 
are formed in response to new or reassessed scientific knowledge about adverse 
environmental impacts which result from technological changes and increased human 
activity. They arise because of a perception that the issue cannot be managed 
successfully by independent state decision-making and that some form of cooperation 
among states is required. In that respect, they are most often ‘threat’ induced and 
reactive rather than precautionary.
Environmental regimes are likely to arise through the process of institutional bargaining 
rather than being imposed by a state acting as a hegemon. This does not, of course, 
preclude a state attempting to exercise this role, nor restrict the exercise of structural 
leadership by a state in the bargaining process.
Because of the dominance of political and economic values over environmental ones, 
and the greater relative weight given to sovereignty rather than interdependence norms, 
(even when there is agreement that international cooperation is necessary) inter-state
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practice on the environment has, for the most part, been inadequate. The regimes so 
constructed do not focus sufficiently on the long-term nor can they adequately ensure 
compliance, both of which are necessary conditions for successful management of 
transboundary environmental problems.
This case study suggests that the process of change thus required in environmental 
regimes is likely to come about through a process of learning when states respond to 
new knowledge and redefine their national and collective interests (policy goals and 
objectives). In this respect, change is most often incremental. In redefining national 
interests, which may then translate into regime change, states also respond to domestic 
power shifts and to pressure from other states.
In this respect, the Antarctic case study also emphasises the importance of coalition 
bargaining and leadership in mobilising change. It also suggests that states exercising 
leadership and forming coalitions in this respect need not be hegemons. It may well 
point to a role for so-called ‘middle powers’ in this process.
Non-state actors, this case study suggests, are an integral part of the construction of 
environmental regimes and of change in those regimes. The scientific community is a 
source of knowledge and information in defining and offering possible solutions to 
environmental problems. In environmental regimes, the scientific community may 
function as a disinterested actor or as an epistemic community by taking an active role 
in policy advocacy and encouraging compliance.
This case study points also to a role for non-governmental environmental organisations 
as central actors in environmental politics, especially in the process of change, through 
their introduction into the debate of new ideas and values, their mobilisation of public 
and electoral pressure and in providing new and different channels of communication 
between states and peoples.
The case study would also suggest that incremental processes, which focus on rules and 
procedures, can go some way towards improving inter-state environmental practice. 
However, in the long-run what is needed for successful management of environmental 
problems and the ensuring of ecological security, is a normative or radical change in 
which states are willing to concede to interdependence norms and the hierarchy of 
values is reordered so that environmental values are privileged over economic and 
political ones. This involves, further, a recognition of the role of non-state actors 
(especially non-governmental environmental organisations and the scientific 
community) in the international system and a rethinking of the place of states vis-a-vis 
those actors.
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Appendix 2
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South 
Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of 
America,
Recognising that it is in the interest of all 
mankind that Antarctica shall continue for ever 
to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and 
shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord;
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to 
scientific knowledge resulting from 
international cooperation in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica;
Convinced that the establishment of a firm 
foundation for the continuation and 
development of such cooperation on the basis of 
freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica 
as applied during the International Geophysical 
Year accords with the interests of science and 
the progress of all mankind;
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of 
Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the 
continuance of international harmony in 
Antarctica will further the purposes and 
principles embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful 
purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter 
alia, any measure of a military nature, such as 
the establishment of military bases and 
fortifications, the carrying out of military 
manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type 
of weapon.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the 
use of military personnel for scientific research 
or for any other peaceful purpose.
Article II
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica 
and co-operation toward that end, as applied 
during the International Geophysical Year, shall
continue, subject to the provisions of the present 
Treaty.
Article HI
1. In order to promote international 
cooperation in scientific investigation in 
Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the 
present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree 
that, to the greatest extent feasible and 
practicable:
(a) information regarding plans for scientific 
programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged 
to permit maximum economy of and 
efficiency of operations;
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in 
Antarctica between expeditions and 
stations;
(c) scientific observations and results from 
Antarctica shall be exchanged and made 
freely available.
2. In implementing this Article, every 
encouragement shall be given to the 
establishment of co-operative working relations 
with those Specialized Agencies of the United 
Nations and other international organisations 
having a scientific or technical interest in 
Antarctica.
Article IV
1. Nothing in the present Treaty shall be 
interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of 
previously asserted rights of or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any 
Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which 
it may have whether as a result of its 
activities or those of its nationals in 
Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting 
Party as regards its recognition or non­
recognition of any other State’s rights of 
or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the 
present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis 
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create 
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new 
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to
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territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be 
asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
Article V
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and 
the disposal there of radioactive waste material 
shall be prohibited.
2. In the event of the conclusion of 
international agreements concerning the use of 
nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions 
and the disposal of radioactive waste material, 
to which all of the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the 
meetings provided for under Article IX are 
parties, the rules established under such 
agreements shall apply in Antarctica.
Article VI
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply 
to the area south of 60* South Latitude, 
including all ice shelves, but nothing in the 
present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way 
affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of 
any State under international law with regard to 
the high seas within that area.
Article VII
1. In order to promote the objectives and 
ensure the observance of the provisions of the 
present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the 
meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty 
shall have the right to designate observers to 
carry out any inspection provided for by the 
present Article. Observers shall be nationals of 
the Contracting Parties which designate them. 
The names of observers shall be communicated 
to every other Contracting Party having the 
right to designate observers, and like notice 
shall be given of the termination of their 
appointment.
2. Each observer designated in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall have complete freedom of access at 
any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all 
stations, installations and equipment within 
those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points 
of discharging or embarking cargoes or 
personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all 
times to inspection by any observers designated 
in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at 
any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by 
any of the Contracting Parties having the right 
to designate observers.
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time 
when the present Treaty enters into force for it, 
inform the other Contracting Parties, and 
thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, 
on the part of its ships or nationals, and all 
expeditions to Antarctica organised in or 
proceeding from its territory;
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its 
nationals; and
(c) any military personnel or equipment 
intended to be introduced by it into 
Antarctica subject to the conditions 
prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of 
the present Treaty.
Article VIII
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their 
functions under the present Treaty, and without 
prejudice to the respective positions of the 
Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over 
all other persons in Antarctica, observers 
designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII and 
scientific personnel exchanged under sub- 
paragraph 1(b) of Article in of the Treaty, and 
members of the staffs accompanying any such 
persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction 
of the Contracting Party of which they are 
nationals in respect of all acts or omissions 
occurring while they are in Antarctica for the 
purposes of exercising their functions.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the 
adoption of measures in pursuance of sub- 
paragraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting 
Parties concerned in any case of dispute with 
regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica shall immediately consult together 
with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable 
solution.
Article IX
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties 
named in the preamble to the present Treaty 
shall meet at the City of Canberra within two 
months after the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and 
places, for the purpose of exchanging 
information, consulting together on matters of 
common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and 
formulating and considering, and 
recommending to their Governments, measures
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in furtherance of the principles and objectives of 
the Treaty, including measures regarding:-
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes 
only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in 
Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific co­
operation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of 
inspection provided for in Article VII of 
the Treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of 
jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(0 preservation and conservation of living 
resources in Antarctica.
2. Each Contracting Party which has become 
a party to the present Treaty by accession under 
Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint 
representatives to participate in the meetings 
referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article, 
during such times as that Contracting Party 
demonstrates in interest in Antarctica by 
conducting substantial research activity there, 
such as the establishment of a scientific station 
or the despatch of a scientific expedition.
3. Reports from the observers referred to in 
Article VII of the present Treaty shall be 
transmitted to the representatives of the 
Contracting Parties participating in the meetings 
referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article.
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this Article shall become effective when 
approved by all the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives were entitled to participate in 
the meetings held to consider those measures.
5. Any or all of the rights established in the 
present Treaty may be exercised as from date of 
entry into force of the Treaty whether or not any 
measures facilitating the exercise of such rights 
have been proposed, considered or approved as 
provided in this Article.
Article X
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to 
exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no 
one engages in any activity in Antarctica 
contrary to the principles or purposes of the 
present Treaty.
Article XI
1. If any dispute arises between two or more 
of the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present 
Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult 
among themselves with a view to having the 
dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement or other peaceful means of their own 
choice.
2. Any dispute of this character not so 
resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of 
all parties to the dispute, be referred to the 
International Court of Justice for settlement; but 
failure to reach agreement on reference to the 
International Court of Justice shall not absolve 
the parties to the dispute from the responsibility 
of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the 
various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 
1 of this Article.
Article XU
1(a) The present Treaty may be modified or 
amended at any time by unanimous 
agreement of the Contracting Parties 
whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings provided for 
under Article IX. Any such modification 
or amendment shall enter into force when 
the depositary Government has received 
notice from all such Contracting Parties 
that they have ratified it  
(b) Such modification or amendment shall 
thereafter enter into force as to any other 
Contracting Party when notice of 
ratification by it has been received by the 
depositary Government. Any such 
Contracting Party from which no notice of 
ratification is received within a period of 
two years from the date of entry into force 
of the modification or amendment in 
accordance with the provision of sub- 
paragraph 1(a) of this Article shall be 
deemed to have withdrawn from the 
present Treaty on the date of the expiration 
of such period.
2(a) If after the expiration of thirty years from 
the date of entry into force of the present 
Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties 
whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings provided for 
under Article IX so requests by a 
communication to the depositary 
Government, a Conference of all the 
Contracting Parties shall be held as soon
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as practicable to review the operation of 
the Treaty.
(b) Any modification or amendment to the 
present Treaty which is approved at such a 
Conference by a majority of the 
Contracting Parties there represented, 
including a majority of those whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in 
the meetings provided for under Article 
IX, shall be communicated by the 
depositary Government to all Contracting 
Parties immediately after the termination 
of the Conference and shall enter into 
force in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of the present Article.
(c) If any such modification or amendment 
has not entered into force in accordance 
with the provisions of sub-paragraph 1(a) 
of this Article within a period of two years 
after the date of its communication to all 
the Contracting Parties, any Contracting 
Party may at any time after the expiration 
of that period give notice to the depositary 
Government of its withdrawal from the 
present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall 
take effect two years after the receipt of 
the notice by the depositary Government.
Article XIII
1. The present Treaty shall be subject to 
ratification by the signatory States. It shall be 
open for accession by any State which is a 
Member of the United Nations, or any other 
State which may be invited to accede to the 
Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting 
Parties whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX of the Treaty.
2. Ratification of or accession to the present 
Treaty shall be effected by each State in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments 
of accession shall be deposited with the 
Government of the United States of America, 
hereby designated as the depositary 
Government.
4. The depositary Government shall inform 
all signatory and acceding States of the date of 
each deposit of an instrument of ratification or 
accession, and the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty and of any modification or amendment 
thereto.
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of 
ratification by all the signatory States, the 
present Treaty shall enter into force for those 
States and for States which have deposited 
instruments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty 
shall enter into force for any acceding State 
upon the deposit of its instruments of accession.
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by 
the depositary Government pursuant to Article 
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XIV
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, 
Russian and Spanish languages, each version 
being equally authentic, shall be deposited in 
the archives of the Government of the United 
States of America, which shall transmit duly 
certified copies thereof to the Governments of 
the signatory and acceding States.
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Appendix 3
CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
(as at February 1992)
State Status* Date of Ratification Date of CP Status1
United Kingdom OS/CP/CL 31 May 1960
South Africa OS/CP 21 June 1960
Belgium OS/CP 26 July 1960
Japan OS/CP 4 August 1960
United States of America OS/CP 18 August 1960
Norway OS/CP/CL 24 August 1960
France OS/CP/CL 16 September 1960
New Zealand OS/CP/CL 1 November 1960
Soviet Union OS/CP 2 November 1960
Argentina OS/CP/CL 23 June 1961
Australia OS/CP/CL 23 June 1961
Chile OS/CP/CL 23 June 1961
Poland AS/CP 8 June 1961 29 July 1977
Czechoslovakia AS/NCP 14 June 1962
Denmark AS/NCP 20 May 1965
Netherlands AS/CP 30 March 1967 19 November 1990
Romania AS/NCP 15 September 1971
Germany
German Democratic Republic AS/CP 19 November 1974 5 October 1987
Federal Republic of Germany AS/CP 5 February 1979 3 March 1981
Brazil AS/CP 16 May 1975 12 September 1983
Bulgaria AS/NCP 11 September 1978
Uruguay AS/CP 11 January 1980 7 October 1985
Papua New Guinea AS/NCP 16 March 19812
Italy AS/CP 18 March 1981 5 October 1987
Peru AS/CP 10 April 1981 9 October 1989
Spain AS/CP 31 March 1982 21 September 1988
China, People’s Republic of AS/CP 8 June 1983 7 October 1985
India AS/CP 19 August 1983 12 September 1983
Hungary AS/NCP 27 January 1984
Sweden AS/CP 24 April 1984 21 September 1988
Finland AS/CP 15 May 1984 9 October 1989
Cuba AS/NCP 16 August 1984
Republic of Korea AS/CP 28 November 1986 9 October 1989
Greece AS/NCP 8 January 1987
Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea AS/NCP 21 January 1987
Austria AS/NCP 25 August 1987
Ecuador AS/CP 15 September 1987 19 November 1990
Canada AS/NCP 4 May 1988
Columbia AS/NCP 31 January 1989
Switzerland AS/NCP 15 November 1990
Guatemala AS/NCP 31 July 1991
* OS: Original Signatory 
CP: Consultative Party
CL: Claimant State 
NCP: Non-consultative Party
AS: Acceding State
1. Original Signatories have automatic consultative party status.
2. Papua New Guinea’s succession to the Antarctic Treaty followed its independence from 
Australia.
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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Appendix 4
ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS
10-25 July 1961 Canberra
18 - 28 July 1962 Buenos Aires
2- 13 June 1964 Brussels
3-18 November 1966 Santiago
18-29 November 1968 Paris
19-31 October 1970 Tokyo
30 October - 10 November 1972 Wellington
9 - 20 June 1975 Oslo
19 September - 7 October 1977 London
17 September - 5 October 1979 Washington
23 June-7 July 1981 Buenos Aires
13-27 September 1983 Canberra
8-18 October 1985 Brussels
5 - 16 October 1987 Rio de Janiero
9- 20  October 1989 Paris
7-18 October 1991 Bonn
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Appendix 5
SPECIAL ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS
1 25, 27 and 29 July 1977 London To consider application for Consultative
Party status from Poland
2 1 27 February - 10 March 1978 Canberra Negotiation of the Convention on the
2 17-28 July 1978 Buenos Aires Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
3 5-6 May 1980 Canberra Resources
(Final Conference: 7 - 20 May 1980) Canberra
3 3 March 1981 Buenos Aires To consider application for Consultative
Party status from the Federal Republic of
Germany
4 1 14-25 June 1982 Wellington Negotiation of the Convention on the
2 17-28 January 1983 Wellington Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
3 11-22 July 1983 Bonn Activities
4 18-27 January 1984 Washington DC
5 23-31 May 1984 Tokyo
6 26 Feburary - 12 March 1985 Rio de Janiero
7 23 September - 6 October 1985 Paris
8 14-25 April 1986 Hobart
9 27 October - 12 November 1986 Tokyo
10 11-20 May 1987 Montevideo
11 18-29 January 1988 Wellington
12 2 May - 2 June 1988 Wellington
5 12 September 1983 Canberra To consider applications for Consultative
Party status from Brazil and India
6 7 October 1985 Brussels To consider applications for Consultative
Party status from the People’s Republic of
China and Uruguay
7 5 October 1987 Rio de Janiero To consider applications for Consultative
Party status from the German Democratic
Republic and Italy
8 20-21 September 1988 Paris To consider applications for Consultative
Party status from Spain and Sweden
9 9 October 1989 Paris To consider applications for Consultative
Party status from Ecuador, Finland, the 
Republic of Korea, the Netherlands and 
Peru (consideration of applications from 
Ecuador and the Netherlands was deferred 
at this meeting)
10 19 November 1990 Vifla del Mar To consider deferred applications for
Consultative Party status from the 
Netherlands and Peru
11 1 19 November - 6 December 1990 Vifla del Mar
2.1 22-30 April 1991 Madrid
2.2 17-22 June 1991 Madrid
3-4 October 1991 Madrid
For the exploration and discussion of all 
proposals relating to the comprehensive 
protection of the Antarctic environment 
and its dependent and associated 
ecosystems (in accordance with 
recommendation XV-1).
Appendix 6
ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
First Consultative Meeting, Canberra, 10-24 July 1961
I- I Exchange of information on scientific programmes
II Exchange of scientific personnel
III Exchange of scientific data
IV SCAR
V International organisations
VI Exchange of information on operations
VII Exchange of information on logistic problems
VIII Conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora
IX Historic sites
X Assistance in emergency
XI Telecommunications
XII Postal services
XIII Exchange of information on nuclear equipment amd techniques
XIV Administrative arrangements for consultative meetings
XV Second Consultative Meeting
XIV Preparations for consultative meetings
Second Consultative Meeting, Buenos Aires, 18-28 July 1962
II- I Exchange of scientific data
II Conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora
III Telecommunications
IV Exchange of information on operations
V Symposium on logistic problems
VI Modifications of reported activities
VII Shipment of scientific materials
VIII International Year of the Quiet Sun (1964-65)
IX Consultative meeting recommendations
X Third Consultative Meeting
Third Consultative Meeting, Brussels, 2-13 June 1964
HI- I Information on facilities for the landing of aircraft
II Notification of unoccupied refuges
III Logistics
IV Next meeting
V Telecommunications
VI Questions concerning meetings of specialists
VII Acceptance of approved recommendations
VIII Agreed Measures for the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora 
IX Interim guidelines for the conservation of fauna and flora
X Interest of SCAR in the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora
XI Pelagic sealing and the taking of fauna on pack ice
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Fourth Consultative Meeting, Santiago, 3-18 November 1966
IV- 1-15 Specially Protected Areas (incorporated in consolidated text of Agreed Measures)
15-17 Specially Protected Species (incorporated in consolidated text of Agreed Measures)
18 Cooperation in implementing article VI of the Agreed Measures for the conservation of
Antarctic fauna and flora
19 Implementation of Article XII(l)(d) of the Agreed Measures
20 Interim guidelines for the conservation of fauna and flora
21 Interim guidelines for the voluntary regulation of Antarctic pelagic sealing
22 Interest of SCAR in Antarctic pelagic sealing
23 Date of exchange of information
24 Meetings of experts
25 Meeting on logistics
26 Telecommunications
27 Effects of Antarctic tourism
28 Next meeting
Fifth Consultative Meeting, Paris, 18-29 November 1968
V- 1 Commemorative stamp issue
2 Measures for improving Antarctic telecommunications
3 Southern ocean
4 Historic monuments
5 Specially Protected Area (Fildes Peninsula)
6 Modification of the Agreed Measures
7 Concerning the proposals of SCAR for the revision of Interim Guidelines for the voluntary 
regulation fo Antarctic Pelagic Sealing
8 Examination of a Draft Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Pelagic Sealing
9 Sixth Consultative Meeting
Sixth Consultative Meeting, Tokyo, 19-31 October 1970
VI 1 Antarctic telecommunications
2 Exchange of information on telecommunications facilities
3 Antarctic meteorology
4 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment
5 Use of radio-isotopes in the Antarctic
6 Coordination of Antarctic scientific investigations involving the use of radio-isotopes
7 Effects of tourists and non-government expeditions on the Antarctic Treaty area
8 Permits for entry to Specially Protected Areas
9 Data on conservation of fauna and flora
10 Specially Protected Area (Coppermine Peninsula)
11 New islands
12 Scientific research rockets
13 Exchanges of information on oceanographic research
14 Historic monuments
15 Seventh Consultative Meeting
Seventh Consultative Meeting, Wellington, 30 October -10  November 1972
VII- 1 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment
2 Review of Specially Protected Areas
3 Sites of Special Scientific Interest
4 Effects of tourists and non-governmental expeditions in the Antarctic Treaty Area
5 Importation of laboratory animals and plants
6 Antarctic resources: effects of mineral exploration
7 Antarctic telecommunications
8 Cooperation in transport
9 Historie monuments
315
Eighth Consultative Meeting, Oslo, 9-20 June 1975
VIII- 1 Specially Protected Area (Litchfield Island)
2 Review of Specially Protected Areas
3 Sites of Special Scientific Interest
4 Sites of Special Scientific Interest: interim guidelines (Management Plans)
5 Permits for entry to Specially Protected Areas
6 Annual exchange of information
7 Cooperation in transport
8 Activities of states that are not consultative parties
9 Effects of tourists and non-governmental expeditions in the Antarctic Treaty Area
10 Antarctic marine living resources
11 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment
12 Disposal of nuclear wastes
13 The Antarctic environment
14 Resources: effects of mineral exploitation
Ninth Consultative Meeting, London, 19 September - 7 October 1977
IX- 1 Antarctic mineral resources
2 Antarctic marine living resources
3 Improvement of telecommunications in the Antarctic
4 Cooperation in transport
5 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment
6 Oil contamination of the Antarctic marine environment
Tenth Consultative Meeting, Washington, 17 September - 5 October 1979
X- 1 Antarctic mineral resources
2 Antarctic marine living resources
3 Improvement of telecommunications in the Antarctic and the collection and distribution of 
Antarctic meteorological data
4 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment collection of geological specimens
5 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment: Site of Special Scientific Interest: interim 
guidelines
6 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment: Sites of Special Scientific Interest
7 Oil contamination of the Antarctic marine environment
8 Effects of tourists and non-government expeditions in the Antarctic Treaty Area
9 Twentieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty
Eleventh Consultative Meeting, Buenos Aires, 23 June - 7 July 1981
XI- 1 Antarctic mineral resources
2 Antarctic marine living resources
3 Air disaster on Mount Erebus
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Twelfth Consultative Meeting, Canberra, 13-27 September 1983
XII 1 Collection and distribution of Antarctic meteorological data
2 Antarctic telecommunications
3 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment
4 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment; code of conduct on waste disposal
5 Extension of the expiry date of the designation of Sites 1-8 as Sites of Special Scientific 
Interests
6 Operation of the Antarctic Treaty system
7 Historic sites and monuments
8 SCAR assistance to consultative parties
Thirteenth Consultative Meeting, Brussels, 8-18 October 1985
Xni 1 Operation of the Antarctic Treaty system: information
2 Operation of the Antarctic Treaty system: overview
3 Exchange of information in accordance with the Antarctic Treaty: annual exchanges
4 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment: code of conduct for Antarctic expeditions and 
station activities: waste disposal
5 Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment: additional protective arrangements
6 Facilitation of scientific research: siting of stations
7 Facilitation of scientific research: Sites of Special Scientific Interest: interim guidelines: 
extension of designation
8 Facilitation of scientific research: Sites of Special Scientific Interest: interim guidelines: 
additional Sites
9 Facilitation of scientific research: Sites of Special Scientific Interest: interim guidelines: 
SSSI No 1: Cape Royds (Amendment to management plan)
10 Specially Protected Areas: North Coronation Island, South Orkney Islands
11 Specially Protected Areas: Lagotellerie Island, Marguerite Bay
12 Specially Protected Areas: "New College Valley", Caughly Beach, Cape Bird, Ross Island
13 Specially Protected Area No 7: Cape Hallett, Victoria Land, extension of boundaries
14 Specially Protected Areas: interim guidelines
15 Matters relating to the appointment of observers at consultative meetings
16 Historic sites and monuments
Fourteenth Consultative Meeting, Rio de Janiero, 5-16 October 1987
XIV- 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
Operation of Antarctic Treaty system: public availability of the documents of Consultative 
Meetings
Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment: environmental impact assessment 
Man’s impact on the Antarctic environment: safeguards for scientific drilling 
Facilitation of scientific research: Sites of Special Scientific Interest: interim guidelines: 
extension of designation
Facilitation of scientific research: Sites of Special Scientific Interest: interim guidelines: 
additional sites
Marine Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
Antarctic meteorology and telecommunications 
Historic sites and monuments 
Air safety in Antarctica
Marine meteorological and sea ice information services for navigation in the Treaty Area of 
the Southern Ocean
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Fifteenth Consultative Meeting, Paris, 9-20 October 1989
XV- 1 Comprehensive Measures for the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent 
and associated ecosystems
2 Comprehensive Measures for the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent 
and associated ecosystems
3 Human impact on the Antarctic environment: waste disposal
4 Human impact on the Antarctic environment: prevention, control and response to marine
pollution
5 Human impact on the Antarctic environment: environmental monitoring in Antarctica
6 Antarctic Protected Area system: new Sites of Special Scientific Interest
7 Antarctic Protected Area system: Redesignation of Special Protected Area, No 11 Cape
Shirreff, as Site of Special Scientific Interest No 32
8 Antarctic Protected Area system: Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Fauna and Flora: amendment to Article VIII (Management Plans for Specially Protected 
Areas)
9 Antarctic Protected Area system: Development of improved descriptions and management 
plans for Specially Protected Areas
10 Antarctic Protected Area system: establishment of Specially Reserved Areas (SRAs)
11 Antarctic Protected Area system: establishment of Multiple-Use Planning Areas (MRAs)
12 Antarctic Protected Area system: new historic sites and monuments
13 Antarctic Protected Area system: historic sites and monuments (amendment to description
of HM 53)
14 Promotion of international scientific cooperation: a declaration
15 Promotion of international scientific cooperation
16 Facilitation of scientific research: comparability and accessibility of Antarctic scientific 
data
17 Facilitation of scientific research: siting of stations
18 Cooperation in meteorological and sea ice information services for maritime and air 
navigation in Antarctica
19 Cooperation in the hydrographic charting of Antarctic waters
20 Air safety in Antarctica
21 Use of Antarctic ice
22 Antarctic Treaty Thirtieth Anniversary commemorative stamp issue
Sixteenth Consultative Meeting, Bonn, 7-18 October 1991 
XVI- 1 Exchange of information
2 Antarctic Protected Area system: new Sites of Special Scientific Interest
3 Antarctic Protected Area system: new Marine Sites of Special Scientific Interest
4 Antarctic Protected Area system: Specially Protected Area: redesignation of Site of
Special Scientific Interest No 30, Avian Island, Marguerite Bay, Antarctic Peninsula as a 
Specially Protected Area
5 Antarctic Protected Area system: Sites of Special Scientific Interest: interim guidelines: 
Site of Special Scientific Interest No 6, Byers Peninsula, Livingston Island, South Shetland 
Islands
6 Specially Protected Areas: revised descriptions and proposed management plans for 
Specially Protected Areas
7 Antarctic Protected Area system: Sites of Special Scientific Interest: extension of 
designation
8 Antarctic Protected Area system: Specially Protected Areas, Cryptogram Ridge, Mount 
Melbourne, Victoria Land
9 Antarctic Protected Area system: Specially Protected Areas, Forlidas Pond and David 
Valley Ponds
10 Antarctic Protected Area system: review of the system
11 Antarctic Protected Area system: new historic sites and monuments
12 Accessibility of Antarctic geophysical data
13 Tourism and non-governmental activities in the Antarctic Treaty area
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Appendix 7
RECOMMENDATION XI-1 (1981) 
ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES
The Representatives,
Recalling the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, 
which established a regime for international co­
operation in Antarctica, with the objective of 
ensuring that Antarctica should continue forever 
to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and 
should not become the scene or object of 
international discord;
Convinced that the framework established by 
the Antarctic Treaty has proved effective in 
promoting international harmony in furtherance 
of the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter, in prohibiting inter alia any 
measures of a military nature, in ensuring the 
protection of the Antarctic environment, in 
preventing any nuclear explosions and the 
disposal of any radioactive waste material in 
Antarctica, and in promoting freedom of 
scientific research in Antarctica, to the benefit 
of all mankind;
Convinced further of the necessity of 
maintaining the Antarctic Treaty in its entirety 
and believing that the early conclusion of a 
regime for Antarctic mineral resources would 
further strengthen the Antarctic Treaty
framework;
Desiring without prejudice to Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty to negotiate with the full 
participation f all the consultative parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty an appropriate set of rules for 
the exploration and exploitation of Antarctic 
mineral resources;
Noting the unity between the continent of 
Antarctica and its adjacent offshore areas;
Mindful of the negotiations that are taking place 
in the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea;
Reaffirming their commitment to the early 
conclusion of a regime for Antarctic mineral 
resources which would take due account of the 
respective interests of the Consultative Parties 
as regards the form and content of the regime, 
including decision-making procedures, as well 
as the special characteristics of the Antarctic 
area;
Recalling further Recommendations VI-4, VII- 
1, VIII-11, VIII-13, IX-5, IX-6 and X-7;
Recommend to their Governments that:
1. They take note of the progress made 
toward the timely adoption of a regime for 
Antarctic mineral resources at the Eleventh 
Consultative Meeting and related meetings and 
the importance of this progress.
2. A regime on Antarctic mineral 
resources should be concluded as a matter of 
urgency.
3. A Special Consultative Meeting should 
be convened in order:
(a) to elaborate a regime;
(b) to determine the form of the regime 
including the question as to whether an 
international instrument such as a 
convention is necessary;
(c) to establish a schedule for negotiations, 
using informal meetings and sessions 
of the Special Consultative Meeting as 
appropriate; and
(d) to take any other steps that may be 
necessary to facilitate the conclusion of 
the regime, including a decision as to 
the procedure for its adoption.
4. The Special Consultative Meeting
should base its work on this Recommendation 
and the relevant Recommendations and Reports 
of the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings.
5. The regime should be based on the 
following principles:
(a) the Consultative Parties should
continue to play an active and 
responsible role in dealing with the 
question of Antarctic mineral 
resources;
(b) the Antarctic Treaty must be
maintained in its entirety;
(c) protection of the unique Antarctic 
environment and of its dependent 
ecosystems should be a basic 
consideration;
(d) the Consultative parties, in dealing 
with the question of mineral resources 
in Antarctica, should not prejudice the 
interests of all mankind in Antarctica;
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(e) the provisions of Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty should not be affected 
by the regime. It should ensure that 
the principles embodied in Article IV 
are safeguarded in application to the 
area covered by the Antarctic Treaty.
6. Any agreement that may be reached on 
a regime for mineral exploration and 
exploitation in Antarctica elaborated 
by the Consultative Parties should be 
acceptable and be without prejudice to 
those States which have previously 
asserted rights of or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica as 
well as to those States which neither 
recognize such rights of or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
nor, under the provisions of the 
Antarctic Treaty, assert such rights or 
claims.
7. The regime should inter alia:
(i) Include means for:
(a) assessing the possible impact 
of mineral resource activities 
on the Antarctic environment 
in order to provide for 
informed decision-making;
(b) determining whether mineral 
resource activities will be 
acceptable;
(c) governing the ecological, 
technological, political, legal 
and economic aspects of those 
activities in cases where they 
would be determined 
acceptable, including
the establishment, as 
an important part of 
the regime, of rules 
relating to the 
protection of the 
Antarctic 
environment; and 
the requirement that 
mineral resource
activities undertaken 
pursuant to the 
regime be
undertaken in
compliance with
such rules.
(ii) Include procedures for adherence by 
States other than the Consultative 
Parties, either through the Antarctic 
Treaty or otherwise, which would:
(a) ensure that the adhering State 
is bound by the basic 
provisions of the Antarctic
Treaty, in particular Articles I, 
IV, V and VI, and by the 
relevant Recommendations 
adopted by the Consultative 
Parties; and
(b) make entities of that State 
eligible to participate in 
mineral resource activities 
under the regime.
(iii) Include provisions for co-operative 
arrangements between the regime and 
other relevant international 
organizations.
(iv) Apply to all mineral resource activities 
taking place on the Antarctic Continent 
and its adjacent offshore areas but 
without encroaching on the deep 
seabed. The precise limits of the area 
of application would be determined in 
the elaboration of the regime.
(v) Include provisions to ensure that the 
special responsibilities of the 
Consultative Parties in respect of the 
environment in the Antarctic Treaty 
Area are protected, taking into account 
responsibilities which may be 
exercised in the area by other 
international organizations.
(vi) Cover commercial exploration 
(activities related to minerals 
involving, in general, retention of 
proprietary data and/or non-scientific 
exploratory drilling) and exploitation 
(commercial development and 
production).
(vii) Promote the conduct of research 
necessary to make environmental and 
resource management decisions that 
would be required.
8. They promote and co-operate in 
scientific investigations which would facilitate 
the effective operation of the regime taking into 
account, inter alia, the relevant parts of the 
Report of Ecological, Technological and other 
Related Experts on Mineral Exploration and 
Exploitation in Antarctica (Washington, June 
1979), attached as an annex to the Report of the 
Tenth Consultative Meeting.
9. With a view to improving predictions 
of the environmental impacts of activities, 
events and technologies associated with mineral 
resource exploration and exploitation should 
such occur, the continue with the assistance of 
the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, 
to define programs with the objectives of:
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(a) retrieving and analysing relevant 
information from past observations and 
research programs;
(b) ensuring in relation to the needs for 
information identified by the Experts 
Report, that effective use is made of 
existing programs;
(c) identifying and developing new 
programs that should have priority,
taking account of the length of time 
required for results to become 
available.
10. In elaborating the regime, they take 
account of the provisions of Recommendation 
IX-1, paragraph 8.1
1. Paragraph 8 of recommendation IX-1 reads:
[The Representatives ... recommend to their Governments that:]
They urge their nationals and other States to refrain from all exploration and exploitation of 
Antarctic mineral resources while making progress towards the timely adoption of an agreed 
regime concerning Antarctic mineral resource activities. They will thus endeavour to ensure 
that, pending the timely adoption of agreed solutions pertaining to exploration and exploitation 
of mineral resources, no activity shall be conducted to explore or exploit such resources. They 
will keep these matters under continuing examination.
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Appendix 8
CONVENTION ON THE REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCE
ACTIVITIES
Preamble
The States Parties to this Convention, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Recalling the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty;
Convinced that the Antarctic Treaty system has 
proved effective in promoting international 
harmony in furtherance of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
in ensuring the absence of any measures of a 
military nature and the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and in promoting 
freedom of scientific research in Antarctica;
Reaffirming that it is in the interest of all 
mankind that the Antarctic Treaty area shall 
continue forever to be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and shall not become the 
scene or object of international discord;
Noting the possibility that exploitable mineral 
resources may exist in Antarctica;
Bearing in mind the special legal and political 
status of Antarctica and the special 
responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties to ensure that all activities 
in Antarctica are consistent with the purposes 
and principles of the Antarctic Treaty;
Bearing in mind also that a regime for Antarctic 
mineral resources must be consistent with 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and in 
accordance therewith be without prejudice and 
acceptable to those States which assert rights of 
or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, 
and those States which neither recognise nor 
assert such rights or claims, including those 
States which assert a basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica;
Noting the unique ecological, scientific and 
wilderness value of Antarctica and the 
importance of Antarctica to the global 
environment;
Recognising that Antarctic mineral resource 
activities could adversely affect the Antarctic 
environment or dependent or associated 
ecosystems;
Believing that the protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated
ecosystems must be a basic consideration in 
decisions taken on possible Antarctic mineral 
resource activities;
Concerned to ensure that Antarctic mineral 
resource activities, should they occur, are 
compatible with scientific investigation in 
Antarctica and other legitimate uses of 
Antarctica;
Believing that a regime governing Antarctic 
mineral resource activities will further 
strengthen the Antarctic Treaty system;
Convinced that participation in Antarctic 
mineral resource activities should be open to all 
States which have an interest in such activities 
and subscribe to a regime governing them and 
that the special situation of developing country 
Parties to the regime should be taken into 
account;
Believing that the effective regulation of 
Antarctic mineral resource activities is in the 
interest of the international community as a 
whole;
HAVE AGREED as follows:
CHAPTER I : GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Definitions
For the purposes of this Convention:
1 "Antarctic Treaty" means the Antarctic 
Treaty done at Washington on 1 December 
1959.
2 "Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties" 
means the Contracting Parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty entitled to appoint representatives to 
participate in the meetings referred to in Article 
IX of that Treaty.
3 "Antarctic Treaty area" means the area to 
which the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty 
apply in accordance with Article VI of that 
Treaty.
4 "Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals" means the Convention done at 
London on 1 June 1972.
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5 "Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources" means the 
Convention done at Canberra on 20 May 1980.
6 "Mineral resources" means all non-living 
natural non-renewable resources, including 
fossil fuels, metallic and non-metallic minerals.
7 "Antarctic mineral resource activities" 
means prospecting, exploration or development, 
but does not include scientific research 
activities within the meaning of Article III of 
the Antarctic Treaty.
8 "Prospecting" means activities, including 
logistic support, aimed at identifying areas of 
mineral resource potential for possible 
exploration and development, including 
geological, geochemical and geophysical 
investigations and field observations, the use of 
remote sensing techniques and collection of 
surface, seafloor and sub-ice samples. Such 
activities do not include dredging and 
excavations, except for the purpose of obtaining 
small-scale samples, or drilling, except shallow 
drilling into rock and sediment to depths not 
exceeding 25 metres, or such other depth as the 
Commission may determine for particular 
circumstances.
9 "Exploration" means activities, including 
logistic support, aimed at identifying and 
evaluating specific mineral resource 
occurrences or deposits, including exploratory 
drilling, dredging and other surface or 
subsurface excavations required to determine 
the nature and size of mineral resource deposits 
and the feasibility of their development, but 
excluding pilot projects or commercial 
production.
10 "Development" means activities, including 
logistic support, which take place following 
exploration and are aimed at or associated with 
exploitation of specific mineral resource 
deposits, including pilot projects, processing, 
storage and transport activities.
11 "Operator" means:
(a) a Party; or
(b) an agency or instrumentality of a Party; or
(c) a juridical person established under the 
law of a Party; or
(d) a joint venture consisting exclusively of 
any combination of the foregoing,
which is undertaking Antarctic mineral resource 
activities and for which there is a Sponsoring 
State.
12 "Sponsoring State" means the Party with 
which an Operator has a substantial and genuine 
link, though being:
(a) in the case of a Party, that Party;
(b) in the case of an agency or instrumentality 
of a Party, that Party;
(c) in the case of a juridical person other than 
an agency or instrumentality of a Party, 
the Party:
(i) under whose law that juridical 
person is established and to whose 
law it is subject, without prejudice 
to any other law which might be 
applicable, and
(ii) in whose territory the management 
of that juridical person is located, 
and
(iii) to whose effective control that 
juridical person is subject;
(d) in the case of a joint venture not 
constituting a juridical person:
(i) where the managing member of the 
joint venture is a Party or an agency 
or instrumentality of a Party, that 
Party; or
(ii) in any other case, where in relation 
to a Party the managing member of 
the joint venture satisfies the 
requirements of subparagraph (c) 
above, that Party.
13 "Managing member of the joint venture" 
means that member which the participating 
members in the joint venture have by agreement 
designated as having responsibility for central 
management of the joint venture, including the 
functions of organising and supervising the 
activities to be undertaken, and controlling the 
financial resources involved.
14 "Effective control" means the ability of the 
Sponsoring State to ensure the availability of 
substantial resources of the Operator for 
purposes connected with the implementation of 
this Convention, through the location of such 
resources in the territory of the Sponsoring State 
or otherwise.
15 "Damage to the Antarctic ecosystem or 
dependent or associated ecosystems" means any 
impact on the living or non-living components 
of that environment or those ecosystems,
323
including harm to atmospheric, marine or 
terrestrial life, beyond that which is negligible 
or which has been assessed and judged to be 
acceptable pursuant to this Convention.
16 "Commission" means the Antarctic 
Mineral Resources Commission established 
pursuant to Article 18.
17 "Regulatory Committee" means an
Antarctic Mineral Resources Regulatory 
Committee established pursuant to Article 29.
18 "Advisory Committee" means the
Scientific, Technical and Environmental 
Advisory Committee established pursuant to 
Article 23.
19 "Special Meeting of Parties" means the 
Meeting referred to in Article 28.
20 "Arbitral Tribunal" means an Arbitral
Tribunal constituted as provided for in the 
Annex, which forms an integral part of this 
Convention.
Article 2
Objectives and General Principles
1 This Convention is an integral part of the 
Antarctic Treaty system, comprising the 
Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect under 
that Treaty, and its associated separate legal 
instruments, the prime purpose of which is the 
ensure that Antarctica shall continue forever to 
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and 
shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord. The Parties provide 
through this Convention, the principles it 
establishes, the rules it prescribes, the 
institutions it creates and the decisions adopted 
pursuant to it, a means for
(a) assessing the possible impact on the 
environment of Antarctic mineral resource 
activities;
(b) determining whether Antarctic mineral 
resource activities are acceptable;
(c) governing the conduct of such Antarctic 
mineral resource activities as may be 
found acceptable; and
(d) ensuring that any Antarctic mineral 
resource activities are undertaken in strict 
conformity with this Convention.
2 In implementing this Convention, the 
Parties shall ensure that Antarctic mineral 
resource activities, should they occur, take place 
in a manner consistent with all the components
of the Antarctic Treaty system and the 
obligations following therefrom.
3 In relation to Antarctic mineral resource 
activities, should they occur, the Parties 
acknowledge the special responsibility of the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the 
protection of the environment and the need to:
(a) protect the Antarctic environment and 
dependent and associated ecosystems;
(b) respect Antarctica’s significance for, and 
influence on, the global environment;
(c) respect other legitimate uses of Antarctica;
(d) respect Antarctica’s scientific value and 
aesthetic and wilderness qualities;
(e) ensure the safety of operations in 
Antarctica;
(0 promote opportunities for fair and 
effective participation of all Parties; and 
(g) take into account the interests of the 
international community as a whole.
Article 3
Prohibition of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities Outside this Convention
No Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be 
conducted except in accordance with this 
Convention and measures in effect pursuant to 
it, and, in the case of exploration or 
development, with a Management Scheme 
approved pursuant to Article 48 or 54.
Article 4
Principles Concerning Judgments on 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
1 Decisions about Antarctic mineral 
resource activities shall be based upon 
information adequate to enable informed 
judgments to be made about their possible 
impacts and no such activities shall take place 
unless this information is available for decisions 
relevant to those activities.
2 No Antarctic mineral resource activity 
shall take place until it is judged, based upon 
assessment of its possible impacts on the 
Antarctic environment and on dependent and 
associated ecosystems, that the activity in 
question would not cause:
(a) significant adverse effects on air and water 
quality;
(b) significant changes in atmospheric, 
terrestrial or marine environments;
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(c) significant changes in the distribution, 
abundance or productivity of populations 
of species of fauna or flora;
(d) further jeopardy to endangered or 
threatened species or populations of such 
species; or
(e) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas 
of special biological, scientific, historic, 
aesthetic or wilderness significance.
3 No Antarctic mineral resource activity
shall take place until it is judged, based upon 
assessment of its possible impacts, that the 
activity in question would not cause significant 
adverse effects on global or regional climate or 
weather patterns.
4 No Antarctic mineral resource activity
shall take place until it is judged that:
(a) technology and procedures are available to
provide for safe operations and
compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 
above;
(b) there exists the capacity to monitor key
environmental parameters and ecosystem 
components so as to identify any adverse 
effects of such activity and to provide for 
the modification of operation procedures 
as may be necessary in the light of the 
results of monitoring or increased
knowledge of the Antarctic environment 
or dependent or associated ecosystems; 
and
(c) there exists the capacity to respond 
effectively to accidents, particularly those 
with potential environmental effects.
5 The judgements referred to in paragraphs 
2, 3 and 4 above shall take into account the 
cumulative impacts of possible Antarctic 
mineral resource activities both by 
themselves and in combination with other 
such activities and other uses of 
Antarctica.
Article 5
Area of Application
1 This Convention shall, subject to 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below, apply to the 
Antarctic Treaty area.
2 Without prejudice to the responsibilities of 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties under 
the Antarctic Treaty and measures pursuant to 
it, the Parties agree that this Convention shall 
regulate Antarctic mineral resource activities 
which take place on the continent of Antarctica 
and all Antarctic islands, including all ice
shelves, south of 60* south latitude and in the 
deep seabed and subsoil of adjacent offshore 
areas up to the deep seabed.
3 For the purposes of this Convention "deep 
seabed” means the seabed and subsoil beyond 
the geographic extent of the continental shelf as 
the term continental shelf is defmed in 
accordance with international law.
4 Nothing in this Article shall be construed 
as limiting the application of other Articles of 
this Convention in so far as they relate to 
possible impacts outside the area referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, including impacts on 
dependent or on associated ecosystems.
Article 6
Cooperation and International Participation
In the implementation of this Convention 
cooperation within its framework shall be 
promoted and encouragement given to 
international participation in Antarctic mineral 
resource activities by interested Parties which 
are Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and by 
other interested Parties, in particular, 
developing countries in either category. Such 
participation may be realised through the Parties 
themselves and their Operators.
Article 7
Compliance with this Convention
1 Each Party shall take appropriate measures 
within its competence to ensure compliance 
with this Convention and any measures in effect 
pursuant to it.
2 If a Party is prevented by the exercise of 
jurisdiction by another Party from ensuring 
compliance in accordance with paragraph 1 
above, it shall not, to the extent that it is so 
prevented, bear responsibility for that failure to 
ensure compliance.
3 If any jurisdictional dispute related to 
compliance with this Convention or any 
measure in effect pursuant to it arises between 
two or more Parties, the Parties concerned shall 
immediately consult together with a view to 
reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
4 Each Party shall notify the Executive 
Secretary, for circulation to all other Parties, of 
the measures taken pursuant to paragraph 1 
above.
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5 Each Party shall exert appropriate efforts, 
consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, to the end that no one engages in any 
Antarctic mineral resource activities contrary to 
the objectives and principles of this Convention.
6 Each Party may, whenever it deems it 
necessary, draw the attention of the 
Commission to any activity which in its opinion 
affects the implementation of the objectives and 
principles of this Convention.
7 The Commission shall draw the attention 
of all Parties to any activity which, in the 
opinion of the Commission, affects the 
implementation of the objectives and principles 
of this Convention or the compliance by any 
Party with its obligations under this Convention 
and any measures in effect pursuant to i t
8 The Commission shall draw the attention 
of any State which is not a Party to this 
Convention to any activity undertaken by that 
State, its agencies or instrumentalities, natural 
or juridical persons, ships, aircraft or other 
means of transportation which, in the opinion of 
the Commission, affects the implementation of 
the objectives and principles of this Convention. 
The Commission shall inform all Parties 
accordingly.
9 Nothing in this Article shall affect the 
operation of Article 12(7) of this Convention or 
Article Vin of the Antarctic Treaty.
Article 8
Response Action and Liability
1 An Operator undertaking any Antarctic 
mineral resource activity shall take necessary 
and timely response action, including 
prevention, containment, clean up and removal 
measures, if the activity results in or threatens 
to result in damage to the Antarctic environment 
or dependent or associated ecosystems. The 
Operator, through its Sponsoring State, shall 
notify the Executive Secretary, for circulation to 
the relevant institutions of this Convention and 
to all Parties, of action take pursuant to this 
paragraph.
2 An Operator shall be strictly liable for:
(a) damage to the Antarctic environment or 
dependent or associated ecosystems 
arising from its Antarctic mineral resource 
activities, including payment in the event 
that there has been no restoration to the 
status quo ante:
(b) loss of or impairment to an established 
use, as referred to in Article 15, or loss of 
or impairment to an established use of 
dependent or associated ecosystems, 
arising directly out of damage described in 
subparagraph (a) above;
(c) loss of or damage to property of a third 
party or loss of life or personal injury of a 
third party arising directly out of damage 
described in subparagraph (a) above; and
(d) reimbursement of reasonable costs by 
whomsoever incurred relating to necessary 
response action, including prevention, 
containment, clean up and removal 
measures, and action taken to restore the 
status quo ante where Antarctic mineral 
resource activities undertaken by that 
Operator result in or threaten to result in 
damage to the Antarctic environment or 
dependent or associated ecosystems.
3(a) Damage of the kind referred to in 
paragraph 2 above which would not have 
occurred or continued if the Sponsoring 
State had carried out its obligations under 
this Convention with respect to its 
Operator shall, in accordance with 
international law, entail liability of that 
Sponsoring State. Such liability shall be 
limited to that portion of liability not 
satisfied by the Operator or otherwise.
(b) Nothing in subparagraph (a) above shall 
affect the application of the rules of 
international law applicable in the event 
that damage not referred to in that 
subparagraph would not have occurred or 
continued if the Sponsoring State had 
carried out its obligations under this 
Convention with respect to its Operator.
4 An Operator shall not be liable pursuant to 
paragraph 2 above if it proves that the damage 
has been caused directly by, and to the extent 
that it has been caused directly by:
(a) an event constituting in the circumstances 
of Antarctica a natural disaster of an 
exceptional character which could not 
reasonably have been foreseen; or
(b) armed conflict, should it occur 
notwithstanding the Antarctic Treaty, or 
an act of terrorism directed against the 
activities of the Operator, against which no 
reasonable precautionary measures could 
have been effective.
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5 Liability of an Operator for any loss of 
life, personal injury or loss of or damage to 
property other than that governed by this Article 
shall be regulated by applicable law and 
procedures.
6 If an Operator proves that damage has 
been caused totally or in part by an intentional 
or grossly negligent act or omission of the party 
seeking redress, that Operator may be relieved 
totally or in part from its obligation to pay 
compensation in respect of the damage suffered 
by such party.
7(a) Further rules and procedures in respect of 
the provisions on liability set out in this 
Article shall be elaborated through a 
separate Protocol which shall be adopted 
by consensus by the members of the 
Commission and shall enter into force 
according to the procedure provided for in 
Article 62 of this Convention.
(b) Such rules and procedures shall be
designed to enhance the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems.
(c) Such rules and procedures:
(i) may contain provisions for
appropriate limits on liability, 
where such limits can be justified;
(ii) without prejudice to Article 57,
shall prescribe means and 
mechanisms such as a claims 
tribunal or other fora by which 
claims against Operators pursuant 
to this Article may be assessed and 
adjudicated;
(iii) shall ensure that a means is
provided to assist with immediate 
response action, and to satisfy 
liability under paragraph 2 above in 
the event, inter alia, that an 
Operator liable is financially 
incapable of meeting its obligation 
in full, that it exceeds any relevant 
limits of liability, that there is a 
defence to liability or that the loss 
or damage is of undetermined 
origin. Unless it is determined 
during the elaboration of the 
Protocol that there are other 
effective means of meeting these 
objectives, the Protocol shall 
establish a Fund or Funds and make 
provision in respect of such Fund 
or Funds, inter alia, for the 
following:
financing by Operators or on 
industry wide bases; 
ensuring the permanent 
liquidity and mandatory 
supplementation thereof in the 
event of insufficiency; 
reimbursement of costs of 
response action, by 
whomsoever incurred.
8 Nothing in paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 above or 
in the Protocol adopted pursuant to paragraph 7 
shall affect in any way the provisions of 
paragraph 1 above.
9 No application for an exploration or 
development permit shall be made until the 
Protocol provided for in paragraph 7 above is in 
force for the Party lodging such application.
10 Each Party, pending the entry into force 
for it of the Protocol provided for in paragraph 7 
above, shall ensure, consistently with Article 7 
and in accordance with its legal system, that 
recourse is available in its national courts for 
adjudicating liability claims pursuant to 
paragraphs 2, 4 and 6 above against Operators 
which are engaged in prospecting. Such 
recourse shall include the adjudication of claims 
against any Operator it has sponsored. Each 
party shall also ensure, in accordance with its 
legal system, that the Commission has the right 
to appear as a party in its national courts to 
pursue relevant liability claims under paragraph 
2(a) above.
11 Nothing in this Article or in the Protocol 
provided for in paragraph 7 above shall be 
construed as to:
(a) preclude the application of existing rules 
on liability, and the development in 
accordance with international law of 
further such rules, which may have 
application to either States or Operators; 
or
(b) affect the right of an Operator incurring 
liability pursuant to this Article to seek 
redress from another party which caused 
or contributed to the damage in question.
12 When compensation has been paid other 
than under this Convention liability under this 
Convention shall be offset by the amount of 
such payment.
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Article 9
Protection of Legal Positions under the 
Antarctic T reaty
Nothing in this Convention and no acts or 
activities taking place while this Convention is 
in force shall:
(a) constitute a basis for asserting, supporting 
or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area or 
create any rights of sovereignty in the 
Antarctic Treaty area;
(b) be interpreted as a renunciation or 
diminution by any Party of, or as 
prejudicing, any right or claim or basis of 
claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica or to exercise coastal state 
jurisdiction under international law;
(c) be interpreted as prejudicing the position 
of any Party as regards its recognition or 
non-recognition of any such right, claim or 
basis of claim; or
(d) affect the provision of Article IV(2) of the 
Antarctic Treaty that no new claim, or 
enlargement of an existing claim, to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall 
be asserted while the Antarctic Treaty is in 
force.
Article 10
Consistency with the Other Components of 
the Antarctic Treaty System
1 Each Party shall ensure that Antarctic 
mineral resource activities take place in a 
manner consistent with the components of the 
Antarctic Treaty system, including the Antarctic 
Treaty, the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals and the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources and the measures in effect pursuant 
to those instruments.
2 The Commission shall consult and 
cooperate with the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties, the Contracting Parties to 
the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals, and the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources with a view to ensuring the 
achievement of the objectives and principles of 
this Convention and avoiding any interference 
with the achievement of the objectives and 
principles of the Antarctic Treaty, the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals or the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, or 
inconsistency between the measures in effect
pursuant to those instruments and measures in 
effect pursuant to this Convention.
Article 11
Inspection under the Antarctic Treaty
All stations, installations and equipment, in the 
Antarctic Treaty area, relating to Antarctic 
mineral resource activities, as well as ships and 
aircraft supporting such activities at points of 
discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel 
at such stations and installations, shall be open 
at all times to inspection by observers 
designated under Article VII of the Antarctic 
Treaty for the purposes of that Treaty.
Article 12
Inspection under this Convention
1 In order to promote the objectives and 
principles and to ensure the observance of this 
Convention and measures in effect pursuant to 
it, all stations, installations and equipment 
relating to Antarctic mineral resource activities 
in the area in which these activities are 
regulated by this Convention, as well as ships 
and aircraft supporting such activities at points 
of discharging or embarking cargoes or 
personnel anywhere in that area shall be open at 
all times to inspection by:
(a) observers designated by any member of 
the Commission who shall be nationals of 
that member; and
(b) observers designated by the Commission 
or relevant Regulatory Committee.
2 Aerial inspection may be carried out at any 
time over the area in which Antarctic mineral 
resource activities are regulated by this 
Convention.
3 The Commission shall maintain an up-to- 
date list of observers designated pursuant to 
paragraph 1(a) and (b) above.
4 Reports from the observers shall be 
transmitted to the Commission and to any 
Regulatory Committee having competence in 
the area where the inspection has been carried 
out.
5 Observers shall avoid interference with the 
safe and normal operations of stations, 
installations and equipment visited and shall 
respect measures adopted by the Commission to 
protect confidentiality of data and information.
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6 Inspections undertaken pursuant to 
paragraph 1(a) and (b) above shall be 
compatible and reinforce each other and shall 
not impose an undue burden on the operation of 
stations, installations and equipment visited.
7 In order to facilitate the exercise of their 
functions under this Convention, and without 
prejudice to the respective positions of the 
Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other 
persons in the area in which Antarctic mineral 
resource activities are regulated by this 
Convention, observers designated under this 
Article shall be subject only to the jurisdiction 
of the Party of which they are nationals in 
respect of all acts or omissions occurring while 
they are in that area for the purpose of 
exercising their functions.
8 No exploration or development shall take 
place in an area identified pursuant to Article 41 
until effective provision has been made for 
inspection in that area.
Article 13 
Protected Areas
1 Antarctic mineral resource activities shall 
be prohibited in any area designated as a 
Specially Protected Area or a Site of Special 
Scientific Interest under Article IX(1) of the 
Antarctic Treaty. Such activities shall also be 
prohibited in any other area designated as a 
protected area in accordance with Article IX(1) 
of the Antarctic Treaty, except to the extent that 
the relevant measure provides otherwise. 
Pending any designation becoming effective in 
accordance with Article IX(4) of the Antarctic 
Treaty, no Antarctic mineral resource activities 
shall take place in any such area which would 
prejudice the purpose for which it was 
designated.
2 The Commission shall also prohibit or 
restrict Antarctic mineral resource activities in 
any area which, for historic, ecological, 
environmental, scientific or other reasons, it has 
designated as a protected area.
3 In exercising its powers under paragraph 2 
above or under Article 41 the Commission shall 
consider whether to restrict or prohibit Antarctic 
mineral resource activities in any area, in 
addition to those referred to in paragraph 1 
above, protected or set aside pursuant to 
provisions of other components of the Antarctic 
Treaty system, to ensure the purposes for which 
they are designated.
4 In relation to any area in which Antarctic 
mineral resource activities are prohibited or 
restricted in accordance with paragraph 1, 2 or 3 
above, the Commission shall consider whether, 
for the purposes of Article 4(2)(e), it would be 
prudent, additionally, to prohibit or restrict 
Antarctic mineral resource activities in adjacent 
areas for the purpose of creating a buffer zone.
5 The Commission shall give effect to 
Article 10(2) in acting pursuant to paragraphs 2,
3 and 4 above.
6 The Commission shall, where appropriate, 
bring any decisions it takes pursuant to this 
Article to the attention of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties, the Contracting Parties to 
the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals, the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources and the Scientific Committee on 
Antarctic Research.
Article 14
Non-Discrimination
In the implementation of this Convention there 
shall be no discrimination against any Party or 
its Operators.
Article 15
Respect for Other Uses of Antarctica
1 Decisions about Antarctic mineral 
resource activities shall take into account the 
need to respect other established uses of 
Antarctica, including:
(a) the operation of stations and their 
associated installations, support facilities 
and equipment in Antarctica;
(b) scientific investigation in Antarctica and 
cooperation therein;
(c) the conservation, including rational use, of 
Antarctic marine living resources;
(d) tourism;
(e) the preservation of historic monuments; 
and
(f) navigation and aviation,
that are consistent with the Antarctic Treaty 
system.
2 Antarctic mineral resource activities shall 
be conducted so as to respect any uses of 
Antarctica as referred to in paragraph 1 above.
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Article 16
Availability and Confidentiality of Data and 
Information
Data and information obtained from Antarctic 
mineral resource activities shall, to the greatest 
extent practicable and feasible, be made freely 
available, provided that:
(a) as regards data and information of 
commercial value deriving from 
prospecting, they may be retained by the 
Operator in accordance with Article 37;
(b) as regards data and information deriving 
from exploration or development, the 
Commission shall adopt measures relating, 
as appropriate, to their release and to 
ensure the confidentiality of data and 
information of commercial value.
Article 17
Notifications and Provisional Exercise of 
Functions of the Executive Secretary
1 Where in this Convention there is a 
reference to the provision of information, a 
notification or a report to any institution 
provided for in this Convention and that 
institution has not been established, the 
information, notification or report shall be 
provided to the Executive Secretary who shall 
circulate it as required.
2 Where in this Convention a function is 
assigned to the Executive Secretary and no 
Executive Secretary has been appointed under 
Article 33, that function shall be preformed by 
the Depositary.
CHAPTER H : INSTITUTIONS
Article 18 
Commission
1 There is hereby established the Antarctic 
Mineral Resources Commission.
2 Membership of the Commission shall be 
as follows:
(a) each Party which was an Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Party on the date when this 
Convention was opened for signature; and
(b) each other Party during such time as it is 
actively engaged in substantial scientific, 
technical or environmental research in the 
area to which this Convention applies 
directly relevant to decisions about 
Antarctic mineral resource activities,
particularly the assessments and 
judgments called for in Article 4; and
(c) each other Party sponsoring Antarctic 
mineral resource exploitation or 
development during such time as the 
relevant Management Scheme is in force.
3 A Party seeking to participate in the work 
of the Commission pursuant to subparagraph (b) 
or (c) above shall notify the Depositary of the 
basis upon which it seeks to become a member 
of the Commission. In the case of a Party 
which is not an Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Party, such notification shall include a 
declaration of intent to abide by 
recommendations pursuant to Article DC(1) of 
the Antarctic Treaty. The Depositary shall 
communicate to each member of the 
Commission such notification and 
accompanying information.
4 The Commission shall consider the 
notification at its next meeting. In the event 
that a Party referred to in paragraph 2(b) above 
submitting a notification pursuant to paragraph 
3 above is an Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Party, it shall be deemed to have satisfied the 
requirements for Commission membership 
unless more than one-third of the members of 
the Commission object at the meeting at which 
such notification is considered. Any other Party 
submitting a notification shall be deemed to 
have satisfied the requirements for Commission 
membership if no member of the Commission 
objects at the meeting at which such notification 
is considered.
5 Each member of the Commission shall be 
represented by one representative who may be 
accompanied by alternate representatives and 
advisers.
6 Observer status in the Commission shall 
be open to any Party and to any Contracting 
Party to the Antarctic Treaty which is not a 
Party to this Convention.
Article 19
Commission Meetings
1(a) The first meeting of the Commission, held 
for the purpose of taking organisational, 
financial and other decisions necessary for 
the effective functioning of this 
Convention and its institutions, shall be 
convened within six months of the entry 
into force of this Convention.
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(b) After the Commission has held the 
meeting or meetings necessary to take the 
decisions referred to in subparagraph (a) 
above, the Commission shall not hold 
further meetings except in accordance with 
paragraph 2 or 3 below.
2 Meetings of the Commission shall be held 
within two months of:
(a) receipt of a notification pursuant to Article 
39;
(b) a request by at least six members of the 
Commission; or
(c) a request by a member of a Regulatory 
Committee in accordance with Article 
49(1).
3 The Commission may establish a regular 
schedule of meetings if it determines that it is 
necessary for the effective functioning of this 
Convention.
4 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, 
its meetings shall be convened by the Executive 
Secretary.
Article 20
Commission Procedure
1 The Commission shall elect from among 
its members a Chairman and two Vice- 
Chairmen, each of whom shall be a 
representative of a different Party.
2(a) Until such time as the Commission has 
established a regular schedule of meetings 
in accordance with Article 19(3), the 
Chairman and Vice-Chairmen shall be 
elected to serve for a period of two years, 
provided that if no meeting is held during 
that period they shall continue to serve 
until the conclusion of the first meeting 
held thereafter.
(b) When a regular schedule of meetings has 
been established, the Chairman and Vice- 
Chairmen shall be elected to serve for a 
period of two years.
3 The Commission shall adopt its rules of 
procedure. Such rules may include provisions 
concerning the number of terms of office which 
the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen may serve 
and for the rotation of its functions.
4 The Commission may establish such 
subsidiary bodies as are necessary for the 
performance of its functions.
5 The Commission may decide to establish a 
permanent headquarters which shall be in New 
Zealand.
6 The Commission shall have legal 
personality and shall enjoy in the territory of 
each Party such legal capacity as may be 
necessary to perform its functions and achieve 
the objectives of this Convention.
7 The privileges and immunities to be 
enjoyed by the Commission, the Secretariat and 
representatives attending meetings in the 
territory of a Party shall be determined by 
agreement between the Commission and the 
Party concerned.
Article 21
Functions of the Commission 
1 The functions of the Commission shall be:
(a) to facilitate and promote the collection and 
exchange of scientific, technical and other 
information and research projects 
necessary to predict, detect and assess the 
possible environmental impact of 
Antarctic mineral resource activities, 
including the monitoring of key 
environmental parameters and ecosystem 
components;
(b) to designate areas in which Antarctic 
mineral resource activities shall be 
prohibited or restricted in accordance with 
Article 13, and to perform the related 
functions assigned to it in that Article;
(c) to adopt measures for the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems and for the 
promotion of safe and effective 
exploration and development techniques 
and, as it may deem appropriate, to make 
available a handbook of such measures;
(d) to determine, in accordance with Article 
41, whether or not to identify an area for 
possible exploration and development, and 
to perform the related functions assigned 
to it in Article 41;
(e) to adopt measures relating to prospecting 
applicable to all relevant Operators:
(i) to determine for particular 
circumstances maximum drilling 
depths in accordance with Article 
1(8);
(ii) to restrict or prohibit prospecting 
consistently with Article 13, 37 and 
38;
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(f) to ensure the effective application of 
Articles 12(4), 37(7) and (8), 38(2) and 
39(2), which require the submission to the 
Commission of information, notifications 
and reports;
(g) to give advance public notice of matters 
upon which it is requesting the advice of 
the Advisory Committee;
(h) to adopt measures relating to the 
availability and confidentiality of data and 
information, including measures pursuant 
to Article 16;
(i) to elaborate the principle of non­
discrimination set forth in Article 14;
(j) to adopt measures with respect to 
maximum block size;
(h) to perform the functions assigned to it in 
Article 29;
(l) to review action by Regulatory 
Committees in accordance with Article 49;
(m) to adopt measures in accordance with 
Articles 6 and 41(l)(d) related to the 
promotion of cooperation and to 
participation in Antarctic mineral resource 
activities;
(n) to adopt general measures pursuant to 
Article 51(6);
(o) to take decisions on budgetary matters and 
adopt financial regulations in accordance 
with Article 35;
(p) to adopt measures regarding fees payable 
in connection with notifications submitted 
pursuant to Articles 37 and 39 and 
applications lodged pursuant to Articles 44 
and 53, the purpose of which fees shall be 
to cover the administrative costs of 
handling such notifications and 
applications;
(q) to adopt measures regarding levies payable 
by Operators engaged in exploration and 
development, the principal purpose of 
which levies shall be to cover the costs of 
the institutions of this Convention;
(r) to determine in accordance with Article 
35(7) the disposition of revenues, if any, 
accruing to the Commission which are 
surplus to the requirements for financing 
the budget pursuant to Article 35;
(s) to perform the functions assigned to it in 
Article 7(7) and (8);
(t) to perform the functions relating to
inspection assigned to it in Article 12;
(u) to consider monitoring reports received 
pursuant to Article 52;
(v) to perform the functions relating to dispute 
settlement assigned to it in Article 59;
(w) to perform the functions relating to
consultation and cooperation assigned to it 
in Articles 10(2) and 34;
(x) to keep under review the conduct of 
Antarctic mineral resource activities with a 
view to safeguarding the protection of the 
Antarctic environment in the interest of all 
mankind; and
(y) to perform such other functions as are 
provided for elsewhere in this Convention.
2 In performing its functions the 
Commission shall seek and take full account of 
the views of the Advisory Committee provided 
in accordance with Article 26.
3 Each measure adopted by the Commission 
shall specify the date on which it comes into 
effect
4 The Commission shall, subject to Article 
16 and measures in effect pursuant to it and 
paragraph 1(h) above, ensure that a publicly 
available record of its meetings and decisions 
and of information, notifications and reports 
submitted to it is maintained.
Article 22
Decision Making in the Commission
1 The Commission shall take decisions on 
matters of substance by a three-quarters 
majority of the members present and voting. 
When a question arises as to whether a matter is 
one of substance or not, that matter shall be 
treated as one of substance unless otherwise 
decided by a three-quarters majority of the 
members present and voting.
2 Notwithstanding paragraph 1 above,
consensus shall be required for the following:
(a) the adoption of the budget and decisions 
on budgetary and related matters pursuant 
to Article 21(l)(p) (q) and (r) and Article 
35(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5);
(b) decisions taken pursuant to Article
21(1)0);
(c) decisions taken pursuant to Article 41(2).
3 Decisions on matters of procedure shall be 
taken by a simple majority of the members 
present and voting.
4 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted 
as preventing the Commission, in taking 
decisions on matters of substance, from 
endeavouring to reach a consensus.
5 For the purposes of this Article, consensus 
means the absence of a formal objection. If, 
with respect to any decision covered by 
paragraph 2(c) above, the Chairman of the
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Commission determines that there would be 
such an objection he shall consult the members 
of the Commission. If, as a result of these 
consultations, the Chairman determines that an 
objection would remain, he shall convene those 
members most directly interested for the 
purpose of seeking to reconcile the differences 
and producing a generally acceptable proposal.
Article 23
Advisory Committee
1 There is hereby established the Scientific, 
Technical and Environmental Advisory 
Committee.
2 Membership of the Advisory Committee 
shall be open to all Parties.
3 Each member of the Advisory Committee 
shall be represented by one representative with 
suitable scientific, technical or environmental 
competence who may be accompanied by 
alternate representatives and by experts and 
advisers.
4 Observer status in the Advisory 
Committee shall be open to any Contracting 
Party to the Antarctic Treaty or to the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources which is not a Party to 
this Convention.
Article 24
Advisory Committee Meetings
1 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, 
the Advisory Committee shall be convened for 
its first meeting within six months of the first 
meeting of the Commission. It shall meet 
thereafter as necessary to fulfil its functions on 
the basis of a schedule established by the 
Commission.
2. Meetings of the Advisory Committee, in 
addition to those scheduled pursuant to 
paragraph 1 above, shall be convened at the 
request of at least six members of the 
Commission or pursuant to Article 40(1).
3 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, 
the meetings of the Advisory Committee shall 
be convened by the Executive Secretary.
Article 25
Advisory Committee Procedure
1 The Advisory Committee shall elect from 
among its members a Chairman and two Vice-
Chairmen, each of whom shall be a 
representative of a different Party.
2(a) Until such time as the Commission has 
established a schedule of meetings in 
accordance with Article 24(1), the 
Chairman and Vice-Chairmen shall be 
elected to serve for a period of two years, 
provided that if no meeting is held during 
that period they shall continue to serve 
until the conclusion of the first meeting 
held thereafter.
(b) When a schedule of meetings has been 
established, the Chairman and Vice- 
Chairmen shall be elected to serve for a 
period of two years.
3 The Advisory Committee shall give 
advance public notice of its meetings and of 
matters to be considered at each meeting so as 
to permit the receipt and consideration of views 
on such matters from international organisations 
having an interest in them. For this purpose the 
Advisory Committee may, subject to review by 
the Commission, establish procedures for the 
transmission of relevant information to these 
organisations.
4 The Advisory Committee shall, by a two- 
thirds majority of the members present and 
voting, adopt its rules of procedure. Such rules 
may include provisions concerning the number 
of terms of office which the Chairman and 
Vice-Chairmen may serve and for the rotation 
of such offices. The rules of procedure and any 
amendments thereto shall be subject to approval 
by the Commission.
5 The Advisory Committee may establish 
such subcommittees, subject to budgetary 
approval, as may be necessary for the 
performance of its functions.
Article 26
Functions of the Advisory Committee
1 The Advisory Committee shall advise the 
Commission and Regulatory Committees, as 
required by this Convention, or as requested by 
them, on the scientific, technical and 
environmental aspects of Antarctic mineral 
resource activities. It shall provide a forum for 
consultation and cooperation concerning the 
collection, exchange and evaluation of 
information related to the scientific, technical 
and environmental aspects of Antarctic mineral 
resource activities.
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2 It shall provide advice to:
(a) the Commission relating to its functions 
under Articles 21(l)(a) to (f), (u) and (x) 
and 35(7)(a) (in matters relating to 
scientific research) as well as on the 
implementation of Article 4; and
(b) Regulatory Committees with respect to:
(i) the implementation of Article 4;
(ii) scientific, technical and
environmental aspects of Articles 
43(3) and (5), 45,47, 51, 52 and 54;
(iii) data to be collected and reported in 
accordance with Article 47 and 52; 
and
(iv) the scientific, technical and 
environmental implications of 
reports and reported data provided 
in accordance with Articles 47 and 
52.
3 It shall provide advice to the Commission 
and to Regulatory Committees on:
(a) criteria in respect of the judgments 
required under Article 4(2) and (3) for the 
purposes of Article 4(1);
(b) types of data and information required to 
carry out its functions, and how they 
should be collected, reported and archived;
(c) scientific research which would contribute 
to the base of data and information 
required in subparagraph (b) above;
(d) effective procedures and systems for data 
and information analysis, evaluation, 
presentation and dissemination to facilitate 
the judgments referred to in Article 4; and
(e) possibilities for scientific, technical and 
environmental cooperation amongst 
interested Parties which are developing 
countries and other Parties.
4 The Advisory Committee, in providing 
advice on decisions to be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41, 43, 45, and 54 shall, in each 
case, undertake a comprehensive environmental 
and technical assessment of the proposed 
actions. Such assessments shall be based on all 
information, and any amplifications thereof, 
available to the Advisory Committee, including 
the information provided pursuant to Articles 
39(2)(e), 44(2)(b)(iii) and 53(2)(b). The 
assessments of the Advisory Committee shall, 
in each case, address the nature and scope of the 
decisions to be taken and shall include 
consideration, as appropriate, of, inter alia:
(b) the nature, extent, duration and intensity of 
likely direct environmental impacts 
resulting from the proposed activity;
(c) possible indirect impacts;
(d) means and alternatives by which such 
direct or indirect impacts might be 
reduced, including environmental 
consequences of the alternatives of not 
proceeding;
(e) cumulative impacts of the proposed 
activity in the light of existing or planned 
activities;
(0 capacity to respond effectively to 
accidents with potential environmental 
effects;
(g) the environmental significance of 
unavoidable impacts; and
(h) the probabilities of accidents and their 
environmental consequences.
5 In preparing its advice the Advisory 
Committee may seek information and advice 
from other scientists and experts of scientific 
organisations as may be required on an ad hoc 
basis.
6 The Advisory Committee shall, with a 
view to promoting international participation in 
Antarctic mineral resource activities as provided 
for in Article 6, provide advice concerning the 
availability to interested developing country 
Parties and other Parties, of the information 
referred to in paragraph 3 above, of training 
programmes related to scientific, technical and 
environmental matters bearing on Antarctic 
mineral resource activities, and of opportunities 
for cooperation among Parties in these 
programmes.
Article 27
Reporting by the Advisory Committee
The Advisory Committee shall present a report 
on each of its meetings to the Commission and 
to any relevant Regulatory Committee. The 
report shall cover all matters considered at the 
meeting and shall reflect the conclusions 
reached and all the views expressed by 
members of the Advisory Committee. The 
report shall be circulated by the Executive 
Secretary to all Parties, and to observers 
attending the meeting, and shall thereupon be 
made publicly available.
(a) the adequacy of existing information to 
enable informed judgments to be made;
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Article 28
Special Meeting of Parties
1 A Special Meeting of Parties shall, as 
required, be convened in accordance with 
Article 40(2) and shall have the functions, in 
relation to the identification of an area for 
possible exploration and development, specified 
in Article 40(3).
2 Membership of a Special Meeting of 
Parties shall be open to all Parties, each of 
which shall be represented by one 
representative who may be accompanied by 
alternate representatives and advisers.
3 Observer status at a Special Meeting of 
Parties shall be open to any Contracting Party of 
the Antarctic Treaty which is not a Party to this 
Convention.
4 Each Special Meeting of Parties shall elect 
from among its members a Chairman and Vice- 
Chairman, each of whom shall serve for the 
duration of that meeting. The Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman shall not be representatives of 
the same Party.
5 The Special Meeting of Parties shall, by a 
two-thirds majority of the members present and 
voting, adopt its rules of procedure. Until such 
time as this has been done the Special Meeting 
of Parties apply provisional rules of procedure 
drawn up by the Commission.
6 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, 
a Special Meeting of Parties shall be convened 
by the Executive Secretary and shall be held at 
the same venue as the meeting of the 
Commission convened to consider the 
identification of an area for possible exploration 
and development
Article 29
Regulatory Committees
1 An Antarctic Mineral Resource Regulatory 
Committee shall be established for each area 
identified by the Commission pursuant to 
Article 41.
2 Subject to paragraph 6 below, each 
Regulatory Committee shall consist of 10 
members. Membership shall be determined by 
the Commission in accordance with this Article 
and, taking into account Article 9, shall include:
(a) the member, if any, or if there are more 
than one, those members of the 
Commission identified by reference to
Article 9(b) which assert rights or claims 
in the identified area;
(b) the two members of the Commission also 
identified by reference to Article 9(b) 
which assert a basis of claim in Antarctica;
(c) other members of the Commission
determined in accordance with this Article 
so that the Regulatory Committee shall, 
subject to paragraph 6 below, consist, in 
total, of 10 members:
(i) four members identified by 
reference to Article 9(b) which 
assert rights or claims, including the 
member or members, if any, 
referred to in subparagraph (a) 
above;and
(ii) six members which do not assert 
rights or claims as described in 
Article 9(b), including the two 
members referred to in 
subparagraph (b) above.
3 Upon the identification of an area in
accordance with Article 41(2), the Chairman of 
the Commission shall, as soon as possible and 
in any event within 90 days, make a 
recommendation to the Commission concerning 
the membership of the Regulatory Committee. 
To this end the Chairman shall consult, as 
appropriate, with the Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee and all members of the Commission. 
Such recommendation shall comply with the 
requirements of paragraphs 2 and 4 of this 
Article and shall ensure:
(a) the inclusion of members of the
Commission which, whether through
prospecting, scientific research or 
otherwise, have contributed substantial 
scientific, technical or environmental 
information relevant to the identification 
of the area by the Commission pursuant to 
Article 41;
(b) adequate and equitable representation of
developing country members of the
Commission, having regard to the overall 
balance between developed and 
developing country members of the
Commission, including at least three 
developing country members of the
Commission;
(c) that account is taken of the value of a 
rotation of membership of Regulatory 
Committees as a further means of ensuring 
equitable representation of members of the 
Commission.
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4(a) When there are one or more members of 
the Regulatory Committee referred to in 
paragraph 2(a) above, the Chairman of the 
Commission shall make the 
recommendation in respect of paragraph 
2(c)(i) above upon the nomination, if any, 
of such member or members which shall 
take into account paragraph 3 above, in 
particular subparagraph (b) of that 
paragraph.
(b) In making the recommendation in respect 
of paragraph 2(c)(ii) above, the Chairman 
of the Commission shall give full weight 
to the views (which shall take into account 
paragraph 3 above) which may be 
presented on behalf of those members of 
the Commission which do not assert rights 
of or claims to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica and, with reference to the 
requirements of paragraph 3(b) above, to 
the views which may be presented on 
behalf of the developing countries among 
them.
5 The recommendation of the Chairman of 
the Commission shall be deemed to have been 
approved by the Commission if it does not 
decide otherwise at the same meeting as the 
recommendation is submitted. In taking any 
decision in accordance with this Article the 
Commission shall ensure that the requirements 
of paragraphs 2 and 3 above are complied with 
and that the nomination, if any, referred to in 
paragraph 4(a) above is given effect.
6(a) If a member of the Commission which has 
sponsored prospecting in the identified 
area and submitted the notification 
pursuant to Article 39 upon which the 
Commission based its identification of the 
area pursuant to Article 41, is not a 
member of the Regulatory Committee by 
virtue of paragraphs 2 and 3 above, that 
member of the Commission shall be a 
member of the Regulatory Committee 
until such time as an application for an 
exploration permit is lodged pursuant to 
Article 44.
(b) If a Party lodging an application for an 
exploration permit pursuant to Article 44 
is not a member of the Regulatory 
Committee by virtue of paragraphs 2 and 3 
above, that Party shall be a member of the 
Regulatory Committee for its 
consideration of that application. Should 
such application result in approval of a 
Management Scheme pursuant to Article 
48, the Party in question shall remain a 
member of the Regulatory Committee
during such time as that Management 
Scheme is in force with the right to take 
part in decisions on matters affecting that 
Management Scheme.
7 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted 
as affecting Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.
Article 30
Regulatory Committee Procedure
1 The first meeting of each Regulatory 
Committee shall be convened by the Executive 
Secretary in accordance with Article 43(1). 
Each Regulatory Committee shall meet 
thereafter when and where necessary to fulfil its 
functions.
2 Each member of a Regulatory Committee 
shall be represented by one representative who 
may be accompanied by alternate 
representatives and advisers.
3 Each Regulatory Committee shall elect 
from among its members a Chairman and Vice- 
Chairman. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman 
shall not be representatives of the same Party.
4 Any Party may attend meetings of a 
Regulatory Committee as an observer.
5 Each Regulatory Committee shall adopt its 
rules of procedure. Such rules may include 
provisions concerning the period and number of 
terms of office which the Chairman and Vice- 
Chairman may serve and for the rotation of such 
offices.
Article 31
Functions of Regulatory Committees
1 The functions of each Regulatory 
Committee shall be:
(a) to undertake the preparatory work 
provided for in Article 43;
(b) to consider applications for exploration 
and development permits in accordance 
with Articles 45,46 and 54;
(c) to approve Management Schemes and 
issue exploration and development permits 
in accordance with Articles 47,48 and 54;
(d) to monitor exploration and development 
activities in accordance with Article 52;
(e) to perform the functions assigned to it in 
Article 51;
(0 to perform the functions relating to 
inspection assigned to it in Article 12;
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(g) to perform the functions relating to dispute 
settlement assigned to it in Article 47(r); 
and
(h) to perform such other functions as are 
provided for elsewhere in this Convention.
2 In performing its functions each 
Regulatory Committee shall seek and take full 
account of the views of the Advisory 
Committee provided in accordance with Article 
26.
3 Each Regulatory Committee shall, subject 
to Article 16 and measures in effect pursuant to 
it and Article 21(l)(h), ensure that a publicly 
available record of its decisions, and of 
Management Schemes in force, is maintained.
Article 32
Decision Making in Regulatory Committees
1 Decisions in a Regulatory Committee 
pursuant to Articles 48 and 54(5) shall be taken 
by a two-thirds majority of the members present 
and voting, which majority shall include a 
simple majority of those members present and 
voting referred to in Article 29(2)(c)(i) and also 
a simply majority of those members present and 
voting referred to in Article 29(2)(c)(ii).
2 Decisions by a Regulatory Committee 
pursuant to Article 43(3) and (5) shall be taken 
by a two-thirds majority of the members present 
and voting, which majority shall include at least 
half of those members present and voting 
referred to in Article 29(2Xc)(i) and also at least 
half of those members present and voting 
referred to in Article 29(2)(c)(ii).
3 Decisions on all other matters of substance 
shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the 
members present and voting. When a question 
arises as to whether a matter is one of substance 
or not, that matter shall be treated as one of 
substance unless otherwise decided by a two- 
thirds majority of the members present and 
voting.
4 Decisions on matters of procedure shall be 
taken by a simply majority of the members 
present and voting.
5 Nothing in the Article shall be interpreted 
as preventing a Regulatory Committee, in 
taking decisions on matters of substance, from 
endeavouring to reach a consensus.
Article 33
Secretariat
1 The Commission may establish a
Secretariat to serve the Commission, Regulatory 
Committees, the Advisory Committee, the 
Special Meeting of Parties and any subsidiary 
bodies established.
2 The Commission may appoint an
Executive Secretary, who shall be the head of 
the Secretariat, according to such procedures 
and on such terms and conditions as the 
Commission may determine. The Executive 
Secretary shall serve for a four year term and 
may be reappointed.
3 The Commission may, with due regard to 
the need for efficiency and economy, authorise 
such staff establishment for the Secretariat as 
may be necessary. The Executive Secretary 
shall appoint, direct and supervise the staff 
according to such rules and procedures and on 
such terms and conditions as the Commission 
may determine.
4 The Secretariat shall perform the functions 
specified in this Convention and, subject to the 
approved budget, the tasks entrusted to it by the 
Commission, Regulatory Committees, the 
Advisory Committee and the Special Meeting 
of Parties.
Article 34
Cooperation with International 
Organisations
1 The Commission and, as appropriate, the 
Advisory Committee shall cooperate with the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals, the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources, and the Scientific 
Committee on Antarctic Research.
2 The Commission shall cooperate with the 
United Nations, its relevant Specialised 
Agencies, and, as appropriate, any international 
organisation which may have competence in 
respect of mineral resources in areas adjacent to 
those covered by this Convention.
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3 The Commission shall also, as appropriate, 
cooperate with the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
and with other relevant international 
organisations, including non-governmental 
organisations having a scientific, technical or 
environmental interest in Antarctica.
4 The Commission may, as appropriate, 
accord observer status in the Commission and in 
the Advisory Committee to such relevant 
international organisations, including non­
governmental organisations, as might assist in 
the work of the institution in question. 
Observer status at a Special Meeting of Parties 
shall be open to such organisations as have been 
accorded observer status in the Commission or 
the Advisory Committee.
5 The Commission may enter into 
agreements with the organisations referred to in 
this Article.
Article 35
Financial Provisions
1 The Commission shall adopt a budget, on 
an annual or other appropriate basis, for
(a) its activities and the activities of 
Regulatory Committees, the Advisory 
Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties, 
any subsidiary bodies established and the 
Secretariat; and
(b) the progressive reimbursement of any 
contributions paid under paragraphs 5 and 
6 below whenever revenues under 
paragraph 4 below exceed expenditure.
2 The first draft budget shall be submitted 
by the Depositary at least 90 days before the 
first meeting of the Commission. At that 
meeting the Commission shall adopt its first 
budget and decide upon arrangements for the 
preparation of subsequent budgets.
3 The Commission shall adopt financial 
regulations.
4 Subject to paragraph 5 below, the budget 
shall be financed, inter alia, by;
(a) fees prescribed pursuant to Articles 
21(l)(p)and43(2)(b);
(b) levies on Operators, subject to any 
measures adopted by the Commission in 
accordance with Article 21(l)(q), pursuant 
to Article 47(k)(i); and
(c) such other financial payments by 
Operators pursuant to Article 47(k)(ii) as
may be required to be paid to the 
institutions of this Convention.
5 If the budget is not fully financed by 
revenues in accordance with paragraph 4 above, 
and subject to reimbursement in accordance 
with paragraph 1(b) above, the budget shall, to 
the extent of any shortfall and subject to 
paragraph 6 below, be financed by contributions 
from the members of the Commission. To this 
end, the Commission shall adopt as soon as 
possible a method of equitable sharing of 
contributions to the budget The budget shall, 
in the meantime, to the extent of any shortfall, 
be financed by equal contributions from each 
member of the Commission.
6 In adopting the method of contribution 
referred to in paragraph 5 above the 
Commission shall consider the extent to which 
members of and observers at institutions of this 
Convention may be called upon to contribute to 
the costs of those institutions.
7 The Commission, in determining the 
disposition of revenues accruing to it, which are 
surplus to the requirements for financing the 
budget pursuant to this Article, shall:
(a) promote scientific research in Antarctica, 
particularly that related to the Antarctic 
environment and Antarctic resources, and 
a wide spread of participation in such 
research by all Parties, particularly 
developing country Parties;
(b) ensure that the interests of the members of 
Regulatory Committees having the most 
direct interest in the matter in relation to 
the areas in question are respected in any 
disposition of that surplus.
8 The finances of the Commission,
Regulatory Committees, the Advisory 
Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties, any 
subsidiary bodies established and the Secretariat 
shall accord with the financial regulations 
adopted by the Commission and shall be subject 
to an annual audit by external auditors selected 
by the Commission.
9 Each member of the Commission, 
Regulatory Committees, the Advisory 
Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties, and 
any subsidiary bodies established, as well as 
any observer at a meeting of any of the 
institutions of this Convention, shall meet its 
own expenses arising from attendance at 
meetings.
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10 A member of the Commission that fails to 
pay its contribution for two consecutive years 
shall not, during the period of its continuing 
subsequent default, have the right to participate 
in the taking of decisions in any of the 
institutions of this Convention. If it continues 
to be in default for a further two consecutive 
years, the Commission shall decide what further 
action should be taken, which may include loss 
by that member of the right to participate in 
meetings of the institutions of this Convention. 
Such member shall resume the full enjoyment 
of its rights upon payment of the outstanding 
contributions.
11 Nothing in this Article shall be construed 
as prejudicing the position of any member of a 
Regulatory Committee on the outcome of 
consideration by the Regulatory Committee of 
terms and conditions in a Management Scheme 
pursuant to Article 47(k)(ii).
Article 36
Official and Working Languages
The official and working languages of the 
Commission, Regulatory Committees, the 
Advisory Committee, the Special Meeting of 
Parties and any meeting convened under Article 
64 shall be English, French, Russian and 
Spanish.
CHAPTER m  : PROSPECTING
Article 37
Prospecting
1 Prospecting shall not confer upon any 
Operators any right to Antarctic mineral 
resources.
2 Prospecting shall at all times be conducted 
in compliance with this Convention and with 
measures in effect pursuant to this Convention, 
but shall not require authorisation by the 
institutions of this Convention.
3(a) The Sponsoring State shall ensure that its 
Operators undertaking prospecting 
maintain the necessary financial and 
technical means to comply with Article 
8(1), and, to the extent that any such 
Operator fails to take response action as 
required in Article 8(1), shall ensure that 
this is undertaken.
(b) The Sponsoring State shall also ensure that 
its Operators undertaking prospecting 
maintain financial capacity, commensurate 
with the nature and level of the activity
undertaken and the risks involved, to 
comply with Article 8(2).
4 In cases where more than one Operator is 
engaged in prospecting in the same general 
area, the Sponsoring State or States shall ensure 
that those Operators conduct their activities 
with due regard to each others’ rights.
5 Where an Operator wishes to conduct 
prospecting in an area identified under Article 
41 in which another Operator has been 
authorised to undertake exploration or 
development, the Sponsoring State shall ensure 
that such prospecting is carried out subject to 
the rights of any authorised Operator and any 
requirements to protect its rights specified by 
the relevant Regulatory Committee.
6 Each Operator shall ensure upon cessation 
of prospecting the removal of all installations 
and equipment and site rehabilitation. On the 
request of the Sponsoring State, the 
Commission may waive the obligation to 
remove installations and equipment.
7 The Sponsoring State shall notify the 
Commission at least nine months in advance of 
the commencement of planned prospecting. 
The notification shall be accompanied by such 
fees as may be established by the Commission 
in accordance with Article 21(l)(p) and shall:
(a) identify, by reference to coordinates of 
latitude and longitude or identifiable 
geographic features, the general area in 
which the prospecting is to take place;
(b) broadly identify the mineral resource or 
resources which are to be the subject of 
the prospecting;
(c) describe the prospecting, including the 
methods to be used, and the general 
programme of work to be undertaken and 
its expected duration;
(d) provide an assessment of the possible 
environmental and other impacts of the 
prospecting, taking into account possible 
cumulative impacts as referred to in 
Article 4(5);
(e) describe the measures, including 
monitoring programmes, to be adopted to 
avoid harmful environmental 
consequences or undue interference with 
other established uses of Antarctica, and 
outline the measures to be put into effect 
in the event of any accident and 
contingency plans for evacuation in an 
emergency;
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(0 provide details on the Operator and certify 
that it:
(i) has a substantial and genuine link 
with the Sponsoring State as defined 
in Article 1(12); and
(ii) is financially and technically 
qualified to carry out the proposed 
prospecting in accordance with this 
Convention; and
(g) provide such further information as may 
be required by measures adopted by the 
Commission.
8 The Sponsoring State shall subsequently 
provide to the Commission:
(a) notification of any changes to the 
information referred to in paragraph 7 
above;
(b) notification of the cessation of 
prospecting, including removal of any 
installations and equipment as well as site 
rehabilitation; and
(c) a general annual account on the 
prospecting undertaken by the Operator.
9 Notifications and reports submitted 
pursuant to this Article shall be circulated by 
the Executive Secretary without delay to all 
Parties and observers attending Commission 
meetings.
10 Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above shall not be 
interpreted as requiring the disclosure of data 
and information of commercial value.
11 The Sponsoring State shall ensure that 
basic data and information of commercial value 
generated by prospecting are maintained in 
archives and may at any time release part of or 
all such data and information, on conditions 
which it shall establish, for scientific or 
environmental purposes.
12 The Sponsoring State shall ensure that 
basic data and information, other than 
interpretative data, generated by prospecting are 
made readily available when such data and 
information are not, or are no longer, of 
commercial value and, in any event, no later 
than 10 years after the year the data and 
information were collected, unless it certifies to 
the Commission that the data and information 
continue to have commercial value. It shall 
review at regular intervals whether such data 
and information may be released and shall 
report the results of such reviews to the 
Commission.
13 The Commission may adopt measures 
consistent with this Article relating to the 
release of data and information of commercial 
value including requirements for certifications, 
the frequency of reviews and maximum time 
limits for extensions of the protection of such 
data and information.
Article 38
Consideration of Prospecting by the 
Commission
1 If a member of the Commission considers 
that a notification submitted in accordance with 
Article 37(7) or (8), or ongoing prospecting, 
causes concern as to consistency with this 
Convention or measures in effect pursuant 
thereto, that member may request the 
Sponsoring State to provide a clarification. If 
that member considers that an adequate 
response is not forthcoming from the 
Sponsoring State within a reasonable time, the 
member may request that the Commission be 
convened in accordance with Article 19(2)(b) to 
consider the question and take appropriate 
action.
2 If measures applicable to all relevant 
Operators are adopted by the Commission 
following a request made in accordance with 
paragraph 1 above, Sponsoring States that have 
submitted notifications in accordance with 
Article 37(7) or (8), and Sponsoring States 
whose Operators are conducting prospecting, 
shall ensure that the plans and activities of their 
Operators are modified to the extent necessary 
to conform with those measures within such 
time limit as the Commission may prescribe, 
and shall notify the Commission accordingly.
CHAPTER IV : EXPLORATION
Article 39
Requests for Identification of an Area for 
Possible Exploration and Development
1 Any Party may submit to the Executive 
Secretary a notification requesting that the 
Commission identify an area for possible 
exploration and development of a particular 
mineral resource or resources.
2 Any such notification shall be 
accompanied by such fees as may be established 
by the Commission in accordance with Article 
21(l)(p) and shall contain:
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(a) a precise delineation, including 
coordinates, of the area proposed for 
identification;
(b) specification of the resource or resources 
for which the area would be identified and 
any relevant data and information, 
excluding data and information of 
commercial value, concerning that 
resource or those resources, including a 
geological description of the proposed 
area;
(c) a detailed description of the physical and 
environmental characteristics of the 
proposed area;
(d) a description of the likely scale of 
exploration and development for the 
resource or resources involved in the 
proposed area and of the methods which 
could be employed in such exploration and 
development;
(e) a detailed assessment of the environmental 
and other impacts of possible exploration 
and development for the resource or 
resources involved, taking into account 
Articles 15 and 26(4); and
(0 such other information as may be required 
pursuant to measures adopted by the 
Commission.
3 A notification under paragraph 1 above 
shall be referred promptly by the Executive 
Secretary to all Parties and shall be circulated to 
observers attending the meeting of the 
Commission to be convened pursuant to Article 
19(2)(a).
Article 40
Action by the Advisory Committee and 
Special Meeting of Parties
1 The Advisory Committee shall meet as 
soon as possible after the meeting of the 
Commission convened pursuant to Article 
19(2)(a) has commenced. The Advisory 
Committee shall provide advice to the 
Commission on the notification submitted 
pursuant to Article 39(1). The Commission 
may prescribe a time limit for the provision of 
such advice.
2 A Special Meeting of Parties shall meet as 
soon as possible after circulation of the report of 
the Advisory Committee and in any event not 
later than two months after that report has been 
circulated.
3 The Special Meeting of Parties shall 
consider whether identification of an area by the 
Commission in accordance with the request 
contained in the notification would be
consistent with this Convention, and shall report 
thereon to the Commission as soon as possible 
and in any event not later than 21 days from the 
commencement of the meeting.
4 The report of the Special Meeting of 
Parties to the Commission shall reflect the 
conclusions reached and all the views expressed 
by Parties participating in the meeting.
Article 41
Action by the Commission
1 The Commission shall, as soon as possible 
after receipt of the report of the Special Meeting 
of Parties, consider whether or not it will 
identify an area as requested. Taking full 
account of the views and giving special weight 
to the conclusions of the Special Meeting of 
Parties, and taking full account of the views and 
the conclusions of the Advisory Committee, the 
Commission shall determine whether such 
identification would be consistent with this 
Convention. For this purpose:
(a) the Commission shall ensure that an area 
to be identified shall be such that, taking 
into account all factors relevant to such 
identification, including the physical, 
geological, environmental and other 
characteristics of such area, it forms a 
coherent unit for the purposes of resource 
management The Commission shall thus 
consider whether an area to be identified 
should include all or part of that which 
was requested in the notification and, 
subject to the necessary assessments 
having been made, adjacent areas not 
covered by that notification.
(b) the Commission shall consider whether 
there are, within an area requested or to be 
identified, any areas in which exploration 
and development are or should be 
prohibited or restricted in accordance with 
Article 13;
(c) the Commission shall specify the mineral 
resource or resources for which the area 
would be identified;
(d) the Commission shall give effect to Article 
6, by elaborating opportunities for joint 
ventures or different forms of 
participation, up to a defined level, 
including procedures for offering such 
participation, in possible exploration and 
development, within the area, by interested 
Parties which are Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties and by other 
interested Parties, in particular, developing 
countries in either category;
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(e) the Commission shall prescribe any 
additional associated conditions necessary 
to ensure that an area to be identified is 
consistent with other provisions of this 
Convention and may prescribe general 
guidelines relating to the operational 
requirements for exploration and 
development in an area to be identified 
including measures establishing maximum 
block sizes and advice concerning related 
support activities; and
(f) the Commission shall give effect to the 
requirement in Article 59 to establish 
additional procedures for the settlement of 
disputes.
2 After it has completed its consideration in 
accordance with paragraph 1 above, the 
Commission shall identify an area for possible 
exploration and development if there is a 
consensus of Commission members that such 
identification is consistent with this Convention.
Article 42
Revision in the Scope of an Identified Area
1 If, after an area has been identified in 
accordance with Article 41, a Party requests 
identification of an area, all or part of which is 
contained within the boundaries of the area 
already identified but in respect of a mineral 
resource or resources different from any 
resource in respect of which the area has 
already been identified, the request shall be 
dealt with in accordance with Articles 39, 40 
and 41. Should the Commission identify an 
area in respect of such different mineral 
resource or resources, it shall have regard, in 
addition to the requirements of Article 41(l)(a), 
to the desirability of specifying the boundaries 
of the area in such a way that it can be assigned 
to the Regulatory Committee with competence 
for the area already identified.
2 In the light of increased knowledge 
bearing on the effective management of the 
area, and after seeking the views of the 
Advisory Committee and the relevant 
Regulatory Committee, the Commission may 
amend the boundaries of any area it has 
identified. In making such an amendment the 
Commission shall ensure that authorised 
exploration and development in the area are not 
adversely affected. Unless there are 
compelling reasons for doing so, the 
Commission shall not amend the boundaries of 
an area it has identified in such a way as to 
involve a change in the composition of the 
relevant Regulatory Commiuee.
Article 43
Preparatory Work by Regulatory Committee
1 As soon as possible after the identification 
of an area pursuant to Article 41, the relevant 
Regulatory Committee established in 
accordance with Article 29 shall be convened.
2 The Regulatory Committee shall:
(a) subject to any measures adopted by the 
Commission pursuant to Article 21(l)(j) 
relating to maximum block sizes, divide its 
area of competence into blocks in respect 
of which applications for exploration and 
development may be submitted and make 
provision for a limit in appropriate 
circumstances on the number of blocks to 
be accorded to any Party;
(b) subject to any measures adopted by the 
Commission pursuant to Article 21(l)(p), 
establish fees to be paid with any 
application for an exploration or 
development permit lodged pursuant to 
Article 44 or 53;
(c) establish periods within which 
applications for exploration and 
development may be lodged, all 
applications received within each such 
period being considered as simultaneous;
(d) establish procedures for the handling of 
applications; and
(e) determine a method of resolving 
competing applications which are not 
resolved in accordance with Article 
45(4)(a), which method shall, provided 
that all other requirements of this 
Convention are satisfied and consistently 
with measures adopted pursuant to Article 
41(l)(d), include priority for the 
application with the broadest participation 
among interested Parties which are 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and 
other interested Parties, in particular, 
developing countries in either category.
3 The Regulatory Committee shall adopt
guidelines which are consistent with, and which 
taken together with, the provisions of this 
Convention and measures of general 
applicability adopted by the Commission, as 
well as associated conditions and general 
guidelines adopted by the Commission when 
identifying the area, shall, by addressing the 
relevant items in Article 47, identify the general 
requirements for exploration and development 
in its area of competence.
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4 Upon adoption of guidelines under 
paragraph 3 above the Executive Secretary 
shall, without delay, inform all members of the 
Commission of the decisions taken by the 
Regulatory Committee pursuant to paragraphs 2 
and 3 above and shall make them publicly 
available together with relevant measures, 
associated conditions and general guidelines 
adopted by the Commission.
5 The Regulatory Committee may from time 
to time revise guidelines adopted under 
paragraph 3 above, taking into account any 
views of the Commission.
6 In performing its functions under 
paragraphs 3 and 5 above, the Regulatory 
Committee shall seek and take full account of 
the views of the Advisory Committee provided 
in accordance with Article 26.
Article 44
Application for an Exploration Permit
1 Following completion of the work 
undertaken pursuant to Article 43, any Party, on 
behalf of an Operator for which it is the 
Sponsoring State, may lodge with the 
Regulatory Committee an application for an 
exploration permit within the periods 
established by the Regulatory Committee 
pursuant to Article 43(2)(c).
2 An application shall be accompanied by 
the fees established by the Regulatory 
Committee in accordance with Article 43(2)(b) 
and shall contain:
(a) a detailed description of the Operator, 
including its managerial structure, 
financial composition and resources and 
technical expertise, and, in the case of an 
Operator being a joint venture, the 
inclusion of a detailed description of the 
degree to which Parties are involved in the 
Operator through, inter alia, juridical 
persons with which Parties have 
substantial and genuine links, so that each 
component of the joint venture can be 
easily attributed to a Party or Parties for 
the purposes of identifying the level of 
Antarctic mineral resource activities 
thereof, which description of substantial 
and genuine links shall include a 
description of equity sharing;
(b) a detailed description of the proposed 
exploration activities and a description in 
as much detail as possible of proposed 
development activities, including:
(i) an identification of the mineral 
resource or resources and the block 
to which the application applies;
(ii) a detailed explanation of how the 
proposed activities conform with 
the general requirements referred to 
in Article 43(3);
(iii) a detailed assessment of the 
environmental and other impacts of 
the proposed activities, taking into 
account Articles 15 and 26(4); and
(iv) a description of the capacity to 
respond effectively to accidents, 
especially those with potential 
environmental effects;
(c) a certification by the Sponsoring State of 
the capacity of the Operator to comply 
with the general requirements referred to 
in Article 43(3);
(d) a certification by the Sponsoring State of 
the technical competence and financial 
capacity of the Operator and that the 
Operator has a substantial and genuine 
link with it as defined in Article 1(12);
(e) a description of the manner in which the 
application complies with any measures 
adopted by the Commission pursuant to 
Article 41(l)(d); and
(f) such further information as may be 
required by the Regulatory Committee or 
in measures adopted by the Commission.
Article 45
Examination of Applications
1 The Regulatory Committee shall meet as 
soon as possible after an application has been 
lodged pursuant to Article 44, for the purpose of 
elaborating a Management Scheme. In 
performing this function it shall:
(a) determine whether the application contains 
sufficient or adequate information 
pursuant to Article 44(2). To this end, it 
may at any time seek further information 
from the Sponsoring State consistent with 
Article 44(2);
(b) consider the exploration and development 
activities proposed in the application, and 
such elaborations, revisions or adaptations 
as necessary:
(i) to ensure their consistency with this 
Convention as well as measures in 
effect pursuant thereto and the 
general requirements referred to in 
Article 43(3); and
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(ii) to prescribe the specific terms and 
conditions of a Management 
Scheme in accordance with Article 
47.
2 At any time during the process of 
consideration described above, the Regulatory 
Committee may decline the application if it 
considers that the activities proposed therein 
cannot be elaborated, revised or adapted to 
ensure consistency with this Convention as well 
as measures in effect pursuant thereto and the 
general requirements referred to in Article 
43(3).
3 In performing its functions under this 
Article, the Regulatory Committee shall seek 
and take full account of the views of the 
Advisory Committee. To that end the 
Regulatory Committee shall refer to the 
Advisory Committee all parts of the application 
which are necessary for it to provide advice 
pursuant to Article 26, together with any other 
relevant information.
4 If two or more applications meeting the 
requirements of Article 44(2) are lodged in 
respect of the same block:
(a) the competing applicants shall be invited 
by the Regulatory Committee to resolve 
the competition amongst themselves, by 
means of their own choice within a 
prescribed period;
(b) if the competition is not resolved pursuant 
to subparagraph (a) above it shall be 
resolved by the Regulatory Committee in 
accordance with the method determined by 
it pursuant to Article 43(2)(e).
Article 46
Management Scheme
In performing its functions under Article 45, 
including the preparation of a Management 
Scheme, and under Article 54, the Regulatory 
Committee shall have recourse to the 
Sponsoring State and the member or members, 
if any, referred to in Article 29(2)(a) and, as 
may be required, one or two additional 
members of the Regulatory Committee.
Article 47
Scope of the Management Scheme
The Management Scheme shall prescribe the 
specific terms and conditions for exploration 
and development of the mineral resource or 
resources concerned within the relevant block. 
Such terms and conditions shall be consistent
with the general requirements referred to in
Article 43(3), and shall cover, inter alia:
(a) duration of exploration and development 
permits;
(b) measures and procedures for the protection 
of the Antarctic environment and 
dependent and associated ecosystems, 
including methods, activities and 
undertakings by the Operator to minimise 
environmental risks and damage;
(c) provision for necessary and timely 
response action, including prevention, 
containment and clean up and removal 
measures, for restoration to the status quo 
ante, and for contingency plans, resource 
and equipment to enable such action to be 
taken;
(d) procedures for the implementation of 
different stages of exploration and 
development;
(e) performance requirements;
(f) technical and safety specifications, 
including standards and procedures to 
ensure safe operations;
(g) monitoring and inspection;
(h) liability;
(i) procedures for the development of mineral 
deposits which extend outside the area 
covered by a permit;
(j) resource conservation requirements;
(k) financial obligations of the Operator 
including;
(i) levies in accordance with measures
adopted pursuant to Article
21(l)(q);
(ii) payments in the nature of and
similar to taxes, royalties or
payments in kind;
(l) financial guarantees and insurance;
(m) assignment and relinquishment;
(n) suspension and modification of the 
Management Scheme, or cancellation of 
the Management Scheme, exploration or 
development permit, and the imposition of 
monetary penalties, in accordance with 
Article 51;
(o) procedures for agreed modifications;
(p) enforcement of the Management Scheme;
(q) applicable law to the extent necessary;
(r) effective additional procedures for the 
settlement of disputes;
(s) provisions to avoid and to resolve conflict 
with other legitimate uses of Antarctica;
(t) data and information collection, reporting 
and notification requirements;
(u) confidentiality; and
(v) removal of installations and equipment, as 
well as site rehabilitation.
344
Article 48
Approval of the Management Scheme
A Management Scheme prepared in accordance 
with Articles 45, 46 and 47 shall be subject to 
approval pursuant to Article 32. Such approval 
shall constitute authorisation for the issue 
without delay of an exploration permit by the 
Regulatory Committee. The exploration permit 
shall accord exclusive rights to the Operator to 
explore and, subject to Articles 53 and 54, to 
develop the mineral resource or resources which 
are the subject of the Management Scheme 
exclusively in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the Management Scheme.
Article 49
Review
1 Any member of the Commission, or any 
member of a Regulatory Committee, may 
within one month of a decision by that 
Regulatory Committee to approve a 
Management Scheme or issue a development 
permit, request that the Commission be 
convened in accordance with Article 19(2)(b) or 
(c), as the case may be, to review the decision 
of the Regulatory Committee for consistency 
with the decision taken by the Commission to 
identify the area pursuant to Article 41 and any 
measures in effect relevant to that decision.
2 The Commission shall complete its 
consideration within three months of a request 
made pursuant to paragraph 1 above. In 
performing its functions the Commission shall 
not assume the functions of the Regulatory 
Committee, nor shall it substitute its discretion 
for that of the Regulatory Committee.
3 Should the Commission determine that a 
decision to approve a Management Scheme or 
issue a development permit is inconsistent with 
the decision taken by the Commission to 
identify the area pursuant to Article 41 and any 
measures in effect relevant to that decision, it 
may request that Regulatory Committee to 
reconsider its decision.
Article 50
Rights of Authorised Operators
1 No Management Scheme shall be 
suspended or modified and no Management 
Scheme, exploration or development permit 
shall be cancelled without the consent of the 
Sponsoring State except pursuant to Article 51, 
or Article 54 or the Management Scheme itself.
2 Each Operator authorised to conduct 
activities pursuant to a Management Scheme 
shall exercise its rights with due regard to the 
rights of other Operators undertaking 
exploration or development in the same 
identified area.
Article 51
Suspension, Modification or Cancellation of 
the Management Scheme and Monetary 
Penalties
1 If a Regulatory Committee determines that 
exploration or development authorised pursuant 
to a Management Scheme has resulted or is 
about to result in impacts on the Antarctic 
environment or dependent or associated 
ecosystems beyond those judged acceptable 
pursuant to this Convention, it shall suspend the 
relevant activities and as soon as possible 
modify the Management Scheme so as to avoid 
such impacts. If such impacts cannot be 
avoided by the modification of the Management 
Scheme, the Regulatory Committee shall 
suspend it, or cancel it and the exploration or 
development permit.
2 In performing its functions under 
paragraph 1 above a Regulatory Committee 
shall, unless emergency action is required, seek 
and take into account the views of the Advisory 
Committee.
3 If a Regulatory Committee determines that 
an Operator has failed to comply with this 
Convention or with measures in effect pursuant 
to it or a Management Scheme applicable to that 
Operator, the Regulatory Committee may do all 
or any of the following:
(a) modify the Management Scheme;
(b) suspend the Management Scheme;
(c) cancel the Management Scheme and the 
exploration or development permit; and
(d) impose a monetary penalty.
4 Sanctions determined pursuant to 
paragraph 3(a) to (d) above shall be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the failure to 
comply.
5 A Regulatory Committee shall cancel a 
Management Scheme and the exploration or 
development permit if an Operator ceases to 
have a substantial and genuine link with the 
Sponsoring State as defined in Article 1(12).
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6 The Commission shall adopt general 
measures, which may include mitigation, 
relating to action by Regulatory Committees 
pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 above and, as 
appropriate, to the consequences of such action. 
No application pursuant to Article 44 may be 
lodged until such measures have come into 
effect
Article 52
Monitoring in Relation to Management 
Schemes
1 Each Regulatory Committee shall monitor 
the compliance of Operators with Management 
Schemes within its area of competence.
2 Each Regulatory Committee, taking into 
account the advice of the Advisory Committee, 
shall monitor and assess the effects on the 
Antarctic environment and on dependent and on 
associated ecosystems of Antarctic mineral 
resource activities within its area of 
competence, particularly by reference to key 
environmental parameters and ecosystem 
components.
3 Each Regulatory Committee shall, as 
appropriate, inform the Commission and the 
Advisory Committee in a timely fashion of 
monitoring under this Article.
CHAPTER V : DEVELOPMENT 
Article 53
Application for a Development Permit
1 At any time during the period in which an 
approved Management Scheme and exploration 
permit are in force for an Operator, the 
Sponsoring State may, on behalf of that 
Operator, lodge with the Regulatory Committee 
an application for a development permit
2 An application shall be accompanied by 
the fees established by the Regulatory 
Committee in accordance with Article 43(2)(b) 
and shall contain:
(a) an updated description of the planned 
development identifying any modifications 
proposed to the approved Management 
Scheme and any additional measures to be 
taken, consequent upon such 
modifications, to ensure consistency with 
this Convention, including any measures 
in effect pursuant thereto and the general 
requirements referred to in Article 43(3);
(b) a detailed assessment of the environmental 
and other impacts of the planned 
development, taking into account Articles 
15 and 26(4);
(c) a recertification by the Sponsoring State of 
the technical competence and financial 
capacity of the Operator and that the 
Operator has a substantial and genuine 
link with it as defined in Article 1(12);
(d) a recertification by the Sponsoring State of 
the capacity of the Operator to comply 
with the general requirements referred to 
in Article 43(3);
(e) updated information in relation to all other 
matters specified in Article 44(2); and
(0 such further information as may be 
required by the Regulatory Committee or 
in measures adopted by the Commission.
Article 54
Examination of Applications and Issue of 
Development Permits
1 The Regulatory Committee shall meet as 
soon as possible after an application has been 
lodged pursuant to Article 53.
2 The Regulatory Committee shall 
determine whether the application contains 
sufficient or adequate information pursuant to 
Article 53(2). In performing this function it 
may at any time seek further information from 
the Sponsoring State consistent with Article 
53(2).
3 The Regulatory Committee shall consider 
whether.
(a) the application reveals modifications to the 
planned development previously 
envisaged;
(b) the planned development would cause 
previously unforeseen impacts on the 
Antarctic environment or dependent or 
associated ecosystems, either as a result of 
any modifications referred to in 
subparagraph (a) above or in the light of 
increased knowledge.
4 The Regulatory Committee shall consider 
any modifications to the Management Scheme 
necessary in the light of paragraph 3 above to 
ensure that the development activities proposed 
would be undertaken consistently with this 
Convention as well as measures in effect 
pursuant thereto and the general requirements 
referred to in Article 43(3). However, the 
financial obligations specified in the
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Management Scheme may not be revised 
without the consent of the Sponsoring State, 
unless provided for in the Management Scheme 
itself.
5 If the Regulatory Committee in 
accordance with Article 32 approves 
modifications under paragraph 4 above, or if it 
does not consider that such modifications are 
necessary, the Regulatory Committee shall issue 
without delay a development permit.
6 In performing its functions under this 
Article, the Regulatory Committee shall seek 
and take full account of the views of the 
Advisory Committee. To that end the 
Regulatory Committee shall refer to the 
Advisory Committee all parts of the application 
which are necessary for it to provide advice 
pursuant to Article 26, together with any other 
relevant information.
CHAPTER V I : DISPUTES SETTLEMENT 
Article 55
Disputes Between Two or More Parties
Articles 56, 57 and 58 apply to disputes 
between two or more Parties.
Article 56
Choice of Procedure
1 Each Party, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to this 
Convention, or at any time thereafter, may 
choose, by written declaration, one or both of 
the following means for the settlement of 
disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention:
(a) the International Court of Justice;
(b) the Arbitral Tribunal.
2 A declaration made under paragraph 1 
above shall not affect the operation of Article 
57(1), (3), (4) and (5).
3 A Party that has not made a declaration 
under paragraph 1 above or in respect of which 
a declaration is no longer in force shall be 
deemed to have accepted the competence of the 
Arbitral Tribunal.
4 If the parties to a dispute have accepted 
the same means for the settlement of a dispute, 
the dispute may be submitted only to that 
procedure, unless the parties otherwise agree.
5 If the parties to a dispute have not 
accepted the same means for the settlement of a 
dispute, or if they have both accepted both 
means, the dispute may be submitted only to the 
Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties otherwise 
agree.
6 A declaration made under paragraph 1 
above shall remain in force until it expires in 
accordance with its terms or until 3 months after 
written notice of revocation has been deposited 
with the Depositary.
7 A new declaration, a notice of revocation 
or the expiry of a declaration shall not in any 
way affect proceedings pending before the 
International Court of Justice or the Arbitral 
Tribunal, unless the parties to the dispute 
otherwise agree.
8 Declarations and notices referred to in this 
Article shall be deposited with the Depositary 
who shall transmit copies thereof to all Parties.
Article 57
Procedure for Dispute Settlement
1 If a dispute arises concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention, 
the parties to the dispute shall, at the request of 
any one of them, consult among themselves as 
soon as possible with a view to having the 
dispute resolved by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement or other peaceful means of their 
choice.
2 If the parties to a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention 
have not agreed on a means for resolving it 
within 12 months of the request for consultation 
pursuant to paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall 
be referred, at the request of any party to the 
dispute, for settlement in accordance with the 
procedure determined by the operation of 
Article 56(4) and (5).
3 If a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Convention relates to a 
measure in effect pursuant to this Convention or 
a Management Scheme and the parties to such a 
dispute:
(a) have not agreed on a means for resolving 
the dispute within 6 months of the request 
for consultation pursuant to paragraph 1 
above, the dispute shall be referred, at the 
request of any party to the dispute, for 
discussion in the institution which adopted 
the instrument in question;
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(b) have not agreed on a means for resolving 
the dispute within 12 months of the 
request for consultation pursuant to 
paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall be 
referred for settlement, at the request of 
any party to the dispute, to the Arbitral 
Tribunal.
4 The Arbitral Tribunal shall not be
competent to decide or otherwise rule upon any 
matter within the scope of Article 9. In 
addition, nothing in this Convention shall be 
interpreted as conferring competence of 
jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice 
or any other tribunal established for the purpose 
of settling disputes between Parties to decide or 
otherwise rule upon any matter within the scope 
of Article 9.
5 The Arbitral Tribunal shall not be
competent with regard to the exercise by an 
institution of its discretionary powers in 
accordance with this Convention; in no case 
shall the Arbitral Tribunal substitute its 
discretion for that of an institution. In addition, 
nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted 
as conferring competence or jurisdiction on the 
International Court of Justice or any other 
tribunal established for the purpose of settling 
disputes between Parties with regard to the 
exercise by an institution of its discretionary 
powers or to substitute its discretion for that of 
an institution.
Article 58
Exclusion of Categories of Dispute
1 Any Party, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to this 
Convention, or at any time thereafter, may, by 
written declaration, exclude the operation of 
Article 57(2) or (3) without its consent with 
respect to a category or categories of disputes 
specified in the declaration. Such declaration 
may not cover disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of:
(a) any provision of this Convention or of any 
measure in effect pursuant to it relating to 
the protection of the Antarctic 
environment or dependent or associated 
ecosystems;
(b) Article 7(1);
(c) Article 8;
(d) Article 12;
(e) Article 14;
(f) Article 15; or
(g) Article 37.
2 Nothing in paragraph 1 above or in any 
declaration made under it shall affect the 
operation of Article 57(1), (4) and (5).
3 A declaration made under paragraph 1 
above shall remain in force until it expires in 
accordance with its terms or until 3 months after 
written notice of revocation has been deposited 
with the Depositary.
4 A new declaration, a notice of revocation 
or the expiry of a declaration shall not in any 
way affect proceedings pending before the 
International Court of Justice or the Arbitral 
Tribunal, unless the parties to the dispute 
otherwise agree.
5 Declarations and notices referred to in this 
Article shall be deposited with the Depositary 
who shall transmit copies thereof to all Parties.
6 A Party which, by declaration made under 
paragraph 1 above, has excluded a specific 
category or categories of disputes from the 
operation of Article 57(2) or (3) without its 
consent shall not be entitled to submit any 
dispute falling within that category or those 
categories for settlement pursuant to Article 
57(2) or (3), as the case may be, without the 
consent of the other party or parties to the 
dispute.
Article 59
Additional Dispute Settlement Procedures
1 The Commission, in conjunction with its 
responsibilities pursuant to Article 41(1), shall 
establish additional procedures for third-party 
settlement, by the Arbitral Tribunal or through 
other similar procedures, of disputes which may 
arise if it is alleged that a violation of this 
Convention has occurred by virtue of:
(a) a decision to decline a Management 
Scheme;
(b) a decision to decline the issue of a 
development permit; or
(c) a decision to suspend, modify or cancel a 
Management Scheme or to impose 
monetary penalties.
2 Such procedures shall:
(a) permit, as appropriate, Parties and 
Operators under their sponsorship, but not 
both in respect of any particular dispute, to 
initiate proceedings against a Regulatory 
Committee;
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(b) require disputes to which they relate to be 
referred in the first instance to the relevant 
Regulatory Committee for consideration;
(c) incorporate the rules in Article 57(4) and
(5).
CHAPTER VH : FINAL CLAUSES
Article 60
Signature
This Convention shall be open for signature at 
Wellington from 25 November 1988 to 25 
November 1989 by States which participated in 
the final session of the Fourth Special Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting.
Article 61
Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or 
Accession
1 This Convention is subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval by Signatory States.
2 After 25 November 1989 this Convention 
shall be open for accession by any State with is 
a Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty.
3 Instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession shall be deposited with 
the Government of New Zealand, hereby 
designated as the Depositary.
Article 62 
Entry into Force
1 This Convention shall enter into force on
the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession by 16 Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties which participated in the 
final session of the Fourth Special Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting, provided that 
number includes all the States necessary in 
order to establish all of the institutions of the 
Convention in respect of every area of 
Antarctica, including 5 developing countries 
and 11 developed countries.
2 For each State which, subsequent to the 
date of entry into force of this Convention, 
deposits an instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, the 
Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth 
day following such deposit.
Article 63
Reservations, Declarations and Statements
1 Reservations to this Convention shall not 
be permitted. This does not preclude a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to this Convention, from making 
declarations or statements, however phrased or 
named, with a view, inter alia, to the 
harmonisation of its laws and regulations with 
this Convention, provided that such declarations 
or statements do not purport to exclude or to 
modify the legal effect of this Convention in its 
application to that State.
2 The provisions of this Article are without 
prejudice to the right to make written 
declarations in accordance with Article 58.
Article 64
Amendment
1 This Convention shall not be subject to 
amendment until after the expiry of 10 years 
from the date of its entry into force. Thereafter, 
any Party may, by written communication 
addressed to the Depositary, propose a specific 
amendment to this Convention and request the 
convening of a meeting to consider such 
proposed amendment.
2 The Depositary shall circulate such 
communication to all Parties. If within 12 
months of the date of the circulation of the 
communication at least one-third of the Parties 
reply favourably to the request, the Depositary 
shall convene the meeting.
3 The adoption of such an amendment 
considered at such a meeting shall require the 
affirmative votes of two-thirds of the Parties 
present and voting, including the concurrent 
votes of the members of the Commission 
attending the meeting.
4 The adoption of any amendment relating 
to the Special Meeting of Parties or to the 
Advisory Committee shall require the 
affirmative votes of three-quarters of the Parties 
present and voting, including the concurrent 
votes of the members of the Commission 
attending the meeting.
5 An amendment shall enter into force for 
those Parties having deposited instruments of 
ratification, acceptance or approval thereof 30 
days after the Depositary has received such 
instruments of ratification, acceptance or 
approval from all the members of the 
Commission.
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6 Such amendment shall thereafter enter into 
force for any other Party 30 days after the 
Depositary has received its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance or approval thereof.
7 An amendment that has entered into force 
pursuant to this Article shall be without 
prejudice to the provisions of any Management 
Scheme approved before the date on which the 
amendment entered into force.
Article 65
W ithdrawal
1 Any Party may withdraw from this 
Convention by giving to the Depositary notice 
in writing of its intention to withdraw. 
Withdrawal shall take effect two years after the 
date of receipt of such notice by the Depositary.
2 Any Party which ceases to be a 
Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty shall 
be deemed to have withdrawn from this 
Convention on the date that it ceases to be a 
Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty.
3 Where an amendment has entered into 
force pursuant to Article 64(5), any Party from 
which no instrument of ratification, acceptance 
or approval of the amendment has been received 
by the Depositary within a period of two years 
from the date of the entry into force of the 
amendment shall be deemed to have withdrawn 
from this Convention on the date of the 
expiration of a further two year period.
4 Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 below, the 
rights and obligations of any Operator pursuant 
to this Convention shall cease at the time its 
Sponsoring State withdraws or is deemed to 
have withdrawn from this Convention.
5 Such Sponsoring State shall ensure that 
the obligations of the Operator have been 
discharged no later than the date on which its 
withdrawal takes effect
6 Withdrawal from this Convention by any 
Party shall not affect its financial or other 
obligations under this Convention pending on 
the date withdrawal takes effect. Any dispute 
settlement procedure in which that Party is 
involved and which has been commenced prior 
to that date shall continue to its conclusion 
unless agreed otherwise by the parties to the 
dispute.
Article 66
Notifications by the Depositary
The Depositary shall notify all Contracting 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty of the following:
(a) signatures of this Convention and the 
deposit of instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession;
(b) the deposit of instruments of ratification, 
acceptance or approval of any amendment 
adopted pursuant to Article 64;
(c) the date of entry into force of this 
Convention and of any amendment 
thereto;
(d) the deposit of declarations and notices 
pursuant to Articles 56 and 58;
(e) notifications pursuant to Article 18; and
(f) the withdrawal of a Party pursuant to 
Article 65.
Article 67
Authentic Texts, Certified Copies and 
Registration with the United Nations
1 This Convention of which the Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic shall be deposited with the 
Government of New Zealand which shall 
transmit duly certified copies thereof to all 
Signatory and Acceding States.
2 The Depositary shall also transmit duly 
certified copies to all Signatory and Acceding 
States of the text of this Convention in any 
additional languages of a Signatory or Acceding 
State which submits such text to the Depositary.
3 This Convention shall be registered by the 
Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
Done at Wellington this second day of June 
1988.
In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly 
authorised, have signed this Convention.
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ANNEX FOR AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
Article 1
The Arbitral Tribunal shall be constituted and 
shall function in accordance with this 
Convention, including this Annex.
Article 2
1 Each Party shall be entitled to designate up 
to three Arbitrators, at least one of whom shall 
be designated within three months of the entry 
into force of this Convention for that Party. 
Each Arbitrator shall be experienced in 
Antarctic affairs, with knowledge of 
international law and enjoying the highest 
reputation for fairness, competence and 
integrity. The names of the persons so 
designated shall constitute the list of 
Arbitrators. Each Party shall at all times 
maintain the name of at least one Arbitrator on 
the list.
2 Subject to paragraph 3 below, an 
Arbitrator designated by a Party shall remain on 
the list for a period of five years and shall be 
eligible for redesignation by that Party for 
additional five year periods.
3 An Arbitrator may by notice given to the 
Party which designated that person withdraw 
his name from the list If an Arbitrator dies or 
gives notice of withdrawal of his name from the 
list or if a Party for any reason withdraws from 
the list the name of an Arbitrator designated by 
it, the Party which designated the Arbitrator in 
question shall notify the Executive Secretary 
promptly. An Arbitrator whose name is 
withdrawn from the list shall continue to serve 
on any Arbitral Tribunal to which that 
Arbitrator has been appointed until the 
completion of proceedings before that Arbitral 
Tribunal.
4 The Executive Secretary shall ensure that 
an up-to-date list is maintained of the 
Arbitrators designated pursuant to this Article.
Article 3
1 The Arbitral Tribunal shall be composed 
of three Arbitrators who shall be appointed as 
follows:
(a) the party to the dispute commencing the 
proceedings shall appoint one Arbitrator, 
who may be its national, from the list 
referred to in Article 2 of this Annex. This 
appointment shall be included in the
notification referred to in Article 4 of this 
Annex.
(b) Within 40 days of the receipt of that 
notification, the other party to the dispute 
shall appoint the second Arbitrator, who 
may be its national, from the list referred 
to in Article 2 of this Annex.
(c) Within 60 days of the appointment of the 
second Arbitrator, the parties to the 
dispute shall appoint by agreement the 
third Arbitrator from the list referred to in 
Article 2 of this Annex. The third 
Arbitrator shall not be either a national of, 
or a person designated by, a party to the 
dispute, or of the same nationality as either 
of the first two Arbitrators. The third 
Arbitrator shall be the Chairman of the 
Arbitral Tribunal.
(d) If the second Arbitrator has not been 
appointed within the prescribed period, or 
if the parties to the dispute have not 
reached agreement within the prescribed 
period on the appointment of the third 
Arbitrator, the Arbitrator or Arbitrators 
shall be appointed, at the request of any 
party to the dispute and within 30 days of 
the receipt of such request, by the 
President of the International Court of 
Justice from the list referred to in Article 2 
of this Annex and subject to the conditions 
prescribed in subparagraphs (b) and (c) 
above. In performing the functions 
accorded him in this subparagraph, the 
President of the Court shall consult the 
parties to the dispute and the Chairman of 
the Commission.
(e) If the President of the International Court 
of Justice is unable to perform the 
functions accorded him in subparagraph 
(d) above or is a national of a party to the 
dispute, the functions shall be performed 
by the Vice-President of the Court, except 
that if the Vice-President is unable to 
perform the functions or is a national of a 
party to the dispute the functions shall be 
performed by the next most senior 
member of the Court who is available and 
is not a national of a party to the dispute.
2 Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner
prescribed for the initial appointment.
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3 In disputes involving more than two 
Parlies, those Parties having the same interest 
shall appoint one Arbitrator by agreement 
within the period specified in paragraph 1(b) 
above.
Article 4
The party to the dispute commencing 
proceedings shall so notify the other party or 
parties to the dispute and the Executive 
Secretary in writing. Such notification shall 
include a statement of the claim and the grounds 
on which it is based. The notification shall be 
transmitted by the Executive Secretary to all 
Parties.
Article 5
1 Unless the parties to the dispute agree 
otherwise, arbitration shall take place at the 
headquarters of the Commission, where the 
records of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be kept 
The Arbitral Tribunal shall adopt its own rules 
of procedure. Such rules shall ensure that each 
party to the dispute has a full opportunity to be 
heard and to present its case and shall also 
ensure that the proceedings are conducted 
expeditiously.
2 The Arbitral Tribunal may hear and decide 
counterclaims arising out of the dispute.
Article 6
1 The Arbitral Tribunal, where it considers 
that prima facie it has jurisdiction under this 
Convention, may:
(a) at the request of any party to a dispute, 
indicate such provisional measures as it 
considers necessary to preserve the 
respective rights of the parties to the 
dispute;
(b) prescribe any provisional measures which 
it considers appropriate under the 
circumstances to prevent serious harm to 
the Antarctic environment or dependent or 
associated ecosystems.
2 The parties to a dispute shall comply 
promptly with any provisional measures 
prescribed under paragraph 1(b) above pending 
an award under Article 9 of this Annex.
3 Notwithstanding Article 57(1), (2) and (3) 
of this Convention, a party to any dispute that 
may arise falling within the categories specified 
in Article 58(1 )(a) to (g) of this Convention
may at any time, by notification to the other 
party or parties to the dispute and to the 
Executive Secretary in accordance with Article 
4 of this Annex, request that the Arbitral 
Tribunal be constituted as a matter of 
exceptional urgency to indicate or prescribe 
emergency provisional measures in accordance 
with this Article. In such case, the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall be constituted as soon as possible 
in accordance with Article 3 of this Annex, 
except that the time periods in Article 3(l)(b),
(c) and (d) shall be reduced to 14 days in each 
case. The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide upon 
the request for emergency provisional measures 
within two months of the appointment of its 
Chairman.
4 Following a decision by the Arbitral 
Tribunal upon a request for emergency 
provisional measures in accordance with 
paragraph 3 above, settlement of the dispute 
shall proceed in accordance with Articles 56 
and 57 of this Convention.
Article 7
Any Party which believes it has a legal interest, 
whether general or individual, which may be 
substantially affected by the award of an 
Arbitral Tribunal, may, unless the Arbitral 
Tribunal decides otherwise, intervene in the 
proceedings.
Article 8
The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the 
work of the Arbitral Tribunal and, in particular, 
in accordance with their law and using all 
means at their disposal, shall provide it with all 
relevant documents and information, and enable 
it, when necessary, to call witnesses or experts 
and receive their evidence.
Article 9
If one of the parties to the dispute does not 
appear before the Arbitral Tribunal or fails to 
defend its case, any other party to the dispute 
may request the Arbitral Tribunal to continue 
the proceedings and make its award.
Article 10
1 The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide, on the 
basis of this Convention and other rules of law 
not incompatible with it, such disputes as are 
submitted to i t
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2 The Arbitral Tribunal may decide, gx 
aeauo & bono. a dispute submitted to it, if the 
parties to the dispute so agree.
Article 11
1 Before making its award, the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall satisfy itself that it has 
competence in respect of the dispute and that 
the claim or counterclaim is well founded in 
fact and law.
2 The award shall be accompanied by a 
statement of reasons for the decision and shall 
be communicated to the Executive Secretary 
who shall transmit it to all Parties.
3 The award shall be final and binding on 
the parties to the dispute and on any Party 
which intervened in the proceedings and shall 
be complied with without delay. The Arbitral 
Tribunal shall interpret the award at the request
of a party to the dispute or of any intervening 
Party.
4 The award shall have no binding force 
except in respect of that particular case.
5 Unless the Arbitral Tribunal decides 
otherwise, the expenses of the Arbitral Tribunal, 
including the remuneration of the Arbitrators, 
shall be borne by the parties to the dispute in 
equal shares.
Article 12
All decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal, including 
those referred to in Articles 5, 6 and 11 of this 
Annex, shall be made by a majority of the 
Arbitrators who may not abstain from voting.
The following Treaty parties signed CRAMRA in the year-long signature period which began on 25 
November 1988.
Consultative Parties
Brazil 25 November 1988
Finland 25 November 1988*
New Zealand 25 November 1988
Norway 25 November 1988
Republic of Korea 25 November 1988*
South Africa 25 November 1988
Sweden 25 November 1988
USSR 25 November 1988
Uruguay 25 November 1988
United States 30 November 1988
Poland 24 February 1989
Argentina 17 March 1989
Chile 17 March 1989
United Kingdom 22 March 1989
China 28 June 1989
East Germany 21 November 1989
Japan 22 November 1989
Non-Consultative Parties
Denmark 24 February 1989
Czechoslovakia 4 November 1989
* Finland and the Republic of Korea were Non-Consultative Parties when they signed the 
Convention. Both attained Consultative Party status on 9 October 1989.
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Appendix 9
RECOMMENDATION XV-1 (1989)
COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ANTARCTIC 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEPENDENT AND ASSOCIATED ECOSYSTEMS
The Representatives,
Convinced of the need to preserve the Antarctic 
Treaty system so as to ensure that Antarctica 
does not become the scene of object of 
international discord;
Bearing in mind the special legal and political 
status of Antarctica and the special
responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties to ensure that all activities 
in Antarctica are consistent with the purposes 
and principles of the Antarctic Treaty;
Recalling the designation of Antarctica as a 
Special Conservation Area;
Recognising the vulnerability to human 
interference of the Antarctic environment and 
its dependent and associated ecosystems;
Recognising further, the unique opportunities 
Antarctica offers for scientific research on 
processes of global as well as regional 
importance;
Taking into account international concern for 
the environment and the importance of 
Antarctica for the global environment;
Bearing in mind the substantial body of 
measures adopted by the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties in recognition of their 
special responsibilities for the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and its dependent and 
associated ecosystems;
Recalling in this context Articles V and EX(l)(f) 
of the Antarctic Treaty and Recommendations 
setting out general principles for the protection 
of the Antarctic environment;
Recalling also:
(a) the Agreed Measures for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and 
Flora and associated recommendations;
(b) the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals (which entered into 
force on 11 March 1978);
(c) the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(which entered into force on 7 April 
1982);
(d) the Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
(which has not yet entered into force);
(e) Recommendations relating to:
(i) the Antarctic Protected Area
system concerning Specially 
Protected Areas, Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest and 
Historic Sites and
Monuments;
(ii) the Code of Conduct for 
Antarctic expeditions and 
station activities;
(iii) the effects of Antarctic
tourism and non­
governmental expeditions;
(iv) the use of radio-isotopes;
(v) oil contamination;
(vi) the prohibition on the disposal 
of nuclear waste; and
(vii) environmental impact
assessment procedures;
as well as work undertaken in relation to the 
uses of Antarctic ice;
Taking note of proposals made at XVth 
Consultative Meeting by France and Australia 
for a comprehensive Convention for the 
Protection of the Antarctic Environment which 
would establish Antarctica as a natural reserve, 
land of science; by the United States for 
comprehensive measures building on the 
components of the Antarctic Treaty system; by 
Chile on comprehensive measures, which 
include the development of the concept of 
Antarctica as a Special Conservation Area; by 
New Zealand for comprehensive measures 
constituting an integrated and binding 
environmental protection regime; and by 
Sweden relating to common elements for 
environmental protection;
Welcoming the further substantial progress 
made on the protection of the Antarctic 
environment and its dependent and associated 
ecosystems through the work of this 
Consultative Meeting including the adoption of 
Recommendation XV-3 on Waste Disposal; 
Recommendation XV-4 on the Prevention, 
Control and Response to Marine Pollution; 
Recommendation XV-5 on Environmental 
Monitoring in Antarctica; Recommendation 
XV-6 on New Sites of Special Scientific
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Interest; Recommendation XV-8 amending 
Article VIII of the Agreed Measures to provide 
for Management Plans for Specially Protected 
Areas (SPAs); Recommendation XV-9 on 
Development of improved descriptions and 
management plans for SPAs; Recommendation 
XV-10 on Establishment of Specially Reserved 
Areas; Recommendation XV-11 on
Establishment of Multiple-use Planning Areas; 
Recommendation XV-14 and XV-15 on 
promotion of international scientific 
cooperation; Recommendation XV-17 on the 
Siting of Stations; Recommendation XV-19 on 
Charting of Antarctic waters; Recommendation 
XV-21 on Antarctic Ice and the Declaration on 
the Ozone Layer and Climate Change;
Acknowledging the need, in the light of the 
unique qualities of Antarctica and increasing 
human activities there, to ensure the effective 
implementation, coordination and further 
elaboration of the system of protection of the 
Antarctic environment and its dependent and 
associated ecosystems;
Recommend to their Governments that:
1. They undertake as a priority objective 
the further elaboration, maintenance and 
effective implementation of a comprehensive 
system for the protection of the Antarctic 
environment and its dependent and associated 
ecosystems aimed at ensuring that human 
activity does not have adverse impacts on the 
Antarctic environment or its dependent or 
associated ecosystems or compromise the 
scientific, aesthetic or wilderness values of 
Antarctica.
2. To contribute to this objective, a 
Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
be held in 1990 to explore and discuss all 
proposals relating to the comprehensive 
protection of the Antarctic environment and its 
dependent and associated ecosystems.
3. In addressing the requirements of such 
a comprehensive system, they:
(a) have regard to the principles for the 
protection of the Antarctic 
environment and its dependent and 
associated ecosystems already 
established under the Antarctic Treaty 
system and shall consider the need to 
elaborate further, expand and 
supplement those principles;
(b) review the existing body of measures 
for the protection of the Antarctic 
environment and its dependent and
associated ecosystems in order, inter 
alia, to:
(i) identify those measures which 
should be updated, strengthened or 
otherwise improved;
(ii) identify areas where the 
existing measures should be 
supplemented;
(iii) consider the nature of the 
legal obligations contained in 
existing measures and the 
need, as necessary, to state 
those obligations with greater 
precision;
(iv) make provision for the 
promotion of research related 
to environmental management 
decisions;
(v) promote the establishment of 
procedures for assessing the 
possible impact of human 
activities on the Antarctic 
environment and its 
dependent and associated 
ecosystems in order to 
provide for informed 
decision-making as to their 
acceptability;
(vi) promote the establishment of 
procedures to monitor the 
effectiveness and adequacy of 
environmental protection 
measures;
(vii) consider the role of an 
information and data base for 
the effective implementation, 
revision and extension of 
environmental protection 
measures;
(c) consider if and to what extent 
institutional arrangements may be 
necessary and the form or forms of the 
legal or other measures needed to 
ensure the maintenance, integration, 
consistency and comprehensiveness of 
the system of protection of the 
Antarctic environment and its 
dependent and associated ecosystems.
Appendix 10
PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
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Preamble
The States Parties to this Protocol to the 
Antarctic Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 
Parties,
Convinced of the need to enhance the protection 
of the Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems;
Convinced of the need to strengthen the 
Antarctic Treaty so as to ensure that Antarctica 
shall continue forever to be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and shall not become the 
scene of object of international discord;
Bearing in mind the special legal and political 
status of Antarctica and the special 
responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties to ensure that all activities 
in Antarctica are consistent with the purposes 
and principles of the Antarctic Treaty;
Recalling the designation of Antarctica as a 
Special Conservation Area and other measures 
adopted under the Antarctic Treaty system to 
protect the Antarctic environment and 
dependent and associated ecosystems;
Acknowledging further the unique opportunities 
Antarctica offers for scientific monitoring of 
and research on processes of global as well as 
regional importance;
Reaffirming the conservation principles of the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources;
Convinced that the development of a 
comprehensive regime for the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems is in the interest of all 
mankind as a whole;
Desiring to supplement the Antarctic Treaty to 
this end;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
Definitions
For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) "The Antarctic Treaty" means the 
Antarctic Treaty done at Washington on 1 
December 1959;
(b) "Antarctic Treaty area" means the area to 
which the provisions of the Antarctic 
Treaty apply in accordance with Article VI 
of that Treaty;
(c) "Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings" 
means the meetings referred to in Article 
IX of the Antarctic Treaty;
(d) "Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties" 
means the Contracting Parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty entitled to appoint 
representatives to participate in the 
meetings referred to in Article IX of that 
Treaty;
(e) "Antarctic Treaty system" means the 
Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect 
under that Treaty, its associated separate 
international instruments in force and the 
measures in effect under those 
instruments;
(0 "Arbitral Tribunal" means the Arbitral 
Tribunal established in accordance with 
the Schedule to this Protocol, which forms 
an integral part thereof;
(g) "Committee" means the Committee for 
Environmental Protection established in 
accordance with Article 11.
Article 2
Objective and Designation
The Parties commit themselves to the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems and hereby designate Antarctica as 
a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.
Article 3
Environmental Principles
1. The protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, 
including its wilderness and aesthetic values 
and its value as an area for the conduct of 
scientific research, in particular research 
essential to understanding the global 
environment, shall be fundamental
356
considerations in the planning and conduct of 
all activities in the Antarctic Treaty area.
2. To this end:
(a) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall 
be planned and conducted so as to limit 
adverse impacts on the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems;
(b) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall 
be planned and conducted so as to avoid:
(i) adverse effects on climate or 
weather patterns;
(ii) significant adverse effects on air or 
water quality;
(iii) significant changes in the 
atmospheric, terrestrial (including 
aquatic), glacial or marine 
environments;
(iv) detrimental changes in the 
distribution, abundance or 
productivity of species or 
populations of species of fauna and 
flora;
(v) further jeopardy to endangered or 
threatened species or populations of 
such species; or
(vi) degradation of, or substantial risk 
to, areas of biological, scientific, 
historic, aesthetic or wilderness 
significance;
(c) activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall 
be planned and conducted on the basis of 
information sufficient to allow prior 
assessments of, and informed judgments 
about, their possible impacts on the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems and on the value of 
Antarctica for the conduct of scientific 
research; such judgments shall take full 
account of:
(i) the scope of the activity, including 
its area, duration and intensity;
(ii) the cumulative impacts of the 
activity, both by itself and in 
combination with other activities in 
the Antarctic Treaty area;
(iii) whether the activity will 
detrimentally affect any other 
activity in the Antarctic Treaty 
area;
(iv) whether technology and procedures 
are available to provide for 
environmentally safe operations;
(v) whether there exists the capacity to 
monitor key environmental 
parameters and ecosystem 
components so as to identify and 
provide early warning of any
adverse effects of the activity and 
to provide for such modification of 
operating procedures as may be 
necessary in the light of the results 
of monitoring or increased 
knowledge of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems; and
(vi) whether there exists the capacity to 
respond promptly and effectively to 
accidents, particularly those with 
potential environmental effects;
(d) regular and effective monitoring shall take 
place to allow assessment of the impacts 
of ongoing activities, including the 
verification of predicted impacts;
(e) regular and effective monitoring shall take 
place to facilitate early detection of the 
possible unforeseen effects of activities 
carried on both within and outside the 
Antarctic Treaty area on the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems.
3. Activities shall be planned and conducted 
in the Antarctic Treaty area so as to accord 
priority to scientific research and to preserve the 
value of Antarctica as an area for the conduct of 
such research, including research essential to 
understanding the global environment.
4. Activities undertaken in the Antarctic 
Treaty area pursuant to scientific research 
programmes, tourism and all other 
governmental and non-governmental activities 
in the Antarctic Treaty area for which advance 
notice is required in accordance with Article 
VII(5) of the Antarctic Treaty, including 
associated logistic support activities, shall:
(a) take place in a manner consistent with the 
principles in this Article; and
(b) be modified, suspended or cancelled if 
they result in or threaten to result in 
impacts upon the Antarctic environment or 
dependent or associated ecosystems 
inconsistent with those principles.
Article 4
Relationship with other components of the 
Antarctic Treaty System
1. This Protocol shall supplement the 
Antarctic Treaty and shall neither modify nor 
amend that Treaty.
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2. Nothing in this Protocol shall derogate 
from the rights and obligations of the Parties to 
this Protocol under the other international 
instruments in force within the Antarctic Treaty 
system.
Article 5
Consistency with the other components of the 
Antarctic Treaty system
The Parties shall consult and co-operate with 
the Contracting Parties to the other international 
instruments in force within the Antarctic Treaty 
system and their respective institutions with a 
view to ensuring the achievement of the 
objectives and principles of this Protocol and 
avoiding any interference with the achievement 
of the objectives and principles of those 
instruments or any inconsistency between the 
implementation of those instruments and of this 
Protocol.
Article 6
Co-operation
1. The Parties shall co-operate in the 
planning and conduct of activities in the 
Antarctic Treaty area. To this end, each Party 
shall endeavour to:
(a) promote co-operative programmes of 
scientific, technical and educational value, 
concerning the protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems;
(b) provide appropriate assistance to other 
Parties in the preparation of environmental 
impact assessments;
(c) provide to other Parties upon request 
information relevant to any potential 
environmental risk and assistance to 
minimise the effects of accidents which 
may damage the Antarctic environment or 
dependent and associated ecosystems;
(d) consult with other Parties with regard to 
the choice of sites for prospective stations 
and other facilities so as to avoid the 
cumulative impacts caused by their 
excessive concentration in any location;
(e) where appropriate, undertake joint 
expeditions and share the use of stations 
and other facilities; and
(f) carry out such steps as may be agreed 
upon at Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings.
2. Each Party undertakes, to the extent 
possible, to share information that may be 
helpful to other Parties in planning and 
conducting their activities in the Antarctic
Treaty area, with a view to the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems.
3. The Parties shall co-operate with those 
Parties which may exercise jurisdiction in areas 
adjacent to the Antarctic Treaty area with a 
view to ensuring that activities in the Antarctic 
Treaty area do not have adverse environmental 
impacts on those areas.
Article 7
Prohibition of Mineral Resource Activities
Any activity relating to mineral resources, other 
than scientific research, shall be prohibited.
Article 8
Environmental Impact Assessment
1. Proposed activities referred to in
paragraph 2 below shall be subject to the 
procedures set out in Annex I for prior 
assessment of the impacts of those activities on 
the Antarctic environment or on dependent or 
associated ecosystems according to whether 
those activities are identified as having:
(a) less than a minor or transitory impact;
(b) a minor or transitory impact; or
(c) more than a minor or transitory impact.
2. Each Party shall ensure that the
assessment procedures set out in Annex I are 
applied in the planning processes leading to 
decisions about any activities undertaken in the 
Antarctic Treaty area pursuant to scientific 
research programmes, tourism and all other 
governmental and non-governmental activities 
in the Antarctic Treaty area for which advance 
notice is required under Article VII(5) of the 
Antarctic Treaty, including associated logistic 
support activities.
3. The assessment procedures set out in 
Annex I shall apply to any change in an activity 
whether the change arises from an increase or 
decrease in the intensity of an existing activity, 
from the addition of an activity, the 
decommissioning of a facility, or otherwise.
4. Where activities are planned jointly by 
more than one Party, the Parties involved shall 
nominate one of their number to coordinate the 
implementation of the environmental impact 
assessment procedures set out in Annex I.
Article 9 
Annexes
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1. The Annexes to this Protocol shall form an 
integral part thereof.
2. Annexes, additional to Annexes I-IV, may 
be adopted and become effective in accordance 
with Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty.
3. Amendments and modifications to 
Annexes may be adopted and become effective 
in accordance with Article IX of the Antarctic 
Treaty, provided that any Annex may itself 
make provision for amendments and 
modifications to become effective on an 
accelerated basis.
4. Annexes and any amendments and 
modifications thereto which have become 
effective in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 
above shall, unless an Annex itself provides 
otherwise in respect of the entry into effect of 
any amendment or modification thereto, 
become effective for a Contracting Party to the 
Antarctic Treaty which is not an Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Party, or which was not an 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party at the time 
of the adoption, when notice of approval of that 
Contracting Party has been received by the 
Depositary.
5. Annexes shall, except to the extent that an 
Annex provides otherwise, be subject to the 
procedures for dispute settlement set out in 
Articles 18 to 20.
Article 10
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings
1. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
shall, drawing upon the best scientific and 
technical advice available:
(a) define, in accordance with the provisions 
of this Protocol, the general policy for the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems; and
(b) adopt measures under Article IX of the 
Antarctic Treaty for the implementation of 
this Protocol.
2. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
shall review the work of the Committee and 
shall draw fully upon its advice and 
recommendations in carrying out the tasks 
referred to in paragraph 1 above, as well as 
upon the advice of the Scientific Committee on 
Antarctic Research.
Article 11
Committee for Environmental Protection
1. There is hereby established the Committee 
for Environmental Protection.
2. Each Party shall be entitled to be a 
member of the Committee and to appoint a 
representative who may be accompanied by 
experts and advisers.
3. Observer status in the Committee shall be 
open to any Contracting Party to the Antarctic 
Treaty which is not a Party to this Protocol.
4. The Committee shall invite the President 
of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic 
Research and the Chairman of the Scientific 
Committee for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources to participate as 
observers at its sessions. The Committee may 
also, with the approval of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting, invite such other relevant 
scientific, environmental and technical 
organisations which can contribute to its work 
to participate as observers at its sessions.
5. The Committee shall present a report on 
each of its sessions to the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting. The report shall cover 
all matters considered at the session and shall 
reflect the views expressed. The report shall be 
circulated to the Parties and to observers 
attending the session, and shall thereupon be 
made publicly available.
6. The Committee shall adopt its rules of 
procedure which shall be subject to approval by 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.
Article 12
Functions of the Committee
1. The functions of the Committee shall be to 
provide advice and formulate recommendations 
to the Parties in connection with the 
implementation of this Protocol, including the 
operation of its Annexes, for consideration at 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, and to 
perform such other functions as may be referred 
to it by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings. In particular, it shall provide advice 
on:
(a) the effectiveness of measures taken 
pursuant to this Protocol;
(b) the need to update, strengthen or otherwise 
improve such measures;
359
(c) the need for additional measures, 
including the need for additional Annexes, 
where appropriate;
(d) the application and implementation of the 
environmental impact assessment 
procedures set out in Article 8 and Annex 
I;
(e) means of minimising or mitigating 
environmental impacts of activities in the 
Antarctic Treaty area;
(f) procedures for situations requiring urgent 
action, including response action in 
environmental emergencies;
(g) the operation and further elaboration of the 
Antarctic Protected Area system;
(h) inspection procedures, including formats 
for inspection reports and checklists for 
the conduct of inspections;
(i) the collection, archiving, exchange and 
evaluation of information related to 
environmental protection;
(j) the state of the Antarctic environment; and
(k) the need for scientific research, including 
environmental monitoring, related to the 
implementation of this Protocol.
2. In carrying out its functions, the 
Committee shall, as appropriate, consult with 
the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, 
the Scientific Committee for the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and other 
relevant scientific, environmental and technical 
organisations.
Article 13
Compliance with this Protocol
1. Each Party shall take appropriate measures 
within its competence, including the adoption of 
laws and regulations, administrative actions and 
enforcement measures, to ensure compliance 
with this Protocol.
2. Each Party shall exert appropriate efforts, 
consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, to the end that no one engages in any 
activity contrary to this Protocol.
3. Each Party shall notify all other Parties of 
the measures it takes pursuant to paragraphs 1 
and 2 above.
4. Each Party shall draw the attention of all 
other Parties to any activity which in its opinion 
affects the implementation of the objectives and 
principles of this Protocol.
5. The Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings shall draw the attention of any State 
which is not a Party to this Protocol to any
activity undertaken by that State, its agencies, 
instrumentalities, natural or juridical persons, 
ships, aircraft or other means of transport which 
affects the implementation of the objectives and 
principles of this Protocol.
Article 14 
Inspection
1. In order to promote the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems, and to ensure 
compliance with this Protocol, the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties shall arrange, 
individually or collectively, for inspections by 
observers to be made in accordance with Article 
VII of the Antarctic Treaty.
2. Observers are:
(a) observers designated by any Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Party who shall be 
nationals of that Party; and
(b) any observers designated at Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meetings to carry out 
inspections under procedures to be 
established by an Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting.
3. Parties shall co-operate fully with 
observers undertaking inspections, and shall 
ensure that during inspections, observers are 
given access to all parts of stations, 
installations, equipment, ships and aircraft open 
to inspection under Article VII(3) of the 
Antarctic Treaty, as well as to all records 
maintained thereon which are called for 
pursuant to this Protocol.
4. Reports of inspections shall be sent to the 
Parties whose stations, installations, equipment, 
ships or aircraft are covered by the reports. 
After those Parties have been given the 
opportunity to comment, the reports and any 
comments thereon shall be circulated to all the 
Parties and to the Committee, considered at the 
next Antarctic Treaty Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting, and thereafter made 
publicly available.
Article 15
Emergency Response Action
1. In order to respond to environmental 
emergencies in the Antarctic Treaty area, each 
Party agrees to:
(a) provide for prompt and effective response 
action to such emergencies which might 
arise in the performance of scientific
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research programmes, tourism and all 
other governmental and non-governmental 
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area for 
which advance notice is required under 
Article VII(5) of the Antarctic Treaty, 
including associated logistic support 
activities;
(b) establish contingency plans for response to 
incidents with potential adverse effects on 
the Antarctic environment or dependent or 
associated ecosystems.
2. To this end, the Parties shall:
(a) co-operate in the formulation and 
implementation of such contingency plans; 
and
(b) establish procedures for immediate 
notification of, and co-operative response 
to, environmental emergencies.
3. In the implementation of this Article, the 
Parties shall draw upon the advice of the 
appropriate international organisations.
Article 16
Liability
Consistent with the objectives of this Protocol 
for the comprehensive protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems, the Parties undertake to 
elaborate rules and procedures relating to 
liability for damage arising from activities 
taking place in the Antarctic Treaty area and 
covered by this Protocol. Those rules and 
procedures shall be included in one or more 
Annexes to be adopted in accordance with 
Article 9(2).
Article 17
Annual Report by Parties
1. Each Party shall report annually on the 
steps taken to implement this Protocol. Such 
reports shall include notifications made in 
accordance with Article 13(3), contingency 
plans established in accordance with Article 15 
and any other notifications and information 
called for pursuant to this Protocol for which 
there is no other provision concerning the 
circulation and exchange of information.
2. Reports made in accordance with 
paragraph 1 above shall be circulated to all 
Parties and to the Committee, considered at the 
next Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, and 
made publicly available.
Article 18
Dispute Settlement
If a dispute arises concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Protocol, the parties to the 
dispute shall, at the request of any one of them, 
consult among themselves as soon as possible 
with a view to having the dispute resolved by 
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful 
means to which the parties to the dispute agree.
Article 19
Choice of Dispute Settlement Procedure
1 Each Party, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to this 
Protocol, or at any time thereafter, may choose, 
by written declaration, one or both of the 
following means for the settlement of disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of 
Articles 7, 8 and 15 and, expect to the extent 
that an Annex provides otherwise, the 
provisions of any Annex and, insofar as it 
relates to these Articles and provisions, Article 
13:
(a) the International Court of Justice;
(b) the Arbitral Tribunal.
2 A declaration made under paragraph 1 
above shall not affect the operation of Article 
18 and Article 20(2).
3 A Party that has not made a declaration 
under paragraph 1 above or in respect of which 
a declaration is no longer in force shall be 
deemed to have accepted the competence of the 
Arbitral Tribunal.
4 If the parties to a dispute have accepted 
the same means for the settlement of a dispute, 
the dispute may be submitted only to that 
procedure, unless the parties otherwise agree.
5 If the parties to a dispute have not 
accepted the same means for the settlement of a 
dispute, or if they have both accepted both 
means, the dispute may be submitted only to the 
Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties otherwise 
agree.
6 A declaration made under paragraph 1 
above shall remain in force until it expires in 
accordance with its terms or until three months 
after written notice of revocation has been 
deposited with the Depositary.
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7 A new declaration, a notice of revocation 
or the expiry of a declaration shall not in any 
way affect proceedings pending before the 
International Court of Justice or the Arbitral 
Tribunal, unless the parties to the dispute 
otherwise agree.
8 Declarations and notices referred to in this 
Article shall be deposited with the Depositary 
who shall transmit copies thereof to all Parties.
Article 20
Dispute Settlement Procedure
1. If the parties to a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of Articles 7, 8 or 
15 or, except to the extent that an Annex 
provides otherwise, the provisions of any Annex 
or, insofar as it relates to these Articles and 
provisions, Article 13, have not agreed on a 
means for resolving it within 12 months of the 
request for consultation pursuant to Article 18, 
the dispute shall be referred, at the request of 
any party to the dispute, for settlement in 
accordance with the procedure determined by 
Article 19(4) and (5).
2. The Arbitral Tribunal shall not be 
competent to decide or rule upon any matter 
within the scope of Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. In addition, nothing in this Protocol 
shall be interpreted as conferring competence of 
jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice 
or any other tribunal established for the purpose 
of settling disputes between Parties to decide or 
otherwise rule upon any matter within the scope 
of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.
Article 21
Signature
This Protocol shall be open for signature at 
Madrid on the 4 th of October 1991 and 
thereafter at Washington until the 3rd of 
October 1992 by any State which is a 
Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty.
Ariels 22
Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or
Accession
1. This Protocol is subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval by signatory States.
2. After the 3rd of October 1992 this 
Protocol shall be open for accession by any 
State which is a Contracting Party to the 
Antarctic Treaty.
3. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession shall be deposited with 
the Government of the United States of 
America, hereby designated as the Depositary.
4. After the date on which this Protocol has 
entered into force, the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties shall not act upon a 
notification regarding the entitlement of a 
Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty to 
appoint representatives to participate in 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings in 
accordance with Article IX(2) of the Antarctic 
Treaty unless that Contracting Party has first 
ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to this 
Protocol.
Article 23
Entry into Force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the 
thirtieth day following the date of deposit of 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession by all States which are Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties at the date on which 
this Protocol is adopted.
2. For each Contracting Party to the 
Antarctic Treaty which, subsequent to the date 
of entry into force of this Protocol, deposits an 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession, this Protocol shall enter into force 
on the thirtieth day following such deposit.
Article 24 
Reservations
Reservations to this Protocol shall not be 
permitted.
Article 25
Modification or Amendment
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of 
Article 9, this Protocol may be modified or 
amended at any time in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in Article XII (l)(a) and (b) 
of the Antarctic Treaty.
2. If, after the expiration of 50 years from the 
date of entry into force of this Protocol, any of 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties so 
requests by a communication addressed to the 
Depositary, a conference shall be held as soon 
as practicable to review the operation of this 
Protocol.
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3. A modification or amendment proposed at 
any Review Conference called pursuant to 
paragraph 2 above shall be adopted by a 
majority of the Parties, including 3/4 of the 
States which are Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties at the time of adoption of this Protocol.
4. Any modification or amendment adopted 
pursuant to paragraph 3 above shall enter into 
force upon ratification by 3/4 of the 
Consultative Parties, including ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession by all States 
which are Consultative Parties at the time of the 
adoption of this Protocol.
5(a) With respect to Article 7, the prohibition 
on Antarctic mineral resource activities 
contained therein shall continue unless 
there is in force a binding legal regime on 
Antarctic mineral resource activities that 
includes an agreed means for determining 
whether, and, if so, under which 
conditions, any such activities would be 
acceptable. This regime shall fully 
safeguard the interests of all States 
referred to in Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty and apply the principles thereof. 
Therefore, if a modification or 
amendments to Article 7 is proposed at a 
Review Conference referred to in 
paragraph 2 above, it shall include such a 
binding legal regime.
(b) If any such modification or amendment 
has not entered into force within 3 years of 
the date of its adoption, any Party may at 
any time thereafter notify to the 
Depositary of its withdrawal from this 
Protocol, and such withdrawal shall take 
effect 2 years after receipt of the notice by 
the Depositary.
Article 26
Notifications by the Depositary
The Depositary shall notify all Contracting 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty of the following:
(a) signatures of this Protocol and the deposits 
of instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession;
(b) the date of entry into force of this Protocol 
and any additional Annex thereto;
(c) the date of entry into force of any 
amendment or modification to this 
Protocol; and
(d) the deposit of declarations and notices 
pursuant to Article 19; and
(e) any notification received pursuant to 
Article 25(5)(b).
Article 27
Authentic Texts and Registration with the 
United Nations
1. This Protocol, done in the English, French, 
Russian and Spanish languages, each version 
being equally authentic, shall be deposited in 
the archives of the Government of the United 
States of America, which shall transmit duly 
certified copies thereof to all Contracting 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.
2. This Protocol shall be registered by the 
Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
SCHEDULE TO THE PROTOCOL 
ARBITRATION 
Article 1
1. The Arbitral Tribxunal shall be constituted 
and shall function in accordance with this 
Protocol, including this Schedule.
2. The Secretary referred to in this Schedule 
is the Secretary General of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration.
Article 2
1 Each Party shall be entitled to designate up 
to three Arbitrators, at least one of whom shall 
be designated within three months of the entry 
into force of this Protocol for that Party. Each 
Arbitrator shall be experienced in Antarctic 
affairs, have thorough knowledge of 
international law and enjoying the highest 
reputation for fairness, competence and 
integrity. The names of the persons so 
designated shall constitute the list of 
Arbitrators. Each Party shall at all times 
maintain the name of at least one Arbitrator on 
the list.
2 Subject to paragraph 3 below, an 
Arbitrator designated by a Party shall remain on 
the list for a period of five years and shall be 
eligible for redesignation by that Party for 
additional five year periods.
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3 A Party which designated an Arbitrator 
may withdraw the name of that Arbitrator from 
the list. If an Arbitrator dies or if a Party for 
any reason withdraws from the list the name of 
an Arbitrator designated by it, the Party which 
designated the Arbitrator in question shall 
notify the Secretary promptly. An Arbitrator 
whose name is withdrawn from the list shall 
continue to serve on any Arbitral Tribunal to 
which that Arbitrator has been appointed until 
the completion of proceedings before the 
Arbitral Tribunal.
4 The Secretary shall ensure that an up-to- 
date list is maintained of the Arbitrators 
designated pursuant to this Article.
Article 3
1 The Arbitral Tribunal shall be composed 
of three Arbitrators who shall be appointed as 
follows:
(a) the party to the dispute commencing the 
proceedings shall appoint one Arbitrator, 
who may be its national, from the list 
referred to in Article 2. This appointment 
shall be included in the notification 
referred to in Article 4.
(b) Within 40 days of the receipt of that 
notification, the other party to the dispute 
shall appoint the second Arbitrator, who 
may be its national, from the list referred 
to in Article 2.
(c) Within 60 days of the appointment of the 
second Arbitrator, the parties to the 
dispute shall appoint by agreement the 
third Arbitrator from the list referred to in 
Article 2. The third Arbitrator shall not be 
either a national of, or a person designated 
by, a party to the dispute, or of the same 
nationality as either of the first two 
Arbitrators. The third Arbitrate»- shall be 
the Chairperson of the Arbitral Tribunal.
(d) If the second Arbitrator has not been 
appointed within the prescribed period, or 
if the parties to the dispute have not 
reached agreement within the prescribed 
period on the appointment of the third 
Arbitrator, the Arbitrator or Arbitrators 
shall be appointed, at the request of any 
party to the dispute and within 30 days of 
the receipt of such request, by the 
President of the International Court of 
Justice from the list referred to in Article 2 
and subject to the conditions prescribed in 
subparagraphs (b) and (c) above. In
performing the functions accorded him or 
her in this subparagraph, the President of 
the Court shall consult the parties to the 
dispute.
(e) If the President of the International Court 
of Justice is unable to perform the 
functions accorded him or her in 
subparagraph (d) above or is a national of 
a party to the dispute, the functions shall 
be performed by the Vice-President of the 
Court, except that if the Vice-President is 
unable to perform the functions or is a 
national of a party to the dispute the 
functions shall be performed by the next 
most senior member of the Court who is 
available and is not a national of a party to 
the dispute.
2 Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner 
prescribed for the initial appointment.
3 In any dispute involving more than two 
Parties, those Parties having the same interest 
shall appoint one Arbitrator by agreement 
within the period specified in paragraph 1(b) 
above.
Article 4
The party to the dispute commencing 
proceedings shall so notify the other party or 
parties to the dispute and the Secretary in 
writing. Such notification shall include a 
statement of the claim and the grounds on 
which it is based. The notification shall be 
transmitted by the Secretary to all Parties.
Article 5
1 Unless the parties to the dispute agree 
otherwise, arbitration shall take place at The 
Hague, where the records of the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall be kept. The Arbitral Tribunal 
shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Such 
rules shall ensure that each party to the dispute 
has a full opportunity to be heard and to present 
its case and shall also ensure that the 
proceedings are conducted expeditiously.
2 The Arbitral Tribunal may hear and decide 
counterclaims arising out of the dispute.
364
Article 6
1 The Arbitral Tribunal, where it considers 
that prima facie it has jurisdiction under this 
Protocol, may:
(a) at the request of any party to a dispute, 
indicate such provisional measures as it 
considers necessary to preserve the 
respective rights of the parties to the 
dispute;
(b) prescribe any provisional measures which 
it considers appropriate under the 
circumstances to prevent serious harm to 
the Antarctic environment or dependent or 
associated ecosystems.
2 The parties to a dispute shall comply 
promptly with any provisional measures 
prescribed under paragraph 1(b) above pending 
an award under Article 9.
3 Notwithstanding Article 20(1) and (2) of 
this Protocol, a party to a dispute may at any 
time, by notification to the other party or parties 
to the dispute and to the Secretary in accordance 
with Article 4, request that the Arbitral Tribunal 
be constituted as a matter of exceptional 
urgency to indicate or prescribe emergency 
provisional measures in accordance with this 
Article. In such case, the Arbitral Tribunal shall 
be constituted as soon as possible in accordance 
with Article 3, except that the time periods in 
Article 3(1 )(b), (c) and (d) shall be reduced to 
14 days in each case. The Arbitral Tribunal 
shall decide upon the request for emergency 
provisional measures within two months of the 
appointment of its Chairperson.
4 Following a decision by the Arbitral 
Tribunal upon a request for emergency 
provisional measures in accordance with 
paragraph 3 above, settlement of the dispute 
shall proceed in accordance with Articles 18 
and 19 of the Protocol.
Article 7
Any Party which believes it has a legal interest, 
whether general or individual, which may be 
substantially affected by the award of an 
Arbitral Tribunal, may, unless the Arbitral 
Tribunal decides otherwise, intervene in the 
proceedings.
Article 8
The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the 
work of the Arbitral Tribunal and, in particular, 
in accordance with their law and using all 
means at their disposal, shall provide it with all 
relevant documents and information, and enable 
it, when necessary, to call witnesses or experts 
and receive their evidence.
Article 9
If one of the parties to the dispute does not 
appear before the Arbitral Tribunal or fails to 
defend its case, any other party to the dispute 
may request the Arbitral Tribunal to continue 
the proceedings and make its award.
Article 10
1 The Arbitral Tribunal shall, on the basis of 
this Protocol and other applicable rules of law 
that are not incompatible with such provisions, 
decide such disputes as are submitted to it.
2 The Arbitral Tribunal may decide, ex 
aequo et bono, a dispute submitted to it, if the 
parties to the dispute so agree.
Article 11
1 Before making its award, the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall satisfy itself that it has 
competence in respect of the dispute and that 
the claim or counterclaim is well founded in 
fact and law.
2 The award shall be accompanied by a 
statement of reasons for the decision and shall 
be communicated to the Secretary who shall 
transmit it to all Parties.
3 The award shall be Final and binding on 
the parties to the dispute and on any Party 
which intervened in the proceedings and shall 
be complied with without delay. The Arbitral 
Tribunal shall interpret the award at the request 
of a party to the dispute or of any intervening 
Party.
4 The award shall have no binding force 
except in respect of that particular case.
5 Unless the Arbitral Tribunal decides 
otherwise, the expenses of the Arbitral Tribunal, 
including the remuneration of the Arbitrators, 
shall be borne by the parties to the dispute in 
equal shares.
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Article 12
All decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal, including 
those referred to in Articles 5, 6 and 11, shall be 
made by a majority of the Arbitrators who may 
not abstain from voting.
Article 13
1. This Schedule may be amended or 
modified by a measure adopted in accordance 
with Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Unless the measure specifies otherwise, the 
amendment or modification shall be deemed to 
have been approved, and shall become 
effective, one year after the close of the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting at which 
it was adopted, unless one or more of the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties notifies 
the Depositary, within that time period, that it 
wishes an extension of that period or that it is 
unable to approve the measure.
2. Any amendment or modification of this 
Schedule which becomes effective in 
accordance with paragraph 1 above shall 
thereafter become effective as to any other Party 
when notice of approval by it has been received 
by the Depositary.
ANNEX I TO THE PROTOCOL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT
Article 1
Preliminary Stage
1. The environmental impacts of proposed 
activities referred to in Article 8 of the Protocol 
shall, before their commencement, be 
considered in accordance with appropriate 
national procedures.
2. If an activity is determined as having less 
than a minor or transitory impact, the activity 
may proceed forthwith.
Article 2
Initial Environmental Evaluation
1. Unless it has been determined that an 
activity will have less than a minor or transitory 
impact, or unless a Comprehensive
Environmental Evaluation is being prepared in 
accordance with Article 3, an Initial 
Environmental Evaluation shall be prepared, it 
shall contain sufficient detail to assess whether 
a proposed activity may have more than a minor 
or transitory impact and shall include:
(a) a description of the proposed activity, 
including its purpose, location, duration, 
and intensity; and
(b) consideration of alternatives to the 
proposed activity and any impacts that the 
activity may have, including consideration 
of cumulative impacts in the light of 
existing and known planned activities.
2. If an Initial Environmental Evaluation 
indicates that a proposed activity is likely to 
have no more than a minor or transitory impact, 
the activity may proceed, provided that 
appropriate procedures, which may include 
monitoring, are put in place to assess and verify 
the impact of the activity.
Article 3
Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation
1. If an Initial Environmental Evaluation 
indicates or if it is otherwise determined that a 
proposed activity is likely to have more than a 
minor or transitory impact, a Comprehensive 
Environmental Evaluation shall be prepared.
2. A Comprehensive Environmental 
Evaluation shall include:
(a) a description of the proposed activity 
including its purpose, location, duration 
and intensity, and possible alternatives to 
the activity, including the alternative of 
not proceeding, and the consequences of 
those alternatives;
(b) a description of the initial environmental 
reference state with which predicted 
changes are to be compared and a 
prediction of the future environmental 
reference state in the absence of the 
proposed activity;
(c) a description of the methods and data used 
to forecast the impacts of the proposed 
activity;
(d) estimation of the nature, extent, duration 
and intensity of the likely direct impacts of 
the proposed activity;
(e) consideration of possible indirect or 
second order impacts of the proposed 
activity;
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(f) consideration of cumulative impacts of the 
proposed activity in the light of existing 
activities and other known planned 
activities;
(g) identification of measures, including 
monitoring programmes, that could be 
taken to minimise or mitigate impacts of 
the proposed activity and to detect 
unforeseen impacts and that could provide 
early warning of any adverse effects of the 
activity as well as to deal promptly and 
effectively with accidents;
(h) identification of unavoidable impacts of 
the proposed activity;
(i) consideration of the effects of the 
proposed activity on the conduct of 
scientific research and on other existing 
uses and values;
(j) an identification of gaps in knowledge and 
uncertainties encountered in compiling the 
information required under this paragraph;
(k) a non-technical summary of the 
information provided under this 
paragraph;
(l) the name and address of the person or 
organisation which prepared the 
Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation 
and the address to which comments 
thereon should be directed.
3. The draft Comprehensive Environmental 
Evaluation shall be made publicly available and 
shall be circulated to all Parties, which shall 
also make it publicly available, for comment. A 
period of 90 days shall be allowed for the 
receipt of comments.
4. The draft Comprehensive Environmental 
Evaluation shall be forwarded to the Committee 
at the same time as it is circulated to the Parties, 
and at least 120 days before the next Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting, for consideration 
as appropriate.
5. No final decision shall be taken to proceed 
with the proposed activity in the Antarctic 
Treaty area unless there has been an opportunity 
for consideration of the draft Comprehensive 
Environmental Evaluation by the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting on the advice of 
the Committee, provided that no decision to 
proceed with a proposed activity shall be 
delayed through the operation of this paragraph 
for longer than 15 months from the date of 
circulation of the draft Comprehensive 
Environmental Evaluation.
6. A final Comprehensive Environmental 
Evaluation shall address and shall include or 
summarise comments received on the draft
Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation. The 
final Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation, 
notice of any decisions relating thereto, and any 
evaluation of the significance of the predicted 
impacts in relation to the advantages of the 
proposed activity, shall be circulated to all 
Parties, which shall also make them publicly 
available, at least 60 days before the 
commencement of the proposed activity in the 
Antarctic Treaty area.
Article 4
Decisions to be based on Comprehensive 
Environmental Evaluations
Any decision on whether a proposed activity, to 
which Article 3 applies, should proceed, and, if 
so, whether in its original or in a modified form, 
shall be based on the Comprehensive 
Environmental Evaluation as well as other 
relevant considerations.
Article 5 
Monitoring
1. Procedures shall be put in place, including 
appropriate monitoring of key environmental 
indicators, to assess and verify the impact of 
any activity that proceeds following the 
completion of a Comprehensive Environmental 
Evaluation.
2. The procedures referred to in paragraph 1 
above and in Article 2(2) shall be designed to 
provide a regular and verifiable record of the 
impacts of the activity in order, inter alia, to:
(a) enable assessments to be made of the 
extent to which such impacts are 
consistent with this Protocol; and
(b) provide information useful for minimising 
or mitigating impacts, and, where 
appropriate, information on the need for 
suspension, cancellation or modification of 
the activity.
Article 6
Circulation of Information
1. The following information shall be 
circulated to the Parties, forwarded to the 
Committee and made publicly available:
(a) a description of the procedures referred to 
in Article 1;
(b) an annual list of an Initial Environmental 
Evaluations prepared in accordance with 
Article 2 and any decisions taken in 
consequence thereof;
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(c) significant information obtained, and any 
action taken in consequence thereof, from 
procedures put in place in accordance with 
Articles 2(2) and 5; and
(d) information referred to in Article 3(6).
2. Any Initial Environmental Evaluation 
prepared in accordance with Article 2 shall be 
made available on request
Article 7
Cases of Emergency
1. This Annex shall not apply in cases of 
emergency relating to the safety of human life 
or of ships, aircraft, or equipment and facilities 
of high value, or the protection of the 
environment, which require an activity to be 
undertaken without completion of the 
procedures set out in this Annex.
2. Notice of activities undertaken in cases of 
emergency, which would otherwise have 
required preparation of a Comprehensive 
Environmental Evaluation, shall be circulated 
immediately to the Parties and forwarded to the 
Committee and a full explanation of the 
activities carried out shall be provided within 90 
days of those activities.
Article 8
Amendment or Modification
1. This Annex may be amended or modified 
by a measure adopted in accordance with 
Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. Unless 
the measure specifies otherwise, the amendment 
or modification shall be deemed to have been 
approved, and shall become effective, one year 
after the close of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting at which it was adopted, 
unless one or more of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties notifies the Depositary, 
within that time period, that it wishes an 
extension of that period or that it is unable to 
approve the measure.
2. Any amendment or modification of this 
Annex which becomes effective in accordance 
with paragraph 1 above shall thereafter become 
effective as to any other Party when notice of 
approval by it has been received by the 
Depositary.
ANNEX n  TO THE PROTOCOL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC 
FAUNA AND FLORA
Article 1
Definitions
For the purposes of this Annex:
(a) "native mammal" means any member of 
any species belonging to the Class 
Mammalia, indigenous to the Antarctic 
Treaty area or occurring there seasonally 
through natural migrations;
(b) "native bird" means any member, at any 
stage of its life cycle (including eggs), of 
any species of the Class Aves indigenous 
to the Antarctic Treaty area or occurring 
there seasonally through natural 
migrations;
(c) "native plant" means any terrestrial or 
freshwater vegetation, including 
bryophytes, lichens, fungi and algae, at 
any state of its life cycle (including seeds, 
and other propagules), indigenous to the 
Antarctic Treaty area;
(d) "native invertebrate" means any terrestrial 
or freshwater invertebrate, at any stage of 
its life cycle, indigenous to the Antarctic 
Treaty area;
(e) "appropriate authority" means any person 
or agency authorised by a Party to issue 
permits under this Annex;
(0  "permit" means a formal permission in 
writing issued by an appropriate authority;
(g) "take" or "taking" means to kill, injure, 
capture, handle or molest, a native 
mammal or bird, or to remove or damage 
such quantities of native plants that their 
local distribution or abundance would be 
significantly affected;
(h) "harmful interference" means:
(i) flying of landing helicopters or 
other aircraft in a manner that 
disturbs concentrations of birds and 
seals;
(ii) using vehicles or vessels, including 
hovercraft and small boats, in a 
manner that disturbs concentrations 
of bird and seals;
(iii) using explosives or firearms in a 
manner that disturbs concentrations 
of birds and seals;
(iv) wilfully disturbing breeding or 
moulting birds or concentrations of 
birds and seals by persons on foot;
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(v) significantly damaging
concentrations of native terrestrial 
plants by landing aircraft, driving 
vehicles, or walking on them, or by 
other means;
(vi) any activity that results in the 
significant adverse modification of 
habitats of any species or 
population of native mammal, bird, 
plant or invertebrate.
(i) "International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling" means the Convention 
done at Washington on 2 December 1946.
Article 2
Cases of Emergency
1. The provisions of this Annex shall not
apply in cases of emergency relating to the 
safety of human life or of ships, aircraft, or 
equipment and facilities of high value, or
protection of the environment.
2. Notice of activities undertaken in cases of 
emergency shall be circulated immediately to 
all Parties and to the Committee.
Article 3
Protection of Native Fauna and Flora
1. Taking or harmful interference shall be 
prohibited except in accordance with a permit
2. Such permits shall specify the authorised 
activity, including when, where and by whom it 
is to be conducted and shall be issued only in 
the following circumstances:
(a) to provide specimens for scientific study 
or scientific information;
(b) to provide specimens for museums, 
herbaria, zoological and botanical gardens, 
or other educational or cultural institutions 
or uses; and
(c) to provide for unavoidable consequences 
of scientific activities not otherwise 
authorised under sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) 
above, or of the construction and operation 
of scientific support facilities.
3. The issue of such permits shall be limited 
so as to ensure that:
(a) no more native mammals, birds, or plants 
are taken than are strictly necessary to 
meet the purposes set forth in paragraph 2 
above;
(b) only small numbers of native mammals or 
birds are killed and in no case more native 
mammals or birds are killed from local 
populations than can, in combination with 
other permitted takings, normally be 
replaced by natural reproduction in the 
following season; and
(c) the diversity of species, as well as the 
habitats essential to their existence, and 
the balance of the ecological systems 
existing within the Antarctic Treaty area 
are maintained.
4. Any species of native mammals, birds and 
plants listed in Appendix A to this Annex shall 
be designated "Specially Protected Species" and 
shall be accorded special protection by the 
Parties.
5. A permit shall not be issued to take a 
Specially Protected Species unless the taking:
(a) is for a compelling scientific purpose;
(b) will not jeopardise the survival or recovery 
of that species or local population; and
(c) uses non-lethal techniques where 
appropriate.
6. All taking of native mammals and birds 
shall be done in the manner that involves the 
least degree of pain and suffering practicable.
Article 4
Introduction of non-native species, parasites 
and diseases
1. No species of animal or plant not native to 
the Antarctic Treaty area shall be introduced 
onto land or ice shelves, or into water in the 
Antarctic Treaty area except in accordance with 
a permit
2. Dogs shall not be introduced onto land or 
ice shelves and dogs currently in those areas 
shall be removed by April 1,1994.
3. Permits under paragraph 1 above shall be 
issued to allow the importation only of the 
animals and plants listed in Appendix B to this 
Annex and shall specify the species, numbers 
and, if appropriate, age and sex and precautions 
to be taken to prevent escape or contact with 
native fauna and flora.
4. Any plant or animal for which a permit 
has been issued in accordance with paragraphs 1 
and 3 above, shall, prior to expiration of the 
permit, be removed from the Antarctic Treaty 
area or be disposed of by incineration or equally 
effective means that eliminates risk to native
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fauna or flora. The permit shall specify this 
obligation. Any other plant or animal 
introduced into the Antarctic Treaty area not 
native to that area, including any progeny, shall 
be removed or disposed of, by incineration or 
by equally effective means, so as to be rendered 
sterile, unless it is determined that they pose no 
risk to native flora or fauna.
5. Nothing in this Article shall apply to the 
importation of food into the Antarctic Treaty 
area provided that no live animals are imported 
for this purpose and all plants and animal parts 
and products are kept under carefully controlled 
conditions and disposed of in accordance with 
Annex III to the Protocol and Appendix C to 
this Annex.
6. Each Party shall require that precautions, 
including those listed in Appendix C to this 
Annex, be taken to prevent the introduction of 
micro-organisms (e.g., viruses, bacteria, 
parasites, yeasts, fungi) not present in the native 
fauna and flora.
Article 5
Information
Each Party shall prepare and make available 
information setting forth, in particular, 
prohibited activities and providing lists of 
Specially Protected Species and relevant 
Protected Areas to all those persons present in 
or intending to enter the Antarctic Treaty area 
with a view to ensuring that such persons 
understand and observe the provisions of this 
Annex.
Article 6
Exchange of Information 
1. The Parties shall make arrangements for:
(a) collecting and exchanging records 
(including records of permits) and 
statistics concerning the numbers of 
quantities of each species of native 
mammal, bird or plant taken annually in 
the Antarctic Treaty area;
(b) obtaining and exchanging information as 
to the status of native mammals, birds, 
plants, and invertebrates in the Antarctic 
Treaty area, and the extent to which any 
species or population needs protection;
(c) establishing a common form in which this 
information shall be submitted by Parties 
in accordance with paragraph 2 below.
2. Each Party shall inform the other Parties 
as well as the Committee before the end of 
November each year of any step taken pursuant 
to paragraph 1 above and of the number and 
nature of permits issued under this Annex in the 
preceding period of 1st July to 30th June.
Article 7
Relationship with Other Agreements outside 
the Antarctic Treaty system
Nothing in this Annex shall derogate from the 
rights and obligations of Parties under the 
International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling.
Article 8 
Review
The Parties shall keep under continuing review 
measures for the conservation of Antarctic 
fauna and flora, taking into account any 
recommendations from the Committee.
Article 9
Amendment or Modification
1. This Annex may be amended or modified 
by a measure adopted in accordance with 
Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. Unless 
the measure specifies otherwise, the amendment 
or modification shall be deemed to have been 
approved, and shall become effective, one year 
after the close of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting at which it was adopted, 
unless one or more of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties notifies the Depositary, 
within that time period, that it wishes an 
extension of that period of time or that it is 
unable to approve the measure.
2. Any amendment or modification of this 
Annex which becomes effective in accordance 
with paragraph 1 above shall thereafter become 
effective as to any other Party when notice of 
approval by it has been received by the 
Depositary.
APPENDICES TO THE ANNEX 
Appendix A:
Specially Protected Species
All species of the genus Arctocephalus, Fur 
Seals. Ommatophoca rossii, Ross Seal.
370
Appendix B:
Importation of Animals and Plants
The following animals and plants may be 
imported into the Antarctic Treaty area in 
accordance with permits issued under Article 4 
of this Annex:
(a) domestic plants; and
(b) laboratory animals and plants including 
viruses, bacteria, yeasts and fungi.
Appendix C:
Precautions to prevent introduction of micro­
organisms
1. Poultry. No live poultry or other living 
birds shall be brought into the Antarctic Treaty 
area. Before dressed poultry is packaged for 
shipment to the Antarctic Treaty area, it shall be 
inspected for evidence of disease, such as 
Newcastle’s Disease, tuberculosis, and yeast 
infection. Any poultry or parts not consumed 
shall be removed from the Antarctic Treaty area 
or disposed of by incineration or equivalent 
means that eliminates risks to native flora and 
fauna.
2. The importation of non-sterile soil shall be 
avoided to the maximum extent practicable.
ANNEX m  TO THE PROTOCOL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
WASTE DISPOSAL AND WASTE 
MANAGEMENT
Article 1
General Obligations
1. This Annex shall apply to activities 
undertaken in the Antarctic Treaty area pursuant 
to scientific research programmes, tourism and 
all other governmental and non-governmental 
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area for which 
advance notice is required under Article VII (5) 
of the Antarctic Treaty, including associated 
logistic support activities.
2. The amount of wastes produced or 
disposed of in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be 
reduced as far as practicable so as to minimise 
interference with the natural values of 
Antarctica, with scientific research and with 
other uses of Antarctica which are consistent 
with the Antarctic Treaty.
3. Waste storage, disposal and removal from 
the Antarctic Treaty area, as well as recycling 
and source reduction, shall be essential 
considerations in the planning and conduct of 
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area.
4. Wastes removed from the Antarctic Treaty 
area shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
be returned to the country from which the 
activities generating the waste were organised 
or to any other country in which arrangements 
have made for the disposal of such wastes in 
accordance with relevant international 
agreements.
5. Past and present waste disposal sites on 
land and abandoned work sites of Antarctic 
activities shall be cleaned up by the generator of 
such wastes and the user of such sites. This 
obligation shall not be interpreted as requiring:
(a) the removal of any structure designated as 
a historic site or monument; or
(b) the removal of any structure or waste 
material in circumstances where the 
removal by an practical option would 
result in greater adverse environmental 
impact than leaving the structure or waste 
material in its existing location.
Article 2
Waste Disposal by Removal from the 
Antarctic Treaty Area
1. The following wastes, if generated after 
entry into force of this Annex, shall be removed 
from the Antarctic Treaty area by the generator 
of such wastes:
(a) radio-active materials;
(b) electrical batteries;
(c) fuel, both liquid and solid;
(d) wastes containing harmful levels of heavy 
metals or acutely toxic or harmful 
persistent compounds;
(e) poly-vinyl chloride (PVC), polyurethane 
foam, polystyrene foam, rubber and 
lubricating oils, treated timbers and other 
products which contain additives that 
could produce harmful emissions if 
incinerated;
(f) all other plastic wastes, except low density 
polyethylene containers (such as bags for 
storing wastes), provided that such 
containers shall be incinerated in 
accordance with Article 3(1);
(g) fuel drums; and
(h) other solid, non-combustible wastes;
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provided that the obligation to remove drums 
and solid non-combustible wastes contained in 
subparagraphs (g) and (h) above shall not apply 
in circumstances where the removal of such 
wastes by any practical option would result in 
greater adverse environmental impact than 
leaving them in their existing locations.
2. Liquid wastes which are not covered by 
paragraph 1 above and sewage and domestic 
liquid wastes, shall, to the maximum extent 
practicable, be removed from the Antarctic 
Treaty area by the generator of such wastes.
3. The following wastes shall be removed 
from the Antarctic Treaty area by the generator 
of such wastes, unless incinerated, autoclaved 
or otherwise treated to be made sterile:
(a) residues of carcasses of imported animals;
(b) laboratory culture of micro-organisms and 
plant pathogens; and
(c) introduced avian products.
Article 3
Waste Disposal by Incineration
1. Subject to paragraph 2 below, combustible 
wastes, other than those referred to in Article 
2(1), which are not removed from the Antarctic 
Treaty area shall be burnt in incinerators which 
to the maximum extent practicable reduce 
harmful emissions. Any emission standards and 
equipment guidelines which may be 
recommended by, inter alia, the Committee and 
the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
shall be taken into account The solid residue of 
such incineration shall be removed from the 
Antarctic Treaty area.
2. All open burning of wastes shall be phased 
out as soon as practicable, but no later than the 
end of the 1998/1999 season. Pending the 
completion of such phase-out, when it is 
necessary to dispose of wastes by open burning, 
allowance shall be made for the wind direction 
and speed and the type of wastes to be burnt to 
limit particulate deposition and to avoid such 
deposition over areas of special biological, 
scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness 
significance including, in particular, areas 
accorded protection under the Antarctic Treaty.
Article 4
Other Waste Disposal on Land
1. Wastes not removed or disposed of in 
accordance with Articles 2 and 3 shall not be 
disposed of onto ice-free areas or into fresh 
water systems.
2. Sewage, domestic liquid wastes and other 
liquid wastes not removed from the Antarctic 
Treaty area in accordance with Article 2, shall, 
to the maximum extent practicable, not be 
disposed of onto sea ice, ice shelves or the 
grounded ice-sheet, provided that such wastes 
which are generated by stations located inland 
on ice shelves or on the grounded ice-sheet may 
be disposed of in deep ice pits where such 
disposal is the only practicable option. Such 
pits shall not be located on known ice-flow lines 
which terminate at ice-free areas or in areas of 
high ablation.
3. Wastes generated at field camps shall, to 
the maximum extent practicable, be removed by 
the generator of such wastes to supporting 
stations or ships for disposal in accordance with 
this Annex.
Article 5
Disposal of Waste in the Sea
1. Sewage and domestic liquid wastes may 
be discharged directly into the sea, taking into 
account the assimilative capacity of the 
receiving marine environment and provided 
that:
(a) such discharge is located, wherever 
practicable, where conditions exist for 
initial diluation and rapid dispersal; and
(b) large quantities of such wastes (genreated 
in a station where the average weekly 
occupancy over the austral summer is 
approximately 30 individuals or more) 
shallbe treated at least by maceration.
2. The by-product of sewage treatment by the 
Rotary Biological Contacter process or similar 
processes may be disposed of into the sea 
provided that such disposal does not adversely 
affect the local environment, and provided also 
that any such disposal at sea shall be in 
accordance with Annex IV to the Protocol.
Article 6
Storage of Waste
All wastes to be removed from the Antarctic 
Treaty area, or otherwise disposed of, shall be 
stored in such a way as to prevent their dispersal 
into the environment.
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Article 7
Prohibited Products
No polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), non- 
sterile soil, polystyrene beads, chips or similar 
forms of packaging, or pesticides (other than 
those required for scientific, medical or hygiene 
purposes) shall be introduced onto land or ice 
shelves or into water in the Antarctic Treaty 
area.
Article 8
Waste Management Planning
1. Each Party which itself conducts activities 
in the Antarctic Treaty area shall, in respect of 
those activities, establish a waste disposal 
classification system as a basis for recording 
wastes and to facilitate studies aimed at 
evaluating the environmental impacts of 
scientific activity and associated logistic 
support To that end, wastes produced shall be 
classified as:
(a) sewage and domestic liquid wastes (Group
1);
(b) other liquid wastes and chemicals, 
including fuels and lubricants (Group 2);
(c) solids to be combusted (Group 3);
(d) other solid wastes (Group 4); and
(e) radioactive materials (Group 5).
2. In order to reduce further the impact of 
waste on the Antarctic environment, each such 
Party shall prepare and annually review and 
update its waste managment plans (including 
waste reduction, storage and disposal), 
specifying for each fixed site, or field camps 
generally, and for each ship (other than small 
boats that are part of the operation of fixed sites 
or of ships and taking into account existing 
management plans for ships):
(a) programmes for cleaning up existing waste 
disposal sites and abandoned work sites;
(b) current and planned waste management 
arrangements, including final disposal;
(c) current and planned arrangements for 
analysing the environmental effects of 
waste and waste management; and
(d) other efforts to minimise any 
environmental effects of wastes and waste 
management
3. Each such Partry shall, as far as is 
practicable, also prepare an inventory of past 
activities (such as traverses, fuel depots, field 
bases, crashed aircraft) before the information is 
lost, so that such locations can be taken into 
account in planning future sicentific
programmes (such as snow chemistry, 
pollutants in lichens or ice core drilling).
Article 9
Circulation and Review of Waste 
Managment Plans
1. The waste management plans prepared in 
accordance with Article 8, reports on their 
implementation, and the inventories referred to 
in Article 8(3), shall be included in the annual 
exchanges of information in accordance with 
Articles HI and VII of the Antarctic Treaty and 
related Recommendations under Article IX of 
the Antarctic Treaty.
2. Each Party shall send copies of its waste 
managment plans, and reports on their 
implementation and review, to the Committee.
3. The Committee may review waste 
management plans and reports thereon and may 
offer comments, including suggestions for 
minimising impacts and modifications and 
improvement to the plans, for the consideration 
of the Parties.
4. The Parties may exchange information and 
provide advice on, inter alia, available low 
waste technologies, reconversion of existing 
installations, special requirements for effluents, 
and appropriate disposal and discharge 
methods.
Article 10
M anagement Practices 
Each Party shall:
(a) designate a waste management official to 
develop and monitor waste management 
plans; in the field, this responsibility shall 
be delegated to an appropriate person at 
each site;
(b) ensure that members of its expedition 
receive training designed to limit the 
impact of its operations on the Antarctic 
environment and to inform them of 
requirements of this Annex; and
(c) discourage the use of poly-vinyl chloride 
(PVC) products and ensure that its 
expeditions to the Antarctic Treaty area 
are advised of any PVC products they may 
introduce in the Antarctic Treaty area in 
order that they may be removed 
subsequently in accordance with this 
Annex.
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Article 11 
Review
This Annex shall be subject to regular review in 
order to ensure that it is updated to reflect 
improvement in waste disposal technology and 
procedures and to ensure thereby maximum 
protection of the Antarctic environment
Article 12
Cases of Emergency
1. This Annex shall not apply in cases of 
emergency relating to the safety of human life 
or of ships, aircraft or other equipment and 
facilities of high value.
2. Notice of activities undertaken in cases of 
emergency shall be circulated immediately to 
all Parties and to the Committee.
Article 13
Amendment or Modification
1. This Annex may be amended or modified 
by a measure adopted in accordance with 
Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. Unless 
the measure specifies otherwise, the amendment 
or modification shall be deemed to have been 
approved, and shall become effective, one year 
after the close of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting at which it was adopted, 
unless one or more of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties notifies the Depositary, 
within that time period, that it wishes an 
extension of that period of time or that it is 
unable to approve the amendment
2. Any amendment or modification of this 
Annex which becomes effective in accordance 
with paragraph 1 above shall thereafter become 
effective as to any other Party when notice of 
approval by it has been received by the 
Depositary.
ANNEX IV TO THE PROTOCOL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION
Article 1 
Definitions
For the purposes of this Annex:
(a) "discharge" means any release howsoever 
caused from a ship and includes any
escape, disposal, spilling, leaking, 
pumping, emitting or emptying;
(b) "garbage" means all kinds of victual, 
domestic and operational waste excluding 
fresh fish and parts thereof, generated 
during the normal operation of the ship 
except those substances which are covered 
by Articles 3 and 4;
(c) "MARPOL 73/78" means the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, 1973 as amended by the 
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto and by 
any other amendment in force thereafter;
(d) "Noxious liquid substance" means any 
noxious liquid substance as defined in 
Annex II of MARPOL 73/78;
(e) "oil" means petroleum in any form 
including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil 
refuse and refined oil products (other than 
petrochemicals which are subject to the 
provisions of Article 4);
(0 "oily mixture" means a mixture with any 
oil content;
(g) "ship" means a vessel of any type 
whatsoever operating in the marine 
environment and includes hydrofoil boats, 
air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, 
floating craft and fixed or floating 
platforms.
Article 2 
Application
This Annex applies, with respect to each Party, 
to ships entitled to fly its flag and with respect 
to any other ship engaged in or supporting its 
Antarctic operations, while operating in the 
Antarctic Treaty area.
Article 3
Discharge of Oil
1. Any discharge into the sea of oil or oily 
mixture shall be prohibited, except in cases 
permitted under Annex I of MARPOL 73/78. 
While operating in the Antarctic Treaty area, 
ships shall retain on board all sludge, dirty 
ballast, tank washing water and other oily 
residues and mixtures which may not be 
discharged into the sea. Ships shall discharge 
these residues only outside the Antarctic Treaty 
area, at reception facilities or as otherwise 
permitted under Annex I of MARPOL.
2. This Article shall not apply to:
(a) the discharge into the sea of oil or oily 
mixture resulting from damage to a ship or 
its equipment:
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(i) provided that all reasonable 
precautions have been taken after 
the occurrence of the damage or 
discovery of the discharge for the 
purpose of preventing or 
minimising the discharge; and
(ii) except if the owner or the Master 
acted either with intent to cause 
damage, or recklessly and with the 
knowledge that damage would 
probably result; or
(b) the discharge into the sea of substances 
containing oil which are being used for the 
purpose of combating specific pollution 
incidents in order to minimise the damage 
from pollution.
Article 4
Discharge of Noxious Liquid Substances
The discharge into the sea of any noxious liquid 
substance, and any other chemical or other 
substances, in quantities or concentrations that 
are harmful to the marine environment, shall be 
prohibited.
Article 5
Disposal of Garbage
1. The disposal into the sea of all plastics, 
including but not limited to synthetic ropes, 
synthetic fishing nets, and plastic garbage bags, 
shall be prohibited.
2. The disposal into the sea of all other 
garbage, including paper products, rags, glass, 
metal, bottles, crockery, incineration ash, 
dunnage, lining and packing materials, shall be 
prohibited.
3. The disposal into the sea of food wastes 
may be permitted when they have passed 
through a comminuter or grinder, provided that 
such disposal shall, except in cases permitted 
under Annex V of MARPOL 73/78, be made as 
far as practicable from land and ice shelves but 
in any case not less than 12 nautical miles from 
the nearest land or ice shelf. Such comminuted 
or ground food wastes shall be capable of 
passing through a screen with openings no 
greater than 25 millimeters.
4. When a substance or material covered by 
this article is mixed with other such substance 
or material for discharge or disposal, having 
different disposal or discharge requirements, the 
most stringent disposal or discharge 
requirements shall apply.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 
above shall not apply to:
(a) the escape of garbage resulting from 
damage to a ship or its equipment 
provided all reasonable precautions have 
been taken, before and after the occurrence 
of the damage, for the purpose of 
preventing or minimising the escape; or
(b) the accidential loss of synthetic fishing 
nets, provided all reasonable precautions 
have been taken to prevent such loss.
6. The Parties shall, where appropriate, 
require the use of garbage record books.
Article 6
Discharge of Sewage
1. Except where it would unduly impair 
Antarctic operations:
(a) each Party shall eliminate all discharge 
into the sea of untreated sewage ("sewage" 
being defined in Annex IV of MARPOL 
73/78) within 12 nautical miles of land or 
ice shelves;
(b) beyond such distance, sewage stored in a 
holding tank shall not be discharged 
instantaneously but shall be discharged at 
a moderate rate and, where practicable, 
while the ship is en route at a speed of no 
less than 4 knots.
This paragraph does not apply to ships certified 
to carry not more than 10 persons.
2. The Parties shall, where appropriate, 
require the use of sewage record books.
Article 7
Cases of Emergency
1. Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Annex shall 
not apply in cases of emergency relating to the 
safety of a ship and those on board or saving 
life at sea.
2. Notice of activities undertaken in cases of 
emergency shall be circulated immediately to 
all Parties and to the Committee.
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Article 8
Effect on Dependent and Associated 
Ecosystems
In implementing the provisions of this Annex, 
due consideration shall be given to the need to 
avoid detrimental effects on dependent and 
associated ecosystems, outside the Antarctic 
Treaty area.
Article 9
Ship Retention Capacity and Reception
Facilities
1. Each Party shall undertake to ensure that 
all ships entitled to fly its flag and any other 
ship engaged in or supporting its Antarctic 
operations, before entering the Antarctic Treaty 
area, are fitted with a tank or tanks of sufficient 
capacity on board for the retention of all sludge, 
dirty ballast, tank washing water, other oily 
residues and mixtures, and have sufficient 
capacity on board for the retention of garbage, 
while operating in the Antarctic Treaty area and 
have concluded arrangements to discharge such 
oily residues and garbage at a reception facility 
after leaving that area. Ships shall also have 
sufficient capacity on board for the retention of 
noxious liquid substances.
2. Each Party at whose ports ships depart en 
route to or arrive from the Antarctic Treaty area 
undertakes to ensure that as soon as practicable 
adequate facilities are provided for the reception 
of all sludge, dirty ballast, tank washing water, 
other oily residues and mixtures, and garbage 
from ships, without causing undue delay, and 
according to the needs of the ships using them.
3. Parties operating ships which depart to or 
arrive from the Antarctic Treaty area at ports of 
other Parties shall consult with those Parties 
with a view to ensuring that the establishment 
of port reception facilities does not place an 
inequitable burden on Parties adjacent to the 
Antarctic Treaty area.
Article 10
Design, Construction, Manning and 
Equipment of Sites
In the design, construction, manning and 
equipment of ships engaged in or supporting 
Antarctic operations, each Party shall take into 
account the objectives of this Annex.
Article 11
Sovereign Immunity
1. This Annex shall not apply to any warship, 
naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated 
by a State and used, for the time being, only on 
government non-commercial service. However, 
each Party shall ensure by the adoption of 
appropriate measures not impairing the 
operations or operational capabilities of such 
shops owned or operated by it, that such ships 
act in a manner consistent, so far as is 
reasonable and practicable, with this Annex.
2. In applying paragraph 1 above, each Party 
shall take into account the importance of 
protecting the Antarctic environment
3. Each Party shall inform the other Parties 
of how it implements this provision.
4. The dispute settlement procedure set out in 
Articles 18 to 20 of the Protocol shall not apply 
to this Article.
Article 12
Preventive Measures and Emergency 
Preparedness and Response
1. In order to respond more effectively to 
marine pollution emergencies or the threat 
thereof in the Antarctic Treaty area the Parties, 
in accordance with Article 15 of the Protocol, 
shall develop contingency plans for marine 
pollution response in the Antarctic Treaty area, 
including contingency plans for ships (other 
than small boats that are part of the operations 
of fixed sites or of ships) operating in the 
Antarctic Treaty area, particularly ships 
carrying oil as cargo and for oil spills 
originating from coastal installations, which 
enter into the marine environment To this end 
they shall:
(a) co-operate in the formulation and 
implementation of such plans; and
(b) draw on the advice of the Committee, the 
International Maritime Organisation and 
other international organisations.
2. The Parties shall also establish procedures 
for co-operative response to pollution 
emergencies and shall take appropriate response 
actions in accordance with such procedures.
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Article 13
Review
The Parties shall keep under continuous review 
the provisions of this Annex and other measures 
to prevent, reduce and respond to pollution of 
the Antarctic marine environment, including 
any amendments and new regulations adopted 
under MARPOL 73/78, with a view to 
achieving the objectives of this Annex.
Article 14
Relationship with MARPOL 73/78
With respect to those Parties which are also 
Parties to MARPOL 73/78, nothing in this 
Annex shall derogate from the specific rights 
and obligations thereunder.
Article 15
Amendment or Modification
1. This Annex may be amended or modified 
by a measure adopted in accordance with 
Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. Unless 
the measure specifies otherwise, the amendment 
or modification shall be deemed to have been 
approved, and shall become effective, one year 
after the close of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting at which it was adopted, 
unless one or more of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties notifies the Depositary, 
within that time period, that it wishes an 
extension of that period or that it is unable to 
approve the measure.
2. Any amendment or modification of this 
Annex which becomes effective in accordance 
with paragraph 1 above shall thereafter become 
effective as to any other Party when notice of 
approval by it has been received by the 
Depositary.
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Appendix 11
ANNEX V TO THE PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY
AREA PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT
(Annex to recommendation XVI-10)
Article 1
Definitions
For the purposes of this Annex:
(a) "appropriate authority" means any person 
or agency authorised by a Party to issue 
permits under this Annex;
(b) "permit" means a formal permission in 
writing issued by an appropriate authority;
(c) "Management Plan" means a plan to 
manage the activities and protect the 
special value or values in an Antarctic 
Specially Protected Area or an Antarctic 
Specially Managed Area.
Article 2 
Objectives
For the purposes set out in this Annex, any area, 
including any marine area, may be designated 
as an Antarctic Specially Protected Area or an 
Antarctic Specially Managed Area. Activities 
in those areas shall be prohibited, restricted or 
managed in accordance with Management Plans 
adopted under the provisions of this Annex.
Article 3
Antarctic Specially Protected Areas
1. Any area, including any marine area, may 
be designated as an Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area to protect outstanding 
environmental, scientific, historic, aesthetic or 
wilderness values, any combination of those 
values, or ongoing or planned scientific 
research.
2. Parties shall seek to identify, within a
systematic environmental-geographical
framework, and to include in the series of 
Antarctic Specially Protected Areas:
(a) areas kept inviolate from human
interference so that future comparisons 
may be possible with localities that have 
been affected by human activities;
(b) representative examples of major 
terrestrial, including glacial and aquatic, 
ecosystems and marine ecosystems;
(c) areas with important or unusual 
assemblages of species, including major 
colonies or breeding native birds or 
mammals;
(d) the type locality or only known habitat of 
any species;
(e) areas of particular interest to ongoing or 
planned scientific research;
(0 examples of outstanding geological, 
glaciologicai or geomorphological 
features;
(g) areas of outstanding aesthetic and 
wilderness value;
(h) sites or monuments of recognised historic 
value; and
(i) such other areas as may be appropriate to 
protect the values set out in paragraph 1 
above.
3. Specially Protected Areas and Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest designated as such by 
past Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings are 
hereby designated as Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area and shall be renamed and 
renumbered accordingly.
4. Entry into an Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area shall be prohibited except in 
accordance with a permit issued under Article 7.
Article 4
Antarctic Specially Managed Areas
1. Any area, including any marine area, 
where activities are being conducted or may in 
the future be conducted, may be designated as 
an Antarctic Specially Managed Area to assist 
in the planning and co-ordination of activities, 
avoid possible conflicts, improve co-operation 
between Parties or minimise environmental 
impacts.
2. Antarctic Specially Managed Areas may 
include:
(a) areas where activities pose risks of mutual 
interference or cumulative environmental 
impacts; and
(b) sites or monuments of recognised historic 
value.
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3. Entry into an Antarctic Specially Managed 
Area shall not require a permit.
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3 above, an 
Antarctic Specially Managed Area may contain 
one or more Antarctic Specially Protected 
Areas, entry into which shall be prohibited 
except in accordance with a permit issued under 
Article 7.
Article 5
Management Plans
1. Any Party, the Committee, the Scientific 
Committee on Antarctic Research or the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources may propose an area 
for designation as an Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area or an Antarctic Specially 
Managed Area by submitting a proposed 
Management Plan to the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting.
2. The area proposed for designation shall be 
of sufficient size to protect the values for which 
the special protection or management is 
required.
3. Proposed Management Plans shall 
include, as appropriate:
(a) a description of the value or values for 
which special protection or management is 
required;
(b) a statement of the aims and objectives of 
the Management Plan for the protection or 
management of those values;
(c) management activities which are to be 
undertaken to protect the values for which 
special protection or management is 
required;
(d) a period of designation, if any;
(e) a description of the area, including:
(i) the geographical co-ordinates, 
boundary markers and natural 
features that delineate the area;
(ii) access to the area by land, sea or 
air including marine approaches 
and anchorages, pedestrian and 
vehicular routes within the area, 
and aircraft routes and landing 
areas;
(iii) the location of structures, including 
scientific stations, research or 
refuge facilities, both within the 
area and near to it; and
(iv) the location in or near the area of 
other Antarctic Specially Protected 
Areas or Antarctic Specially 
Managed Areas designated under
this Annex, or other protected areas 
designated in accordance with 
measures adopted under other 
components of the Antarctic Treaty 
System.
(0  the identification of zones within the area,
in which activities are to be prohibited, 
restricted or managed for the purpose of 
achieving the aims and objectives referred 
to in subparagraph (b) above;
(g) maps and photographs that show clearly 
the boundary of the area in relation to 
surrounding features and key features 
within the area;
(h) supporting documentation;
(i) in respect of an area proposed for 
designation as an Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area, a clear description of the 
conditions under which permits may be 
granted by the appropriate authority 
regarding:
(i) access to and movement within or 
over the area;
(ii) activities which are or may be 
conducted within the area, 
including restrictions on time and 
place;
(iii) the installation, modification, or 
removal of structures;
(iv) the location of field camps;
(v) restrictions on materials and 
organisms which may be brought 
into the area;
(vi) the taking of or harmful 
interference with native flora and 
fauna;
(vii) the collection or removal of 
anything not brought into the area 
by the permit-holder;
(viii) the disposal of waste;
(ix) measures that may be necessary to 
ensure that the aims and objectives 
of the Management Plan can 
continue to be met; and
(x) requirements for reports to be made 
to the appropriate authority 
regarding visits to the area;
(j) in respect of an area proposed for 
designation as an Antarctic Specially 
Managed Area, a code of conduct 
regarding:
(i) access to and movement within or 
over the area;
(ii) activities which are or may be 
conducted within the area, 
including restrictions on time and 
place;
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(iii) the installation, modification, or
removal of structures;
(iv) the location of field camps;
(v) the taking of or harmful
interference with native flora and 
fauna;
(vi) the collection or removal of
anything not brought into the area 
by the visitor;
(vii) the disposal of waste; and
(viii) any requirements for reporting to
be made to the appropriate
authority regarding visits to the 
area; and
(k) provisions relating to the circumstances in 
whic Parties should seek to exchange 
information in advance of activities which 
they propose to conduct
Article 6
Designation Procedures
1. Proposed Management Plans shall be
forwarded to the Committee, the Scientific 
Committee on Antarctic Research and, as
appropriate, to the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources. In formulating its advice to the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, the 
Committee shall take into account any 
comments provided by the Scientific Committee 
on Antarctic Research and, as appropriate, by 
the Commission fen- the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources. Thereafter 
Management Plans may be approved by the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties by a 
measure adopted at an Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting in accordance with 
Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. Unless 
the measure specifies otherwise, the Plan shall 
be deemed to have been approved 90 days after 
the close of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting at which it was adopted, unless one or 
more of the Consultative Parties notifies the 
Depositary, within that time period, that it 
wishes an extension of that period or is unable 
to approve the measure.
2. Having regard to the provisions of 
Articles 4 and 5 of the Protocol, no marine area 
shall be designated as an Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area or an Antarctic Specially 
Managed Area without the prior approval of the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources.
3. Designation of an Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area or an Antarctic Specially 
Managed Area shall be for an indefinite period
unless the Management Plan provides 
otherwise. A review of a Management Plan 
shall be initiated at least every five years. The 
Plan shall be updated as necessary.
4. Management Plans may be amended or 
revoked in accordance with paragraph 1 above.
5. Upon approval Management Plans shall 
be circulated promptly by the Depositary to all 
Parties. The Depositary shall maintain a record 
of all currently approved Management Plans.
Article 7
Permits
1. Each Party shall appoint an appropriate 
authority to issue permits to enter and engage in 
activities within an Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area in accordance with the 
requirements of the Management Plan relating 
to that Area. The permit shall be accompanied 
by the relevant sections of the Management 
Plan and shall specify the extent and location of 
the Area, the authorised activities and when, 
where and by whom the activities are authorised 
and any other conditions imposed by the 
Management Plan.
2. In the case of a Specially Protected Area 
designated as such by past Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings which does not have a 
Management Plan, the appropriate authority 
may issue a permit for a compelling scientific 
purpose which cannot be served elsewhere and 
which will not jeopardise the natural ecological 
system in that Area.
3. Each Party shall require a permit-holder to 
carry a copy of the permit while in the Antarctic 
Specially Protected Area concerned.
Article 8
Historic Sites and Monuments
1. Sites or monuments of recognised historic 
value which have been designated as Antarctic 
Specially Protected Areas or Antarctic Specially 
Managed Areas, or which are located within 
such Areas, shall be listed as Historic Sites and 
Monuments.
2. Any Party may propose a site or 
monument or recognised historic value which 
has not been designated as an Antartic Specially 
Protected Area or an Antarctic Specially 
Managed Area, or which is not located within 
such an Area, for listing as a Historic Site or 
Monument The proposal for listing may be 
approved by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
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Parties by a measure adopted at an Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting in accordance with 
Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. Unless 
the measure specifies otherwise, the proposal 
shall be deemed to have been approved 90 days 
after the close of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting at which it was adopted, 
unless one or more of the Consultative Parties 
notifies the Depositary, within that time period, 
that it wishes an extension of that period or is 
unable to approve the measure.
3. Existing Historic Sites and Monuments 
which have been listed as such by previous 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings shall be 
included in the list of Historic Sites and 
Monuments under this Article.
4. Listed Historic Sites and Monuments shall 
not be damaged, removed or destroyed.
5. The list of Historic Sites and Monuments 
may be amended in accordance with paragraph 
2 above. The Depositary shall maintain a list of 
current Historic Sites and Monuments.
Article 9
Information and Publicity
1. With a view to ensuring that all persons 
visiting or proposing to visit Antarctica 
understand and observe the provisions of this 
Annex, each Party shall make available 
information setting forth, in particular:
(a) the location of Antarctic Specially 
Protected Areas and Antarctic Specially 
Managed Areas;
(b) listing and maps of those Areas;
(c) the Management Plans, including listings 
of prohibitions relevant to each Area;
(d) the location of Historic Sites and 
Monuments and any relevant prohibition 
or restriction.
2. Each Party shall ensure that the location 
and, if possible, the limits of Antarctic Specially 
Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially Managed 
Areas and Historic Sites and Monuments are 
shown on its topographic maps, hydrographic 
charts and in other relevant publications.
3. Parties shall co-operate to ensure that, 
where appropriate, the boundaries of Antarctic 
Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic Specially 
Managed Areas and Historic Sites and 
Monuments are suitably marked on the site.
Article 10
Exchange of Information
1. The Parties shall make arrangements for:
(a) collecting and exchanging records, 
including records of permits and reports of 
visits, including inspection visits, to 
Antarctic Specially Protected Areas and 
reports of inspection visits to Antarctic 
Specially Managed Areas;
(b) obtaining and exchanging information on 
any significant change or damage to any 
Antarctic Specially Managed Area, 
Antarctic Specially Protected Area or 
Historic Site or Monument; and
(c) establishing common forms in which 
records and information shall be submitted 
by Parties in accordance with paragraph 2 
below.
2. Each Party shall inform the other Parties 
and the Committee before the end of November 
each year of the number and nature of permits 
issued under this Annex in the preceding period 
of 1st July to 30th June.
3. Each Party conducting, funding or 
authorising research or other activities in 
Antarctic Specially Protected Areas or Antarctic 
Specially Managed Areas shall maintain a 
record of such activities and in the annual 
exchange of information in accordance with the 
Treaty shall provide summary descriptions of 
the activities conducted by persons subject to its 
jurisdiction in such areas in the preceding year.
4. Each Party shall inform the other Parties 
and the Committee before the end of November 
each year of measures it has taken to implement 
this Annex, including any site inspections and 
any steps it has taken to address instances of 
activities in contravention of the provisions of 
the approved Management Plan for an Antarctic 
Specially Protected Area of Antarctic Specially 
Managed Area.
Article 11
Cases of Emergency
1. The restrictions laid down and authorised 
by this Annex shall not apply in cases of 
emergency involving safety of human life or of 
ships, aircraft, or equipment and facilities of 
high value or the protection of the environment.
2. Notice of activities undertaken in cases of 
emergency shall be circulated immediately to 
all Parties and to the Committee.
381
Article 12
Amendment or Modification
1. This Annex may be amended or modified 
by a measure adopted in accordance with 
Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. Unless 
the measure specifies otherwise, the amendment 
or modification shall be deemed to have been 
approved, and shall become effective, one year 
after the close of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting at which it was adopted, 
unless one or more of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties notifies the Depositary, 
within that time period, that it wishes an 
extension of that period or that it is unable to 
approve the measure.
2. Any amendment or modification of this 
Annex which becomes effective in accordance 
with paragraph 1 above shall thereafter become 
effective as to any other Party when notice of 
approval by it has been received by the 
Depositary.
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Interviews
Many people were interviewed as participants or observers to the Antarctic issues 
discussed in this thesis. Those listed below include only active participants - 
government officials and non-governmental representatives. These interviews were 
conducted on a confidential basis and material gained through them has been used to 
support analysis and develop interpretations.
Vladimir Golitsyn, Senior Legal Officer, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary 
General, United Nations, New York, 6 July 1989, 10 August 1989
Dr Robert Hofman, Scientific Program Director, US Marine Mammal Commission, 
Washington DC, 19 July 1989
Dale A Crane, Staff Director, Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, US 
House of Representatives, Washington DC, 19 July 1989
Sue Sabella and Molly Evans, Greenpeace USA, Washington DC, 20 July 1989
Robin Tuttle, Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of International Affairs, National Marine 
and Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US 
Department of Commerce, Silver Spring, Maryland, 21 July 1989
Michael Tillman, Senior Scientist for Fisheries, National Marine and Fisheries Service, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Department of 
Commerce, Silver Spring, Maryland, 21 July 1989
Evelyn Hurwich, The Antarctica Project, Washington DC, 24 July 1989
Alfred N Fowler, Executive Secretary, Council of Managers of National Antarctic 
Programs, Washington DC, 24 July 1989
William Westermeyer, Oceans and Environment Program, Office of Technology 
Assessment, US Congress, Washington DC, 25 July 1989
Scott Hajost, Acting Associate Administrator for International Affairs, US Environment 
Protection Agency, Washington DC, 25 July 1989
Jack Talmadge, Head, Polar Coordination and Information, Division of Polar Programs, 
National Science Foundation, Washington DC, 26 July 1989
Sherburne Abbott, Staff Director, Polar Research Board, National Research Council, 
Washington DC, 26 July 1989
R Tucker Scully, Director, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environment and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, 
Washington DC, 26 July 1989
Lee Kimball, World Resources Institute, Washington DC, 27 July 1989
Bruce Manheim, Environmental Defense Fund, Washington DC, 31 July 1989
Jagdish Patel, Antarctic Campaigner, Greenpeace UK, London, 31 August 1989
Peter Zoller, Australian High Commission, London, 1 September 1989
John Heap, Head, Polar Regions Section, South America Department, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, London, 4 September 1989
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Lena Hagelin, Antarctic Campaigner, Greenpeace International, Amsterdam, 13 
September 1989
Danny Elder, Co-ordinator, Coastal and Marine Programme, IUCN, Gland, 15 
September 1989
Peter Clarkson, Executive Secretary, SCAR, Cambridge, 3 October 1989
Nigel Bonner, British Antarctic Survey, 26 October 1989, (telephone interview)
Inigo Everson, Chair, Scientific Committee, CCAMLR, Cambridge, 27 September 1989
Alan Hemmings, NGO Representative, New Zealand Antarctic delegation, Auckland, 
23 August 1988, December 1989
Catherine Wallace, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, Coromandel, New 
Zealand, 30 December 1989
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Explanatory Notes
The following notes provide a guide to the referencing system in the text of the thesis 
and the location of sources in the bibliography. Most of the notes here relate to primary 
sources.
Antarctic Treaty documents are listed by consultative meeting. They are numbered as 
on the original document and referenced in the text by document number and year of 
meeting.
Government documents are listed by country within each of the categories set out in the 
table of contents on the previous page. All United Nations documents are listed by 
document number in date order.
Material from non-governmental organisations is listed by organisation. The author of 
a NGO paper or report, if known, is included in square brackets in the bibliographic 
entry. Documents produced by Greenpeace offices are all listed under an entry for 
Greenpeace, in date order, regardless of which national office they came from. 
However, where the source is known (for example, Greenpeace Australia or 
Greenpeace International) that information is included in the bibliographic entry.
Non-governmental organisation journals such as ECO or Antarctic News (which are 
listed separately in the bibliography) are referenced in the text by the name of the 
journal, the number of the issue and the year (for example, ECO LXXI(l), 1989). The 
Campaigners Antarctic Notes are referenced in the text as CAN, with number of issue 
and year. Only those Notes cited in the text are specifically listed in the bibliography.
Entries for the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) and the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are included in the non­
government section of the primary sources part of the bibliography. Publications by 
national Antarctic operators, such as the National Science Foundation or the British 
Antarctic Survey, are listed with secondary source material.
There is a small section in the bibliography on newspapers. Those newspapers cited 
here refer to articles for which no author or title information is available. Where those 
details are available, the reference is included in the secondary source listing.
Books and articles are listed together in the secondary source section of the 
bibliography although material which relates to the theoretical framework of this thesis, 
developed in chapter one, is listed separately for ease of reference in what is a large 
bibliography.
Some authors will appear in more than one part of this bibliography. For example, 
Australian Prime Minister Hawke is listed in primary sources (for speeches, press 
releases etc) and in secondary sources (for published articles or chapters).
Where a document or publication is undated, but that date can be determined by 
context, it is included in the bibliographic entry in square brackets.
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